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This thesis is a study of one common aspect of the Australian POW experience across 
the Pacific and European theatres of the Second World War; leadership. The 
leadership of POWs is examined through a series of case studies based on three 
different types of leaders; positional (rank), professional (Medical Officers or 
chaplains) or emergent. Dependent on their leadership type, these men were 
responsible for a formal or informal group. Formal groups consisted of the POW 
population within a camp, compound, prisoner battalion or marching group. Informal 
groups were usually mates or acquaintances who found themselves in the same camp 
compound, working or marching group. Two other similar structures existed across 
the Pacific and European theatres; camp types and conditions. Four common camp 
types existed; transit, permanent, working camps or forced movement. There were 
three common camp conditions; relatively stable, volatile and extreme conditions.  
Using this contextual framework this thesis’ examination of POW leadership is 
structured through an examination and analysis of a leader’s dominant behavioural 
style that he adopted in making his decisions and in the way he formed relations with 
and interacted with men and the captor. The work of leadership theorists, sociologists 
and behavioural scientists have informed the structure and composition of this study, 
but its disciplinary focus and methodology are historical.  
Four leadership styles are examined in this thesis; authoritarian, transformational, 
democratic and self-sacrificial. The authoritarian leadership style was adopted by 
POW leaders in both theatres, albeit for very different reasons. Democratic and self-
sacrificial leadership styles were unique to the context of captivity in relatively stable 
conditions in Europe and volatile and extreme captive settings in the Pacific Theatre. 
The only transformational leader examined in this thesis comes from the European 
theatre. The relatively stable conditions in Air Force Officer Camps combined with the 
particular circumstances and character of this individual, enabled this leadership style 
to be adopted.  
For each leader examined in this thesis key questions have been posed. The manner in 
which they were selected for their leadership position, their behaviour and decisions as 
a POW leader and their interaction with and the relationship they formed with their 
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respective formal or informal group and the captor. These questions are posed and 
considered using a variety of examples of the leader’s behaviour and his reactions to 
the respective challenges of leading men within their captive context.  
Irrespective of the style a leader adopted, or the conditions they endured, a leader’s 
ability to maintain his legitimacy from the perspective of his formal or informal group 
members impacted on his ability to perform and, in some cases, maintain his 
leadership positon. Some of the leaders examined in this thesis realised the 
fundamental importance of the group’s perception of their decisions and the reasons 
for their decisions. These men worked hard to maintain the trust of their group. Others, 
either through choice or the nature of the volatile and extreme circumstances of their 
captive setting, chose to put their own interests and survivorship above the collective 
needs of their group. These leaders lost the trust of their men and in some cases their 
leadership position collapsed. The final chapter of this thesis examines what happened 
when the breakdown of leadership structures occurred in both formal and informal 
groups.  
This thesis therefore, is essentially a study of human dynamics within the unique 
setting of POW camps. It considers what behavioural and leadership traits allowed 
positional leaders to retain legitimacy in captivity and the behaviour which led 
positional leaders to lose their leadership legitimacy. When the latter occurred, 
professional and/or emergent leaders responded to the physical and psychological 
needs of the group who, particularly in the Pacific Theatre, were powerless against the 
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‘Rank does not confer privilege or give power. It imposes responsibility.’ 












‘It is easier to find men who will volunteer to die, than to find those who are 
willing to endure pain with patience.’ 











































The Second World War stands as the watershed in contemporary prisoner of war 
(POW) history. In a conflict fought on five continents involving 65 belligerent nations, 
some 35 million military personnel became POWs.1 About 30 000 of these men were 
Australians.2 Italy and Germany held about a quarter of them. The rest became 
prisoners of the Japanese.  
 
Historical examination of the Australian captive experience has not been, to date, 
approached as a shared one. Instead, historians examine it through a strict division of 
theatres. The unstated assumption behind this is that the conditions experienced by 
prisoners in Europe and the Pacific were so different that they had to be dealt with 
separately. Yet historians, such as Bob Moore, Kent Fedorowich, Gerhard Hirschfeld, 
Peter Romijn, Pieter Lagrou and Hank Nelson, have argued that this division is largely 
a structural device imposed by historians and have called for studies that incorporate 
both theatres of war in their analysis.3 In 1996 Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich 
began this scholarship by composing a metanarrative of the POW experience across 
both theatre of the Second World War.4   
 
This thesis aims to continue this scholarship by responding, in part, to their call. It 
examines the captive experience of Australian POWs in both theatres of war from the 
perspective of leadership. Using case studies, the structure, styles, actions and 
legitimacy of men who were leaders of Australian POWs, and the men’s responses to 
their leaders, are its focus. Despite differences in captors, captor imposed conditions 
and the other nationalities Australians shared imprisonment with, leadership was a 
                                                          
1 S. Mackenzie, ‘The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II’, The Journal of Modern History, 
vol. 66, no.3, (1994), p.487. 
2 This statistic is derived from the figures given by Joan Beaumont in her entry to the Oxford 
Companion to Australian Military History. The precise number of Australian captives remains 
unknown. J. Beaumont, ‘Prisoners of War’, in  P. Dennis et al (eds.), Oxford Companion to Australian 
Military History, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.474, 476-477.  
3 B. Moore and K. Fedorowich (eds.), ‘Prisoners of War in the Second World War: An Overview,’ in 
Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II, (Oxford; Berg, 1996), pp.1-2; P. Romjin et al, 
‘Foreword,’ in B. Moore and B. Hately-Broad (eds.), Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, 
Homecoming and Memory in World War II, (New York: Berg, 2005), p.1; H. Nelson, ‘Beyond Slogans: 
Assessing the Experience and the History of the Australian Prisoners of War of the Japanese’, in K. 
Hack and K. Blackburn (eds.), Forgotten Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia, (Oxford: Routledge, 
2008), pp.28-29.   
4 Moore and Fedorowich, ‘Prisoners in the Second World War,’ pp.1-18.  
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common experience for all Australian prisoners, whether they were leaders or were 
members of groups led by others. Leadership formed the basis of their interaction with 
other prisoners and one of the dynamics of their captive experience. This thesis, 
therefore, offers one way in which the Australian captive POW experience of the 
Second World War may be examined in the same study. It is by no means that only 
way that the captive experience of Australians across the two theatres can be linked. 
More research focusing on uniting the captive experience of POWs is needed.   
 
The question of leadership in captivity, of course, is not new. Inadvertently or 
intentionally, historians have examined men who were leaders, the role they had and 
how the prisoners they led as a group responded to them. Yet, these studies usually 
focus on one particular leader in one specific location. This thesis extends these 
studies by looking at selected examples of leadership across both theatres of war and 
the responses of those they led. Not all the leaders examined in this thesis are 
Australian. In the European Theatre, British leaders mainly led Australian prisoners. 
The reverse, however, was true for the Pacific Theatre where Australian prisoners 
were often under the command of fellow nationals.  
 
Three broad categories of leadership existed in captivity: rank-based (or positional) 
leadership, professional leadership (medical officers [MOs] and chaplains) and 
emergent leadership. The success or failure of these leaders depended on their 
leadership style, which was based on their leadership vision and goal, how they used 
both and their ability to convey both to their followers. The primary focus of the 
thesis, then, is an analysis of how leadership was formed, maintained and legitimised, 
or lost, in selected settings. To do this, four leadership styles are examined: 
authoritarian, transformational, democratic and self-sacrificial. The collapse of 
leadership rounds out the work.   
 
One of the key elements in evaluating the success or failure of leadership is the 
reaction of the groups to their leaders. Two groups are examined in this thesis, formal 
groups and informal groups. Formal groups were basically military units, either those 
that went into captivity or those formed by the captor, the Work Forces formed by the 
Japanese to work on the Burma-Thailand Railway being one example. Informal groups 
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were networks formed by the men within formal groups, a form of social interaction 
summed up by Australian POWs as mateship.   
 
Thesis outline  
The content and aims of this thesis has meant that it is not structured chronologically. 
Instead, it is structured according to the four leadership styles mentioned above. 
Within these styles, positional, professional and emergent leaders, and leadership 
within groups where relevant, are discussed. Each chapter examines the respective 
leaders’ styles by explaining, through examples, their leadership vision and goals, their 
behaviour towards their men and how they attempted to protect their men from the 
captor. The success or failure of the leader in maintaining his group’s structure, 
identity and collective purpose is examined from the perspective of his actions as well 
as the perspective of his men.  
 
Authoritarian leadership is the first style explored in this thesis. This leadership style is 
traditionally associated with the military and was used by positional, professional and 
emergent leaders. The reasons why leaders retained this traditional military leadership 
style varied. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan, the General Officer 
Commanding (GOC) of Australians at Changi POW Camp, for example, refused to 
even consider adapting his traditional military leadership style. Irrespective of his 
POW status, Galleghan considered that he and his men remained active soldiers. In 
contrast Captain Reginald William James Newton, leader of U Battalion D Force on 
the Burma-Thailand Railway, used a traditional authoritarian leadership style to ensure 
the survival of his men. In Stalag Luft III in Poland, British Squadron Leader Rodger 
Bushell applied an authoritarian leadership style for a very different purpose. Bushell 
used his reputation as an escape expert to become an emergent leader, inspiring 
British, Commonwealth and some American officers to voluntarily submit to his 
authoritarian control to plan what is now known as the Great Escape.  
 
Transformational and democratic leadership is examined next. These leadership styles 
were adopted by leaders who were willing, and able, to depart from the traditional 
authoritarian military leadership style. The positional leaders examined in this section 
are from the European Theatre. British Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot 
Day is used to examine the nature of transformational leadership. Captured by the 
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Germans seventeen days into the war,5 during his years of captivity Day was able to 
convince the men under his command that they could still contribute to the war effort 
through the escape and intelligence networks he organised. He gave the men under his 
command a sense of purpose. In accomplishing this feat, Day, arguably became the 
most successful positional leader amongst POWs in German captivity.  
 
Democratic leadership was practised in two ways. In Germany, air force officers and 
non- commissioned officers (NCOs) were housed in separate compounds in the POW 
camps. This structural organisation was unique to the European Theatre. Lacking a 
positional leader, the NCOs elected their leaders. The two leaders examined here are 
Scottish Air Force Sergeant James ‘Dixie’ Deans and Australian Warrant Officer 
Alistair McGregor Currie. These men did not have the advantage of positional 
authority to exercise an authoritarian leadership style over their respective groups. 
They therefore adopted a democratic leadership style. Both men used a consultative 
leadership style based on committees and remained accountable to their formal group 
for their decisions. A democratic leadership style was also used by members of 
informal groups, or mates, in both theatres of captivity. Through relying on each 
other’s strengths and skills, leadership shifted amongst, and between, group members 
based on the physical and psychological needs of the group.  
 
Conditions in the Pacific Theatre were the reasons behind the emergence of the fourth 
leadership style explored in this thesis, self-sacrificial leadership, a selfless form of 
leadership where leaders place the group’s interests above their own. The aggression 
and violence of the captor on the Burma-Thailand Railway, and during the death 
marches on Borneo, saw MOs, chaplains and emergent leaders adopt this leadership 
style. On the Burma-Thailand Railway, these leaders included MOs Lieutenant 
Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop, Major Kevin James Fagan and Major Bruce Atlee 
Hunt. Two Australian chaplains also practiced this leadership style: Major Lionel 
Thomas Marsden and Private Harry Thorpe. Some work party leaders such as Petty 
Officer Raymond Edward Parkin and Flight Lieutenant Don Dewey also adopted a 
self-sacrificial leadership style, as did men amongst the work parties who helped 
                                                          




weaker and sick prisoners complete their work quota. On the forced marches from 
Sandakan POW camp to Ranau, when the Japanese showed little hesitation in killing 
the prisoners in their custody, Warrant Officer William John Kinder willingly adopted 
a self-sacrificial leadership style. These men chose to the put the needs of others above 
their own. They made this choice, even when they understood that it meant they would 
be physically punished, and possibly killed. Australian Corporal Rodney Edward 
Breavington’s story rounds out the examination of self-sacrificial leadership.   
 
The final chapter of the thesis examines what happened to formal and informal groups 
when leadership collapsed as leaders chose to protect themselves instead of their group 
members. In Europe it mainly occurred during the winter forced marches in 1944-
1945. In the Pacific Theatre this reversion from leadership responsibilities was more 
marked, occurring on the Burma-Thailand Railway and in Borneo. The case studies in 
this chapter include Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes, Captain George Robin 
Cook, Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich, MO Captain Roderick Lionel 
Jeffrey and the men who decided that escape offered them the best chance of survival.     
 
As the structure of the thesis is thematic rather than chronological, the following 
provides an overview of how Australians became prisoners, where they were held and 
how they were treated to provide context for the chapters that follow.  
 
Prisoners of War in the Second World War 
In both theatres of war, Australians were held as prisoners in four types of camps: 
transit, permanent (that is, the camp location remained static but not necessarily the 
prison population), work and special camps (interrogation centres, punishment camps 
or prisons). In the case of the forced marches to be discussed below, the camps were 
temporary, more akin to staging posts. Across these camps, three types of conditions 









The European Theatre 
On 26 December 1940, at Giarabub in Libya, Italians captured the first Australian 
military prisoner of the Second World War.6 This dubious honour belonged to 
Sergeant Kenneth Walsh, a member of the 6th Divisional Cavalry Regiment. Between 
1941 and 1942, during fighting in the Middle East, a further 7115 Second Australian 
Imperial Force (AIF) officers and other ranks became prisoners.7 Most were members 
of the 6th and 9th Divisions. The failed campaigns in Greece (April 1941) and then 
Crete (May-June 1941) resulted in a further 2065 and 3109 AIF captives.8 These men 
became prisoners of the Germans.  
 
Australian prisoners in Europe also belonged to the air force and navy. Germany held 
most of the 1476 air force personnel taken prisoner in this theatre.9 These men usually 
belonged to one of three air force service groups, Royal Air Force (RAF), Royal 
Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel attached to Bomber Command or the Second 
Tactical Air Force. Most of these men became prisoners after bailing out over 
Germany or occupied Europe. Then, during operations in British Somaliland, Crete, 
Tobruk, St. Nazaire and Anzio, the Germans, Vichy French and Italians captured a 
smaller number of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) personnel.10   
 
Germany organised its prisoners according to arms of service, nationality and rank. 
Australians in this captive setting did not remain a distinct group. Instead, the 
Australians became part of a larger group of British and Commonwealth prisoners.  
 
The German Wehrmacht (Army) controlled Allied Army prisoners. Officers were held 
in Offizierlager or Oflags. Most Australian Army officers were in four camps; Oflags 
VIIB (Eichateatt), VIB (Warburg), VC (Wurzach) and VA (Weinburg).11 Australian 
                                                          
6 R. Reid, In Captivity: Australian Prisoners of War in the Twentieth Century, (Canberra: Department 
of Veteran Affairs, 1999), p.12.  
7 A. Field, ‘Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,’ in B. Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein: Australia in 
the War of 1939-1945, series 1, vol. III, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1966), p.755.  
8 Field, ‘Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,’ pp.755-756.  
9 J. Herrington, Air Power over Europe 1944-1945: Australia in the War of 1939-1945,  series 3, vol. 
IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial,1954), p.473. 
10A. Walker, Medical Services of the R.A.N. and R.A.A.F: Australians in the War of 1939-1945, series 5, 
vol. IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961), pp.79-80. 




other ranks were held in at least 24 Mannschaft-Stammlager or Stalags located in 
Germany, occupied Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania.12 On 31 
December 1943, the largest clusters of Australian other ranks were 1516 at Stalag 
VIIIB/344 (Lamsdorf), 1228 at Stalag XVIIIA (Wolfsberg) and 814 at Stalag XVIIIC 
(Hammelburg).13 From Stalags, the overwhelming majority of other rank prisoners 
were sent to Arbeitskommandos (working camps). Most worked in coalmines, forestry 
and factories, or on farms and construction works. The Geneva Convention restricts 
the captor’s ability to employ NCOs as labour,14 but these prisoners can act as 
supervisors or, if they request, for proper remuneration they can engage in labour. In 
September 1942, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the German Armed 
Forces High Command responsible for prisoners, acknowledged these rights.15 It 
created specific camps for non-working NCOs. Australian NCO’s were mostly 
confined to two camps, Stalags 383 (Hohenfels) and 357 (Bremen).16  
 
From 1941, the Luftwaffe assumed control of air force prisoners. Like their 
British/Commonwealth and American counterparts, Australian Air Force prisoners 
examined in this thesis were interrogated by the Luftwaffe at Dulag Luft (Oberursel), a 
transit camp. (The Luftwaffe interrogation centre was later relocated to Frankfurt and 
then Wetzlar). After a temporary stay in the Dulag Luft compound, they were 
transferred to other camps. From 21 March 1942, Stalag Luft III (Sagan) functioned as 
the central Luftwaffe camp.17 The majority of Australian Air Force officers were held 
in three of its four compounds, East, North and Belaria.18 Australian Air Force NCOs 
moved between five of the Luftwaffe camps; Stalag Luft I (Barth), III (Sagan), IV 
                                                          
12 Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe, pp.1-2; Transcription of Cable 475, to Foreign Office 
from Geneva, Re STRENGHTS British P.O.W. Germany end NOVEMBER, 29 December 1944, pp.3-
4, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156.  
13 Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe, pp.1-2.  
14 Article 27, Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929,  
<http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/305?OpenDocument,> maintained by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, accessed on 12 April 2014.  
15 A. Gilbert, POW: Allied Prisoners of War in Europe, 1939-1945, (London: John Murray, 2006), 
pp.145-148; W. Mason, Prisoners of War: Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 
(Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1954), pp.260-261; V. Vourkoutiotis, 
Prisoners of War and the German High Command: The British and American Experience, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp.112-113. 
16 Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe, p.2. 
17 Herrington, Air Power over Europe 1944-1945, p.477; O. Clutton-Brock, Footprints on the Sands of 
Time: RAF Bomber Command Prisoners-of-War in Germany, 1939-1945, (London: Grub Street, 2003), 
p.70. 
18 Herrington, Air Power over Europe 1944-1945, p.477.  
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(Gross Tychow), VI (Heyedekrug) and VII (Bankau).19 Due to overcrowding, some air 
force officers and NCOs, including Australians, were confined to a Stalag compound. 
It appears that Stalag VIIIB/344 (Lamsdorf) held the largest number of Australians Air 
Force NCOs.20  
 
All navy prisoners, regardless of rank were confined to one camp, Marlag und Milag 
Nord (Westertimke). The Kriegsmarine (Navy) controlled this camp. L. Parker’s 
records reveal that, over the duration of the war, 18 Australians were held there.21  
 
Conditions in German camps varied. Most Australians had access to shelter, food, 
clothing and communal spaces. Air force officer camps experienced, on average, the 
best conditions. Army other rank prisoners assigned to coal mining 
Arbeitskommandos, and those in some of the permanent Stalags, experienced the 
worst conditions. In these camps prisoners were exposed to extremely dangerous work 
conditions, untenable work hours, food and water shortages, excessive overcrowding, 
derelict infrastructure, which, along with poor sanitation and hygiene, caused a range 
of health problems. In all German camps, Red Cross food parcels became a prisoner’s 
saving grace. On its own, the German ration provided little nutritional value.22 Food 
parcels, which arrived regularly from spring 1941 until about mid 1944, enabled 
prisoners to live above subsistence levels.  
 
The tides of the war adversely impacted upon conditions in the camps. Allied bombing 
cut German transport lines and with it access to food (Red Cross parcels and German 
rations), clothing and fuel. These shortages were most acutely felt in the winter of 
1944-1945.23 This period coincided with an unsustainable rise in the number of 
                                                          
19 This pattern of movement is evident in the statements made by repatriated Australian Air Force 
prisoners. See AWM54 779/3/129 Parts 1-30.  
20 This compound held 74 Australian Air Force NCOs.  See B. Collins, Statement by Repatriated Navy, 
Army or Air Force Prisoners of War taken at O.H.Q. RAAF, 12 April 1945, p.2, AWM54 779/3/129 
Part 11; J. Kean, Statement by Repatriated Navy, Army or Air Force Prisoners of War taken at O.H.Q. 
RAAF, 12 April 1945, p.2, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 4; J. Saunders, Statement by Repatriated Navy, 
Army or Air Force Prisoners of War taken at O.H.Q. RAAF, 12 April 1945, p.2, AWM54 779/3/129 
Part 4.  
21 Parker, Australian Prisoners of War in Europe, p.1. 
22 A. Walker, Middle East and Far East: Australia in the War of 1939-1945, series 5, vol. II, (Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial, 1962), pp.416-419. 
23 W. Urke, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and 
Italy, 7 February 1945, pp.1-2, NAA:A705:163/1/743; A. Currie, Statements by Royal Air Force 
Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, A.407822, 18 April 1945, p.1, AWM54 
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prisoners. At this time, most camps were overcrowded and prisoners were cold and 
hungry.   
 
Germany’s treatment of its prisoners largely reflected the latter’s service arm. In 
Luftwaffe camps the Commandant, guards and Abwehr (security), for the most part, 
reacted only if provoked.24 In some Oflags, Stalags and Arbeitskommandos, 
Commandants, guards and civilian bosses could be more temperamental. Across some 
camps unprovoked shootings occurred. This was usually the result of trigger-happy 
guards. However, some spiteful attacks did occur. In all camps, misbehaviour led to 
mass punishment. This usually took two forms; tampering with Red Cross food 
parcels and closing communal spaces. Some prisoners also endured reprisals. These 
reflected the German High Command’s response to conditions endured by its own 
forces fighting and captured by the Allies. Reprisals included the chaining and 
handcuffing of prisoners’ hands and the removal of basic hygiene items, cooking 
items, furniture and blankets.25   
 
For most of the war, Germany largely adhered to the Geneva Convention26 and treated 
its British, Commonwealth and American prisoners according to the principle of 
reciprocity.27 The presence of visiting International Committee of the Red Cross and 
Protecting Power representatives undoubtedly influenced this behaviour. Notable 
exceptions, however, did occur. The most infamous was the killing of 50 of the Allied 
air force escapees who had participated in the Great Escape. 
 
                                                          
779/3/129 Part 11; Inspecting Power Report on Stalag VIIIB, 21-22 September 1944, pp.1, 4-5, 
TNA:PRO:WO244/27; H. Armstrong, Diary 28 December 1944 to 10 March 1945, AWM PR01247; A. 
Currie, handwritten notes in blue booklet, ff.7-31 AWM PR03373; I. Muckton., ‘Life at Lamsdorf: An 
Extract from the Diary of I. Muckton,’ in J. Holliday (ed.), Stories of the RAAF POWs of Lamsdorf 
including Chronicles of their 500 Mile Trek, (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWS Association, 
1992), pp.125-127.  
24 For an overview of the treatment of air force and army prisoners by the German Commandments and 
guards see Clutton-Brock, Footprints on the Sands of Time, pp.42-108; S. Mackenzie, The Colditz 
Myth: The Real Story of POW Life in Nazi Germany, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
pp.111-124. 
25 For an overview of reprisals see Mason, Prisoners of War, pp.460-461; Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth, 
pp.243-249; J. Vance, ‘Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943,’ The Journal 
of Military History, vol.59, July (1995), pp.483-505. 
26 Vourkoutiotis, Prisoners of War and German High Command, pp.200-201. 
27 A. Kochavi, Confronting Captivity: Britain and the United States and their Prisoners of War in Nazi 
Germany, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), pp.2, 24. 
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For most prisoners in German custody, the final phase of their captivity was the most 
traumatic. As the Russian, British and American forces drew closer to POW camps, 
the Germans moved most prisoners in the line of the advancing enemy out of their 
camps. The reasons why the German High Command did this remain contested. 
Article 9 of the Geneva Convention makes the captor responsible for protecting 
detainees from the combat zone.28 Yet this may not have the only reason for their 
movement. It is possible that Adolf Hitler saw these prisoners as his final bargaining 
tool.29  
 
In January 1945, in the depths of a frigid winter, prisoners from fourteen base camps, 
and an unknown number of attached Arbeitskommandos, moved on foot (and if lucky 
by rail) from POW camps in East Prussia and Poland into Czechoslovakia or 
Germany.30 In temperatures often below zero, these prisoners, including some 
Australians, trekked about 20 miles a day.31 Some of these men marched for about 
three months, walking over 500 miles.32 Lack of basic planning characterised these 
movements. Food and shelter were often wanting and columns divided and merged. 
Limited food supplies, poor health, loss of spirit and the chance to escape meant that 
many prisoners dropped out of the columns. Some of these prisoners stayed in hiding 
until the end of the war, while others were eventually picked up by advancing Allied 
forces. The prisoners who were last seen leaving a marching column, and who 
remained missing after liberation, were now either prisoners of the Soviet Union or 
presumed to be dead.33 
 
                                                          
28 Article 9, Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva.    
29 D. Foy, For You the War is Over: American Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany, (New York: Stein 
and Day, 1984), p.139; Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth, p.359. 
30 Analysis of information relating to movement of POW war camps in the path of the Soviet advance, 
not dated, pp.1-2, TNA:PRO:AIR14/1239.  
31 Cipher from Berne to Foreign Office, No. 191, 26 January 1945, p.1, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156; Enclair 
from Berne to Foreign Office, No. 216, 1st February 1945, p.2, TNA:PRO:FO916/1156.  
32 Most Australians who endured this march were from Stalag 344 (Lamsdorf). For an overview of 
Australian Air Force NCOs experiences see J. Holliday (ed.), The RAAF POWs of Lamsdorf including 
Chronicles of their 500 Mile Trek, Section 5 “The March to Freedom,” (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF 
POWs Association, 1992), pp.193-294.  
33 L. Caplan, ‘Death March Medic,’ cited in J. O’Donnell, unpublished manuscript titled ‘The Shoe 
Leather Express: The Evacuation of Kriegsgefangenen Lager Stalag Luft IV Deutschland Germany’, 
pp.60-62, AWM MSS1437; D. Radke, ‘Background to the March to Freedom, January 22 1945 to 30 
March 1945’, p.1, AWM PR86/181 Wallet 2; A. Crawley, Escape from Germany: The Methods of 
Escape Used by RAF Airmen During the Second World War, (London: HMSO, 1985), p.303; Clutton-
Brock, Footprints on the Sands of Time, pp.121, 141-147.  
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By February 1945, about 250 000 British and American prisoners were on the road in 
three main groups.34 In the south of Germany about 80 000 prisoners moved towards 
Nuremberg, Karlsbad, Eger or Czechoslovakia.35 In central Germany, about 60 000 
prisoners moved towards Berlin, Leipzig and Brunswick.36 In northern Germany 
another 100 000 prisoners walked towards Hamburg and Bremen.37 Then on 7 March 
1945, Allied advances near the Rhine River forced prisoners in this area to move 
towards central Germany.38 To the east, prisoners who had been placed by the 
Germans into one of the seven hastily formed prisoner reception centres were again 
forced onto the road because of the Russian advance.39 Other prisoners, who had not 
reached a reception centre, never stopped walking. They simply turned around.40  
 
The second phase of movement in the spring, again in response to Allied advances, 
proved almost leisurely. Warmer weather, more amendable guards, greater access to 
food and, in most cases, less than a month on the road, stood in stark contrast with the 
winter marches.41 For prisoners and captives alike, one significant danger still 
remained; Allied strafing. Friendly fire killed an unknown number of prisoners, 
including some Australians. Some of these men were only days from liberation.   
 
At the end of the war, Allied forces recovered 5378 Australian prisoners from 
Germany.42 Prior to this, 812 had been repatriated, and another 97 had successfully 
                                                          
34 Field, ‘Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,’ p.814.  
35 Decipher from High Commission’s Office, I.7948 SC 31, 8 March 1945, NAA: A816:67/301/134.  
36 ibid.    
37 ibid.  
38 Field, ‘Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,’ p.814. 
39 In March 1945 seven reception centres were operating. These were Stalag’s IIIA (Lukenwalde), 357, 
XIB (Fallingbostel), XIIC (Hammelburg), VIIA (Mooseberg), XIIID (Nuremberg) and XIA 
(Altengrabow). Conditions in these camps ranged from sub-standard to notorious. All experienced 
excessive overcrowding and had limited food supplies. For an overview of conditions in reception 
camps see Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth, pp.367-368; Mason, Prisoners of War, pp.459-460.  
40 O’Donnell, ‘The Shoe Leather Express,’ p.70; Crawley, Escape from Germany, p.303; Herrington, 
Air Power over Europe, 1944-1945, pp.496-498.  
41 Telegram from International Red Cross Committee to British Foreign Office, no.612, 9th April, Re 
Report on the General Situation on 31st March 1945, pp.1-5, TNA:PRO:FO916/1182; Clutton-Brock, 
Footprints on the Sands of Time, pp.135-190; J. Nichol and T. Rennell, The Last Escape: The Untold 
Story of Allied Prisoners of War in Germany, 1944-1945, (London: Viking, 2002), pp.288-310.  
42 This figure is different from the figure cited above as it takes into account the number of Australian 
POWs transferred into German custody after the capitulation of Italy. See L. Parker, Australian Military 
Forces, Prisoners of War- against Germany and Italy. Summary of Recoveries and Deaths by Theatre of 
Operations in which Captured and Location of Prisoners of War, Table I, p.1, AWM54 781/6/6. 
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escaped and either rejoined allied lines or had gone in hiding for the duration.43 Over 
the entirety of the conflict, 155 Australians died whilst in German custody.44   
 
 
The Pacific Theatre  
The Japanese captured over 22 000 Australians.45 Most of these men, captured in the 
first three months of 1942, were members of the 8th Division. The Japanese took 1049 
prisoners in New Britain, 1075 on Ambon Island, 14 792 in Singapore 1137 in Timor 
and 2736 in Java.46 The Japanese also captured 354 RAN and 373 RAAF personnel.47 
Most of the Navy prisoners (320) were captured after the Japanese sank HMAS 
Perth.48 The Japanese held Australian prisoners in camps in ten countries across their 
empire.49 Broadly speaking, two types of camps existed: permanent camps and work 
camps. Conditions in these camps depended on their location, purpose and the war’s 
progress.   
 
Most Australians spent some time in a permanent camp. The largest were Changi 
(Singapore), Kuching (Sarawak), Sandakan (Borneo), Batavia (Java), Tantui (Ambon 
Island) and Hainan Island. In most of these camps, the initial stages of captivity were 
bearable. Most prisoners had enough food, water and shelter to survive. Japanese 
demands for labour, while strenuous at Sandakan, did not usually amount to a death 
sentence.  Most Australian prisoners, particularly those at Changi, had enough energy 
to participate in recreation and educational activities.  
 
For at least the first twenty months, prisoners who stayed in Changi camp had minimal 
interaction with the Japanese.50 This changed in September 1943, when they were 
forced to begin construction on an aerodrome.51 The pattern of captor/prisoner 
interaction in other permanent camps, however, was different. From the outset, most 
                                                          
43 Parker, Summary of Recoveries and Deaths by Theatre of Operations in which Captured and Location 
of Prisoners of War, p.1.   
44 ibid.   
45 Reid, In captivity, p.20. 
46 Beaumont, ‘Prisoners of War,’ p.477; Reid, In Captivity, pp.19-20. 
47 Beaumont, ‘Prisoners of War,’ p.477; Reid, In Captivity, p.20. 
48 Walker, Medical Services of the R.A.N. and R.A.A.F, p.80. 
49 Beaumont, ‘Prisoners of War,’ p.479. 
50 The exception to this is the Selerang Barracks Incident. This is explained in Chapter 2.  
51 AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 17 September 1943, Appendix 2B, AWM52 1/5/19/17. 
13 
 
Australians were exposed to violence. Perceived or real disobedience, or simply a 
prisoner’s presence, could provoke a guard to attack. As the war continued, conditions 
in all the permanent camps deteriorated. The Japanese cut food rations, sometimes to 
the point of starvation. In almost every permanent camp, Japanese violence against the 
prisoners intensified in frequency and brutality. Changi Camp also operated as the 
central transit camp for the Pacific. Between February 1942 and December 1943, most 
of the Australians in this camp left with local and overseas Work Forces.52 Those who 
remained were mostly sick and unfit. In total, 167 Australians died in Changi.53 
 
The number of deaths in Changi was slight in comparison to the numbers of 
Australians prisoners who died in other permanent camps in the Pacific. Tantui 
(Ambon Island), Hainan Island and Sandakan camp experienced the most severe 
decline in conditions. There the Japanese deliberately starved the prisoners. Combined 
with sustained and increasingly sadistic violence and, in the case of Sandakan camp, 
labour demands, death rates quickly increased. At Ambon and Hainan Islands, 718 of 
the 807 Australian prisoners died.54 At Sandakan camp, up until May 1945, about 700 
had perished.55 From late January 1945, those still alive at Sandakan were forced to 
endure the most horrendous experience of all those experienced by Australian 
prisoners in the Second World War. 
 
On 24 January 1945, Major-General Manaki Takanobu ordered the prisoners in 
Sandakan Camp to march into the jungle.56 Their destination was Ranau, some 256 
kilometres away.57 The prisoners left the camp in two groups, three months apart.58 
Men unable to keep up with the pace were shot. For starved, severely debilitated men, 
the result was inevitable. The first group set out with 470 Australian and British 
                                                          
52 For an overview of the departure of Australians from Changi see Walker, Middle East and Far East, 
pp.553-560. 
53 F. Galleghan, Prisoners of War Camps Singapore Report, Part 3, pp.14, 24, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 3. 
54 A. Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ in L. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, series 1, vol. IV, 
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p.608; Beaumont, ‘Prisoners of War,’ p.479.  
55 Private K. Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, 14 November 1945, p.1, AWM 1010/4/17; W. 
Sticpewich, unpublished writings titled ‘Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials’, p.3, AWM 
PR00637 Folder 3.  
56 L. Silver, Sandakan: A Conspiracy of Silence, Third Revised Edition, (Burra Creek: Sally Milner 
Publishing, 2009), pp.188-189.  
57 Beaumont, ‘Prisoners of War,’ p.480.  
58 W. Sticpewich, unpublished writings titled ‘Prelude to Sandakan- Ranau’, ff.2-7, AWM PR00637 
Folder 5.  
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prisoners.59 Only 218 made it to Ranau.60 The second group of 500 lost 360 men on 
the track.61 When this group arrived at Ranau, only four Australians and two British 
prisoners from the first group were still alive.62 At Ranau, the critically sick and dying 
prisoners were not allowed to rest. Some carried Japanese rations on long treks 
through the jungle. Others laboured on small projects. Physical abuse of the prisoners 
was widespread. In the end, out of a total of 620 Australians in the marches, only six 
survived.63 These men survived because they escaped.  
 
The Japanese use of prisoners as labour for Japan’s war effort was not governed by the 
restrictions imposed by international law or subject to international inspection. It was 
also characterised by its brutality. Although most permanent camps had labour 
projects, the brutality associated with the use of captive labour was particularly evident 
with the Work Forces. The Japanese organised eleven of these using Australia, British, 
Dutch and American prisoners from Changi and Java.64 These formal groups were sent 
to Japan and to work on the Burma-Thailand Railway.  
 
Three Changi raised Forces went to Japan. The Australian components of these mixed 
British/Australian Forces comprised of 563 (C Force), 200 (G Force) and 300 (J 
Force).65 These Work Forces were reinforced by Australians captured in New Britain 
and some of the survivors from Japan’s greatest labour project, the Burma-Thailand 
Railway.66 In Japan, Australians worked mostly in coalmines, factories, zinc factories, 
mills and on wharves.67 Conditions in these settings varied. Most prisoners worked 
                                                          
59 Sticpewich, Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials, p.2. 
60 Eighty-eight of these men arrived after a stay of about a month at Pagination on the track to Ranau. 
Private K. Botterill, Testimony given at Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, p.13, NAA:B4163 
Reel 4 Part 1: Lance Bombardier W. Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, 19 November 1945, p.5, 
AWM 54 1010/4/107.   
61 T. Mort, Interrogation Report submitted by Capt T.L Mort obtained from the four Aus recovered PW 
ex RANAU, Part II, p.2, AWM PR00637 Folder 1.  
62 Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.4.  
63 In addition to the Australians marching, there were 217 British POWs. None of these men survived. 
See Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.604; P. Ham, Sandakan: The Untold Story of the Sandakan 
Death Marches, (Sydney: William Heinemann, 2012), pp.274, 344.  
64 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.546; Walker, Middle East and Far East, pp.557-559.  
65 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ pp.524-525; Walker, The Middle East and Far East, pp.651-
652. Other smaller groups of Australians were also transferred to Japan. See Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the 
Japanese,’ pp.616-617.   
66 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ pp.612, 614. 
67 An unknown number of RAN prisoners were kept in a permanent camp at Ofuna. Walker, Medical 
Services of the R.A.N and R.A.A.F, pp.82-83. 
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long hours, suffered from the cold, food shortages, exhaustion and some violence. In 
Japan, 190 Australian Army prisoners died.68   
 
It was the Burma-Thailand Railway, however, that claimed the most casualties. In 
1943, the Japanese sought to build what the British had deemed impossible, a 421km 
extension of the existing Moulmein-Yealong railway line through virgin malaria 
ridden jungle.69 For this task, the Japanese recruited its most expendable labour 
source, military prisoners and civilians conscripted from occupied countries. To build 
the railway, the Japanese provided picks, shovels, hand held drills and dynamite, along 
with the occasional compressor and elephant. Starvation, beatings, monsoonal 
conditions and tropical diseases combined to create a hell on earth for these men. In 
total, one in four (2815) Australian prisoners died toiling for the Japanese on this 
project.70  
 
It has been estimated that the labour force for the project consisted of between 61 000 
and   64 000 POWs and 270 000 civilians. 71 About 13 000 Australians were part of 
that labour force.72 The Australians were divided between nine Work Forces. Four 
worked on the Burma side of the project. Three of these groups were Black Force 
(593), Williams Force (number unknown) and a group led by Major L. J. Roberston 
(385), raised in Java.73  Black Force laboured at Beke Taung (kilo 40), Williams Force 
at Tanyin (Kilo 35). Roberston’s group, mostly survivors from HMAS Perth, were 
combined with the Changi raised A Force. A Force, comprised of 3000 Australians, 
was divided into three battalions.74 These men laboured at Victoria Point, Mergui, 
Tavoy and Thanbyuzyat. A Force left Changi on 15 May 1942, before the Japanese 
                                                          
68 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.642.  
69 For reference to this statistic see Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.545.   
70 G. Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific – the Powerful Untold 
Story, (London: Robson, 1995), p.222.  
71 P. Adam-Smith, Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea, (Ringwood: Viking/Penguin, 1992), 
p.397; S. Flower, ‘Captors and Captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway,’ in  B. Moore and K. 
Fedorwich, Prisoners of War and Their Captors in World War II, (Oxford: Berg, 1996), p.240; G. 
McCormack and H. Nelson (eds.), ‘Introduction,’ in The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and 
History, (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p.1.  
72 McCormack and Nelson (eds.) ‘Introduction,’ in The Burma-Thailand Railway, p.1.   
73 Black Force also contained 109 Americans. Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.546; Australian 
War Memorial Encyclopaedia, General information about Prisoners of the Japanese, 
<http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/POW/general_info.asp,> maintained by the Australian War 
Memorial, accessed on 10 April 2014. 
74 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.541.  
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separated officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel from the other prisoners.75 
Major General Cecil Arthur Callaghan appointed Brigadier Arthur Leslie Varley to 
lead it.76 Varley was, therefore, the highest-ranking positional leader of any nationality 
on the Burma-Thailand Railway. 
 
On the Thailand side of the Burma-Thailand Railway, Australians were represented in 
five Forces. Four Forces, D, F, H and H.6, were raised in Changi.77 These Forces were 
comprised of 2222, 3662, 600 and 68 Australians respectively.78 With the exception of 
H.6 Force, each Force had at least one Australian battalion.79 H.6 Force was different. 
On Japanese orders, it consisted of mainly of Australian and British officers.80 The 
fifth Work Force came from Java. Dunlop Force, named for its leader Lieutenant 
Colonel Ernest Edward Dunlop, was made up of 900 mixed Australian Army, Air 
Force and Navy prisoners and an unknown number of American survivors from the 
USS Houston.81 On their arrival in Thailand, the Japanese expanded Dunlop Force by 
two battalions. The first compromised of 377 Australians, the second of 663 Dutch.82 
For reasons unknown, while in Thailand, H and F Force remained under Malayan-
Japanese administrative control.83 This order had devastating consequences. It meant 
that H and F Force were not allowed to access supplies from Japanese occupied 
Thailand. Instead, they had to wait on supplies from Japanese occupied Malaya.84 
                                                          
75 Galleghan, ‘Prisoners of War Camps Singapore Report,’ p.3; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ 
p.541.  
76 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.519.  
77 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.525; Walker, Middle East and Far East, pp.558-559.  
78 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ pp.525, 585.  
79 Dunlop Force had four battalions (O, P, Q, R), D Force had three battalions (S, T and U) and F Force 
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Officers Party, 11 May 1944, Appendix 2, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5.  
81 E. Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in 
THAILAND, p.1, AWM54 554/5/5; R. Parkin, Into the Smoother: A Journal of the Burma-Thailand 
Railway, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1963), p.1. 
82 Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, 
p.1. 
83 Various Members of the Unit Association, The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F., p.654.  
84 Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.5; K. Kappe, History of F Force, 5 
September 1945, Appendix 1, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 2; R. Oakes, unpublished writings titled 
‘Manuscript’, p.319, AWM MSS1037. 
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Most of these supplies never arrived. This meant that the ration allowance for these 
Australians was significantly below subsistence level. The lack of rations, combined 
with poor leadership and violence from the captors, resulted in a higher rate of 
mortality for Australian POWs in H and F Force in comparison to other Australian 
Work Forces.85   
 
For most Australians held by the Japanese, captivity was a prolonged and sometimes 
agonising struggle. For some it resulted in the most difficult challenge of all: facing 
death with dignity. In total, 8031 Australians prisoners in Japanese custody died.86 



















                                                          
85 R. Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force – Changi 15 May 1944, p.27, AWM 54 554/11/4 Part 5; 
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CHAPTER 1: LEADERSHIP, SOURCES, CASE STUDIES, AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter establishes the theoretical, contextual and structural foundations required 
to explore leadership behind the wire. It falls into three sections. The first examines 
attempts to define leadership, the group, human dynamic and survivorship studies that 
have informed the analysis of the captive experience in this thesis and the theoretical 
approach used in its analysis. The second section outlines the sources used and the 
selection of case studies, and the third is a review of the relevant literature.   
 
Leadership studies  
Leadership studies and theory is an attempt to understand how leadership works and 
why some leaders are successful while others are not. Scholars in this field, however, 
have not been able to agree on a definition or description of leadership.1 Robert Taylor 
and William Rosenbach best summarise the state of the literature, ‘There are as many 
descriptions of leadership as there are people who write about it.’2 
 
Sociologists and behavioural scientists developed leadership studies to understand the 
dynamics of human interaction within groups.3 Leadership scholars agree that a leader 
is an individual who, in a particular situation or task, is responsible for a group of 
people.4 The complexity stems from understanding how leaders are identified amongst 
small or large groups, the behavioural pattern they apply and how leaders maintain 
their status when the variables of their context and group dynamics are factored into an 
analysis of their behaviour.5  
 
                                                          
1 R. Daft, The Leadership Experience, Second Edition, (Fortworth Texas: Harcourt College Publishers, 
2002), pp.4-6; J. Rost, Leadership for Twenty-First Century, (New York: Praegar, 1993), pp.6-11, 38-
65. 
2 R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), ‘Introduction’, in Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, 
First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.1. 
3 Daft, The Leadership Experience, pp.4-26; D. Fleet and G. Yukl, ‘A Century of Leadership Research,’ 
in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, Second Edition, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.65-67; A. Lussier and C. Achua, Leadership: Theory, Application 
and Skill Development, (Ohio: South-Western College Publishing Thompson Learning, 2001), pp.4-16.  
4 C. Holloman, ‘Leadership and Headship,’ in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), Military Leadership: 
In Pursuit of Excellence, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.98.  
5 Fleet and Yukl, ‘A Century of Leadership Research,’ pp.65-90; R. House and R. Aditya, ‘The Social 
Scientific Study of Leadership: Quo Vadis?’, Journal of Management, vol.23, no.3, 1997, pp.409-473. 
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Scholars have identified different types, or categories, and styles of leadership. 
Leadership type depended on how the leader acquired his or her position, that is, 
through appointment based on seniority, skills and/or experience or natural emergence 
from the group.6 The latter type of leader, known as emergent, requires the consent of 
group members before they can function as its leader. Regardless of how leaders are 
selected, each leader will apply a behavioural model in making his or her decisions, 
sharing them and enforcing them amongst their group members.7 These behavioural 
patterns, called leadership styles, are discussed below. The type and style of a leader 
will depend on the setting, purpose and goal of the leader and his or her group. 
Although professional and business studies are a significant element in the field,8 it 
has also been a part of how western militaries have tried to understand what made past 
leaders successful and how future leaders can be trained more effectively and 
efficiently.9 
 
Until the Second World War, the trait approach, which identifies character traits of 
successful leaders, was dominant.10 During the 1940s, however, scholars began to 
focus on the importance of variables in defining leadership. Subsequent research 
developed five main theoretical approaches to leadership. The behavioural approach 
seeks to identify the different behavioural patterns of successful leaders.11 The 
                                                          
6 Daft, The Leadership Experience, pp.441-442; W. Dimma, ‘On Leadership’, in R. Taylor and W. 
Rosenbach (eds.), Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1992), p.54; A. Mant, Intelligent Leadership, (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp.25-27. 
7 T. Cronin. ‘Thinking about Leadership,’ in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), Military Leadership: 
In Pursuit of Excellence, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.199; Fleet and Yukl, ‘A 
Century of Leadership Research,’ pp.72-81; J. Jiang, ‘The Study of the Relationship between 
Leadership Style and Project Success,’ American Journal of Trade and Policy, vol.1, issue 1, June 
2014, pp.51-52.  
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Evolution of Leadership: A Preliminary Skirmish,’ in C. Graumann and S. Moscovici (eds.), Changing 
Conceptions of Leadership, (New York: Springer-Vales, 1986), pp.11-31; E. Potter and F. Fielder, ‘The 
Utilization of Staff Member Intelligence and Experience under High and Low Stress’, Academy of 
Management Journal, vol.24, no.2, 1981, pp.361-376; P. Ribbins and H. Gunter, ‘Mapping Leadership 
Studies in Education: Towards a Typology of Knowledge Domains, Educational Management 
Administration Leadership, vol.30, no.4, October 2002, pp.359-385. 
9 The British and American military have been at the forefront of this research. For example see L. 
Matthews and D. Brown (eds.), The Challenge of Military Leadership, (Washington: Pergamon-
Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989); R. Taylor et al, Military Leadership: In Pursuit of 
Excellence, Sixth Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009).  
10 Daft, The Leadership Experience, pp.43-50; J. Fleenor, ‘Trait Approach to Leadership,’ 
Encyclopaedia of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, (North Carolina: University of North 
Carolina Sage Publications, 2006), pp.830-832. 




contingency, or variable approach, focuses on examining the impact of external factors 
on leaders and how they react to them.12 The visionary or charismatic approach 
focuses on the methods and strategies leaders use to both motivate their followers and 
to gain and maintain loyalty from their group members.13 The fourth approach is an 
extension of the visionary approach. It examines how leaders apply different 
emotional intelligences to gain the loyalty of their group members and inspire them to 
give their best efforts to achieving or even changing the group goal.14 The most recent 
approach, developed during the 1980s, links specific traits with the identification of 
competent leaders within the context of corporate business.15   
  
Some leadership scholars have used only one of the approaches outlined above. 
Others, however, recognising the complex nature of leadership, have merged some of 
these approaches together to create an integrative way of examining the behaviour of 
leaders and the way they interact with group members in response to their particular 
setting.16 Irrespective of which approaches have been used, leadership studies have 
increasingly adopted a scientific approach to their studies since the 1950s.17 This 
methodology develops hypotheses of how leaders will act in a particular situation, 
tests the hypotheses using either experimental or real life situations, and writes up the 
results in terms of affirming or questioning the hypotheses within the broader context 
of leadership theory. Many leadership scholars believe that this is an objective 
approach that can identify and train future leaders, particularly in the commercial 
sector.18 Mats Alvesson, however, in 1996 suggested that the objective methodology 
sought by scholars was impossible.19 Scholars had to acknowledge the subjectivity of 
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their interpretation of the data and how they use their findings to engage with, 
challenge, affirm or extend leadership theory. 
 
Despite the different theoretical approaches to studying leadership, the one approach 
that has been consistently used, is still used and is the most relevant for this thesis is 
the trait approach. The trait approach adopts an empirical methodology to identify 
traits that make successful leaders by listing the personal, physical and intellectual 
traits common to great political and military leaders.20  
 
This approach dates back to ancient Chinese scholars. The Lao-tzu (wise leader) was 
‘selfless, hardworking, honest, able to time the appropriateness of actions, fair in 
handling conflict and able to “empower” others.’21 Similar empirical studies were 
penned by ancient Greek scholars including Plato and Aristotle, and by scholars from 
medieval Europe, most notably Machiavelli.22 The modern adaptation of this approach 
to leadership began with the ‘Great Man Approach’ to history developed by Thomas 
Carlyle in the 1840s.23 By the 1860s a more complex level of trait scholarship had 
developed. Scholars were no longer satisfied with identifying leadership traits, but 
attempted to ascertain if leadership traits were innate or the result of education and 
experiences.24  
 
In 1974 Ralph Stodgill reviewed the findings of this approach to leadership. He 
concluded that studies conducted using the trait approach between 1948 and 1970 had 
identified six essential leadership traits.25 These were ‘general intelligence, initiative, 
interpersonal skills, self-confidence, drive for responsibility and personal integrity.’26 
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A third edition of his study written by Bernard Bass in 1990, after Stodgill passed 
away in 1978, added three more essential traits to his list; ‘aggressiveness, 
independence [and a] tolerance for stress.’27 
 
The trait approach, however, had come under sustained criticism in the 1940s, 
coinciding with new approaches to the study of leadership based on the scientific 
research methods described above.28 Critics were mainly concerned that a leadership 
model that examined leadership traits in isolation from the reaction and interaction 
leaders with their followers, and the achievement or failure of leaders to direct their 
group towards achieving their goals, lacked legitimacy. Stodgill argued that ‘[a] 
person does not become a leader by virtue of the possession of some combination of 
traits.’29 The apparent methodological and substantive failure of trait leadership 
theory, therefore, had led to it being replaced by the more scientifically based 
leadership theories noted above.  
 
Despite these criticisms, there has been a resurgence of trait theory since the 1980s.30 
New trait scholars combine empirical research with a scientific methodology to 
identify the traits of past and current leaders.31 These scholars have largely focused on 
identifying particular cognitive, personality, motivational and social traits combined 
with the problem solving skills of successful leaders.32 The new form of trait 
leadership theory is, therefore, an integrative theoretical model. It attempts to identify 
the behavioural, ethical, visionary and contingency traits of successful leaders. In this 
way, the new trait model combines past theoretical approaches to offer an empirical 
study of real leaders in real situations although its critics, such as Stephen Zaccaro, 
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Cary Kemp, Paige Bader and John Fleenor, have argued that the methodological 
concerns raised in the 1940s largely remain the same.33  
 
New trait scholars have created new lists of traits common to successful leaders. 
According to Robert Lussier and Christopher Achua these traits fall into five 
categories: leadership and extraversion, agreeableness, adjustment, conscientiousness 
and the ability to be open to new experiences.34 Although these categories, and the 
traits listed within them, reflect the fact that the focus of this research was on leaders 
in business, military historians and personnel have used these in their analyses.   
 
American General Edward Meyer, for example, used his experience in the Korean 
War and as an officer on the Chief of Staff to identify ‘character, honesty, loyalty, 
courage, self-confidence, humility and self-sacrifice’35 as common traits of successful 
military leaders in battle. Yet, theorists and retired military leaders have emphasised 
that it is impossible for military leaders to be born with leadership traits, they have to 
be taught.36 Others, such as the American General Samuel Marshall, who was chief of 
Army during the Second World War and the Korean War, disagrees, arguing that ‘not 
everyone can be taught…in most people success or failure is caused more by mental 
attitude then mental capacity. Many are unwilling to face the ordeal of thinking for 
themselves and of accepting responsibility for others.’37 Marshall argued that what 
was required for a successful military leader was ‘application to duty and 
thoroughness in all undertakings, along with that maturity of spirit and judgment that 
comes with percept, by kindness, by study, by watching, and above all, by example.’38  
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Of the various approaches and models discussed above, the integrative empirical 
methodology of trait leadership theory is best suited for this thesis. It allows an 
evaluation of the behaviour of military leaders in captivity by examining their 
characteristics and behaviour, interactions with their group and captor, and their 
approaches to achieving their respective goals.  
 
Leadership categories and leadership legitimacy 
Two distinct types of leaders have been identified in the theoretical literature.  
 
The first is leaders who have positional power.39 These leaders, usually appointed 
because of their seniority or skills, have the ability to give rewards to their 
subordinates and determine punishment when subordinates do not follow their 
instructions.40 Depending on the group’s context, purpose and composition, a 
positional leader may also be elected from the group members. According to studies 
conducted by behavioural scientists Alvin Gouldner, Edwin Hollander, Stephen 
Wilson, Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, the tenure of elected positional leaders 
is dependent on retaining the support of their group.41 Unlike a positional leader, who 
because of seniority or skill, has been awarded a leadership position, elected positional 
leaders are highly accountable to their group for all of their decisions. As a 
consequence, if the elected leader loses the trust of the group, a new positional leader 
may be nominated from the group members.  
 
The second type of leader is an emergent leader who challenges the positional leader.42 
Instead of relying on positional power, an emergent leader is given leadership status 
voluntarily when members of a group see an individual’s behaviour as deserving the 
status of leader. Emergent leaders lack official sanction and are usually found within 
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groups or in a volatile or extreme situation. Stodgill believes that emergent leaders are 
usually the more effective because, as the natural leader of their group, they usually 
have a greater connection with, and understanding of, their group’s needs and can 
‘represent and articulate group goals and values to others both within and outside of 
the group.’43   
 
In this thesis, positional leaders refer are the most highly ranked officer or NCO within 
a POW camp, compound or location. Emergent leaders are men of a lower rank who 
rise from within the group to attain the loyalty of the men because of their 
understanding of the physical and/or psychological needs of the group. In volatile and 
extreme settings, this usually occurs when positional leaders have failed to adequately 
protect their group.   
 
This thesis also explores a third type of leader, the professional leader, a term coined 
specifically for this study to discuss the MOs and chaplains. Although the functions 
and actions of these leaders are often recognised in the literature examining captivity, 
they have not been allocated to a specific category in the literature.44 This leadership 
category is based on the set of skills possessed by these men who had the capacity to 
understand and attend to different aspects of Australian captives’ needs during the 
Second World War.  
 
No leader can function without leadership legitimacy,45 based on the belief, as Edwin 
Hollander argues, ‘that the leader has the authority to exert influence.’46 Legitimacy is 
determined by followership, that is, trust between leaders and their group, which is 
usually based on a leader’s proven skill set to protect the best interests of group 
members. And although leadership legitimacy has been examined predominantly 
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within civilian settings, military leadership scholars, such as William Litzinger and 
Thomas Schaefer, argue that the concept of leadership legitimacy also applies to 
military leaders.47 Rank in and of itself is not enough to build trust between positional 
leaders and their subordinates.  
 
Two methodologies developed by leadership scholars to analyse leadership legitimacy 
have been used in this thesis. The first is an assessment of legitimacy based on the 
group’s perception of their leader’s status, role and the contribution he or she makes 
towards the formation and achievement of group goals.48 The second comes from the 
complementary field of group dynamics,49 which is discussed below.    
 
Leadership Styles 
The different ways in which leaders approach their tasks have been classified as 
leadership styles. The literature on leadership styles is voluminous, yet reflects 
Thomas Cronin’s basic definition of a leadership style as ‘how a person relates to 
people, to tasks and to challenges.’50 The most useful analysis of leadership styles for 
the purposes of this thesis comes from two complementary fields of research.  
 
Sociologists and behavioural scientists have researched leaders’ behaviour and the 
way they interact with group members.51 Juanjuan Jiang’s 2014 survey of the literature 
of leadership styles reveals the existence of 19 styles.52 These styles are inextricably 
linked to the theoretical framework applied by the scholars. For example, behavioural 
leadership styles, largely identified between the 1940s and 1960s, are democratic, 
                                                          
47 W. Litzinger and T. Schaefer, ‘Leadership through Followership’, in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach 
(eds.), Military Leadership Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, First Edition, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984), pp.215-220. 
48 Daft, The Leadership Experience, pp.251, 256-261; Hollander, ‘Legitimacy, Power and Influence,’ 
pp.29-43; R. Kelley, ‘In Praise of Followers,’ in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, Military Leadership: In 
Pursuit of Excellence, Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp.99-107.  
49 Cartwright and Zander, ‘An Introduction: Leadership and Group Performance,’ pp.487-510; M. von 
Cranach, ‘Leadership as a Function of Group Action,’ in C. Graumann and S. Moscovici (eds.), 
Changing Conceptions of Leadership, (New York: Springer-Vales, 1986), pp.115-134; Hollander, 
Leadership Dynamics, pp.13-16, 45-52; 
G. Homans, The Human Group, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp.138-149. 
50 T. Cronin, ‘Thinking about Leadership,’ in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach, (eds.), Military Leadership: 
In Pursuit of Excellence, First Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p.199. 
51 For an overview of this literature see Fleet and Yukl, ‘A Century of Leadership Research,’ pp.65-90; 
House and Aditya, ‘The Social Scientific Study of Leadership,’ pp.409-473. 
52 Jiang, ‘The Study of the Relationship between Leadership Style and Project Success,’ pp.51-52. 
27 
 
autocratic and bureaucratic.53 Contingency leadership theorists, who dominated 
leadership scholarship in the 1960s, applied variables to identify leadership styles.54 
They identified four styles: directive, supportive, participative and achievement-
oriented.55 In 1978 James Burn pioneered the study of transformational leaders.56 This 
style of leader is able to form a special relationship with his or her followers to the 
point where the leader can change their perception of the group’s purpose. From the 
late 1970s to 1990s, behavioural scientists extended this idea to explore the link 
between transformational leaders and charisma.57 These studies led to the profiling of 
transformational leaders, that is, leaders who are focused on motivating their followers 
to achieve a precise goal, usually within a work environment.58 Laissez-faire leaders, 
who largely allow their followers to make decisions on their own, will attempt to 
influence their followers but, because they lack genuine connection with them, have 
difficulty in applying visionary or motivational leadership styles, which are explained 
below.59  From the late 1990s, leadership scholars explored the emotional intelligences 
exhibited by leaders in an attempt to identify how leaders could influence their 
followers’ intellect and morality.60 Six leadership styles have been identified in this 
category: visionary, coaching, affiliate, democratic, pacesetting and commanding.61 
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The turn of the century saw behavioural scientists turn their focus to how leadership 
styles can influence businesses’ success with a focus on identifying the styles of 
competent leaders. Three leadership styles have been identified under this category: 
engaging, involving and goal-oriented.62  
 
Jiang’s review of the literature on leadership styles reveals three significant features of 
the scholarship. Firstly, scholars have continued to add new leadership styles to the 
growing body of literature. Secondly, leadership styles are inextricably linked with the 
theoretical framework applied by the scholars. Lastly, despite using different 
theoretical frameworks, an overlap between leadership styles exists and, therefore, 
some of the titles given to leadership styles are either the same or supplementary. This 
overlap reflects the fact that it is impossible to isolate the characteristics of leaders 
from the characteristics and responses of their groups, the contextual variables in 
which the group functions and the goals set. It is for these reasons that Thomas 
Cronin’s earlier approach identifying the differences between leadership styles is 
easier to understand and apply.  
 
In 1984 Cronin identified six diametrically opposing leadership styles; autocratic and 
democratic, centralised and decentralised, empathetic and detached, extroverted and 
introverted, assertive and passive, engaged and remote.63 Holloman and Rost 
confirmed Cronin’s findings.64 In the last thirty years of leadership scholarship, most 
sociologists and social scientists in the field recognise that the broad styles identified 
by Cronin can be used together by a leader to create group unity and achieve a group 
goal. Robert Lussier and Christopher Achua refer to this blending of leadership styles 
as integrative leadership theory.65   
 
Groups, human dynamics and survivorship  
From the 1930s sociologists and behavioural scientists began using empirical research 
combined with scientific methodology to study human interaction within groups.66 In 
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contrast to leadership studies, this field of research does not focus on the dominant 
group member’s behaviour. Instead it examines how all group members interact with 
each other in different settings.  
 
This field of research has, across different cultures, historical periods and settings, 
proven that the formation of groups is an inevitable consequence of human 
interaction.67  Socialisation with others is, therefore, the basis of what humans see as 
normal structures. This field of research has sought to understand how and why groups 
form, function, add and exclude members, and why and how they often compete with 
other groups within a particular setting.  
 
Scholars in this field use several theoretical models.68 Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin 
Zander, in their review of the literature, identified seven major theoretical approaches 
in the field. Kurt Lewin’s field theory focuses on examining the variables within the 
group’s context.69 Interaction theory, developed by Robert Bales, George Homans and 
William Whyte, examines group members’ relationships, interactions and the way 
they approach and achieve goals.70 Theodore Newcomb advocated a systems theory 
approach that focuses on the interaction between group members’ roles and how the 
group collectively achieves a goal.71 Jacob Moreno first introduced sociometric theory 
that examined group dynamics through the study of interpersonal interactions between 
group members and how these interactions allowed the group to form and stay 
together.72 Psychoanalytical theory dates back to Sigmund Freud’s study of groups.73 
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This theoretical approach scientifically examines the motivations of each group 
member to achieve a group’s purpose.74 Cognitive theory is similar. It examines the 
reasons why group members stay together, the relationship they have with each other 
and how these two factors influence their perception of others.75 In contrast to the 
behavioural theoretical approaches, empiricist models use personality testing and 
statistical analysis to explain why some groups form and stay together.76 
 
With the exception of the empiricist model, there are distinct similarities and overlaps 
between the group dynamic theoretical approaches to studying human interaction in 
groups. Cartwright and Zander therefore, concluded that scholars in the field often use 
a variety of complementary models to understand the groups they are studying.77 
Research methods of observation, field experiments based on established groups 
responding to an artificial scenario in a research laboratory, and people who are not in 
an established group responding to an artificial scenario in a research laboratory, are 
common across the theoretical models.78 This field of scholarship is used in this thesis 
to formulate an understanding of the importance of group structures, how they work 
and why they succeed or fail.  
 
A new sub-speciality of group dynamic research emerged in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, which is important in understanding the dynamics of groups 
studied in this thesis.  
 
Sociologists and behavioural scientists have explored what happens to group 
interaction when the group is faced with an extreme situation.79 The work within this 
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field is voluminous. It includes the reaction of groups to natural disasters and mass 
scale accidents, such as plane crashes.80 The most relevant studies in this field for this 
thesis are how human groups react to human conflict, in particular, civilian prisoners 
in concentration camps during the Holocaust. Holocaust survivors have written some 
of these studies.  
 
Bruno Bettleheim was imprisoned at Buchenwald concentration camp between March 
1938 and 20 April 1939 following Hitler’s annexation of Austria.81 After his release, 
Bettleheim migrated to the United States. In 1961, as a qualified child psychologist, he 
published The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age.82 One section of his study, 
titled ‘Behaviour in extreme situations: coercion’83 drew heavily on his personal 
experience of captivity. He concluded that in extreme situations prisoners ‘were 
usually dependent for survival on group cooperation.’84 In extreme situations, 
however, groups are susceptible to fracturing because group members often revert to 
childish behaviour.85 For example, some group members who found an opportunity to 
gain extra food or other basic needs, would often take it and, in doing so, isolate 
themselves from their group. However, Bettleheim observed that these individuals, 
who had broken the trust of the group, quickly realised that they could not survive 
alone. Groups were the only way internees could pool their collective skills to seek out 
food, water and psychological comfort, although Bettleheim thought that relying on a 
group for psychological comfort was the sign of a weak prisoner who, if the group 
dissolved, often would not cope. When a prisoner was rejected from a group, or 
decided they no longer wanted to belong to a group because they had lost hope, they 
often slipped into apathy, which usually led to death.86  
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Elie Cohen, a Jewish Dutch physician, was captured by the Nazis on 13 August 1943 
when he, his wife and three year old son were attempting to flee to Sweden.87 Cohen 
and his family arrived at Auschwitz on 14 September 1943. His wife and son were 
killed on arrival. Cohen managed to survive by working as a doctor in the camp. 
Cohen’s study, Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp, is based on his 
observations of human interaction in this extreme captive setting.88 His study affirms 
Bettleheim’s observations, but because of Cohen’s more extreme captive setting, his 
observations are more detailed, blunt and brutal. Cohen’s study also offer greater 
academic insights by linking his observation to psychological theories of behaviour. 
His study includes an exploration of the fundamental importance of selective 
friendship and group psychology amongst the inmates.89 He also notes the lack of pre-
existing group structures in civilian concentration camps contrasts to military prisoners 
who enter captivity with already established group structures and behavioural 
expectations.90 The difference between the two, Cohen suggests, is that a civilian 
group ‘will not react in any way that is characteristic of a group with a leader.’91 
Instead they have to form some structure for themselves amongst a crowd, a hard ask 
when most are paralyzed with fear. In comparison to civilian prisoners, therefore, 
military POWs had a distinct advantage because of pre-existing group structures. 
 
Sociologists and behavioural scientists have confirmed that the key to survival for 
civilians in concentration camps was belonging to a group92, despite the groups being 
what Herbert A. Bloch called ‘crude and rudimentary forms of communal life which 
were, in effect, modern feral communities.’93 Bloch noted that different types of 
groups emerged in concentration camps; groups based on commonalities, for example 
nationalities, and groups who resisted their oppressors. Despite their differences, 
groups had one essential commonality, their members all wanted to survive. Group 
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leaders helped make survival possible, often by reverting to a parent-child relationship 
with their group members.94 Curt Bondy, a professor of social psychology, interned at 
Buchenwald Concentration Camp, noted, that prisoners who had previously been in 
regulated groups prior to their imprisonment had better functioning groups than those 
whose previous groups had only been for social purposes.95 Bondy based this 
argument on his observation of the behaviour of ‘twenty young boys who were 
arrested on a training farm, together with the director of this farm.’96 This training 
farm, Bondy explained, not only taught the boys how to manage the day-to-day 
operations of agricultural farms but also ‘stressed character building, group 
consciousness and responsibility.’97 
 
In 1967 Elmer Luchterhand offered a more academically comprehensive psychological 
study of group behaviour of inmates in concentration camps.98 His study offered three 
more classifications of groups; stable pairs, small groups of three to eight prisoners, 
usually based on pairings of prisoners, and large groups comprising of nine of more 
prisoners.99 Of the survivors he studied he noted that most belonged to small groups 
based on pairings.100 This was because this type of group allowed ‘reciprocal 
sharing.’101 Small groups also ‘kept alive the semblance of humanity.’102 
 
Terrence Des Pres, an American academic who published a comprehensive study of 
survivors of concentration camps, agrees with Luchterhand, Bloch, Bondy, Cohen and 
Bettleheim’s conclusion that membership of a group was the common characteristic of 
a survivor.103 Des Pres, who based his study on oral interviews and an empirical 
methodology, placed the emphasis on ‘solidarity’104 within groups. He cites Bluma 
                                                          
94 ibid., p.340. 
95 C. Bondy, ‘Problems of Internment Camps,’ The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, vol.39, 
1943, pp.456-459.  
96 ibid., p.457. 
97 ibid.  
98 E. Luchterhand, ‘Prisoner Behaviour and Social System in the Nazi Concentration Camps,’ pp.245-
262.  
99 ibid., p.251. 
100 ibid., pp.251, 253-255. 
101 ibid., p.254. 
102 ibid. p.260. 
103 T. Dres Pres, The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976), pp.vii, 96-147. 
104 Des Pres, The Survivor, p.121.  
34 
 
Weinstock who concluded that ‘survival…could only be a social achievement, not an 
individual accident.’105  
 
Survivor memories and academic studies of civilian internees, therefore, provide 
important insights into how informal group structures operate in extreme captive 
settings and these insights have informed the analysis of groups in this thesis.  
 
In contrast to the scholarship on group structures amongst concentration camp 
prisoners, there is little analysis of group structures in studies of POWs. Those that do 
exist refer to the importance of group structures in passing, such as explaining why 
some men held as prisoners during the Korean War became apathetic. Harvey 
Strassman, Margaret Thaler and Edgar Schein, for example, concluded in their study A 
Prisoner of War Syndrome: Apathy as a Reaction to Severe Stress, that men taken 
prisoner by the Chinese had a greater chance of surviving if ‘a buddy cajoled or forced 
them into activity and survival behaviour.’106 If a prisoner lacked this support system, 
many lost interest in looking after themselves.107  
 
Leadership in captivity during the Second World War 
In a military setting, tradition and disciplinary structures mandate that leadership is 
determined by rank. Traditional military leadership is, therefore, positional because of 
the rank of the leader, even in captivity. According to the Australian Military 
Regulations and Orders (1927), military structures remained unchanged if men were 
captured.108 In captivity, commanding officers, therefore, retained responsibility for 
their men’s discipline, supplies, funds and most importantly for this thesis, attempts to 
preserve their health.109 As soldiers, prisoners were expected to obey their 
commanding officer and any prisoner who contravened these regulations was liable to 
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punishment after liberation.110 The commanding officer and his staff were responsible 
for reporting these breaches.111  
 
International law also reinforced positional leadership in captivity. Articles 43 and 44 
of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929) acknowledged 
the right of prisoners to representation and a degree of self-organisation although the 
approval of POW leaders was subject to the captor’s final decision.112 This 
Convention decreed that the highest-ranking prisoner functioned as the captives’ 
representative. With the aid of an interpreter, this prisoner was responsible for 
representing the formal group’s interests and rights to the captor, Protecting Power and 
aid groups. These responsibilities extended to the organisation and distribution of 
supplies to their men. In the Second World War, Germany was bound by these 
rules.113 Japan was not. Although a signatory of the Geneva Convention, Japan did not 
ratify it.114 Japan’s attitude towards prisoner leadership was, therefore, different.   
 
In the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe officer camps, the highest-ranking prisoner 
automatically became the positional and formal group leader.115  In camps holding 
British/Commonwealth prisoners, this leader was known as the Senior British Officer 
(SBO). In Luftwaffe NCO camps or compounds, no clear hierarchy of rank existed. 
Instead of seniority, a vote determined the positional leader. In German Wehrmacht 
other rank camps, the method of determining formal group leadership appears to have 
been haphazard. For example in NCO compounds, the senior NCO sometimes 
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automatically took charge, but in other army compounds, a general vote determined 
positional leadership. The method of choosing the positional leader in other rank 
camps appears to have been influenced by two key factors – the seniority and 
personality of the NCO, and the size and national composition of the formal group. In 
air force and army other rank and NCO camps/compounds, formal group leaders were 
officially known as the Man-of-Confidence (MOC) or simply the camp leader.  
 
In the German camps, committees assisted formal group leaders. In officers’ camps, 
committees were comprised of the most senior ranking prisoners and sometimes 
prisoners who had skills relevant to the committee’s purpose. In NCO and other rank 
camps, committee members were usually selected using one of two methods: 
appointment by the formal group leader or a general vote by the entire camp 
population. Committee roles usually included interpreter, assistant, senior medical 
officer (SMO), hut/room commanders and, in German Stalags, working detachment 
leaders. A secondary prisoner committee structure also existed in the German camps. 
These prisoners, usually selected on rank, skill or vote, organised the prisoners’ daily 
activities. In most camps, the most powerful of these committees was a secret 
committee that organised escape. 
 
Japanese Bushido culture did not officially acknowledge POWs.116 Unless it was in 
Japan’s interests, prisoners organised themselves, although from August 1942, the 
Japanese separated officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel from the other 
prisoners.117 This meant that for almost the duration of captivity, formal group 
leadership was the responsibility of senior ranking Lieutenant Colonels.  
 
Depending on the structure of the camp, formal group leaders in the Pacific were 
responsible for Australian or multi-national groups. Despite different national 
compositions, the standard criteria for leadership remained the same, seniority of 
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rank.118 Work Forces usually had a two-tired structure; the composite group that was 
then subdivided into battalions. In most cases, the positional leader of the base camps 
in Changi or Java appointed the leaders at both levels. These appointments were made 
on rank, with one exception, Captain Reginald William James Newton, who is 
discussed in Chapter 3. Some of the forces that originated from Java were not divided 
into battalions until their arrival in Thailand or Burma. In these circumstances, the 
formal group leader appointed battalion leaders. For all Work Forces, rank remained 
the predominant criteria for selection.  
 
As in Europe, most formal group leaders in the Pacific had the assistance of a staff. 
The number and type of staff positions depended on four factors; the amenability of 
the Commandant, and the size, location and purpose of the camp. Rank and skill 
usually determined staff positions. Common roles included second in command, 
battalion or area leaders, quartermaster, SMO and a hygiene/sanitation officer.  
 
As members of the British Commonwealth, Australian formal groups in the Pacific 
technically remained under British command. In practice this only really occurred in 
one location; Changi. Here the Australian formal group leader, the GOC, came under 
the leadership structure of Malaya Command.119  
 
German and Japanese demands often disrupted the structure and composition of 
formal groups. In both theatres, but particularly in Europe, some new formal groups 
were comprised of mixed service and multi-national personnel. In these circumstances, 
the most senior ranking officer from across the different services and nationalities 
usually functioned as the positional leader. In some instances, national groups retained 
a secondary leadership structure. These structures, based on rank, usually remained 
subsidiary to the authority of the group’s leader.   
 
Implicit in the discussion above has been the role of groups in captivity. Across the 
European and Pacific Theatres, two structures provided the framework for most 
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prisoner interaction: formal and informal groups. Despite different captive conditions, 
legal obligations and official leadership titles, the structure of formal and informal 
groups was essentially the same in both theatres.  
 
At the macro level, formal groups reflected military structure at the moment of 
capture. Typically, in both theatres, army battalions and naval crews were captured at 
the same time, usually after formal surrender. Air force personnel were an obvious 
exception because their capture often occurred at the individual, or small group level, 
after being shot down over enemy territory. Irrespective of the means of capture, 
however, military structures were basically transferred intact from combat into 
captivity with positional officers in charge of units.   
 
The captor also created formal groups. These fell into two categories. The first was the 
Work Forces where prisoners drawn from different units were ordered by the captor to 
work outside the wire. The second was the formation of groups, again often drawn 
from different units, for the forced marches in Europe and Borneo. In all cases, they 
were under the command of an appointed positional leader.   
 
Collective transfer from battle into captivity meant that informal groups within 
battalions, squadrons or naval crews, based on mateship, remained intact, matching the 
theortical patterns of group dynamics discussed earlier in this chapter. These informal 
groups provided the core relationships in a prisoner’s day-to-day life.120 They were a 
prisoner’s main defence against psychological and physical breakdown. The 
fundamental importance of this structure was reflected in the fact that, in both theatres, 
informal groups tried their utmost to stay together. Some prisoners, however, 
acknowledging the possibility that they could be forced to separate from their mates, 
retained a larger circle of friends and acquaintances. This meant that if an informal 
group was divided, men hoped they would know someone to form a new group. 
However, sometimes men knew no one. In these circumstances, informal groups were 
formed using different criteria; shared nationality, experience, interests, beliefs, 
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civilian occupation and, in the most volatile and extreme settings, simply a shared 
location or hope for survival.  
 
The leadership structure within informal groups reflected the conditions of their 
captive setting. In relatively stable settings, longstanding mates and/or those with the 
best interpersonal skills usually had seniority. In volatile and extreme captive settings, 
leadership usually fell to the prisoner with the best survival skills. Importantly within 
informal groups, leadership often shifted between and amongst group members. This 
fluid transfer of leadership status reflected the immediate needs, skills and health of 
group members. As captive conditions, group member’s health and the compositions 
of groups changed, collective leadership emerged, as all physically able group 
members helped each other to survive. In sum, then, flexibility was a key 
characteristic of informal groups studied in this thesis.  
 
In captivity, leadership legitimacy was vital. Formal and informal groups needed to 
know that their leader was genuine. Leaders had to prove their worth against the power 
and aggression of the captor and, sometimes just as importantly, against the anger and 
frustration of the men themselves. Positional leaders often had to re-earn the trust of 
their men as some questioned the relevance of positional leaders and a military 
organisation that had led them into captivity. In the captive setting, professional 
leaders had to earn the respect and followership of men by attending the physical, 
psychological and/or spiritual needs of their group. This meant that in volatile or 
extreme settings (see below), positional and professional leaders had to prove that they 
were willing to protect the interest of their men against the captor, even if it meant 
jeopardising their personal safety. When these leaders failed, emergent leaders 
sometimes stepped up and filled the role.  
 
Ultimately in captivity, a leader’s legitimacy depended on his ability to balance the 
physical and psychological needs of the group with the demands and/or aggression of 
the captor. The ability of a leader to successfully balance these demands legitimised 
his leadership status. Failure led to the men looking for an alternative leader, be he 
positional, professional or emergent. When a legitimate leader could not be found, or 
the legitimate leader was not as effective as they had hoped, the formal group often 
divided into smaller sub-groups. This pattern of behaviour reflects the behavioural and 
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scientific analysis of civilian and military groups in extreme situations discussed 
earlier. 
 
However, in most extreme settings a time comes when even the strongest group 
structures break down. This usually occurs when most or some group members are 
dying. In the face of death, individual survivorship can trump collective identity. In 
these circumstances, leadership becomes redundant.   
 
As noted earlier, the thesis explores a third type of leader, the professional leader in 
the form of MOs and chaplains. Across both theatres, in relatively stable camps, most 
Australian, British/Commonwealth prisoners did not consider MOs and chaplains as 
leaders. Instead, they offered professional services. Their transformation from being a 
professional into a leader occurred mainly in volatile and extreme conditions in the 
Pacific Theatre. In this context the lifesaving skills of MOs, combined with a 
willingness to try and protect their patients against the aggression of the captor, made 
them sometimes more important than the positional leader of their formal group, 
particularly when the positional leader failed to protect his men. In these 
circumstances, the professional leaders acquired leadership legitimacy. In contrast to 
MOs, chaplains became leaders for a select group of prisoners who admired the faith 
of men who continued to believe in their Christian teachings and inspired others to do 
the same.  
 
As noted in the Introduction, three types of conditions existed in POW camps across 
the two theatres of war: relatively stable, volatile and extreme. Relatively stable 
captive settings existed when the men’s basic needs were provided for either entirely 
by the captor, or by the captor and the Red Cross.121 In volatile captive settings the 
survival of the prisoners was at risk because of insufficient food, lack of medical 
supplies, forced labour and/or violence. Extreme captive conditions existed when 
prisoner’s basic needs were not met and, as a result, order within the group structures 
vanished and chaos took over. This definition of extreme differs from the way 
historians have previously evaluated captive settings. Joan Beaumont, Sibylla Jane 
Flower and Rosalind Hearder described extreme conditions as existing when 
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prisoners’ survival was at risk.122 This thesis defines this type of captive settings as 
volatile not extreme. Extreme conditions only existed when social structures broke 
down, usually when prisoners understood that the captor intended that none of them 
would survive and leadership ceased to have relevance. This definition of extreme 
settings reflects the survivorship literature outlined previously in this chapter where 
extreme settings exist only when a crisis imposed on a group destroys the structure of 
a group and in doing so pushes individuals ‘to their limits and beyond.’123 The 
literature, however, also notes that there can be exceptions to this general rule.124    
 
Australian air force, army and navy POWs held by the Germans mostly lived in 
relatively stable camps until the forced marches during the winter of 1944-1945 when 
the conditions became volatile. Conditions in the Pacific Theatre, however, could 
move from stable to volatile and, in the end, extreme. Two POW camps provide an 
example.   
 
Between February 1942 and mid-1943, conditions in Changi were relatively stable, 
(with one significant exception, the Selarang Barrack Square Incident, which is 
described in Chapter 2).125 From mid-way through 1943, however, conditions began to 
deteriorate.126 Emaciated, sick and broken men began returning from the Burma-
Thailand Railway. The poor condition of these men put a strain on an already 
decreasing camp ration. Then the Japanese demanded men for a local labour project, 
the construction of an aerodrome. The transition from relatively stable to a volatile 
setting occurred when all of the prisoners were forced to move to the squalor and 
cramped conditions of the civilian jail in May 1944.127  
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Conditions at the Sandakan POW Camp on Borneo moved from stable to volatile and 
finally extreme. Conditions in the camp were only stable for a short period of time, 
between 18 July 1942 and October 1942.128 Prisoners caught stealing food from the 
Japanese gardens were beaten, work quotas for building the aerodrome were high and 
the guards were generally harsh in their treatment of the prisoners. By 1943, with the 
Japanese insisting on a quick completion of the project, conditions quickly become 
volatile.129 The deteriorating conditions were exacerbated when, on the 22 July 1943, 
the Japanese guards discovered a combined prisoner/civilian intelligence network 
operating from the camp.130 The Japanese reacted savagely. Food rations were 
significantly decreased, work demands, which were already at high, unsustainable 
levels, increased further and Japanese violence towards to the prisoners escalated.131 
Conditions moved from volatile to extreme from 24 January 1945 when the Japanese 
conducted the forced marches from Sandakan to Ranau.132 As described in the 
Introduction, guards executed men who fell behind in the marches and the prisoners 
who reached Ranau were executed in three separate massacres. There were only six 
survivors from this extreme setting.133 These men survived because they managed to 
escape.  
 
As noted in the Introduction, four leadership styles have been chosen for this thesis: 
authoritarian, transformational, democratic and self-sacrificial. The choice reflects the 
sources available and because some styles (such as authoritarian) reflect the fact that 
this is a thesis about military men. But the choice of styles also reflects the fact that 
leadership in captivity was far more complex than the simple military positional model 
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allows. A fuller description of each of these leadership styles acts as a preface to the 
case studies.  
 
One of the methodological issues faced in writing this thesis was linking the 
leadership style categories with the case studies used. At an aggregate level, the social 
sciences have little difficulty in creating broad categories to analyse human behaviour 
and responses. At the individual level, the task is far more difficult. Few of the 
individuals studied for this thesis slotted easily into one style. Jeffrey A. Matteson and 
Justin A. Irving argue that most successful leaders often use a mixture of styles to 
achieve their leadership goals,134 a reflection of the new approach to trait theory 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Yet, it is also true that most have a core style, or what 
Matteson and Irving describe as ‘a set of behaviours’ that a leader will exhibit the 
majority of the time.135 Other leadership styles can, and do, supplement or 
complement the dominant style chosen by the leader. This was certainly the case with 
the successful leaders studied for this thesis. They had a dominant set of behaviours, 
yet were capable of adapting their leadership style in a response to the conditions, 
needs and behaviour of the group.   
 
Sources and the selection of case studies 
Three main sources were used for this thesis: material generated by official sources, 
the memoirs of POWs (both published and unpublished) and oral histories of the POW 
experience, held by the Australian War Memorial, the Imperial War Museum, the 
National Archives of Australia, the Australians at War Film Archive and the British 
Broadcasting Peoples War Stories archives. These shaped the choice of case studies 
used for the thesis, which is discussed at the end of this section.  
 
Official sources provided information on the camps, their conditions and the treatment 
of men as POWs. For both theatres, they included repatriated prisoners’ 
questionnaires, statements and reports from positional and professional leaders on 
their experiences or roles within a camp committee.  
                                                          
134 J. Matteson and J. Irving, ‘Servant versus Self-Sacrificial Leadership: A Behavioural Comparison of 
Two Follow-Oriented Leadership Theories’, International Journal of Leadership Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 
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In the Pacific Theatre the AIF Diary at Changi provided valuable evidence for 
understanding the role, responsibilities and decisions of the positional leader of 
Australians, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan. The AIF Diary 
included official monthly reports by AIF HQ, routine orders issued by the positional 
leader, meeting minutes, transcripts of speeches made by the positional leader and 
correspondence with British Malaya Command.136 Attached to the official AIF HQ 
records were a number of reports. Two of these reports were written by Galleghan as 
Australian GOC and British Malaya Command GOC E. Holmes during the period 
after their liberation by the Japanese, but while they were still awaiting repatriation.137 
These reports provide an overview of the entire period of their tenure as positional 
leaders, the reasons for their orders and their interpretation of their role as positional 
POW leaders. The other official reports attached to the AIF HQ Diary include those 
written by the positional leaders of Work Forces sent to the Burma-Thailand Railway 
who returned to Changi, that is, F and H Force. The report from H Force includes an 
attachment written by the Australian positional leader Roland Frank Oakes and the 
Australian chaplain Lionel Marsden.138 Ten separate reports were written on the 
activities of F Force. These reports include a mixture of medical conditions, work 
conditions and chronicles of Japanese war crimes.139 Edward Dunlop, who led Dunlop 
Force, also wrote an interim report on the experiences of his Work Force while he was 
awaiting repatriation from Thailand.140 Similar reports exist for A and D Force.141  
                                                          
136 See AWM52 1/5/19.  
137 F. Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, AWM 54 544\11\4 Part 3; E. Holmes, 
Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island for Period 17 August 1942 to 31 
August 1945, 18 September 1945 AWM54 554/11/4 Part 10 Appendix 7. 
138 L. Marsden, Report of the Work of Chaplain with H Force, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5 Appendix 2 
Part 1A; R. Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, 15 May 1944, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 5 Appendix 
2 Part 1. 
139 For example see J. Huston, History of F Force Part 2: Medical Report, AWM54 554/7/5 Part 1; C. 
Kappe, Report on Activities of the AIF "F" Force which left Changi for Thailand in April 1943, 5 
September 1945, AWM54 554/7/4.  
140 E. Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in 
THAILAND, 14 September 1945, AWM54 554/5/5. 
141 Eight reports were written on the activities of D Force from a medical perspective. Only one report, 
written by Edward Dunlop, who was not a member of D Force, attempts to chronicle their experiences 
as a whole. See E. Dunlop, Interview Report upon Experiences of Prisoners of War, Working Camps 
and Hospitals in Thailand, 14 September 1945, AWM54 554/5/5. Fifteen separate reports exist on the 
experiences of A Force. For example see C. Anderson, On Conditions of Prisoners of War, AWM54 
554/2/4; C. McEachern, Reports on Conditions, Life and Work of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam, 
8 October 1945, AWM54 554/2/1A; C. Ramsay, On Conditions of Prisoners of War Camps under 
Command during period February 1942 - August 1944, 8 October 1945, AWM54 554/2/5. 
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Sworn statements and affidavits made by repatriated prisoners to the War Crimes 
Board of Inquiry corroborates and offers further insights into incidents outlined in 
official reports and the prisoners’ private records.142  
 
The six survivors of the death marches from Sandakan POW Camp to Ranau provide 
the only insights into how prisoners interacted with each other in this extreme captive 
environment. Five of these men provided sworn statements to the Australian War 
Crimes Board of Inquiry.143 The transcript of Owen Campbell and Richard 
Braithwaite’s preliminary interrogation, and Campbell’s final interrogation, are helpful 
in understanding the conditions each of these men endured and how they managed to 
escape.144 Statements from William Hector Sticpewich, Keith Botterill, Nelson Short 
and William Moxham were collected by 2 Echelon Army Headquarters.145 These 
survivors also testified as to their experiences in a number of forums. Botterill testified 
at the Webb Inquiry.146 Sticpewich, Botterill and Moxham testified at the trial of 
Japanese officers charged with war crimes because of their roles during the marches 
from Sandakan to Ranau.147 Sticpewich also annotated the information gained from 
                                                          
142 For example of statements to the War Crimes Board of Inquiry see Lieutenant C. Lee, War Crimes 
Trials Statement, 8 April 1946, AWM54 1010/4/89; Lieutenant G. Mansfield, War Crimes Trials 
Statement, 22 March 1946, AWM54 1010/4/95; Major R. Newton, War Crimes Trials Statement, 19 
September 1946, AWM54 109/4/1. 
143 Private K. Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, 14 November 1945, AWM54 1010/4/17; 
Bombardier J. Braithwaite, War Crimes Trials Statement, no date recorded, AWM54 1010/4/19; W. 
Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, January 17 1946, AWM54 1010/4/107; W. Moxham, War 
Crimes Trials Statement, 19 November 1945, AWM54 1010/4/107; Private N. Short, War Crime Trials 
Statement, 16 November 1945, AWM54 1010/4/129; Warrant Officer W. Sticpewich, War Crimes 
Trials Statement, 19 October 1945, AWM54 1010/4/134. 
144 Preliminary Interrogation of Bdr J. Braithwaite who escaped from Sandakan Area British North 
Borneo, taken on 19 June 1945, AWM52 1010/1/2; Preliminary Interrogation of Private O. Campbell, 
2/10 Fd Regt AIF, who escaped from Sandakan Area British North Borneo, 28 July 1945, AWM54 
1010/1/2; O. Campbell, Statement of Received PW and Civilian relating to his or her self, 28 July 1945, 
AWM54 1010/4/27. 
145 Statements of Warrant Officer H. Sticpewich, Private K. Botterill, Private N. Short and Lance 
Bombardier W. Moxham, NAA:B3856: 144/1/372 Part 3. 
146 K. Botterill, Testimony to the Webb Inquiry, 14 November 1945, NAA A11049, Roll 1. 
147 K. Botterill, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 
1946, AWM54 1010/3/98; K. Botterill, Testimony at the War Crimes Trial of civilian K. Kotoro, 
civilian K. Koyoski, S. Saburo, 25 May 1946, AWM54 1010/6/30; W. Moxham, Testimony in the Trial 
of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, AWM54 1010/3/98; W. 
Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of M. Fukushiam of Borneo POW Camp, 30 May 1946, AWM54 
1010/6/5; W. Sticpewich, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at 
Rabaul, May 1946, AWM54 1010/3/98; W Sticpewich, Testimony in the Trial of M. Fukushiam of 
Borneo POW Camp, 30 May 1946, AWM54 1010/6/5; W. Sticpewich, Testimony in Trial of Capt S. 
Hoshijiam, 8 January 1946, AWM54 1010/3/46. 
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the interrogation and affidavits of some Japanese military prisoners.148 The testimony 
provided by Japanese defendants in these war crime trials provided a different 
perspective on prisoner leadership in this extreme captive setting.149 Investigative 
reports written by L. Darling, a Prisoner of War Liaison Officer, and the Australian 
War Crimes Board of Inquiry, also assisted in understanding what happened to the 
Australian prisoners on Borneo and the impact of these extreme conditions on leaders 
and followership.150  
 
For prisoners in Europe, the only equivalent detailed information that exists for 
specific POW camps are the camp histories and reports written by air force officers 
and NCOs imprisoned at Stalag Luft III. Official camp histories were written by the 
British officers imprisoned in North and East Compounds and NCOs imprisoned in 
Centre Compound.151 Various members of the Stalag Luft III escape and intelligence 
organisations also wrote detailed reports on their activities inside this camp and in 
other air force officers and NCO camps in Germany.152 Protecting Power and 
International Committee of Red Cross Inspection Reports occasionally offered some 
insights into the role and problems of positional leaders.153 The three series of 
statements made by repatriated POWs proved more useful. The National Archives of 
the United Kingdom hold two sets of relevant repatriation questionnaires, the initial 
interrogation reports and special questionnaires regarding escape and intelligence 
activities which took place in POW camps.154 The Australian War Memorial holds 
                                                          
148 For example see Affidavits by Japanese Personnel in connection to charges arising from Sandakan-
Ranau, Death Marches with Comments by Warrant Officer W. Sticpewich, AWM54 1010/4/179; W. 
Sticpewich, Notes on the Interrogation of TAKAHARA, AWM PR00637 Folder 3. 
149 For example see M. Fukushima, War Crimes Trial Statement January 1946, AWM54 1010/4/174; G. 
Watanabe, Testimony in Trial of Captain T. Takakuwa and Captain G. Watanabe, 30 November 1945, 
AWM54 1010/3/94. 
150 Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, AWM226 Box 3(a), item 8A; L. Darling, 
Report on Investigations of Australian and Allied Prisoners of War of 9th Division Area, August 1945, 
Part 2, Appendix A, AWM54 779/1/25.  
151 Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East 
(Officers) Compound, TNA:PRO:WO208/3283; Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force 
Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III North (Officers) Compound, TNA:PRO:WO208/3283. 
152 For example J. Bristow, Report on Secret Radio Receivers Built and Maintained by Warrant Officer 
J.F. Bristow, TNA:PRO:WO208/5433; R. Kellett, Report by Royal Air Force Officer Prisoners of War 
on the Development and Conduct of a Military Intelligence System, Appendix Z.I, 27 June 1945, TNA: 
PRO: WO208/3245; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report ‘X’, 
TNA:PRO:AIR40/285.  
153 These reports are found in the series TNA:PRO:WO224. 
154 For reference to the interrogation reports see TNA:PRO:WO208/3630-3662. For reference to Special 
Questionnaires see TNA:PRO:WO208/5437-5450. 
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statements made by repatriated or released RAAF prisoners held in Germany and a 
limited selection of statements made by repatriated or released army prisoners. Most 
of the statements by army officers have, however, been lost.155 
 
Investigations by the Royal Air Force Special Investigation Branch into the Great 
Escape from Stalag Luft III, the Military Department of the Judge Advocate’s office 
and the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry held at the camp itself, helped identify the 
role of positional and emergent leadership in this setting.156 Proceedings from war 
crimes trials surrounding this event, and civilian statements, also helped explain the 
aftermath of this event and the impact of reprisals ordered by the OKW on 
British/Commonwealth POWs in Germany.157 Correspondence amongst and between 
International Committee of Red Cross  delegates in Germany, Switzerland and 
London, the British War and Foreign Office, the Australian High Commissioner, 
Australian Prime Minister and the Australian Department of External Affairs 
regarding the forced marches also provided information regarding the location and 
position of prisoners in this volatile captive setting.158  
 
For Australians leaders in both theatres, service records provided supplementary and 
occasionally valuable information. Of most relevance were the attestation statements, 
citations and recommendations for awards of particular positional, professional and 
emergent leaders.159 The Australian and Commonwealth Nominal Rolls and 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission Roll of Honour also assisted in confirming 
                                                          
155 See AWM54 779/3/126. 
156 Interim Report on the Investigation being made by the Military Department of the Judge Advocate 
General Office London, 7 August 1945, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2265; Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry held 
to Investigate the Shootings of Air Force Personnel at Stalag Luft III, 29 May 1944, 
TNA:PRO:AIR2/10121; Royal Air Force Special Investigation Branch, Stalag Luft III Murder 
Investigation Report Part 1, Summary of Facts, August 1945, TNA:PRO:WO208/5633. 
157 For example see German War Crimes, Alleged Crime: Ill Treatment – Taking Reprisals, Ref: 
MD/JAG/FS/22/19 (2c), TNA:PRO:WO311/186; M. Hinnsel, Voluntary Statement by Civilian 
Internee, 10 June 1946, TNA:PRO:AIR40/2265; United Kingdom Charges against German War 
Criminals, Shooting of 50 R.A.F. Prisoners of War from Stalag Luft III, July 1944, 
TNA:PRO:AIR40/2275.  
158 For example Memorandum for Headquarters Bomber Command, Bombing of Prisoner of War 
Camps from the War Office, no date provided, TNA:PRO:AIR14/1238; Telegraph to British Prisoner of 
War Branch from M. Edwards, Regarding Stalag 344, PW/BR/12388/45, 21 January 1945, 
TNA:PRO:AIR14/1238.  
159 For example see A. Garland, Attestation Form, NAA:B883: VX32307; List of Awards for Services 
rendered whilst PW, Captain Reginald William Newton, AWM119 173 Part 1; R. Mogg, 
Recommendation re Aus. 467822 W/O Currie A.M. (RAAF), TNA:PRO:AIR40/273. 
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the identity and location of prisoners, particularly those who were killed by the 
Japanese on Borneo.    
 
There are a significant number of published and unpublished memoirs and diaries 
from Australian POWS who were held captive in the Pacific. The majority of 
published works are from POWs held in Changi or Java and who, at some point in 
1942 or 1943, where transferred as a member of a Work Force to the Burma-Thailand 
Railway. These include, amongst other, works by Russel Braddon, Edward Dunlop, F. 
Power, D. McLagan, C. Moore, Ray Parkin, Rowley Richards, Rohan Rivett, George 
Sprod, Tom Uren, Roy Whitecross and Keith Wilson.160 The unpublished manuscripts 
held at the Australian War Memorial are from a wider variety of captive locations 
including Borneo (Sandakan then Kuching POW camp), Changi, different Work 
Forces on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Japan, Java, Korea, Saigon, Sumatra and 
Timor. These works include the writings of Samuel Barlow, Harold Byrne, Stanley 
Francis Denning, Alexander Hatton Drummond who writes under the pseudonym 
Alexander Hatton, John Giles, Elliott McMaster, Roland Frank Oakes, Clive Riches, 
Donald Thomas, Robert Welsh and Bill Young.161  
 
Only some of the published works are used in this thesis, while all of the manuscripts 
have been consulted and used as evidence. The published writings selected are those 
of prisoners who were part of the formal groups or positional, professional or 
                                                          
160 R. Braddon, The Naked Island, (London: Werner Laurie, 1952); E. Dunlop, The War Diaries of 
Weary Dunlop: Java and the Burma-Thailand Railway 1942-945, (Camberwell: Penguin Group, 2005); 
D. McLaggan, The Will to Survive: A Private View as a POW, (Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1995); C. 
Moore, The Ill-Fated F Force. (Australia: Self-published, 1963); R. Parkin, Into the Smother: A Journal 
of the Burma-Siam Railway, (London: Hogarth, 1963); F. Power, Kurrah! An Australian POW in 
Changi, Thailand & Japan, 1941-1945 (McCrae: R.J and S.P Austin, 1991; R. Richards, A Doctor’s 
War, (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2005); R. Rivett, Behind Bamboo, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Australian 
War Classics, 1991); G. Sprod, Bamboo Round My Shoulder, (Kenthurst: Kangaroo Press, 1981); T. 
Uren, Straight Left, (Milsons Point: Random House Australia, 1994); R. Whitecross, Slaves of the Sons 
of Heaven: A Personal Account of an Australian POW 1942-1945, (Sydney: Dymocks, 1953); K. 
Wilson, You’ll Never Get Off the Island, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989). 
161 S. Barlow, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS1446; H. Byrne, unpublished 
manuscript titled, ‘A Personal Story of World War II,’ AWM MSS1719; S. Denning, unpublished 
manuscript titled ‘Memoirs of Private S.F. Denning,’ AWM MSS1542; A. Drummond, unpublished 
manuscript titled, ‘The Naked Truth,’ AWM MSS1530; J. Giles, unpublished manuscript titled ‘The 
Lost Years,’ AWM MSS2027; E. McMaster, unpublished manuscript titled, ‘My War Experience, 
Friendship and 3 1/2 Years as a POW, 3 April to 3 October 1945’, AWM MSS1522; R. Oakes, 
unpublished manuscript titled, ‘Work and Be Happy,’ AWM MSS1037; C. Riches, unpublished 
manuscript titled, ‘My Army Days,’ AWM MSS1711; D. Thomas, unpublished manuscript titled, 
‘Forty Years on I Remember,’ AWM MSS1301; R. Welsh, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM 
MSS1554; B. Young, unpublished manuscript titled, ‘Return to a Dark Age,’ AWM MSS1364.  
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emergent leaders studied in this thesis. This selection of case studies, outlined below, 
reflects two aims of the thesis. The first is the study of positional, professional and 
emergent leaders who have either not yet been examined by historians or to re-
evaluate leaders who historians have previously analysed in the Pacific Theatre. The 
second is the evaluation of leadership in captivity. Case studies were selected where 
the official and other sources used for the thesis revealed a leader’s style and the extent 
of his followership.  
 
Some of the leaders of Australians in the European Theatre were not Australian. In 
these circumstances, the writings and recollections of British, New Zealand and South 
Africans prisoners also provided insights into these leaders. For this theatre a number 
of published and unpublished memoirs and diaries from British, Australian and 
American POWs were used. Most of these works were written by air force POWs who 
were either officers or NCOs. The writings of these men usually include an 
explanation of their time in transit camps, permanent POW camps and the forced 
marches. The published works include writings by Alan Burgess, Paul Brickhill and 
Conrad Norton, John Castle, David Codd, John Dominey (a pseudonym for Ron 
Mogg), Jim Holliday, Richard Pape, Richard Passmore, Delmar Spivey, Hilma Gibb 
and Gibb George, Frederick Richardson and Calton Younger.162 Unpublished 
manuscripts held by the Australian War Memorial contain the memories of three 
Australia army prisoners in Germany, two Australian medical personnel in Germany 
including one doctor, four Australian Air Force personnel captured by the Germans, 
one unnamed prisoner of the Germans and one RAN prisoner.163 The Imperial War 
                                                          
162 P. Brickhill and C. Norton, Escape to Danger, Second Edition, (London: Faber, 1954); A. Burgess, 
The Longest Tunnel: The True Story of the Great Escape, (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1990); J. 
Castle, The Password is Courage, (Long Preston: Magna, 1982); D. Codd, Blue Job, Brown Job: A 
Personal Journey through World War Two, (Bradford on Avon: ELSP, 2000); J. Dominey, The 
Sergeant Escapers, (London, Allan, 1974); J. Holliday (ed.), Stories of the RAAF POWS of Lamsdorf 
including chronicles of their 500 mile trek (Holland Park: Lamsdorf RAAF POWS Association, 1992); 
J. Pape, Boldness by my Friend, (London: Headline Review, 2008); R. Passmore, Moving Tent, 
(London: T. Harmsworth Pub, 1982); F. Richardson, Man is not lost: The Log of a Pioneer RAF 
Pilot/Navigator, 1933-1946, (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1997); D. Spivey, POW Odyssey: 
Recollections of Center Compound, Stalag Luft III and the Secret German Peace Mission in World War 
II, (Attleboro: Colonial Lithograph,1984); C. Younger, No Flight from the Cage, (London: Frederick 
Muller, 1956). 
163 For reference to the manuscripts of the Australian army POWs in Germany see H. Hammond, 
unpublished manuscript titled ‘Personal Account of Henry Hammond’, AWM MSS1730; S. McDougal, 
unpublished manuscript titled ‘Rock City: An Experience. Blindheim Germany,’ AWM MSS1710; N. 
Shute, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS0685. For reference to the Australian MO taken 
prisoner by the Germans see G. Anderson, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS1626; L. 
Le Souef, unpublished manuscript titled ‘To War without a Gun’, AWM MSS0783. For reference to the 
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Museum has a significant collection of unpublished manuscripts of POWs captured by 
the Germans, mainly from air force officers and NCOs in Stalag Luft III, Stalag VIIIB 
and prisoners from air force and army POW camps who were moved from their 
permanent camps during the forced marches.164 Those manuscripts written by POWs 
in the same camp as the positional and emergent leaders studied in this thesis have 
been included. The catalogue system used in footnotes is the system that was in place 
when the research was conducted in 2008.  
 
Oral histories have provided a significant source for understanding the role and 
perception by formal group members of positional, professional and emergent leaders. 
The interviews conducted by Donald Wall, Hank Nelson, the Imperial War Museum 
and the Australians at War Film Archive asked the repatriated prisoners about 
leadership within their camps.165 If the repatriated prisoner remembered something 
about their positional leader, good or bad, the interviewer usually asked a series of 
follow-up questions. It is these questions that reveal the identities and roles of leaders. 
Listening to interviews and reading transcripts of repatriated prisoners from the same 
POW camp has, therefore, provided information as to who were considered to be 
leaders and the extent to which they gained, retained or lost leadership legitimacy 
behind the wire.   
 
Nelson, Beaumont, Vourkouriotis, Mackenzie and Hearder have highlighted inherent 
methodological problems with prisoner recollections.166 The accuracy of prisoner 
                                                          
RAAF personnel taken prisoner by the Germans see I. Dack, unpublished manuscript titled ‘So You 
Wanted Wings Hey!!’, AWM MSS1511; O. Drigber, unpublished manuscript titled ‘As I saw it’, AWM 
MSS1412; J. Hancock, unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS2154; R. Osborn, unpublished 
manuscript titled, ‘The Last Landing of C. Charlie 23 Jan 1943,’ AWM MSS1482. For reference to the 
unnamed Australian POW in Germany see unknown, unpublished memoir titled ‘My Last Days in 
Germany, AWM MSS1973. For reference to the one manuscript by RAN prisoner see J. Hill, 
unpublished and untitled manuscript, AWM MSS2045.   
164 For reference to manuscripts by RAF Officers in Stalag Luft III see N. Flesker, unpublished 
manuscript titled, ‘Operations: Memoirs of the Great Escape,’ IWM 99/82/1; H. Groocock, unpublished 
manuscript titled ‘Mein Camp’, IWM 01/30/01; J. Maddock, unpublished manuscript titled 
‘Memoires:1939-1945, IWM 67/406/1. For reference to manuscripts of RAF NCOs imprisoned in 
Stalag VIIIB see L. Shorrock, unpublished manuscript titled, ‘Guest of the Fuhrer’, IWM 80/2/1. 
165 The interviews conducted by Hank Nelson and Donald Wall were part of their research for their respective 
books on Australian POWs. These interviews can be accessed at the AWM. Conrad Wood and Peter Hart 
conducted a large proportion of the interviews of POWs held captive in Europe on behalf of the IWM.   
166 J. Beaumont, Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity, 1941-1945, (St. Leonards, Allen and 
Unwin, 1988), pp.6-8; R. Header, ‘Memory, Methodology and Myth: Some of the Challenges of 
Writing Australian Prisoner of War History,’ Journal of the Australian War Memorial, vol. 40, 
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recollections can be distorted by distance in time and space and the displacement of 
individual thought by collective beliefs, national myths or memory. In an attempt to 
overcome this inherent flaw, at least three sources have been used to justify the 
description and analysis of leadership. The nature of some extreme captive/evasion 
settings and loss or lack of primary sources has meant, in some cases, this is 
impossible.  
 
The number of writings and recollections of Australians held prisoner in the European 
Theatre is much smaller than those for the Pacific Theatre. In the German context, 
most writings and/or recollections from Australian prisoners come from air force 
personnel. This disparity reflects the better condition these men experienced and their 
protection from forced labour. Conditions in army officer and NCO camps were 
generally not as good as their air force counterparts but, protected from labour, these 
men did have time to write and reflect on their experiences. However, in comparison 
to air force prisoners, there are fewer writings and recollections by these men. It is 
possible that the post-war emphasis on escape in the European Theatre and a national 
focus on the horrors of captivity in the Pacific, made these men reluctant to tell their 
stories. The disproportionate authorship of primary sources by Australians in the 
European Theatre is made worse by the loss of a large number of Australian Army 
repatriation questionnaires.167 During the course of researching this thesis, no 
reference to leadership has been found in any Australian naval POW camp in Europe. 
These problems shaped the parameters for the selecting leaders from the European 
Theatre. Therefore, in the German setting of captivity, there is a disproportionate 
emphasis on the leadership of Australian Air Force officers and NCOs.  
 
Taking into account the difficulties with the sources discussed above, this thesis 
examines the leadership of Australians in the following settings in Europe; Dulag Luft, 
Stalag Luft’s I, III, VI, Oflag XXIB, Stalag’s 357 (Thorn then Fallingbostel), 
VIIIB/344 and the forced marches. The small amount of primary sources from 
Australians in Italy meant that exploring leadership in this captive setting was 
                                                          
February 2007, pp.2-4; Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth, p.411; Nelson, ‘Beyond the Slogans’, pp.31-32; 
Vourkoutiotis, Prisoners of War and German High Command, p.1. 
167 The Australian Army repatriated prisoner questionnaires for Germany/Italy are held at the AWM. 
Occasionally, an army prisoner’s statement is included in a folder containing RAAF prisoner 
statements. Thousands of these statements are, however, missing.  
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impossible. This exclusion is not unique. Bob Moore, a scholar in this area of POW 
studies, has examined the Italian POW experience in Britain, including their day-to-
day experiences, the British government’s policies towards these POWs and their fate 
after the capitulation of Italy at the end of the war.168 Moore has written the only 
comparative study between the experiences of Italian POWs in Britain and British 
POWs in Italy.169 The disparity, in his words, reflects the sparse sources that exist on 
British/Commonwealth POWs’ experiences in Italy.  
 
In contrast to the practical limitations of examining leadership of Australians in the 
European Theatre, sources on Australians in the Pacific are voluminous. This meant 
parameters had to be set regarding which leaders and locations to examine. The first 
set of parameters were based on identifying camp types and conditions, that is, 
relatively stable, volatile and extreme. The secondary set of parameters reflected the 
objectives of the thesis discussed earlier, the re-examination of some well-known 
Australian and British leaders of Australian captives during the Second World War, 
while also drawing attention to previously unidentified leaders. These parameters have 
meant that not all prominent Australian positional and professional POW leaders from 
the Pacific Theatre are analysed in this thesis.170 The formal groups chosen are the 
                                                          
168 B. Moore, ‘Enforced Diaspora: The Fate of Italian Prisoners of War during the Second World War,’ 
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‘The Importance of Labor: The Western Allies and their Italian Prisoners of War in World War II,’ 
Annali dell’Istituto Storico italo-germanico in Trento XXVIII, (2002), pp.529-550; B. Moore and K. 
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Survival and Leadership in Captivity, 1941-1945, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988); W. Gherardin, 
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POWs in Changi, Pudu Jail, Dunlop Force, U Battalion D Force, the Australian 
Battalion attached to H Force, F Force, and the POWs who were forced to march from 
Sandakan camp to Ranau on Borneo.  
 
Literature review  
The studies by historians who have explored leadership in captivity fall into two 
categories: those that examine leadership peripherally and historians who explicitly 
examine prisoner leadership structures. In the first category, studies refer to positional, 
professional and emergent leaders within a larger description of captive locations, 
conditions and experiences. Here historians inadvertently describe leadership roles and 
sometimes provide insights into a leader’s legitimacy and effectiveness.  
 
Four types of historical works fall into this category. The first are Australian and New 
Zealand official histories of the Second World War.171 The second are sweeping 
narratives of the Australian captive experience that usually span more than one 
conflict. Publications by the Australian Departments of Defence and Veteran Affairs 
dominate this category, with the obvious exception of Patsy Adam-Smith’s study 
Prisoners of war: from Gallipoli to Korea.172 The third category consists of battalion 
histories. Most Australian battalions that had men captured in the Second World War 
include a narrative in their history describing their experiences.173 The last and most 
extensive category is the work of historians who address the experience of prisoners in 
a particular theatre of the Second World War. Historians in this category describe and 
analyse prisoner experiences, but do not deliberately address the question of 
leadership. The works in this category are numerous.  
                                                          
171 For example see A. Field, ‘Prisoners of the Germans and Italians,’ in B. Maughan, Tobruk and El 
Alamein: Australia in the War of 1939-1945, series 1 Army, vol. III, (Canberra: Australian War 
Memorial, 1966), pp.755-822; J. Herrington, Air Power Over Europe 1944-1945: Australia in the War 
of 1939-1945, series 3, vol. IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), pp.466-498; A. Sweeting, 
‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ in L. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust: Australia in the War of 1939-1945, 
series I, vol. IV, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial,1957), pp.511-642; W. Mason, Prisoners of War: 
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172 For example of Australian government publications on POWs see R. Reid, In Captivity: Australian 
Prisoners of War in the Twentieth Century, (Department of Veteran Affairs: Canberra, 1999); M. 
Tracey, Australian Prisoners of War, (Department of Defence: Canberra, 1999). For Adam-Smith’s 
work see P. Adam-Smith, Prisoners of War: from Gallipoli to Korea, (Ringwood: Viking, 1992).  
173 The 2/19th battalion history provides the most extensive narrative on captivity. See Various Members 
of the Unit Association, The Grim Glory of the 2/19th Battalion A.I.F., (Crows Nest: Acme Office, 




Bob Moore has composed an overview of the experience and conditions of Axis and 
Allied POWs in Europe.174 Studies by David Rolf, David Foy, Arthur Durand, Bob 
Moore and Barbara Hately, Oliver Clutton-Brock, Ariech Kochavi and Jonathan 
Vance provide insight into the experience of British/Commonwealth or American 
prisoners in Germany.175 These studies focus on POWs capture, camp conditions, 
interaction with the captor, everyday experiences, including camp entertainment, food 
supplies and distribution, and escape. Vasilis Vourkoutiotis, John Nichols and Tony 
Rennell’s studies focus on the experience of British/Commonwealth POWs during the 
forced marches and German OKW policies for British/Commonwealth and American 
prisoners.176  
 
Peter Monteath provides the most extensive study of Australian prisoners in Germany 
to date.177 He provides an overview of the circumstances of capture, the organisation 
and set-up of POW camps in Germany and finally a thematic study of their 
experiences. The themes explored are the everyday life of prisoners, life in labour 
camps, crime and punishment by the captor (including reprisals), escape, special 
camps and the forced marches. Throughout this analysis, Monteath mentions 
positional leaders and explains their role and importance to the men in the camp.  
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2000); J. Vance, ‘Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943,’ The Journal of 
Military History, vol.59, July (1995), pp.483-504; J. Vance, ‘The War Behind the Wire: The Battle to 
Escape from a German Prison Camp,’ Journal of Contemporary History, vol.28, (1993), pp.675-693; J. 
Vance, ‘The Politics of Camp Life: The Bargaining Process in Two German Prison Camps,’ War and 
Society, vol.10, no.1 May (1992), pp.109-126.  
176 J. Nichol and T. Rennell, The Last Escape: The Untold Story of Allied Prisoners of War in Germany, 
1944-1945, (London: Viking, 2002); V. Vourkoutiotis, Prisoners of War and German High Command: 
The British and American Experience, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).  
177 P. Monteath, P.O.W: Australian Prisoners of War in Hitler’s Reich, (Sydney: MacMillan, 2011).  
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Eleven historians have addressed the Australian experience of captivity in the Pacific: 
Hank Nelson, Gavin McCormack, Pattie Wright, Don Wall, Kevin Smith, Lynette 
Silver, Cameron Forbes, Michelle Cunningham, Roger Maynard, Paul Ham, Peter 
Brune and Charles Roland.178 Nelson, Forbes and Brune provide an overview of the 
Australian prisoner experience across different captive settings in the Pacific Theatre. 
Nelson and McCormack’s edited work explores different themes, which arise out of 
the study of Australian prisoners on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Wright explores the 
experience of different Australian POWs on the Burma-Thailand Railway, while 
Maynard offers a narrative on the Australian POWs experiences at Ambon. Roland 
includes an analysis of officers’ maintenance of their priviledge in captivity, an issue 
discussed in this thesis.  
 
Donald Wall, Lynette Silver, Michele Cunningham and Paul Ham provide a narrative 
of the Australian prisoners’ experiences at Sandakan and the forced marches to Ranau. 
By default, these historians explore positional, professional and emergent leadership 
within part of the larger narrative of what occurred at these locations. Robin Havers 
has explored captivity in Changi and the Burma-Thailand Railway.179 Although 
Havers’ study focuses on the British experience, he provides insight into Australians 
positional leadership because of the structure of British/Australian command in 
Changi camp. Gavan Daws’ Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the 
Pacific provides a description and some analysis of mostly American experiences of 
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Singapore 1942-45, (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); R. Havers, ‘The Changi POW Camp and 
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War, (London: Hambledon Press, 2000), pp.17-34. 
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captivity across different settings in the Pacific.180 Like Durand’s study of air force 
prisoners in Germany (mainly Americans at Stalag Luft III), Daws’ study offers 
important insights into positional and emergent leaders. Daws’ analysis of the 
formation, maintenance and fracturing of informal groups is particularly relevant to 
this thesis. 
 
The second category of historians specifically analyse POW leadership as part of their 
studies. These works are both generalised and theatre specific.  
 
Jonathan Vance’s edited work Encyclopaedia of Prisoners of War is the first study to 
address some universal themes of captivity.181 Two of these themes are positional and 
professional leadership. This reference text also includes detailed entries on the 
experience of prisoners in different types of camps. Sibylla Jane Flower’s study 
focuses on positional leadership of British POWs on the Burma-Thailand Railway.182 
Through the description of events, these historians have, by default, identified some 
emergent leaders.  
 
Simon Mackenzie’s The Colditz Myth: British and Commonwealth Prisoners of War 
in Nazi Germany and Adrian Gilbert’s POW: Allied Prisoners of War in Europe 1939-
1945, offer a chapter that describes and analyses positional leadership.183 Both studies 
address similar themes. These are the structure of formal groups, captor and captive 
perceptions of positional leaders’ roles, leadership legitimacy, styles of leadership, the 
necessity for discipline and leadership evaluation. Gilbert’s study includes a chapter 
on professional leaders. He outlines their roles, experiences and followership - or lack 
of thereof. Mackenzie’s study also addresses professional leadership. His analysis is 
part of a greater theme ‘[B]ody and [S]oul.’184 Both authors, through the description 
and analysis of the captive experience, refer to emergent leaders.  
 
                                                          
180 G. Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific, (New York: William 
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183 A. Gilbert, POW: Allied Prisoners of War in Europe, 1939-1945, (London: John Murray, 2006); S. 
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Nine historians have specifically addressed Australian POW leadership in the Pacific 
Theatre: Hank Nelson, Rosalind Header, Joan Beaumont, Peter Stanley, Michelle 
Cunningham, Gavan Daws, Ian Campbell and Lucy Roberston.  
 
In his 1989 article, ‘A Bowl of Rice for Seven Camels: The Dynamics of Prisoners of 
War Camps’, Nelson explores how Australian prisoners interacted.185 Across the 
breadth of Australian captive locations in the Pacific, Nelson addresses four themes: 
camp economies, discipline, prisoner-to-prisoner relationships and prisoner behaviour 
in the extreme situations where men were dying. Without using the labels utilised in 
this thesis, Nelson’s article highlights the core feature of the Australian captive 
experience in the Second World War, the role of human dynamics amongst, and 
between, formal and informal groups. 
 
Rosalind Hearder provides the most substantial analysis of a specific type of leader. In 
her thesis, Careers in Captivity: Australian Prisoner-of-war Medical Officers in 
Japanese Captivity during World War II (now published), Hearder analyses one type 
of professional leader, the MO.186 Most of her analysis centres on two settings, Changi 
and the Burma-Thailand Railway. Hearder’s study is, therefore, the first to offer an 
analysis of one type of leader in captivity, in more than one setting. For this reason, 
and because of its content, Hearder’s study is the natural forerunner to this thesis.  
 
Joan Beaumont briefly examines leadership in captivity in Gull Force: Survival and 
Leadership in Captivity 1941-1945.187 She provides a chronological narrative of the 
experiences of Gull Force in battle and captivity that includes a four-page overview of 
the concept of leadership.188 In 2015, Joan Beaumont, Lachlan Grant and Aaron 
Pegram’s edited work, Beyond Surrender: Australian Prisoners of War 1915-1953, 
offers two chapters relevant to the examination of leadership within the POW 
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camps.189 Lucy Robertson explores the different methods the Australian GOC used to 
discipline and control his men.190 Beaumont’s chapter extends one of her previous 
research themes, the advantages of rank in surviving captivity on the Burma-Thailand 
Railway.191  
  
Cunningham, Flower, McArthur, Nelson, Stanley and to a lesser extent, Daws, have 
also explored the question of officer privilege in captivity.192 These historians have 
demonstrated that, on the Burma-Thailand Railway and in Changi and Sandakan POW 
camps, some Australian, American and British officers, under the orders of their 
positional leaders, were given extra privileges. In the volatile and extreme captive 
settings this meant that officers were more likely than the other ranks to survive. 
Eventually, the men realised this disparity and looked to their positional leaders to 
help ensure that their interests were protected. The willingness of a positional leader to 
react to his men’s needs ultimately reflected their ability to adapt their position to the 
conditions of captivity. If a leader could not do this, Flower and Stanley’s works 
explain how positional leaders lost their legitimacy amongst the men. An analysis of 
leadership in captivity is, therefore, more than a theoretical study. Prisoners in the 
Second World War considered leadership to be a vital element of their day-to-day 
activities and, ultimately, their survival.    
 
Ian Campbell’s thesis on the leadership of Brigadier Frederick Gallagher Galleghan in 
the Second World War assessed Galleghan’s leadership as a commanding officer in 
training, battle and captivity against the prescriptive command ‘model’ also used by 
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Beaumont, Flower and Cunningham in their work.193 It offers an analysis of a 
particular positional leader in one captive setting and Galleghan’s story certainly suits 
the command model where rank is important in leadership. This thesis, however, 
offers very different conclusions to Campbell’s. It will argue that behind the wire, 
leadership could, and did, function without traditional military structures. The goal of 
positional leaders also changed as the object was no longer to win a battle, but to keep 
the men alive. Only by attempting or achieving this, did positional leaders gain 
legitimacy. Followership in captivity, therefore, required something more than rank. In 
a captive setting leadership cannot be assessed according to the same criterion as a 
military positional leader in training or battle. Lucy Robertson has recently questioned 
Galleghan’s authoritarian approach to control his men behind the wire, an argument 
this thesis explores in a later chapter.194  
 
Biographies can provide insights into the way a particular leader worked, although 
they need to be read carefully. Only four prisoner positional leaders in the Second 
World War have been the subject of this type of scholarship. The first is Stan O’Neil’s 
celebratory narrative of Galleghan.195 The second is an equally partial narrative of 
British Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day by Sydney Smith.196 
Biographies, by Julie Summers and Peter Davies, examine the same subject, British 
Lieutenant Colonel Philip Toosey.197 Three biographies on Australia’s iconic MO in 
captivity, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Edward ‘Weary’ Dunlop, have been written. Sue 
Ebury has written two of these studies.198 Margaret Geddes wrote the other.199 A New 
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Zealand prisoner Chaplain, R.G. McDowall, has been the subject of a Master’s thesis 
by M. Tagg.200   
 
Oral history is an important primary source used by most historians in the works 
outlined above. Hank Nelson, in particular, based his work, POW: Prisoners of War 
Australians under Nippon, on interviews he conducted with repatriated POWs. In 
recent times, collated transcripts of oral histories by POWs have also been published. 
These works include Michael Caulfield’s War Behind the Wire: Australian Prisoners 
of War, based on the Australians at War Film Archive.201 Caulfield organised his 
selection of POW interviews from the European and Pacific Theatres into themes, 
including positional and emergent leadership.   
 
Caulfield has produced three other edited collections. One of these collections, Voices 
of War: Stories from the Australians at War Film Archive, explores the Australian 
prisoner experience from across both theatres of the Second World War in a 
chronological narrative.202 Charles Rollings and Mararet Geddes have produced 
similar collections of oral histories, which include POW stories, organised in a 
chronological narrative.203 Brian MacArthur’s work Surviving the Sword: Prisoners of 
the Japanese 1942-1945 combines oral interviews and diaries to explain the 
experiences of British, Australian and American POWs across different captive 
settings.204 
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Stalag XIB, Fallingbostel, Autumn 1944.  
The prisoners stand rigidly at attention, boots shined, clothes clean, hopeful their 
improvised efforts will be enough.1 He strides towards the morning parade with 
purpose, dignity and poise. He stops to inspect his men, the prisoners, his fellow 
captives. Finally, he bellows ‘My name is Lord! J.C. Lord. Jesus Christ Lord, the only 
holy man in the British Army and don’t you forget it!’2  
 
Authoritarian leadership is a directive style usually adopted by positional leaders to 
achieve a specific task or goal.3 It is characterised by an uncompromising belief that 
position legitimizes the act of ‘telling’4 subordinates or followers what to do. The 
leader, therefore, has control, and at times absolute power, over his subordinates.5 
Authoritarian leaders impose a pathway towards the achievement of their self-defined 
vision. This is demonstrated through the leader’s ability to dictate followers’ actions 
and behaviours along with rewards and/or punishments. Authoritarian leadership is the 
nucleus of military structure and power where rank gives authority. This positional 
power is legally protected by enforceable regulations.6 Within this organisational 
structure it is a cultural expectation that a positional leader adopts an authoritarian 
style. Almost all military POW camps transferred regulatory hierarchical structures to 
the captive state. This structure allowed the ranking positional leaders and some 
emergent leaders to use an authoritarian style. The adoption of this leadership style 
was not forced. It was a conscious choice based in military culture.     
 
Yet, even in the military, rank does not provide a leader with automatic followership 
from subordinates. Rather, rank only imposes ‘headship.’7 As Charles Holloman 
argues, ‘Leadership is more a function of the group or situation than a quality which 
adheres to a person appointed to a formal position...’8 Rank positional leaders 
                                                          
1 Rolf, Prisoners of the Reich, pp.40-41. 
2 E. Stonard cited in Rolf, Prisoners of the Reich, p.41. 
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Graumann and S. Moscovici (eds.), Changing Conceptions of Leadership: Springer Series in Social 
Psychology, (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986), pp.87-91. 
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8 ibid., p.97.  
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therefore have to earn legitimacy for their leadership through their actions and 
treatment of subordinates that, in turn, builds followership. In captivity, moral 
legitimacy becomes an even more important requirement for positional leadership 
because the legal authority of rank is compromised by captivity. The compromised 
authority of rank also means that positional leadership based on rank can be 
superseded in importance by leadership characterised by followership.   
 
This section explores three different leaders who adopted an authoritarian style of 
leadership. The first is a positional leader within the Pacific Theatre, Lieutenant 
Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan. As prisoner of the Japanese in Changi, 
Galleghan was the quintessential positional leader who maintained a traditional 
military style of authoritarian leadership based on regulations and procedures set down 
by the army. Despite his captive status, Galleghan never paused to consider any other 
sort of leadership style. Strict adherence to military regulations was the only standard 
he applied behind the wire, despite the deteriorating captive conditions in Changi. 
Galleghan believed that a strict continuation of military disciplinary procedures, 
including punishment, would allow him to achieve leadership legitimacy and build 
followership. 
 
Captain Reginald William James Newton is the second leader explored in this section. 
Newton was a prisoner of the Japanese. Despite only being a captain, Newton became 
a positional leader of Australians in two volatile captive settings in the Pacific Theatre 
because he was the highest ranked officer: Pudu Jail in Kuala Lumpur and the Burma-
Thailand Railway. To achieve his leadership goal of collective survival, Newton 
adopted an authoritarian style. Of the three leaders examined in this section, according 
to the men in his formal group, Newton acquired leadership legitimacy and a fierce 
followership. He did this by using his cunning, courage and sheer audacity in his 
attempts to outwit the captor to protect his men from the captor’s aggression. This was 
a battle Newton largely won. In return for his efforts, men within and from outside his 
formal group not only recognised his status as a leader but also acknowledged his 
success.  
 
The third leader, British Squadron Leader Rodger Bushell, is an example of an 
emergent leader whose legitimacy was based on an expertise highly relevant to men in 
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captivity, that is, escape. A prisoner of the Germans in Dulag Luft and Stalag Luft III, 
Bushell’s expertise and experience in escape activities enabled him to become a leader 
amongst groups of multi-national prisoners. Bushell also exercised authoritative 
leadership over these men. His master plan of a mass escape enabled him to retain 
legitimacy despite his emergent status. Australian, British, Commonwealth and even 
American prisoners willingly accepted his uncompromising style of leadership for a 
slim, or even fool’s, hope of freedom.  
 
Although the leadership of the three men examined in this section was of an 
authoritarian style, each man had very different motives for applying this traditional 
military leadership style in captivity. Galleghan believed that the only way to secure 
the collective survival of the men under his command was to maintain the belief that 
they were soldiers, not prisoners: he ran Changi, he said, ‘as if we were still in the 
army’.9 Newton knew that he had to have absolute control over his men if he was to 
have any hope of achieving a leadership goal he shared with Galleghan: the collective 
survival of men under his command. Yet, he also knew that the traditional military 
methods would not work in the volatile conditions in which he led his men and so 
adapted his leadership style in a manner that would have been anathema for 
Galleghan. Bushell had more a selfish motive. He used an authoritarian leadership 
style to recruit and control the men of Stalag Luft III North Compound for his escape 
scheme so that he could have another chance to escape captivity.  
 
The respective formal groups of these three authoritarian leaders reacted very 
differently to their leadership styles and their leadership goals. As will be argued in the 
chapters that follow, Galleghan’s refusal to acknowledge the limitations of his power 
in captivity, and the reality of his conditions, meant that he struggled to achieve 
leadership legitimacy let alone followership amongst the men under his command. 
Newton, however, by accepting the fact that he was a prisoner of the Japanese (and all 
that it entailed) succeeded as an authoritarian leader. Bushell’s execution by the 
Germans ensured that, in popular memory, his personal motivations would be largely 
forgotten because he had organised the largest mass escape of prisoners in Germany, 
the Great Escape.  
                                                          
9 F. Galleghan cited in Nelson, POW, p.34.  
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CHAPTER 2: LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK (BLACK JACK) 
GALLAGHER GALLEGHAN 
 
Frederick (Black Jack) Gallagher Galleghan, a Lieutenant Colonel in charge of the 
2/30th Battalion, had aspirations of becoming a general.1 As a member of the 8th 
Division his ambitions were dealt a bitter blow. The surrender of Singapore meant he 
became a POW. Stan Arneil, Galleghan’s biographer, suggests the realisation of his 
fate was perhaps Galleghan’s darkest hour. ‘The frustrations he suffered and the 
agonizing of “what might have been” had the army not capitulated was a cross which 
he and others bore for three and a half years as pows [sic].’2 Yet captivity offered 
Galleghan the opportunity to become an unequivocal leader of men. Sir Roden Culter 
suggests that this period may even have been Galleghan’s happiest as captivity 
provided a setting where he could fulfil his leadership ambitions on his own terms.3  
 
Galleghan’s leadership style 
As a Lieutenant Colonel in the Citizens Militia Force and then in the Second AIF, 
Galleghan founded his leadership style upon regulation, order and discipline.4 He had 
an uncompromising authoritarian style coupled with an abrupt manner born from a 
resolute conviction in his abilities as a ranking officer. Even before captivity, 
Galleghan’s style of leadership led to difficulties, both within units he commanded and 
with his superiors. His leadership style so antagonised AIF HQ that it took the 
intervention of former Prime Minister William Morris Hughes to secure his 
appointment at battalion level in the Second AIF.5 
 
Galleghan’s position as the ranking Australian officer in Changi was due to the 
Japanese decision to separate senior officers, defined as prisoners above the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel, from their men. Thus on 21 July 1942, on the authority of joint 
orders by Australian Major General Cecil Arthur Callaghan, and British Malaya 
Command Lieutenant General Arthur Ernest Percival, Galleghan was promoted from 
                                                          
1 Arneil, Black Jack, p.18. 
2 ibid., p.18. 
3 R. Culter, Foreword, in Arneil, Black Jack, p.viii.  
4 Arneil, Black Jack, pp.22-29, 58-60; A. Penfold, W. Bayliss and R. Crispin, Galleghan’s Greyhounds: 
History of the 2/30 Battalion, (Sydney: 2/30 Battalion AIF Association, 1979), pp.3-4.  
5 Arneil, Black Jack, pp.58-59.  
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Lieutenant Colonel to GOC AIF.6 Galleghan therefore inherited positional leadership 
of the Australian Compound in Changi. By this time, the Australians had been behind 
the wire for nearly five months. Galleghan, therefore, did not have the challenge of 
setting up leadership structures within the first few months of captivity. Instead, this 
responsibility had fallen to his superior, Callaghan. 
  
On 19 February 1942, a few days after their capture, the Japanese threatened ‘extreme 
measures’7 if positional leaders were unable to control their men. Callaghan, taking the 
threat seriously, ensured his men realised that not only did rank authority remain in 
place behind the wire, but also that Australian military law remained operable. In 
doing so, he laid the foundation for legitimising positional leadership based upon an 
authoritarian style within captivity.    
 
Callaghan, however, quickly discovered that transferring traditional military structure 
and discipline to captivity was not easy. In the earliest days, the relevance and 
legitimacy of positional leaders hung in the balance. Men’s natural feelings of anger, 
resentment and fear were channelled into grievances against their officers.8 Ill-
discipline and displays of bad temper were commonplace. Many of the other ranks 
believed that the authority of officers ceased to exist in captivity. Callaghan responded 
to this challenge towards officer authority by implementing a ‘flexible’ transfer of 
Australian military structures in Changi. Having established an AIF HQ, he divided 
the Australian Compound into six areas based on Brigade, Battalion and Unit lines, 
each with its Commanding Officer.9 Callaghan also realised that rank alone could not 
secure the control of Australians. In a letter to his officers, Callaghan explained, 
‘Discipline is not created by edict. You do not achieve discipline simply by giving 
                                                          
6 C. Callaghan, Special Order, 20 July 1942, p.1, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; C. Callaghan, Special 
Order, 5 August 1942, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2; A. Percival, Court Martial Warrant, 20 July 42, 
AWM 3DRL/2313, Folder 2. In April 1944 the captor extended Galleghan’s power to Deputy Camp 
Commander and Representative Officer to IJA. See F. Galleghan, Monthly Report April 1944, 
Appendix 14, p.2, AWM52 1/5/19/23. 
7 Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.3. Also see AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 19 
February 1942, p.1, AWM52 1/5/19/8.  
8 For example see Kenny, ‘How I Won the War with Three Aces and a Pair of Twos’, p.1; Oakes, 
‘Singapore Story’, p.257; Young, ‘Return to a Dark Age’, p.34; Wilson, You’ll Never Get Off the 
Island, pp.6-7. 
9 In total Changi consisted of six compounds for the Australian, British, Dutch and Indian POWs. No 
interaction allowed except by their respective positional leaders under the authority of British Malaya 
Command. See Mason, Prisoners of War, p.174; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.514.  
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orders; discipline is inspired, created and maintained by leadership. Without that 
inspiration and without that necessary leadership, you will never get discipline.’10 To 
establish the legitimacy of their leadership in captivity, Callaghan was suggesting that 
his officers needed to rely on something more than military regulations. A 
combination of practical example, empathy and motivation was required. ‘Always 
endeavour to look at things from the men’s point of view...Your only concern is 
welfare and efficiency. Be strong and consistent. Don’t try to impress. Be natural. Set 
your standards and adhere to it [sic].’11 Callaghan, therefore, appealed to men’s 
intrinsic natural loyalties and reinforced the view that the alternative, a mob mentality, 
was an inherent risk to their survival.12 In effect, Callaghan was devolving some of the 
authority normally centred in HQ to the officers in the compounds.  
 
Callaghan’s approach to leadership in captivity did not mean that disciplinary 
standards would be allowed to irreversibly slide. To reinforce regulatory procedures, 
for example, he introduced an AIF detention barracks.13 Unit patrols (provosts) acted 
as a deterrent to unacceptable behaviour.14 Until barbed wire was erected around the 
compound on 28 February, he placed Australian sentries around the compound 
boundaries on Japanese orders.15 Yet in spite of his carefully calculated response to 
their captive state, Callaghan never achieved complete control of his formal group. 
The AIF HQ War Diary reveals that discipline remained a problem, rooted in the 
                                                          
10 C. Callaghan, Changi Address delivered by Brigadier J.H, Thyer to Officers, Warrant Officers and 
Senior NCOs in the Changi Prison Camp on 18 June 1942, p.2, AWM 3DRL/4035. This address was 
delivered by Thyer due to Callaghan’s ill-health.  
11 ibid., p.8.  
12 ibid., pp.2-8. 
13 AIF HQ Malaya, Re Capitulation and Revision of AIF Prisoners of War Administration Instructions 
1942, pp. 3-4, AWM52 1/5/19/8; Galleghan, Singapore POW Camps Report, pp.1-2; Letter to the 
Officer Commanding all Camps in S’pore from unknown Brigadier, pp.1-3, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1. 
14 AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 22 February 1942, Appendix 1, AWM52 1/5/19/8.  
15 AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 10 March 1942, Appendix 2, AWM52 1/5/19/8; Major Kato, 
Regulations for Prisoners of War, 24 March 1942, p.2, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1. Barbed wire was not 
placed around the Australian Compound until 28 February. The Japanese made the POWs responsible 
for installing and maintaining their compounds boundaries. See Havers, Reassessing the Japanese 
Prisoner of War Experience, p.57. 
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notion of the other ranks that rank had lost its authority in captivity.16 Most Australian 
other ranks still saw their officers as the same men who had led them into captivity. 17  
When Galleghan became positional leader in July 1942, the Australian Compound was 
operating of the basis of a traditional military structure, and Galleghan used this 
structure as the basis for his own positional leadership response.18 However, unlike 
Callaghan’s willingness to acknowledge the unique circumstances of captivity through 
applying a flexible approach to leadership, Galleghan saw captivity as simply a new 
military setting, and therefore his leadership approach remained unchanged from that 
which he had practiced within a service setting. Galleghan’s leadership style and 
orders aimed to reinforce his men’s identity as soldiers. He explained to historian 
Hank Nelson: 
I ran it as if we were still in the army. I remember I used to say to the 
troops as often as I could ‘you’re soldiers and when I march you out of this 
camp I’m going to march you out as soldiers. I’m not going to march you 
out as a mob. You’ll still be soldiers on the day it’s over.’19   
 
That meant adopting an uncompromising authoritarian style. Nothing less than 
absolute control was acceptable.   
 
The nature of Galleghan’s orders provides evidence of his strict authoritarian style. 
For example, on 30 July 1942 he announced, ‘HQ [AIF Changi] will control all policy 
and [the] commander will take full responsibility.’20 Galleghan, therefore, quickly 
abandoned Callaghan’s flexible approach to military regulations in captivity of 
                                                          
16 For example of the lack of authority in traditional ranks see AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 27 February 
1942, p.13, AWM52 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 18 April 1942, p.63, AWM52 
1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 30 July 1942, p.138, AWM52 1/5/19/8. For example of 
rank and file perception of rank authority see L. Stable, Address to AIF Ordnance Battalion at Changi, 
25 March 1942, AWM PR86/191; Young, ‘Return to a Dark Age’, p.34; Sprod, Bamboo Round My 
Shoulder, p.9. 
17 For example see Oakes, ‘Singapore Story’, p.257. 
18 For reference to Callaghan’s organisation see AIF HQ Malaya, Capitulation and Revision of AIF 
Prisoners of War Administrative Instructions, 15 March 1942, pp.1-6, AWM54 54/11/21; Callaghan, 
Changi Address delivered to Officers, Warrant Officers and Senior NCOs in the Changi Prison Camp, 
p.2; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, pp.1-3; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the 
Japanese,’ pp.511-519; Walker, Middle East and Far East, pp.523-532.  
19 F. Galleghan cited in Nelson, POW, p.34. 
20 F. Galleghan, Notes of First Conference of Area Comds and HQ staff held by Lt-Col Galleghan 
ADM Comd AIF 30 Jul 1942, para 2, AWM 3DRL\2313 Folder 2. Also see AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of 
Conference 30 July 1942, p.138; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 15 August 1942, p.144, 
AWM52 1/5/19/8; Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.10.  
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devolving some power to officers within the six compounds. Instead, just as in times 
of training and battle, Galleghan centralised control and he used this power to its full 
extent. He promulgated hundreds of routine orders for Australian captives in Changi. 
These orders consolidated his positional power and demonstrated his authoritarian 
leadership style, even down to the smallest level. For example, he banned the use of 
two unspecified abusive words, prohibited other ranks from engaging in organised 
gambling, restricted movement between the unit areas in the compound, banned the 
growth of beards, introduced compulsory morse code classes for mental stimulation 
and vigorously enforced the saluting of Australian, British and Dutch officers.21 
Controversially, Galleghan also retained traditional officer privileges associated with 
active service. For example, Galleghan allotted officers higher pay, more rations and 
excluded them from compound fatigues and Japanese work parties.22 Officers were 
also entitled to the services of full time batmen.23 This practice was only abandoned 
when too many Australian other ranks had been transferred out of the camp in 
overseas Work Forces.  
 
To reinforce his vision that the Australians remained soldiers, not prisoners, Galleghan 
structured the daily activities of his men. Beginning with reveille at 0800 hours and 
concluding with lights out at 2245 hours, the day for Australians in Changi consisted 
of five parades, three meal breaks, two work periods and nightly recreational 
activities.24 Camp fatigues were compulsory for other ranks. Depending on Japanese 
demands, additional work could also be allocated to the men.25 In the early period of 
                                                          
21 AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 30 July 1942, p.139; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 8 
September 1942, p.152A, AWM52 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 29 December 1942, 
p.191D, AWM52 1/5/19/18; F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders, No.190, 1 September 1943, p.12, 
AWM52 1/5/19/18. 
22  For reference to the officers pay see Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, pp.17-18. 
For reference to allegations of officers receiving more rations see Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, pp.45, 
63-64; J. Kerr, loose paper titled ‘The End of the Track’, AWM PR 86/191; S. Leonard, loose writings 
titled ‘Officers’, AWM PR01013 Folder 5; Braddon, The Naked Island, p.154; McLaggan, The Will to 
Survive, pp.70,79; Sprod, Bamboo Round My Shoulders, p.36. For reference to Galleghan protecting 
officers from compound fatigues and working parties see AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 8 
September 1942, p.152A; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 17 September 1943, Appendix 2G, 
AWM52 1/5/19/8.   
23 F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders, No.140, 14 April 1943, AWM54 1/5/19/12 Part 2.   
24 C. Bayliss, Diary 13 January 1942, AWM PR00555. Galleghan’s daily schedule was based upon 
Lieutenant Colonel Sugita’s requirement for POWs issued on 10 March 1942. See unknown Brigadier, 
Preliminary Draft on Standing Orders for British and Australian Prisoners of War, 10 March 1942, 
pp.1-2, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1.  
25 For examples see M. Felsch, Diary 12 December 1942, AWM PR01391; Arneil, One Man’s War, p.l; 
McLaggan, The Will to Survive, pp.66,70. These work parties remained housed in Changi. Other work 
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his positional leadership tenure, July 1942 to March 1943, Galleghan ordered that 
regimental exercises, competitions and instruction be held.26 Instructions were 
delivered by officers to the ranks on subjects such as military drills, air raid practices, 
NCO training courses, and unit and brigade ceremonial parades. Participation in most 
activities was compulsory. Galleghan believed that by maintaining regular military 
routines, the men would cease to think of themselves as prisoners, rank authority 
would be maintained and his authoritarian leadership style would be legitimised.  
 
Punitive discipline was central to Galleghan’s authoritarian leadership. Originally, 
Galleghan had maintained Callaghan’s ‘flexible’ disciplinary system.27 This meant 
District Court Martials at compound level were convened for all charges against 
officers and for serious charges against NCOs. Commanding Officers dealt with the 
less serious breaches by NCOs and all other ranks. However, even in this largely 
decentralised disciplinary system, Galleghan ensured his presence was felt by 
suggesting punishments to compound Commanding Officers. The sentences he 
suggested included up to 28 days in the AIF detention barracks, fines of £5 in the 
equivalent in Japanese pay, extra fatigues or warnings. Not satisfied with the 
behaviour of the men, however, on 9 February 1943, Galleghan centralised 
punishment.28 This meant all charges against any Australian officer or other rank were 
now subject to a centralised disciplinary proceedings, using normal military law, 
including, if it was necessary, District Court Martials which would be held at AIF HQ.  
 
Assuming total control of disciplinary proceedings reflected Galleghan’s belief that 
only he could strictly enforce his orders and thereby control the behaviour of the 
Australians within the compounds. However, it proved to be a mistaken belief: overall, 
                                                          
parties had been formed in the immediate aftermath of surrender. These were permanently posted in 
other location in Singapore. See AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 22 February 1942, Appendix 1; 
Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.519.  
26After this date depleted access to clothing, deteriorating health and increased Japanese work demands 
curbed these activities. For reference to the regimental life of Australians in Changi see AIF HQ 
Malaya, War Diary 26 January 1943, p.206, AWM521/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 4 February 
1943, p.199, AWM52 1/5/19/8; AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 27 February 1943, p.206, AWM52 
1/5/19/8; Galleghan, Prisoners of War Camps Singapore Report, p.4.    
27 Letter to the Officer Commanding all Camps in S’pore from unknown Brigadier, pp.1-3; A. 
Thompson, Memo Discipline, 23 August 1942, Schedule X, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1.  
28 AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 9 February 1943, p.200A, AWM52 1/5/19/8.  
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under Galleghan’s revised system, Australian disciplinary standards slipped.29 Crime 
rates rose from the beginning of 1943 and by January 1944 it had reached epidemic 
levels.30 Many reasons for this pattern existed. Survivors had returned from overseas 
Work Forces, in particular the Burma-Thailand Railway. At this location, Australians 
had endured volatile captive conditions including starvation, forced labour and sadistic 
violence by the Japanese. Back in Changi, basic rations had reached their lowest levels 
and the Japanese were demanding daily working parties to construct an aerodrome. All 
of these factors contributed to a growing dissatisfaction amongst the men as they 
slipped into a survivorship mode to cope with the deteriorating conditions. Yet, none 
of this forced Galleghan to reflect upon his leadership style. He refused to adopt a 
more flexible disciplinary regime to accommodate the acute physical and 
psychological needs of the men that might have ameliorated the situation. Instead, he 
saw the rising crime rate as a challenge to his authority and he reacted accordingly. 
For example, he amended Court Marital Procedures so that from September 1943 a 
prisoner charged with trading on the black market inside Changi now bore the burden 
of proving his innocence.31 Nor was Galleghan afraid to publicly display his power as 
a leader. For example, the AIF HQ War Diary noted that from 30 January 1944, 
Galleghan installed himself as the only presiding officer in Australian Court Marital 
Proceedings.32 Stan Arniel, one of Galleghan’s greatest supporters, alleged that 
Galleghan even fixed trial results and likened Galleghan’s approach to military law to 
that of a ‘marshal of the wild west in the USA.’ 33 Not surprisingly, the number of 
                                                          
29 For example see AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 26 May 1943, Appendix B-10, pp.1-2, 
AWM52 1/5/19/14; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 23 July 1943, Appendix 3C, AWM52 
1/5/19/16; AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 6 January 1944, Appendix 2A, AWM52 1/5/19/23; 
AIF HQ Malaya, Notes of Conference 20 January 1944, Appendix 2C, AWM52 1/5/19/23; AIF HQ 
Malaya, Notes of Conference 14 April 1944, Appendix 2B, AWM52 1/5/19/23; P. Head, Memo 
Discipline-Trading, 15 August 1943, Appendix 10, AWM52 1/5/19/17. 
30 Substantial increase in crime can be observed from detention barracks admissions and re-admissions 
statistics noted in AIF War Diaries in January to March 1944. For example see D. Head, A.I.F. 
Detention Barracks Changi Monthly Return of Detainees M/In and M/Out of Barracks Period – Jan 
1944, Appendix 21, AWM52 1/5/19/21; O.C Dent Barracks, Monthly Return of Detainees in Detention 
Period Feb- 1944, Appendix 23, AWM52 1/5/19/22; Officer I/C Detention Barracks, A.I.F. Detention 
Barracks Return for Month of March 1944, Appendix 29A, AWM52 1/5/19/22. Also see AIF HQ 
Malaya, Notes of Malaya Command Conference 18 February 1943, p.1, AWM51 1/5/19/11 Part 1; F. 
Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders, 27 April 1943, Appendix S1, AWM52 1/5/9/12 Part 2.  
31 F. Galleghan, AIF Routine Orders No.192, 3 September 1943, Appendix 1B, AWM52 1/5/19/18.   
32 AIF HQ Malaya, AIF War Diary 30 January 1944, p.9, AWM52 1/5/19/21; Arneil, Black Jack, p.30.  
33 Arneil, Black Jack, p.30. Possible collaboration of this allegation exists in the writings of Hatton. See 
Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, f.121.   
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charges laid against, and guilty findings for, other ranks steadily increased.34 
Galleghan’s rigid authoritarian leadership style, then, also contributed to the spiralling 
rates of crime. 
 
Combined, these acts reveal the inherent contradiction within Galleghan’s leadership 
style. To control his men, Galleghan himself breached traditional military disciplinary 
procedures. Through these illegal actions, Galleghan was admitting that his control 
over his men, despite his positional authority as GOC AIF, was insecure. Positional 
leadership through rank alone was not enough to secure his position as the Australian 
leader if his power and authority was not accepted by the men behind the wire.      
 
Other illegal actions taken by Galleghan, as ranking officer, provide further evidence 
that he could not secure his leadership authority, let alone legitimacy, through his 
authoritarian leadership style. Prior to his forced departure, Callaghan had explicitly 
restricted Galleghan’s authority as GOC in one area: Galleghan was not allowed to 
‘promot[e] officers, warrant officers or NCOs.’35 Yet, in his position as GOC, 
Galleghan promoted rank and file to acting unpaid positions. 36 Galleghan rationalised 
this direct breach of his orders by pointing to the high rate of illness amongst the 
Australian prisoners and their movements out of Changi.37 In his formal report on his 
leadership in Changi, Galleghan also stated that beaching Callaghan’s orders were 
‘necessary… for the purposes of discipline and control.’38 Under the pretext of 
discipline and control, Galleghan also decommissioned officers who disobeyed his 
orders.39 While no precise instructions were left from Callaghan regarding officer 
decommissioning, it is clear from his selective promotion of officers who agreed with 
his leadership style, and the decommissioning of officers who questioned and 
disobeyed his orders, that Galleghan was creating a circle of supporters who would 
                                                          
34 In the 12 month period from February 1942 to February 1943 332 men were detained. See AIF 
Detention Barracks POW Yearly Return of Men in Detention for the Year Ending 28th Feb 1943, 
pp.114-115, AWM52 1/5/19/11 Part 1.  
35 Callaghan, Special Order, 20 July 1942. 
36 D. Head, WOs and NCOs Review, 14 February 1944, Appendix 15, pp.1-2, AWM52 1/5/19/21; 
Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.11; F. Galleghan, Routine Orders No.148, 7 
April 1943, p.200, AWM52 1/5/19/12 Part 2; F. Galleghan, Routine Orders No.182, 7 August 1943, 
Appendix 1B, AWM52 1/5/19/17. 
37 Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.11. 
38 ibid.   
39 For examples of decommissioning of unpaid promotions see S. Arneil, Diary 20 June 1944, AWM 
PR88/076; J. Roxburgh, Diary 21 December 1944, AWM PR84/117. 
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follow his orders without question. Then, with their support, as GOC of Australians in 
Changi, Galleghan could ignore the limitations of his own rank because he believed 
that he had the authority and power to issue orders beyond those allowed under 
traditional military law.  
 
Explaining Galleghan’s leadership style 
Although Galleghan’s leadership goal was the collective survival of his men, as he 
made clear in his interview with Nelson discussed above, the most important reason 
underlying Galleghan’s leadership style was his refusal to accept his status as a 
prisoner. He continued to perceive his role as that of a regular military positional 
officer in a new military setting. Underlying this perception was a deeply personal 
motive. He wanted his experiences as a military leader to become part of Australian 
public memory. In a letter to Australian Lieutenant Colonel Charles Henry Kappe, on 
26 January 1943, he wrote: ‘It is by these means [regular military discipline] we will 
create an AIF in Malaya that in the future will add fresh laurels to those already 
earned.’40 The letter was written seven months into Galleghan’s period as a positional 
leader when conditions in Changi were relatively stable and, as far as he was 
concerned, he was successfully establishing himself as a positional leader.  
 
Prior to 1944, Galleghan’s experience with the Japanese as captors had been relatively 
easy and, in fact, had given Galleghan an event that he regarded as both a victory over 
the captor and an affirmation of his leadership style. The event had come very early in 
his term as a positional leader. 
 
Fourteen days after the transfer of senior officers, and on the same day as the 
execution of two Australian prisoners who had been recaptured after they attempted to 
escape (see Chapter 8), Galleghan and British Malaya Command were requested by 
the Japanese to sign a no-escape clause which stated; ‘I, the undersigned, hereby 
solemnly swear on my honour that I will not, under any circumstances, attempt to 
escape.’41 The Japanese threatened ‘measures of severity,’42 meaning the confinement 
                                                          
40 Letter to Lt-Col C.H Kappe, Officers, NCOs and Men, 27 Inf Bde from F. Galleghan, 26 January 
1943, p.1, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 2. 
41 Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.16. 
42 Barrack Square Concentration, 1 September 1942, pp.1-2, AWM 3DRL/2313, Folder 3. Also see AIF 
HQ Malaya, Notes on Special Conference 1415 hours 30 August 1942, p.1, AWM54 1/5/19/8.  
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of the prisoner population, if they refused to sign. It was clearly meant to establish the 
authority of the captor over the prisoners. In response to this threat to his authority, 
Galleghan, in combination with British Malaya Command GOC Lieutenant Colonel E. 
B. Holmes, reacted with an authoritarian response to the Japanese.43  
 
In the first joint meeting chaired by Holmes as the ranking officer in response to the 
Japanese request, the British Compound leaders and Galleghan refused to sign the 
clause.44 Their objection was to the precise wording of the clause.45 They wanted a 
direct order to sign the document which, they believed, would nullify the words 
‘honour’ and ‘promise’46 thereby rendering it meaningless. Galleghan explained their 
position to the Japanese Commandant. He asked him ‘how he [Galleghan] could be 
ordered to swear on his honour, and asked if his honour was subject to Japanese 
orders.’47 This abrupt non-submissive tone demonstrates Galleghan’s refusal to accept 
his captive status. He was not a subservient prisoner, but a defiant military leader who 
did not recognise the limitations of his position as a POW.     
 
In response to the prisoner’s stance, the Japanese Commandant ordered reprisals. At 
1800 hours on 2 September 1943, 15 400 British and Australian POWs were rounded 
up and marched to Selarang Barrack Square.48 The precise dimensions of the square 
are contested. Galleghan puts the dimensions at 150 yards by 250 yards.49 Holmes 
extends this by ten yards.50 In contrast the Official Australian History places the 
                                                          
43 Lieutenant Colonel E. Holmes outranked Galleghan. Therefore communications with the captor were 
conducted as a joint response. See Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.3; 
Galleghan, Notes of First Conference of Area Comds and HQ Staff held by Lt-Col Galleghan ADM 
Comd AIF 30 Jul 1942, para 2.  
44 E. Holmes, Interim Report on British and Australian PW Camps Singapore Island for Period of 17 
August 1942 to 31 August 1945, p.4, Appendix 7, AWM52 554/11/4 Part 10.  
45 AIF HQ Malaya, Notes on Special Conference 1415 hours 30 August 1942, p.1; Havers, Reassessing 
the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience, p.66. 
46 Gallehgan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, p.17. 
47 AIF HQ Malaya, Notes on Special Conference 1415 hours 30 August 1942, p.1. 
48 This figure is based on Galleghan’s report. See Galleghan, Prisoner of War Camps Singapore Report, 
p.16. In his notes on the Barrack Square Concentration Galleghan places the number of POWs confined 
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dimensions at just over eight acres.51 What is undisputed is that this space could not 
accommodate the number of prisoners. There were only seven three-storey buildings 
to house them. The Australians occupied one building.52 Here men were assigned to 
rooms, hallways, stairs, the roof and the small area of open ground in front of the 
building. The prisoners were ordered by the Japanese to remain in the square until they 
signed the no-escape clause.  
 
In this new setting Galleghan’s leadership style remained authoritative.53 He ordered 
men to remain in unit lines, established a 24 hour duty roster for essential services 
such as the construction of latrines on the open cement square, pickets to monitor 
prisoner behaviour and a sentry to guard the enforced perimeter. The last requirement 
was essential. The Japanese had surrounded the square with machine guns.  
Within this confined and dangerous setting, British Malaya Command, along with the 
British and Australian leaders, remained defiant.54 Over four days they presented the 
Commandant with four alternative drafts of the no-escape clause. The Commandant 
refused to negotiate as he did not have the authority to change the wording of the 
clause that originated from Tokyo.  
 
With negotiations going nowhere, the situation for the prisoners in Serlang Barrack 
Square quickly became dire. Severe water and food shortages, combined with 
primitive sanitary conditions, created dangerous health conditions.55 Lieutenant 
Colonel Glyn White, the Australian SMO in Changi, predicted that in these conditions 
there would be 400 cases of dysentery by the end of the first week, and after three 
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weeks there would be no survivors.56 The Japanese then threatened to move the 
hospital patients into the square and hinted at the possibility of executions. Only at this 
point did the positional Malaya, British and Australian leaders consider surrendering 
to the captor’s demands.57 
 
Yet, for some unknown reason, the Japanese Commandant began to waver. With a hint 
of victory, Galleghan’s defiance returned. He urged his Australian and the British 
officers to stand firm. He explained his reasoning to AIF HQ. ‘If we could get a direct 
order from the IJA we have gained something from the barrack square.’58 Galleghan 
clearly interpreted this incident as a power struggle between his own positional power 
and that of the captor, a struggle which, despite the risk to his men, he refused to lose.   
On 4 September 1942 the Japanese re-issued Order Number 7. Back dated to 2 
September it included a statement ordering the prisoners to sign the no-escape clause. 
Galleghan rejoiced in his victory.59 When the Australians were still in Serlang Barrack 
Square, he addressed them. ‘All you have to do for the present is play the game like 
men, be soldiers of the AIF, carry out your orders of the AIF and with the help of God 
I hope to lead you home again.’60 This excerpt from Galleghan’s speech reveals that, 
in his mind, the showdown with the captor had validated his perception of his status as 
a soldier and therefore the validity of transferring a military authoritarian leadership 
style into captivity. His victory, he believed, had confirmed that he was not a leader of 
prisoners but of active Australian soldiers in a military setting. 
 
Yet, Galleghan’s behaviour during this incident contradicted his leadership goal of 
collective survivorship. Above all, Galleghan wanted to lead his men home. He 
believed that only through the absolute control of the men could he achieve this goal.61 
Yet, his aggressive stance towards the Japanese in this incident demonstrates his 
willingness to place his men’s lives at risk for the sake of his own leadership authority. 
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His refusal to accept the submissiveness of his position as a prisoner meant that 
Galleghan brought his men into a potentially catastrophic situation. His victory, 
however, affirmed his convictions about his leadership style and that the risk he had 
taken was justified.   
 
Galleghan fiercely believed his authoritarian leadership style in captivity would bring 
him recognition for performing his duty. Yet, increasing his positional power, and the 
way he used that power as discussed earlier, led to the men questioning his 
authenticity and motives in being their positional leader in captivity. His continual 
blindness to the reality of this situation meant that for the majority of Australian 
prisoners Galleghan’s ‘headship’ never transformed into legitimate leadership. Instead 
Galleghan became a threat to their survival.  
 
The responses of officers and men to Galleghan’s leadership style   
The writings and recollections of Australians imprisoned in Changi reveal that there 
were three different responses to Galleghan’s leadership. The first was support for 
Galleghan at different stages of captivity in Changi, although this support was 
spasmodic and not ongoing. Men whose reaction to Galleghan fell into this category 
were often prisoners who had known Galleghan prior to captivity, in particular the 
officers and men from his own battalion.   
 
The second was amusement at Galleghan’s perception of his power as a POW. The 
third response was open defiance. Some Australian officers and men remained 
constant in their perceptions of Galleghan, others fluctuated between the three 
different responses. Most, however, did not believe that his authoritarian style, and the 
decisions that he made, turned him into a legitimate leader.  
 
One of the unique features of Galleghan’s leadership in Changi is the difference 
between the allegiance of some of the men from Galleghan’s own battalion and those 
from outside it.62 Prisoner writings demonstrate that beyond his own battalion, 
Galleghan never received legitimacy for his leadership style and therefore, did not 
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have followership. These Australians were unable to connect with, or even understand, 
Galleghan’s rationale for pretending they were still active soldiers and not prisoners. 
This perception led to an inherent lack of trust in the motives and methods of 
Galleghan’s authoritarian leadership. Historian Hank Nelson agrees that men outside 
of his own battalion were less tolerant of Galleghan’s leadership style as they did not 
understand his methods.63 For these men, Galleghan was not a legitimate leader, but an 
obstacle to their survivorship in captivity.   
 
In contrast, some men from Galleghan’s 30th Battalion, who had forged a relationship 
with and understanding of his leadership style in months of hard training prior to their 
deployment, understood that his rigid approach was meant to create group loyalty for 
the purpose of victory, however it was defined.64 For most men this had been a slow 
and often painful learning process. However, when they finally understood his 
purpose, a bond formed between the ‘old man’65 and his loyal supporters.    
Galleghan’s only public breakdown in captivity proves the strength of this 
relationship. On 16 December 1943 the first group of survivors from his 30th Battalion 
returned from the Burma-Thailand Railway.66 The officers and men were 
unrecognisable. Emaciated shadows stood in front of him. In a powerful display of the 
loyalty and followership of these men, the survivors paraded before their commander. 
Stan Arneil recalls the incident.  
 
The sergeant major dressed us off and we stood in a straight line as he 
went over and reported to Colonel Johnston. Johnston went over to Black 
Jack Galleghan and he said, “Your 2\30 all present and correct sir.” And 
Galleghan said, “Where are the rest?” The Major then said, “They are all 
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here sir.” And we were. Black Jack Galleghan, the iron man, broke down 
and cried.67  
 
In this moment, for the first and only time in captivity, Galleghan was forced to face 
the reality of his status as a prisoner. Beyond the confines of Changi, he was 
powerless, he could not protect his men from the aggression and violence of the 
Japanese. Yet, even this shock did not give Galleghan pause to reconsider his 
leadership style. He continued to focus on what he could control, his authoritarian 
leadership of his formal group in Changi.    
 
The lengths that Galleghan went to in an effort to prove that he and his men were not 
prisoners sometimes created moments of amusement. Most of these moments centred 
on Galleghan’s insistence that the Australians observe routine military procedures at 
Changi. Galleghan’s compulsory regimental parades provides one example of this 
reaction. The writings of Private Elliott McMaster describe his participation in the 20th 
Battalion’s drill squad, which won a competition in Changi. McMaster’s pride in this 
victory came at Galleghan’s expense, as his battalion had defeated Galleghan’s. ‘I can 
well imagine much to Black Jacks [sic] regret, we were judged best, despite Black 
Jacks [sic] belief that no one could show his perfect 2\30 battalion how to drill...’ 68  
 
Although Acting Corporal Douglas McLaggan’s writings often reflected hostility 
towards Galleghan, these could be tempered. On 26 January 1943, Australia Day, 
Galleghan ordered a ceremonial review parade of all remaining infantry, artillery, 
motor transport and corps units in Changi. McLaggan wrote that the only things 
missing from this review parade were the men’s ‘bayonets and rifles.’69 But, he added, 
‘We had to give it to the old bastard that he certainly had a lot of nerve.’70  Few other 
positional leaders, he wrote, would have had the gumption to order a ceremonial 
parade whilst POWs. ‘What the Japs thought of such a performance I never heard, but 
we got away with it, and considering what was to come in the next three years, glad it 
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happened. The finest hour for many who did not survive.’71 For this short period of 
time he shared Galleghan’s interpretation of captivity.  
 
Some men openly ridiculed Galleghan leadership style and decisions in their writings. 
The reasons usually lay in Galleghan’s refusal to adapt regular military procedures to 
reflect the reality of their captive status. Within these writings, questions regarding the 
relevance of positional leadership, which had been asked since Callaghan’s tenure 
began, are strongly expressed. This negative perception of Galleghan’s leadership can 
be examined according to three different themes; his disciplinary regime, the 
maintenance of officer privileges and the long-term existence of a thriving black 
market. For example, Private Alexander Hatton Drummond wrote:  
 
About the only penalty BJ [Galleghan] did not threaten…was banishment 
to Australia, while about the only penalty free crimes left were, sleeping 
with other men’s wives, ors [other ranks] eating meals consisting of 20 
courses of more, courting officers [sic] batman or female impersonation 
[sic] from the concert party and using lavender water at the toilet.72   
 
Drummond’s criticism of Galleghan’s disciplinary regime reveals two things. First, the 
extraordinary amount of disciplinary measures Galleghan used to enforce his authority 
as GOC AIF led to the men mocking his overregulated daily routines. Secondly, the 
manner in which Galleghan enforced his regulations meant that the men did not 
automatically follow his orders, instead he had to ‘threaten’ punishments to secure his 
authority.73 As far as Drummond was concerned, his GOC lacked leadership 
legitimacy. Douglas McLaggan’s description of Galleghan’s leadership was more 
trenchant. In February 1943 he wrote; ‘Black Jack had... in no uncertain terms, set 
himself up as absolute dictator. No more or no less than a monarch of all he 
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surveyed.’74 McLaggan belonged to Galleghan’s own battalion and his description of 
Galleghan as a ‘dictator’ clearly indicates that he believed his CO had moved far 
beyond any reasonable extension of regulatory military authority, that he was in 
incapable of leading men in captivity – he could only order them about.  
 
Galleghan’s protection of officer privilege caused great anger amongst the other ranks. 
These men watched as their officers, protected from camp fatigues and Japanese 
working parties, used their additional pay to purchase more food items from the AIF 
canteen. Drummond believed that most food items went to the ‘officers [sic] messes, 
individual officers, warrant officers, sergeants messes, individual warrant officers, 
sergeants...’ and only then ‘other ranks could scramble for the rest.’75 Corporal F. 
Power noted that although Australian prisoners within the Australian Compound were 
technically able to buy food from the canteen to supplement their rations from late 
1942, the reality was different. He wrote, ‘We could spend this money in a canteen in 
camp, although prices for many articles, especially tinned meat were extremely high 
and out of reach for all except officers.’76 The implications of this for the rank and file 
were clear; Galleghan’s maintenance of officer privileges in terms of pay, along with 
the pricing of food items, meant that officers were better fed than other ranks. 
 
Galleghan’s maintenance of officer privilege also had serious implications for the 
health of the men in the other ranks. After the survivors had returned from the Work 
Forces on the Burma-Thailand Railway, a period which coincided with a decreasing 
base ration, the Japanese demanded that other ranks perform outside camp fatigues. 
Despite the other ranks now working both inside and outside the POW camp, 
Galleghan still refused to let go of the peacetime practice of officers receiving more 
food. Galleghan’s decision, in combination with the physical debilitation caused by 
overseas and outside Work Forces, meant that disease began to take a real toll on the 
men of Changi.77   
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The other ranks were also angered by Galleghan’s protection of officer privileges in 
other ways. For example, Sergeant Alfred Montford wrote, ‘They [the officers] have 
their formal mess safari jackets, pick of the food etc. I wonder if we all die one by one 
would the last one be the quartermaster or would he continue through to the last 
officers and “die that they may live.”’78  
 
The differences Galleghan imposed between officers and other ranks fuelled the 
growth of a thriving black market within Changi.79 Instead of missing out on 
additional supplies the men took matters into their own hands. At ‘Paddies’ men and 
even officers traded and sold food and medical supplies. Prisoner writings reveal that a 
wide variety of men were engaged in this underground activity, including MOs, 
medical orderlies, mess staff, AIF gate guards, other ranks, contacts in the Malayan 
and Chinese populations, even some of the Imperial Japanese Army camp guard.80  
 
Galleghan refused to allow the Black Market, which he saw as a clear threat to his 
authoritarian leadership legitimacy, to survive. In an effort to break it, Galleghan 
issued wide ranging new orders which included restricting men’s movement in areas 
that contained saleable goods, a compulsory registration system for private foodstuffs 
and tradable personal belongings and a ban on lending money or trading goods 
without the prior permission of the group commanding officer.81 None of these ideas 
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worked. In desperation, Galleghan significantly increased the punishment for men 
caught engaging in black market activities. For example, in April 1943, two men 
found guilty of participating in black market activities received a sentence of 120 days 
detention.82 Despite his threats and draconian punishments, Paddies continued to 
thrive. Galleghan’s inability to stop this illegal activity provides further evidence that 
the men did not accept that his leadership approach was in their best interests. Instead, 
the men looked to fulfil their needs in their own way.   
 
To date, discussion has centred on the men who were in Changi from the start of their 
incarceration. Lieutenant Colonel Edward ‘Weary’ Dunlop offered an outsider’s 
perspective on Galleghan’s leadership style. Captured in Java, Dunlop arrived in 
Changi with his own group of Australian prisoners who were en route to Thailand. 
Dunlop found Galleghan’s authoritarian approach to leadership in captivity completely 
unrealistic.83 Having personally experienced beatings by the Japanese, Dunlop could 
not believe that the transfer of military procedures and regulations from battle into 
captivity could secure collective survivorship.84 He found it simply staggering that 
Galleghan, by virtue of his rank and appointment as GOC AIF Changi, assumed that 
he had a positional responsibility for all Australians captured by the Japanese, even 
those in transition through Changi, as Dunlop’s group was. 85 Galleghan’s idea of what 
that meant was made clear in his interactions with the Australians captured in Java. 
The men arrived in Changi dressed only in rags. Galleghan, without stopping to ask 
why they were in such a debilitated condition, admonished their officers and other 
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ranks for their lack of respect for the Australian uniform and regulatory discipline.86 
Gunner Frederick Skeels reaction to Galleghan’s outburst typifies the anger felt by 
these men. ‘I don’t think he knew or probably even cared [for our circumstances]...we 
cursed him to hell.’87 
 
Nor could Galleghan understand how the officers and men accepted Dunlop, a MO, as 
their positional leader. Galleghan maintained that rank accorded to MOs was 
recognition of their professional skills; it was not combat positional rank. Unable to 
recognise leadership in a form with which he was unfamiliar, he dismissed Dunlop’s 
leadership legitimacy. This led to a showdown between these two men.  
 
It started when Galleghan sent a note to Dunlop requesting the name of the proper 
positional leader of his group and that this ranking officer assume positional leadership 
of the formal group: ‘Comd AIF desires following information: Name of senior 
combatant officer with party. Suggest changing OC party to combatant officer. Is there 
any reason for not making change?’88 Dunlop promptly responded to Galleghan’s note 
explaining the Japanese did not recognise non-combatant rank and therefore, as he was 
a Lieutenant Colonel, the Japanese viewed him as the senior officer and leader of the 
group rather than Major W. Wearne, who was the ranking positional combat officer. 
Galleghan, who did not recognise the authority of the Japanese, refused to accept 
Dunlop’s reasoning. By chance, Brigadier Arthur Blackburn, commanding officer of 
the 2/3rd Anti-Machine Gun Battalion, was at Changi at this time as he was en route to 
Formosa to join the senior officers’ camp.89 After hearing the details of the dispute, 
Blackburn provided Dunlop with a written memorandum which stated that ‘I 
[Blackburn] have considered this matter and desire Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop to 
retain command for administrative and disciplinary purposes so long as the troops 
brought over by him remain together as one body.’90 In a meeting with Galleghan, 
Dunlop took great pleasure in providing him with this written validation of his 
leadership authority.91 After reading the memorandum, Galleghan still questioned 
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Major Wearne, the ranking combatant officer with Dunlop’s Java force, asking if he 
agreed that Dunlop should be the positional leader. Galleghan finally conceded that 
Blackburn, as a higher ranking officer, had the authority to order Dunlop to remain in 
command.   
 
This entire incident is an example of how Galleghan could not recognise that other 
forms of leadership could exist in captivity. Dunlop’s leadership legitimacy questioned 
Galleghan’s approach to leadership. In contrast to Galleghan, Dunlop had adapted and 
changed his leadership style to fit the reality of the circumstances (which will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 7). Dunlop’s leadership also threatened 
Galleghan’s control of Australians in Changi. For the first time, Australians within 
Changi realised that other Australians were being led by men other than positional 
officers who brought a different leadership style to protecting their men against their 
captors. This knowledge threatened the very core of Galleghan’s leadership style and 
his capacity to be seen by Australians in Changi as their legitimate leader.   
 
Dunlop, however, was amused by it all. In his published diaries he wrote, ‘I remained 
bland and friendly and assured him I bore him no resentment (for meddling in my 
affairs) and that it was nice of him to go to all these pains on my behalf.’ 92 Galleghan 
did not take this rebuke to his authority well and made sure that any assistance Dunlop 
needed was either denied, or given in such a way that confirmed his perception of 
leadership was the correct way Australians should be managed in captivity. For 
example, in response to Dunlop’s request for essential supplies, which at the time were 
available in Changi, Galleghan refused.93 Instead he insisted that Dunlop’s men wait 
for the supplies that had been promised to them by the Japanese after their arrival in 
Thailand. As a result of Galleghan’s order, Dunlop’s men left Changi in the same 
boots that they had arrived in: ‘178 men without boots, 204 with unserviceable boots 
and 302 with boots urgently needing repair.’94 Galleghan did offer Dunlop one 
concession, 5 gulden per officer for their personal needs.95 Dunlop flatly refused this 
offer as Galleghan deliberately excluded the other ranks from his offer of payment. By 
                                                          
92 ibid, p.146. 
93 ibid.  
94 E. Dunlop cited in Adam-Smith, Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea, pp. 263-264. 
95 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.147. 
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refusing his offer Dunlop refused to be complicit in Galleghan’s maintenance of 
officer privilege in captivity. The men of Dunlop Force left Changi with very bitter 
feelings towards Galleghan. Chief Petty Officer Ray Parkin put it this way: ‘We 
[Dunlop Force] are wearing our badge of disreputableness with pride…  the well-
dressed [the leaders in Changi] have much to learn about this POW business; their day 




Galleghan’s leadership failure: April 1944-August 1945 
From April 1944 to August 1945, the Japanese interfered with Galleghan’s ability to 
control his men. It began with the Japanese forbidding the punishment of rank and file 
through ‘confinement and detention’97 unless it took place under their direct 
supervision. In response to this threat to his own authority, Galleghan closed the AIF 
detention barracks.98 Now instead of detention, offenders were punished through 
compulsory hourly reporting or, on medical advice, decreased rations or extra 
fatigues.99 These new punishments signalled to the Australians that, despite their now 
seriously debilitated physical state, Galleghan still refused to compromise the 
standards of discipline that he saw as central to his leadership style. Galleghan 
remained unwilling to adapt to the changing circumstances that came with captivity.  
As has been shown, for some Australian prisoners in Changi, Galleghan’s orders 
lacked any authority, now at this acute stage of their captivity in Changi most men did 
not even pretend that Galleghan had any authority over them. This state of affairs, 
however, had been reached by the Australians even before the Japanese forced 
Galleghan to step down as their positional leader.     
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In May 1944 the Japanese ordered the transfer of all POWs in Changi to the Civilian 
Jail.100 At this new location the prisoners were divided into two groups. The other 
ranks moved inside the jail with warrant officers, while all other officers lived outside 
the jail. The Japanese ordered that the warrant officers were now in charge of the men 
and that they were directly answerable to the Japanese. Galleghan was therefore no 
longer recognised by the Japanese as the Australian leader and he could no longer 
issue orders to the Australians. Yet, he continued to issue regulatory orders to be 
carried out by Australian warrant officers.101 And his methods became even more 
draconian. For example, in an attempt to squash disciplinary problems he considered 
new forms of punishment including special penal companies for hard labour, public 
humiliation and restricting offenders to their sleeping quarters.102 
 
For Gallegan the worst was still to come. On 21 July 1944 the newly appointed 
Japanese Commandant, Lieutenant Takashi, made a British member of the Straits 
Settlements Volunteer Force, Lieutenant Colonel J. Newey, the representative officer 
of all Australian, British, Dutch and American prisoners in Changi Jail.103 By order of 
the captor, Galleghan’s positional leadership ceased to exist. According to the 
Japanese, Galleghan could no longer control his men through regulatory orders. 
Galleghan refused to acknowledge Newey’s leadership authority as it had been granted 
by the Japanese rather than through standard Australian Army procedures.104 
Galleghan petitioned Australian officers and other ranks to follow his lead and refuse 
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to acknowledge Newey’s leadership. Stan Arneil writings noted the irony of 
Galleghan’s request. He wrote:  
 
There is a strained atmosphere in official circles in the camp. The colonel 
now in charge is evidently a jun [sic], so all the other colonels in the camp 
have asserted their seniority and have resigned any jobs they may have 
been doing. [Yet a] few weeks ago we were lectured on loyalty to 
authority and cooperation between all ranks.105  
 
In March 1945, Galleghan even attempted to usurp Newey’s authority by issuing 
separate orders for Australians inside the Civilian Jail.106 These orders were issued 
through the highest ranking of the two Australian officers on Newey’s staff, Major A. 
Thompson. 
 
Galleghan’s obvious frustrations at his situation could be dismissed as an authoritarian 
leader attempting to cling to power. Newey’s leadership was, however, controversial. 
Having been appointed by the new Japanese Commandant, Galleghan, and the 
prisoners, were deeply suspicious of his motives. Questionable behaviour, such as 
signing for Red Cross parcels before receiving them, refusing to advocate for the 
prisoners and incorporating Japanese punishments into his disciplinary regime, 
strengthened Galleghan’s suspicions that Newey was collaborating with the 
Japanese.107 On 5 July 1945, when Lieutenant Miura took over command of Changi 
and immediately replaced Newey, Galleghan believed this decision by Miura meant 
that his suspicions had been justified.108  
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Despite the captor forcing the end of his leadership of Australians in Changi, 
Galleghan’s leadership style meant that for most prisoners he never achieved the status 
of a legitimate leader. As a POW Galleghan refused to adjust his leadership style to 
meet his men’s needs. Instead, he firmly believed that an uncompromising 
authoritarian leadership style based on regulatory discipline was the only leadership 
style which was allowed for a positional leader. 
 
Until his last days, Galleghan remained convinced of this truth. In Hank Nelson’s 
Prisoners of War, Galleghan stated:  
 
We were able to continue in all the years to run Changi as an army. I know 
that got criticised. You’ve got Russell Braddon who wrote The Naked 
Island. Russell Braddon’s idea of how to run that camp was that it was to 
be like a town council, of which the mayor would be elected and all the 
rest of it. After all Russell Braddon was a private.109   
 
Even evidence of open hostility towards his methods by his men did not cause 
Galleghan to change his approach. Instead this opposition only made him more 
determined. From his first to his last days of captivity, the power and authority of rank 
remained more important to Galleghan than the acceptance of his status as a prisoner. 
Any adaption of traditional military leadership in captivity, even for the sake of the 
essential physical needs of his men for survivorship, would have been, to Galleghan, a 
personal failure.  
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CHAPTER 3: CAPTAIN REGINALD WILLIAM JAMES NEWTON 
 
On 15 February 1942, Captain Reginald William James Newton became a prisoner of 
the Japanese.1 Newton’s introduction to captivity was particularly cruel, enduring sixty 
hours of interrogation by the Japanese at Malacca Jail.2 Then on 20 February 1942, the 
Japanese transferred Newton to Pudu Jail at Kuala Lumpur,3 joining about 600 other 
Australian and British POWs.4 Although a captain, Newton was the highest ranked 
Australian POW in the camp and therefore served as the Australian formal group’s 
positional leader.5 
 
Newton’s leadership style 
When he assumed his leadership position, Newton realised the enormity of the task. 
Having already experienced the reality of his captors’ willingness to inflict pain upon 
their prisoners, Newton based his leadership vision on the collective survival and 
protection of his men.6 Initially, alongside his British positional leaders, Newton 
attempted to use traditional military techniques to protect his men against the 
Japanese. For example, one of the first challenges Newton and the British officers 
faced was the conditions in Pudu Jail. The Japanese had confined the prisoners to a 20-
cell section of the jail with an open latrine in its open area.7 With the British officers, 
Newton vigorously protested these conditions to their captors.8 Then after a month of 
protests, on 20 April, the officers won some important concessions. The prisoners were 
allowed to spread out over the three story buildings in the jail’s main section, which 
meant that the sick could be isolated and only two prisoners had to sleep in each cell.  
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Newton and the British officers then petitioned the Japanese for improvements in the 
meagre Japanese rations.9 Following their protests, the Japanese agreed to supply more 
food, even meat to the prisoners. The meat, however, was rotten which caused 
significant health problems for the POWs. According to the 2/19th battalion history, 
‘after three days we were able to keep some it in the stomachs.’10 Dysentery also 
became a major problem. From this experience, Newton learnt to ‘never under any 
circumstances to believe anything the Japs told us, for at no time did they tell the 
truth…’11 
 
Newton began to seek alternative ways to supply his men with their basic needs. 
However, Newton was mostly confined to Pudu Jail.12 His men, though, quickly 
discovered that they could use the civilians they came into contact with on their 
working parties to secretly buy extra goods. One particular working party location, the 
Kuala Lumpur Army stores, offered the Australians great opportunities to steal food 
and other goods that they needed.13 The hardest part of these schemes was smuggling 
the goods back into their quarters at Pudu Jail. Newton solved this problem. While the 
Japanese were inspecting the returning working parties at the gates, Newton 
supervised the POWs. The men who had managed to buy and steal items, passed them 
secretly to Newton, who, because he was not part of the working party was not 
searched. Newton then smuggled them into the POW quarters in the jail.14 Newton and 
the British officers then divided the goods between all the POWs.15  
 
When the Japanese started to pay the POWS, Newton ruled that all those in his formal 
group would put a large portion of their pay into a collective pool to cover the costs of 
extra rations and medical supplies, both legally and illegally obtained.16 Leading by 
example, Newton put two-thirds of his $25 a month pay into the pooled fund and 
asked the men to contribute half of their pay to the fund. He gave the funds to trusted 
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officers who accompanied the working parties and the British padre, Noel Duckworth. 
These men then bought goods illegally.17 By introducing and maintaining these 
polices, Newton’s formal group quickly came to trust him. They came to understand 
that Newton had their best interests, and not his own, at the forefront of his decisions. 
From these schemes, the Australians POWs at Pudu Jail formed an understanding of 
the role of officers in captivity. Australian Gunner Russell Braddon explained:  
 
From the very beginning officers postulated their entire behaviour on the 
fact that they were responsible for their men. They would not eat until the 
men had eaten. It was military etiquette to the ninth degree in favour of 
those who were less privileged. And it was magnificent. We were looked 
after by our sirs. And we needed to be looked after because life was 
grim.18 
 
As the positional leader of Australians POWs in Pudu Jail, Newton realised that he 
needed cunning and unorthodox strategies not found in any military regulation manual 
to achieve his leadership goal of collective survivorship. In essence, he understood that 
he had to adapt to their unique circumstances, to find and take any advantage for his 
men that came his way.   
 
Once his men understood Newton’s leadership style and trusted that he would 
maintain it, they became even more eclectic in their illegal purchases and thieving 
activities. For example, from his men Newton received an electric radio and then a 
short wave transceiver.19 Newton, determined to get the radio working, offered his 
services along with those of Lieutenant McQueen, a qualified electrician, to rewire the 
electricity in the jail for the Japanese. As Newton expected, the Japanese accepted 
their offer. Then having fixed the wiring, unknown to the Japanese, Newton ‘tapped 
into’ the supply, to operate his radio and then the short wave transceiver. To hide his 
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prize possessions, Newton then had a POW build the radio into a wooden stool, which 
remained in Newton’s cell. When the Japanese conducted their regular searches, he 
offered the stool to the Japanese officer to sit on, who from this position ordered his 
men to search Newton’s cell. Newton’s unorthodox solution gave his men a link to the 
world beyond their jail.  
 
This sort of ingenious thinking, based on carefully interpreting the circumstances in 
which he found himself, and then exploiting any possible loopholes for his men, 
became the hallmark of Newton’s positional leadership style. Newton epitomises the 
strength of POW leaders who understood that their unique situation meant that they 
had to apply a different set of skills to captivity to those required in battle. Newton 
also refused to accept that, as a POW positional leader, he was always subservient to 
the captor. Newton never stopped attempting to outwit the Japanese.  
 
Whilst at Pudu Jail, Newton’s sense of responsibility for his men as their positional 
leader led him to add another element to his leadership style, one that would endure. 
Soon after the re-wiring of the jail, POWs haggled for electric equipment from their 
civilian contacts.20 Having smuggled their goods in, the POWs also tapped into the 
wiring. This inevitably resulted in regular electrical outages in the jail. Every time 
there was an outage, Newton and McQueen would be called to the guardroom and 
beaten for failing to do their job properly. Then they would be forced to fix the wiring. 
This happened quite regularly until the Japanese found the source of the problem, the 
electric equipment in the prisoners’ cells. Having found the contraband they 
confiscated the equipment, violently assaulted the culprits then put them into solitary 
confinement for seven days. Newton was prepared to put his body on the line for his 
men, but he did not want to put his men into a position where they themselves became 
the victim. He also expected his officers and NCOs to follow his lead, as the history of 
the 2/19th explained:  
 
It was laid down as a firm and definite policy at Pudu and it was carried 
through, for the nearest officer or N.C.O., to always interpose himself 
between any Nip [sic] trying to inflict punishment on any of the men and 
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to take the brunt of any punishment, for we had learned very early, that the 
more junior the Jap was, the more senior the rank of any prisoner he could 
punish was more acceptable and the third class Jap private was very 
pleased to be able to pass on what he had been getting from his own 
seniors for so long.21 
 
Newton also faced one of the most troubling decisions that he had to make as a POW 
leader at Pudu Jail. Sergeant Ken Bell, a member of Newton’s formal group, 
approached him asking for permission to escape with a British POW.22 Newton was 
torn. He understood Bell’s desire, but doubted the practicality of his plan and feared 
the punishment that Bell might be forced to endure if he was caught, which he thought 
was probable. After arguing with Newton all night, Bell refused to listen. His fellow 
escapee, British Captain Michael MacDonald, informed the British positional officer, 
Colonel Hartigan, that he and Bell planned to escape that night. This was the same 
night that two British civilians, Bill Harvey and Frank Van Renan, also escaped from 
Pudu Jail. 23 The next day at roll call, Newton and Warrant Officer Carl Renkert, 
fudged the Australian POW figures by telling the Japanese that the missing man was 
on the ‘banjo’ (latrine). Then, 48 hours later, the missing POWs were caught. For 
lying, Newton and Renkert were violently assaulted in front of the Australian POWs. 
The recaptured POWs were handed over the Kempei-Tai (secret police), brutally 
interrogated and then executed. Newton was allowed to see Bell prior to his death but 
was not allowed to witness his execution.  
 
While this was happening, the Japanese ordered the POWs to sign the no-escape 
clause issued to the men in Changi.24 Newton was allowed to discuss the matter with 
the British positional leaders for 15 minutes before he and the five British officers 
were forced into confinement in a cell that was meant to hold only one prisoner. 
During those fifteen minutes, however, Newton had managed to get a message to his 
men to sign the clause. Newton explained that, as POWs, they were signing the clause 
under duress. Therefore, legally, it meant nothing. The difference between the 
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leadership goals and styles of Newton and Galleghan, could not be more marked. 
Newton, realising the extremity of the situation, adapted to the circumstances and gave 
in to the Japanese on this occasion. He was not willing to risk the probability of 
violent repercussions being taken by the Japanese against his men. This decision 
reflects the way Newton interpreted his role as positional leader, that is, to try and 
secure the collective survival of his men, and that included attempts to manage the 
Japanese to avoid incidents that put his men at risk. Unlike Galleghan, who had placed 
his formal group at risk by ordering them not to sign the no-escape clause, Newton 
knew which fights he needed to win for the safety of his formal group and which 
fights to concede.  
 
In total, eight Australians died at Pudu Jail, one from battle wounds, five from 
dysentery and three, including Sergeant Bell, who were executed.25 Bell’s death gave 
Newton’s men an understanding of what could happen if they ignored his advice. The 
men also saw for themselves that Newton, who was willing to be assaulted by the 
Japanese for their mistakes, was trying to keep them alive. The men in his formal 
group at Pudu Jail understood what Newton was doing and why, and trusted him. The 
2/19th battalion history summarised it this way: ‘It was definitely laid down that it was 
now the responsibility of officers and N.C.O.’s to get our chaps home and in as good a 
health condition as we could.’26  In sum, they understood his leadership style.  
 
The size of Newton’s formal group helped him in developing a leadership style based 
on a combination of unorthodox ideas and courage to gain essential needs for his men 
and, where necessary, personally protect them. The group was small enough to make 
his approach, despite his failures, manageable. His men were personally aware of the 
choices he was making and the risks he was taking for them to improve their chances 
of survival. As the 2/19th battalion history put it: ‘The chaps knew that they had tried 
and solid leaders.’27 Through his actions and experiences at Pudu Jail, then, Newton 
had legitimised his position as leader and forged a loyal followership amongst his 
men. And although he was not to know it at the time, it also laid the foundations for 
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his ability to successfully lead a formal group in an even more volatile captive 
environment, the Burma-Thailand Railway.  
 
Newton in Changi 
Even before Newton was transferred to Changi, Galleghan was aware of Newton’s 
different approach to positional leadership in captivity, one that ignored many of the 
rules set out in the Australian military regulations. Galleghan first discovered this 
when he received an informal nominal roll from Newton, listing the Australians held 
prisoner in Pudu Jail. Newton thought it was essential that Galleghan, as the 
Australian positional officer at the main POW camp in the region, should know that he 
and his men were alive and where they were being held. However, with the Japanese 
refusing to allow communication between prisoners in different camps, the only way 
Newton could get this information to the Australian GOC in Changi was through 
unorthodox means. Through a chance Chinese contact, when Newton was burying 
Private Kennedy who had died from dysentery, Newton arranged for a nominal roll, 
written on toilet paper, to be secretly delivered to Galleghan.28 Knowing the risks his 
contact was taking in delivering the roll, Newton addressed it to ‘Fred.’29 Galleghan 
was not impressed. 
 
When Newton and his men arrived in Changi POW camp on 3 October 1942, 
Galleghan was quick to admonish Newton for his lack of respect and failure to follow 
proper procedure in his nominal roll.30 Galleghan then informed Newton, that, if in the 
future, he addressed an officer by their first name, as he had on his nominal roll, he 
would be court-martialled. Newton quickly pointed out that the behaviour of the 
Japanese towards POWs, and any civilian who was found to have helped them, made 
it impossible to follow proper protocol when filling out a nominal roll, which was 
being secretly delivered. He added that instead of pretending to play soldiers, 
positional leaders now had to do whatever they could to protect their men, even if 
meant breaking traditional military regulations.31   
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Due to his rank as captain, Newton did not retain his role as the positional leader of an 
Australian formal group in Changi. He did, however, still retain a leadership position 
as the officer in charge of the 2/19th and 2/20th Battalion lines.32 From this position, 
Newton maintained that Galleghan’s approach to leadership in captivity was wrong.33 
Newton tried to convince the officers in Changi that Galleghan’s belief that it was 
possible to treat captivity just as if it was another battle was utterly naïve. In other 
words, Newton rejected Galleghan’s notion that it was business as usual between 
officers and other ranks in captivity. It is not surprising that, after only 10 days in 
Changi, Galleghan transferred Newton to a Singapore based working party under the 
leadership of Major John Green Fairley.34   
 
If Galleghan thought this transfer would force Newton to accept his interpretation of 
captivity was correct, he was mistaken. Arriving back at Changi on 22 December 
1942, Newton’s view had not changed.35 In his own unique way, Newton was trying to 
persuade Galleghan that the basic needs and rights of the men should be at the 
forefront of his leadership style. Newton, however, failed to even raise doubt in 
Galleghan’s mind. He was, after all, only a captain.  
 
Despite not having any impact on Galleghan, Newton’s presence in Changi did raise 
questions in the minds of some of the other Australians POWs. When Newton and his 
men arrived in Changi, stories immediately started to circulate about what Newton had 
done for his men at Pudu Jail.36 It became well known that Newton had willingly put 
his body on the line to help protect his men against the aggression of the Japanese and 
had issued orders, as their positional leader, that were outside traditional military 
regulations, in order to allow his men to gain vital supplies. Then, when Newton 
started openly questioning the choices Galleghan was making as the positional leader 
of POWs in Changi, Newton’s behaviour may have contributed to some of 
Galleghan’s formal group questioning his approach.37 Newton’s formal group from 
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35 Interview with Newton, tape 1; Various Members of the Unit Association, The Grim Glory of the 
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Pudu Jail understood that there was another approach to positional leadership behind 
the wire; adaptability and innovation on the part of officers to protect and provide for 
their men could work. And they talked. Some of Galleghan’s formal group began to 
believe that Galleghan’s approach to leadership in captivity, based on continuation of 
Australian military regulations, may not have been the best way to ensure survival in 
captivity. From his discussions with Newton, Galleghan must have been aware that 
this was a possible conversation taking place amongst members of his formal group. 
Galleghan would have realised that the loyalty of men towards Newton, and the 
latter’s proven ideas about positional leadership in captivity, posed a threat to his 
control over his men and therefore his leadership legitimacy.  
 
Galleghan attempted to deal with this threat to his authority in two ways. Initially, 
Galleghan claimed that one of Newton’s decisions had in fact threatened the 
survivorship of all Australians in Changi.38 When Newton’s men left their base camp 
from their Singapore working party, each received a Red Cross parcel. Under Farley’s 
and Newton’s orders, the men consumed the contents of their packages before they 
arrived back at Changi. When Galleghan found out, he admonished Farley and 
Newton, arguing that the Red Cross parcels should have been handed over, intact, to 
the AIF supply depot at Changi. In reply, Newton quickly pointed out that the 
prisoners on the working party included men from Galleghan’s own 2/30th Battalion 
who had also eaten the contents of their packages. In other words, the order had not 
been to the advantage of just the men from Newton’s battalion. He also pointed out 
that men from the 2/30th, who had previously been on working parties and who had 
brought Red Cross packages back to Changi intact, had given their packages to the 
2/30th kitchen. This meant that Galleghan’s own battalion had, in fact, received more 
food than the rest of the prisoners in the compound. For Newton’s apparent insolence, 
Galleghan punished the entire 2/19th Battalion. He refused to issue them with any extra 
food for Christmas. Galleghan then tried to replace Newton as leader of the 2/19th with 
Major Saggers of the 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion. Newton only discovered this when 
he arrived back at the 2/19th’s lines. Newton promptly removed all of Saggers’ 
belongings and told him to go back to his own unit. Saggers refused and both men 
went to see Galleghan. This time Galleghan directly ordered Newton to stand aside 
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from the 2/19th Battalion and replaced both men with Lieutenant Colonel Roland 
Frank Oakes of the 2/26th. Newton told Galleghan exactly what he thought about his 
decision. ‘It [was] rather poor to have a complete stranger around the 2/19 battalion.’39 
With these words, Newton pointed out one of the most significant faults of 
Galleghan’s positional leadership in captivity, that he did not understand how a 
positional leader could gain the followership of his men.  
 
Newton’s appointment and his leadership style for U Battalion D Force 
On 7 March 1943 Galleghan made a surprise appointment. He made 36-year-old 
Captain Newton the positional leader of U Battalion, D Force. 40 This Force, 
comprised of 695 men, mostly from the 22 Brigade who, on Japanese orders, were to 
depart Changi for an unknown location.41 The reasons why Galleghan selected 
Newton, a lowly ranked officer, to lead U Battalion are unknown. It is possible that it 
was to send the troublesome Newton away from Changi. Two other reasons, however, 
seem probable.  
 
It is possible that Galleghan anticipated that the Japanese intended to use D Force for a 
work project. Newton himself foresaw this possibility and warned Galleghan of it.42  
Having experienced first-hand how the Japanese interpreted the role of a POW 
working party, both at Pudu Jail and then at Singapore, Newton warned Galleghan that 
their captor’s promise of a land of ‘milk and honey’43 was completely unrealistic.44 
However, from Galleghan’s perspective, Newton not only had experience in a POW 
working party, he had civilian training as an engineer.45 Both factors may have led 
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99 
 
Galleghan to appoint him as U Battalion’s positional leader. Galleghan may also have 
considered that Newton’s skills, combined with his dominating personality, 
unorthodox leadership methods, and his loyal followership amongst the men, made 
Newton the best candidate for the job. Yet, Galleghan’s rigid adherence to traditional 
military structures leaves this interpretation open to some doubt. Newton’s relatively 
low rank should have concerned him. Yet, Galleghan passed over higher ranked 
officers, selecting Newton to lead Australian prisoners into the unknown. This 
suggests that, for some reason, Galleghan may have had confidence in Newton’s 
ability to lead. In all likelihood, Newton’s appointment was an interplay of all these 
elements, including removing a difficult junior officer from Changi.  
 
U Battalion’s unknown destination turned out to be the Burma-Thailand Railway. The 
battalion spent five months (March to August 1943) constructing the railway in 
Thailand and then from September 1943 to March 1944, performed maintenance work 
in the Thailand sector.46 During his twelve months in Thailand, Newton was one of the 
lowest ranking positional captive leaders. Yet, the writings and recollections of 
survivors, from both U Battalion, D Force members and those outside his battalion, 
show that Newton was one of the most successful positional leaders on this horrific 
work project.47  
 
Newton succeeded because he had already formulated his leadership style, established 
his leadership vision and knew that he had the conviction to apply it. It also helped 
that once again, as in Pudu Jail, Newton was in charge of a small group of POWs. This 
meant that the leadership style that he had established in Pudu Jail was directly 
transferrable to his new formal group, U Battalion, D Force. Newton’s experiences at 
Pudu Jail also meant that he was not surprised by the captor’s behaviour in Thailand; 
instead, he expected it. Newton, therefore, in structuring his formal group, and in 
decisions that he made as positional leader, applied the lessons he had learnt in Pudu 
Jail. 
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At Pudu Jail Newton observed that the Japanese were inclined to pay violent attention 
to those officers on working parties who, because of their protected status under 
Australian military regulations, refused to work.48 Newton used this experience to 
form U Battalion. Instead of the standard thirty-five officers, for U Battalion he chose 
only six officers and an MO.49 These officers were Captains K. Westbrook, Frederick 
Harris, E. Gaden, and Lieutenants Ralph Everett Sanderson, Frank Ramsbottom and C. 
Wiley.50 The MO for U Battalion was David Clive Critchley Hinder.51 Newton knew 
these men well and, most importantly, they knew and approved of Newton’s approach 
to leadership in captivity.52 By selecting these men, Newton ensured that he received 
unwavering loyalty for his leadership approach. Newton’s six officers also fulfilled 
another essential criterion; each had experienced captivity outside the relatively 
sheltered confines of Changi. According to Newton, this meant that his officers had 
proven that they had the strength of character to deal with the grim reality of life as 
POW of the Japanese and the particular challenges that lay ahead.53  
 
Newton also took every opportunity he could to negotiate key concessions from 
civilians and even his captors. He maintained absolute control of his men in an attempt 
to save them from not only their captor’s aggression, but also their own weaknesses 
and fears. Through sheer force of personality, a genuine desire to protect and provide 
for his men and applying his unique unorthodox leadership techniques, Newton almost 
achieved his goal of collective survival in one of the most volatile environments that 
Australians experienced in captivity during the Second World War.54 
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When the reality of the prisoners’ position in Thailand became apparent, Newton 
further adapted his leadership structures. He effectively reversed the traditional 
military hierarchical structure to make Hinder, the MO, the apex of all U Battalion’s 
decisions.55 For example, rather than issuing direct orders as positional leader, he 
followed, applied and enforced Hinder’s rules for setting up base camp, collecting and 
distributing rations and the selection of men for the working parties. Hinder also 
identified for Newton the sickest men in his camp. These were the men who were most 
in need of Newton’s protection from the aggression of the Japanese.56 Peter Brune’s 
assessment of U Battalion suggests that the unique power relationship between 
Newton and Hinder provided a model for survivorship on the Burma-Thailand 
Railway.57 This is without doubt correct. Through his ability to adapt his leadership 
structures to suit the volatile situation in Thailand, Newton’s leadership role evolved 
from being the positional leader solely in charge of his men, into the officer who 
vigorously applied and enforced his MO’s advice to achieve his leadership goal of 
collective survival of his formal group. Through his unorthodox transfer of authority 
to Hinder, Newton’s formal group also understood the extent to which Newton tried to 
protect them and keep them alive as the 2/19th battalion history explains:  
 
[I]t was the firm and definite duty of our No 1 that David Hinder’s dictates 
were obeyed in each and every minute respect. Our job was to get as many 
home as we could, and there was to be no departures from this in any 
thought or action and everybody would comply.58  
 
When U Battalion arrived at Bampong in Thailand, for reasons that remain unknown, 
their guards suddenly abandoned them.59 Newton used this time to gather intelligence. 
Hearing rumours of starvation conditions, slave labour and widespread illness, Newton 
quickly realised that giving Hinder a dominant leadership role was not enough to 
ensure the survival of his men. What would be desperately needed was a continual 
supply of food. Therefore, in his unorthodox manner, Newton negotiated what was to 
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become his men’s lifeline for the duration of their time in Thailand. He contacted 
Boon Pong, a Thai trader. Using his unique combination of persuasion, charisma and 
his refusal to hear the word ‘no’, Newton persuaded Boon Pong to follow U Battalion 
up the river with food and medical supplies. In return for the supplies, Newton 
promised full payment after the war. Until then, for payment in lieu, Newton gave 
Boon Pong a paper IOU in the form of an amended Bank of NSW cheque, which he 
had found during a search of his men’s kits. Newton, a customer of the bank, crossed 
out the branch of Wahroonga and inserted the head office in Sydney. In a post-war 
interview with the Gaden family, Newton admitted that he had not even negotiated the 
interest rate. ‘[Boon Pong] agreed to take [the] paper. [Our] only concern was food 
and whatever medical supplies we could get. [We] were not worried about what 
interest he would charge.’60 Had Newton not discovered the chequebook, it is probable 
that he would have found another way to secure Boon Pong’s cooperation as he did 
this later on, when he arranged the delivery of supplies using promissory notes.61 As 
early as his arrival in Thailand, Newton sensed that the acute needs of his men 
demanded such ingenuity.   
 
Newton’s relations with the captor  
Newton’s manipulation of traditional military structures, and his ability to negotiate 
supplies for his men, may have come to nothing if he could not gain some influence 
over the Japanese. In her journal article on positional leadership on the Burma-
Thailand Railway, Sibylla Jane Flower concluded that ‘limited cooperation with the 
enemy’62 provided the best way for positional leaders to protect their men.63 Newton 
had certainly learnt that at Pudu Jail. He had also observed that the Japanese respected 
positional leaders who retained control over their men.64 Newton also discovered that 
feigning displays of respect for the Japanese often outweighed the consequences of 
open defiance.65 With this in mind, Newton launched himself into a calculated crusade 
against Warrant Officer Aitaro ‘Tiger’ Hiramatusu, a test which Brune labels as ‘one 
of Newton’s greatest triumphs.’66  
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Hiramatusu controlled U Battalion for about nine months.67 In this time, Newton used 
every conceivable ploy against him to gain life-sustaining concessions for his men. It 
began with the rigid control of his formal group. From the very formation of U 
Battalion, Newton built a cohesive and controlled unit, a process that began even 
before he left Changi. Newton had dismissed a man in the battalion who defied his 
authority. The 2/19th battalion history explains: ‘One of the parade at the rear made a 
disparaging remark about Newton and he in turn went straight into the rank and dealt 
with the clown (who was dropped from the draft).’68 This incident set the tone for the 
relationship between Newton and his men. Even before leaving Changi, Newton’s 
formal group understood that under no circumstances would Newton allow 
insubordination from his men.  
 
In the volatile conditions of Thailand, Newton’s control became unequivocal. Newton 
enforced his orders with the threat of corporeal punishment.69 He informed his men 
that any member who brought the safety of the group into danger would be punished. 
Newton’s leadership goal of survivorship thus provided the foundation for group 
interaction. He realised that only as a cohesive, rigidly controlled unit could he attempt 
to protect the men. In return for his protection, Newton, expected them to respect and 
obey his authority. His men, mostly, complied.  
 
Private Arthur Cooper’s writings recall that in Thailand, Newton threatened one of his 
men with corporal punishment.70 Hiramatusu had found out that someone had stolen 
food from the engineers and he threatened to behead an officer. Newton was livid. 
Calling a parade, he vehemently reminded his men that collectivism and not 
individualism, defined them. 
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Newton was like a raging bull walking in front of us and when he got right 
in front of me he said ‘and you’re the bloody culprit Shorty. Nobody’s 
going to lose their head over a bastard like you. As a matter of fact I think 
I’ll knock your feet right from under you now.’71  
 
In his post-war interview, Newton recalled with pride that he only had to resort to 
corporal punishment twice; once in Thailand and once, later on, in Japan.72 The culprit 
was the same individual. On the Burma-Thailand Railway, this unnamed Australian 
stole a fellow prisoner’s watch. Newton considered this an appalling crime, a breach of 
group trust and a threat to their collective identity. Newton described how he handled 
the issue.  
 
I had to do something. I hit him myself. [Then I] said to his platoon, ‘I 
don’t care what you do with him. I’ll bury him tomorrow if I have to.’ 
That’s the only way you could handle [it.]73  
 
Newton was not the only positional leader to enforce discipline through corporal 
punishment in Thailand.74 The fact that he used it only twice reveals the extent of his 
men’s faith and trust in him. His decisions and methods may not have always been 
universally popular, but his men did realise that his unorthodox approach offered them 
the best hope of surviving.   
 
Newton’s rigid control of his formal group enabled him to build a basic understanding 
with Hiramatusu. Through Newton’s display of authority, Hiramatusu came to 
understand that U Battalion were survivors. Acting on Hinder’s advice as to the fitness 
of the men, Newton ensured that U Battalion’s base camps and working parties were 
organised in such a way that Hiramatusu did not intervene.75 In comparison to other 
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battalions, this meant that Newton’s men were able to remain marginally ‘fit’.76 On 
average, in comparison to other Work Force battalions, recruitment for U Battalion 
working parties was, therefore, not as difficult.77 Hiramatusu put this down to his own 
leadership, and Newton was prepared to accept that.78 Yet, there was also an element 
of mutual respect involved in the relationship between the two men, as Frank Barker 
recalled. 
 
The Tiger used to respect reggie [sic] because reggie [sic] was a fellow 
who would stand up and bellow at everybody, of course that suited the 
Tiger down to the ground to think that we were being well disciplined by 
our own officers. And he did run a tight ship. So Tiger respected him to 
the point where he could argue, negotiate and not do too badly. U 
Battalion, because of that relationship, I believe suffered a lot less than 
some of the others.79 
 
Having earned Hiramatusu’s respect, Newton proceeded to exploit it, using it as ‘a 
lever to wrest a thousand privileges.’80     
 
Three examples reveal just how far Newton was able to manipulate Hiramatusu. 
Firstly, at Tonchan Central Camp, Newton successfully petitioned Hiramatusu to 
move their base camp to a more sanitary site.81 This meant Newton could move his 
men away from a British battalion whose sanitary and hygiene practices allegedly 
threatened the health of Newton’s men. The second example demonstrates Newton’s 
cunning. In Thailand, Newton and his officers arranged several schemes that ensured 
U Battalion received regular food and pay. Two schemes were particularly important. 
At Tonchan South Camp, following an outbreak of cholera, Newton arranged for Boon 
Pong to approach Hiramatusu offering a deal.82 In return for guaranteeing the 
acceptance of his deliveries, Hiramatusu could keep 10 per cent of the goods. This 
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allowed Hiramatusu to indulge in his gambling habit. Hiramatusu accepted the deal, 
unaware it was Newton’s idea.  A similar deal was also offered to the Japanese officer 
in charge of the kitchen.83 In return for U Battalion officers recording more prisoners 
on the working party than were actually present, which meant pay for other ranks who 
did not exist, this Japanese officer received 5 per cent of the profits which were earned 
from the non-existent workers.84 Unlike some other battalions on the Burma-Thailand 
Railway, this agreement ensured U Battalion not only received their pay on time as the 
Japanese officer wanted his portion of the deal, but that they also received additional 
pay beyond what they were due.85 Then, as in Pudu Jail, prisoners pooled funds into a 
central account, popularly known as ‘Newton’s Amenities Fund.’86 From this 
collective fund, Newton and his officers purchased supplementary food and medical 
supplies. Newton also made sure that some of their money was sent down river to 
Tahsao and other base hospitals, where U Battalion patients were being treated.87 
Then, when these schemes were not enough to provide for his men, or the opportunity 
presented itself, Newton sometimes supplemented them with organised theft from the 
Japanese stores.88 Newton’s ability to orchestrate these schemes to provide vital food 
and medical supplies to his men, regardless of their location, earned him the only 
recommendation for protecting his men that was given to a positional leader on the 
Burma-Thailand Railway in the Official Australian Medical History.89 
 
Newton supplemented his tactics and schemes with an unwavering stance against the 
excesses of the Japanese. Irrespective of the threat or use of violence, Newton became 
the antithesis of the submissive prisoner. In ‘roaring Reggie’90 Hiramatusu met his 
match. Driver Herbert James McNamara, in Donald Wall’s history of the 2/20th 
Battalion, explains ‘The Tiger had great admiration for Captain Newton with his 6 foot 
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height, his block-bashing voice and his iron efficiency.’91 McNamara goes so far to 
suggest Newton’s leadership style and manner allowed him to challenge Hiramatusu’s 
power.92  
 
Hiramatusu’s acceptance of Newton’s leadership style also led to more amicable 
captor/captive relations. For example, Newton’s sheer determination and courage 
earned him an important concession from Hiramatusu. In Nelson’s, P.O.W Prisoners 
of War: Australians under Nippon, Geoff O’Conner explained that, on one occasion, 
Newton demanded that his men be given more boots.93 After his request was ignored, 
and knowing that he would be assaulted for his insolence, Newton continued to insist 
on more boots for his men. ‘They gave him the treatment and stood him in front of the 
guardhouse and he kept on demanding the boots and they kept him there. Eventually 
the Japs got sick of him; they couldn’t shut him up. And the men got their boots.’94 
 
Hiramatusu’s acceptance of Newton’s leadership style, authority and legitimacy, also 
enabled Newton to pressure Hiramatusu into protecting one of his men, Driver Harry 
George Dunn.95 At Tonchan Central, Dunn reacted to the growing aggression of the 
Japanese engineers by downing his tools. For this act of defiance, the engineers tied 
Dunn’s hands behind his back with string and tied him to a tree with his feet 
suspended off the ground. Someone on this working party despatched a secret runner 
back to camp. Upon hearing the news, Newton goaded Hiramatusu into action.  
 
Newton told the Tiger that if that was the way the Jap Engineers behaved, 
he [Newton] would pull Dunn down and he, the Tiger, should investigate 
why the Jap Engineers were taking punishments out of the Tiger’s hands.96 
 
Hiramatusu took the bait. With Newton, he rushed out to the construction site, pulled 
Dunn down, and ordered U Battalion’s men back to camp. According to Bombardier 
Hugh Vincent Clarke, a member of T Battalion, D Force, this may not have been an 
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isolated incident. Clarke claims that at the Konyu-Hintok (Hell Fire Pass) cutting, 
Hiramatusu withdrew U Battalion from a work shift after Japanese engineers and 
guards mistreated U Battalion workers.97 This incident is not mentioned in the 2/19th 
battalion history and according to that source, Hiramatusu had relinquished control of 
U Battalion during its time at this cutting.98 Newton, however, in his statement to the 
Australian War Crimes Commission, stated that Hiarmatusu retained control of U 
Battalion’s camp at Konyu.99 Irrespective, it is clear that on least one occasion, 
Hiramatusu took protective measures against the engineers on behalf of the men of U 
Battalion. This suggests that Newton’s leadership goals and the collective identity he 
fostered amongst U Battalion members extended to the enemy. According to Clarke, 
prisoners outside Hiramatusu’s battalion observed this temporary alliance.100    
 
The tiger [sic] looked after Newton’s mob, who arrived looking very fit. 
We thought they were giants, because we had all shrunken away. Nobody 
smiled and things were really bad, but then U battalion [sic] came and 
things improved a lot because the tiger would not allow the engineers to 
bash his men around. He would go down to into the cutting and say, ‘Well, 
you don’t do this sort of thing’.101 
 
A further example of Hiramatusu’s acceptance of Newton’s leadership style is simply 
extraordinary. Hiramatusu ordered a Japanese funeral for Private Tommy 
Wardfield.102 Killed by a falling tree, Hiramatusu declared Wardfield ‘died whilst 
serving with the Japanese army and not as a prisoner.’103 All members of U Battalion, 
Japanese camp guards and sector engineers attended. Hiramatusu and the chief 
engineer spoke at Wardfield’s gravesite. The Japanese left flowers on the grave. 
Hiramatusu and the chief engineer also left food and drink to aid the journey of 
Wardfield’s spirit into the next world. This incident appears to be unique. According 
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to Private Roy Clifford Mudiman, it occurred on 9 August 1943.104 This date almost 
corresponds with the completion of the main phase of Railway construction.105 
Wardfield’s funeral may therefore, have represented a wider acknowledgment by 
Hiramatusu of U Battalion’s work and sacrifice in Thailand. Regardless of the motive, 
this symbolic concession reflected Hiramatusu’s respect for Newton’s leadership.  
 
When Newton’s unorthodox leadership methods failed to protect his men from the 
Japanese, he again put his body on the line. Newton demonstrated selfless courage 
within minutes of U Battalion arriving in Thailand. Prior to boarding steel train trucks 
in Singapore, two 8th Division Australian Army Service Corp prisoners, Privates Les 
Grey and George Frederick Day, informed Newton of their plan to escape.106 Instead 
of talking them out of their foolhardy endeavour as he had tried to do with Bell, 
Newton provided them with a similar cover story. When the train stopped, he said, the 
pair left the train to go to the ‘banjo’, then without warning the train started to move. 
The two Australians successfully escaped, although their time at large was short.107 
 
At Bampong, when the Japanese guards realised they were two prisoners short, they 
called Newton to the front of the parade.108 In front of the entire battalion, the guards 
interrogated and assaulted him. Despite continued blows, Newton stuck to the cover 
story. Newton’s selfless act established for the newly formed U Battalion an ingrained 
respect for their positional leader. Many had heard of Newton’s selfless courage in 
Pudu Jail, now they saw it for themselves. This act provided Newton with the essential 
foundation of trust that, together with his success in gaining supplies and concessions 
from the Japanese, enabled him to become their legitimate leader. This a remarkable 
achievement for a man who was unpopular, even disliked, in training and during 
combat.109 
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The timing of this incident also gave rise to a fundamental expectation. The men of U 
Battalion believed that Newton would protect them, not only with his words and 
unorthodox tactics, but also with his body. Newton did not disappoint. Throughout U 
Battalion’s tenure on the Burma-Thailand Railway, but particularly at Konyu, Newton 
maintained his selfless stance.110 Newton regularly won the camp tally for the number 
of bashings, his score usually double that of his nearest rival.111 His sworn statement to 
the War Crimes Trials explained the motive behind his behaviour.  
 
I myself received 68 beatings and periods of punishment during PW 
period, mainly for interceding on behalf of personnel and requesting 
medical supplies. It was the policy for all my officers to always intercede 
on behalf of our men and draw attention away from the men.112  
 
In contrast to some positional leaders, Newton had clearly adopted an expansive 
definition of positional responsibility, one that was capable of change as the 
circumstances changed. For example, as discussed earlier, Newton firmly believed his 
duties did not cease when members of his battalion left his camp, usually to be 
transferred to a base hospital. Instead, Newton maintained contact with these men, 
making regular visits to base hospitals located down the river.113 Then when he 
discovered that most Australian Force leaders had sent their sick men to base hospitals 
without any practical support or representation, Newton acted on their behalf.114 He 
provided some of his own battalion officers to act as Australian representatives to 
ensure that sick Australians at Tarsau and Chungkai hospitals had national 
representatives on the prisoner administration board of the hospital. Newton also 
provided men to represent sick Australians in hospital messes and gave monetary 
support to British officers for the Australian patients’ food and medical supplies.115 
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Newton’s sense of positional responsibility was, therefore, an inclusive responsibility 
for all Australians in need of his assistance.    
 
This expansive sense of duty became a continuing theme throughout Newton’s time in 
Thailand. For example, in September 1943, while U Battalion was at Reng Tin, 
Newton heard rumours of an Australian battalion nearby.116 Going ‘walkabout’ 
Newton found Major Alfred John Cough’s battalion about ten kilometres inland.117 
These Australians were in an appalling state. Their Japanese Commandant had failed 
to recognise a separate Australian leadership structure, leaving Dutch prisoners in 
control. The 2/19th battalion history claims that this meant these Australians were 
given the last portions of the meagre ration, had minimal access to medical supplies 
and were overrepresented in working parties.118 Newton arranged for these men to 
receive some of U Battalion’s supplies and, if Cough could gain his Commandant’s 
approval, for Boon Pong to deliver some supplies. Newton’s efforts, however, proved 
to be in vain. The following day, Cough’s battalion moved to an unknown location.  
Newton had more success helping nine isolated British Royal Northumberland 
Fusiliers.119 At Hintok camp, Newton found these men without food, shelter or money. 
Newton folded these British prisoners into U Battalion. The 2/19th battalion history 
explained why Newton did this.   
 
It was always the fear that our lads would be placed in a similar position 
and without anybody to help them they would lose men unnecessarily, 
through no fault of their own.120 
 
Newton’s followership 
Newton’s self-defined leadership role and behaviour forged a deep loyalty between 
himself and his men. Newton successfully united Australian soldiers mostly from the 
2/18th, 2/19th and 2/20th Battalions through his unorthodox positional leadership style 
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and his ability to meet the promises he made to his men. For the members of U 
Battalion, therefore, Newton became a visionary and transformational leader.  
 
The depth of trust U Battalion members had in Newton is best illustrated by the 
following example. During its time in Thailand, U Battalion experienced only one 
serious outbreak of cholera.121 One unnamed Australian, a ‘suspected’ case, became 
hysterical, believing that if he were moved to the cholera lines, he would surely die. 
Newton approached him saying, ‘Laddie, Doc suspects cholera and we will have to 
take you over to the cholera lines.’122 The prisoner’s response was a heart-rending plea 
for life. ‘I am sure I am alright and you will condemn me to death if you take me 
there.’123 Newton knew he could not allow one man’s fear to comprise his goal of 
collective survival, yet, despite the risks, he took time to comfort the distressed 
Australian. Slowly, Newton convinced him, for the sake of his mates, to move. This 
prisoner’s decision to leave on his own accord demonstrates Newton’s leadership 
skills, even with men who believed that they were facing death.124  
 
For some members of U Battalion, these bonds were never severed. For example on 22 
April 1992, U Battalion survivor Peter Willington wrote to Newton telling him of his 
and fellow U Battalion survivor Noel Harvey’s continued admiration and loyalty.125 
Importantly Willington also linked Hinder with Newton in his letter, writing ‘[B]oth of 
you were great Australians, you [were a] brave wise leader and Dave was a devoted 
and brave medical officer.’126 Wellington went on to comment on Newton’s care of his 
men, which never ceased under such trying conditions. He ended his letter with the 
following quotation from Moses Harvey:  
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‘Great men are the gifts of kind heaven to our poor world; instruments by which 
the highest one works out his designs, light-radiators, to give guidance and 
blessings to the travellers of time.’127 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Grove Wright Anderson, the officer in-charge of 2/19th 
Battalion in battle, touched on Newton’s authoritarian style: ‘One of Reg’s qualities is 
that when he has something to say, those at the back can hear.’128 In Nelson’s book, 
POW: Prisoners of War: Australians under Nippon, Geoff O’Conner, Cliff Moss and 
an unnamed sergeant agree with this memory of Newton.129 Nelson adds that ‘Newton 
gave the men confidence that what could be done would be done.’130 His schemes, his 
ability to outmanoeuvre the captor, combined with his sheer determination to help his 
men, meant that his formal group believed that Newton would find a way to protect 
them. He seldom let them down.  
 
Men outside Newton’s formal group who worked on the Burma-Thailand Railway 
also knew of, and acknowledged, his leadership. Two call signs illustrate this. Along 
the length of the Railway in Thailand, U Battalion were known as the ‘U Beauties.’131 
At Tonchan Central, the adjoining English camp renamed the U Battalion camp as 
‘Reggies retreat.’[sic]132 At Tampie, when U Battalion had finished its part in the 
construction of the railway and were moved down river into a holding camp with other 
POWs, a higher ranked English positional leader gave up his leadership role in favour 
of Newton. The English positional leader explained that Newton was better at dealing 
with the Japanese and would offer the POWs more protection from them than he 
possibly could.133  
 
In Thailand, Newton almost realised his leadership vision of collective survival. In an 
volatile captive environment, of the 695 men in U Battalion, 33 died.134 All but one of 
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these men died from illness. This achievement earned Newton respect and admiration 
from prisoners of all nationalities both during the war and after it.  
After the war, other positional leaders acknowledged Newton’s achievements. In a 
letter to Newton dated 14 October 1980, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Edward Dunlop 
described him as the ‘king of the footsloggers and jungle dwellers.’135 Anderson wrote 
to Australian Army Headquarters, recalling, ‘I have not heard of any officer of any 
nationality more highly spoken of for his work with Pws [sic] by the Ors [sic] than 
Capt. Newton.’136 These descriptions of the loyalty of Newton’s formal group 
epitomize the fierce followership that his leadership methods gave him. Through 
stanch application of his leadership role, his defiance and selfless attitude, the 
gratitude men felt for Newton evolved into reverence and awe.  
 
On 13 March 1946, when Newton’s accomplishments were more widely known, 
Major General Cecil Arthur Callaghan recommended Newton for an Order of the 
British Empire (OBE).137 It read:  
 
His consistent inspiring leadership, courage and personal example over a 
long period and under very adverse circumstances, inspired and raised the 
morale of those under his command and his fellow prisoners. His efforts 
on many occasions were directly responsible for saving many lives and 
casualties.138  
 
Despite the praise Newton received from the men he led and from other officers and 
medical officers who lived through the hellish conditions forced upon them by their 
captor on the Burma-Thailand Railway, the Australian Army was less impressed. It 
had doubts about a captain who felt that it was perfectly legitimate to discard the 
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military manual, and exceed the authority regulations allowed him, when it came to 
protecting his men in captivity. That found its quintessential example in Boon Pong.  
 
When Newton was repatriated, he paid Boon Pong from his personal bank account.139 
Newton then applied to the Australian Army for repayment. He was informed that the 
Army considered his deal with Boon Pong was inappropriate, irrespective of the fact 
that that deal had been partly responsible for the fact that Newton’s battalion lost the 
fewest number of Australians on the Railway. Newton took his story to the press. The 
matter was only resolved when the Red Cross reimbursed Newton.140  
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CHAPTER 4: SQUADRON LEADER ROGER BUSHELL 
 
British Squadron Leader Roger Bushell, through his expertise in escape, became an 
emergent leader of British/Commonwealth and, for a time, some American Air Force 
officers, imprisoned in Stalag Luft III North Compound. Free from the official rank 
responsibility of collective survivorship of a formal group, Bushell’s leadership was 
founded on organising a mass escape, popularly known as the Great Escape. In 
organising this escape, Bushell used a traditional authoritarian military leadership 
style. Bushell’s ability to use this uncompromising leadership style is testimony to 
the leadership legitimacy he acquired from men who desperately wanted to believe 
that Bushell’s idea might lead to their freedom.  
 
Bushell’s captive experience prior to Stalag Luft III North Compound 
South African born Roger Bushell was the embodiment of the mythological German 
POW, that is, a prisoner obsessed with escape. Bushell was captured on 23 May 
1940, after his Hawker Hurricane plane was shot down by enemy fire when his 
squadron was attempting to provide cover for evacuating British forces at Dunkirk.1 
Taken prisoner by the Germans, between May 1940 and March 1944 Bushell was 
imprisoned in two POW camps: Dulag Luft (Oberursel) and Stalag Luft III (Sagan).2 
He escaped from both camps.3 
 
Bushell’s first escape took place from the permanent compound at Dulag Luft, the 
Luftwaffe interrogation centre for all newly captured air force officers and NCOs.4 
Bushell was selected by Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day, the SBO, 
to stay in this camp as part of his permanent staff, which he did for about a year.5 
During this time Bushell became part of Day’s secret escape organisation (see 
Chapter 5). Bushell not only accepted the challenge set by Day’s secret operation; he 
thrived on it.  
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For the escape from Dulag Luft, Day appointed Lieutenant Commander Jimmy 
Buckley as the executive officer and Bushell as intelligence and supply officer.6 In 
consultation with Day, Buckley chose a tunnel as the escape method.7 This meant 
Bushell, along with all of the other members of the permanent staff, also became a 
digger.8 Over the period of about nine months, Bushell enthusiastically worked at his 
assigned tasks. As supply officer he created an escape fund from a portion of each 
permanent staff member’s German pay9 and used the money to create an escape kit for 
each member of Day’s staff.10 The kit compromised of goods that Bushell talked the 
German guards into giving him, food that the prisoners saved from their Red Cross 
parcels and maps of the Swiss frontier, drawn by Bushell based on his knowledge of 
this region from his past career as a champion skier for Britain.11 Maps of the local 
area were also drawn by Day based on his careful observations when he and his men 
went on their parole walks with their German guards.12  
 
Bushell’s ability to talk the guards at this camp into handing over what were obvious 
escape aids, such as a civilian suit, reflects the relationship he had established with his 
captors.13 Bushell had the advantage of knowing how to speak German.14 At Dulag 
Luft, Bushell continued to practice his skills with any guard who was willing to talk to 
him.15 The unique congenial atmosphere between Commandant Rumpel and Day’s 
permanent POW staff meant that Bushell was also a favourite of the German staff. For 
example, in Sydney Smith’s biography of Day, he describes one particular dinner 
party held by Rumpel for Day’s staff. At this party, Bushell asked Rumpel and his 
staff to call him ‘Von Bushell.’16 Then Bushell role-played a conversation between 
himself, pretending to be an escaped POW captured on the German side of the Swiss 
border and Rumpel, who played the role of a German policeman.17 Bushell’s purpose 
                                                          
6 Crawley, Escape from Germany, p.102; Smith, Wings Day, p.56; Vance, A Gallant Company, p.11. 
7 Crawley, Escape from Germany, p.102; Smith, Wings Day, p.56; Vance, A Gallant Company, p.11. 
8 Smith, Wings Day, p.56. 
9 ibid., p.64. 
10 ibid., p.66. 
11 For reference to aids in the escape kit see Smith, Wings Day, pp.64, 66. For reference to Bushell’s 
skiing career see Smith, Wings Day, p.52; Vance, A Gallant Company, p.11. 
12 Smith, Wings Day, pp.41, 45. 
13 For reference to Bushell talking a guard at Dulag Luft into selling him a civilian suit see Smith, Wings 
Day, p.106.  
14 Crawley, Escape from Germany, p.102; Durand, Stalag Luft III, p.1; Smith, Wings Day, p.63.  
15 Smith, Wings Day, p.63. 
16 ibid.  
17 ibid.   
118 
 
was to test his German speaking skills and convince Rumpel that he was a native 
German. He failed.   
 
A fast and noisy exchange followed at the end of which Rumpel 
switched to English, ‘Roger, that third or fourth word was so 
absolutely English that even a stupid policeman would see through 
you.’18 
 
Disgruntled with his failure, the game continued. After each go, Bushell asked Rumpel 
for advice on how to improve his monologue. The game continued until Rumpel 
despairingly told Bushell that ‘no, there is only one man here who might get away 
with it, Vivian. His German is good.’19 Summing up the exchange, Smith remarked 
that ‘only a man like Roger Bushel could have tricked a man like Rumpel into giving 
him tips on how to argue his way across the Swiss frontier.’20 
 
By the first weekend in June 1941, the tunnel was ready to be used.21 It was to be a 
group escape but Bushell had an alternative plan for himself. He explained to Day that 
he wanted to hide in the goat-shed, located on the recreation field in the permanent 
compound, and then the night before the escape was due to take place, he would climb 
over the wire by himself.22 Bushell was honest with Day about his motives. He 
explained that, as supply officer, he knew that he and Vivian had the best escape kits 
and the only real chance of successfully escaping, a chance that he believed that he 
could substantially increase if he left the night before everyone else. Not only would 
this would allow him to catch an earlier train than the other escapers, but his chances 
of success would not be adversely affected by another escaper’s mistakes. Bushell’s 
plan was clearly based on selfish motives. He did not want anyone else to jeopardise 
his chances of successfully making it to Switzerland. When the men on Day’s 
permanent staff realised what Bushell was planning, they quickly pointed out to him 
that if he failed and was recaptured, it would mean the guards at Dulag Luft would 
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heighten security thus making it impossible for the group escape to go ahead.23 
Bushell ignored them.24 He was convinced that his plan would work. For reasons 
unknown, Day approved Bushell’s plan. However it cost Bushell his reputation as a 
team player amongst the other prisoners who were scheduled to make their escape.   
 
Bushell’s plan almost worked.25 The night before the planned escape, dressed in his 
civilian suit, Bushell came out of the goat shed and climbed over the wire. He made 
his train and was within a few miles of the Swiss border before he was stopped by a 
civilian who notified the police. Under guard, Bushell was then sent back to Dulag 
Luft. On the train back to camp, which was filled with prisoners under guard, Bushell 
again managed to escape.26 This time, his scheme called for other prisoners to 
cooperate with him. These prisoners staged a card game while he and some other 
prisoners, who had volunteered to help him, cut a hole in the carriage floorboards that 
was large enough for one man to get through. Bushell and some other prisoners 
successfully escaped from the train. Bushell then paired up with Czech prisoner, Jack 
Zafouk. Both men stripped off their uniforms, which had disguised civilian clothes, 
and together they travelled by train to Czechoslovakia.27 Here, Bushell spent three 
months in hiding. He was still waiting for contacts in the Czech underground to help 
him leave when the apartment he was hiding in was raided by the Gestapo.28 The 
Gestapo were not looking for Bushell, they discovered him by chance. They were 
searching the city following the murder of Reich Protector Moravia, Reihard 
Heydrich.  
 
Bushell was taken back into Germany and endured two months of interrogation by the 
Gestapo29 who believed he had been fighting with the Czech underground. Bushell’s 
release back into Luftwaffe custody only came after Commandant Rumpel and 
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Commandant Von Lindeiner, who was in charge of Stalag Luft III, and an unknown 
Luftwaffe General, ordered that he be returned to a POW camp.30  
 
Upon his release, Bushell was sent to Stalag Luft III and placed in East Compound. 
According to Smith and Vance, he arrived gaunt, exhausted and almost broken.31 Day, 
who was now also in this camp, immediately ordered him to cease all escape activity 
until he had recovered.32 Smith, in his biography of Day, suggests that Bushell’s 
horrific experiences at the hands of the Gestapo brought forgiveness for his selfish 
decision at Dulag Luft to put his own escape in front of that of his fellow prisoners.33 
His conclusion is certainly supported by evidence from the POWs. For example, L. 
Hall’s interview with the Imperial War Museum and Nathaniel Flekser’s writings 
suggest that, for the prisoners who had not met Bushell, his reputation and experiences 
commanded their respect.34 According to British Air Force Sergeant, Ron Mogg, this 
respect extended to the NCOs who were in Centre Compound at Stalag Luft III.35 
 
When Day and Buckley, who was still Day’s escape organisation leader, and about 
100 Air Force Officers were transferred to Oflag XXIB at Schubin, Bushell became 
the president of the escape committee at Stalag Luft III East Compound.36 Something 
about Bushell’s character, however, apparently worried Day and Buckley. Before they 
departed from East Compound, Day and Buckley ‘seriously advised’37 Bushell not to 
plan any new escape activities.38 The Abwehr (security) guards were too suspicious 
and it would be better to let things cool down again before escape activities resumed.   
 
Bushell, however, was already planning a new escape and now had the authority to put 
his scheme into practice. The perfect opportunity presented itself when the prisoners 
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received news that they were going to be transferred to a new compound, North 
Compound.39 Upon hearing this news Bushell shared with men who had been on 
Buckley’s escape committee his vision for a mass escape on a scale unparalleled.40 It 
was this plan and its fruition that transformed the respect the men had for Bushell into 
leadership legitimacy.  
 
Bushell’s leadership vision and style 
According to Vance, Bushell told the prisoners on the escape committee that he 
wanted them to use their transfer to North Compound to launch a new escape scheme. 
Bushell wanted this operation to be ‘a big escape that would tie down thousands of 
soldiers and auxiliaries and really make a difference to the war effort.’41 He 
confidently claimed that 200 or more POWs could escape in one attempt, and if 
successful, the same scheme could be used at a later date to allow other prisoners to 
also escape.42  British POW Alan Burgess captured Bushell’s passion for escape by 
quoting him in The Longest Tunnel.    
 
Everyone here in this room is living on borrowed time. By rights 
we should all be dead! The only reason that God allowed us this 
extra ration of life is so we can make life hell for the Hun... 
Realistically, how many men do we think are going to make it back 
to England, the U.S.A, the antipodes [sic], and all the other places? 
Very few. But we’re going to give the Germans as big a shock in 
their Wagnerian war score as they’ve ever had. Not a bang on a big 
bass drum but an explosion of howitzer proportions...43 
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Members of Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report “X”, pp.12-14, TNA:PRO:AIR40/285.  
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Bushell then announced the logistics of his plan. Instead of building just one tunnel, 
they would dig three simultaneously.44 If the Germans discovered one or two tunnels, 
another tunnel would still be operable. In contrast to other escape attempts, Bushell 
explained that these tunnels would not be constructed according to an imposed 
timetable: rather security would be the most important feature of the plan.45 As he put 
it,  
 
Finally we’re not going to work to a deadline. Security is going to 
be paramount. If the goons get in a snit over something, I’m quite 
prepared to close up shop completely for a couple of weeks until 
the fuss dies down. Oh, and by the way, I don’t want to hear the 
word tunnel again, we call the three Tom, Dick [and] Harry.46 
 
To ensure success, Bushell explained to the members of the escape committee that he 
had to have absolute control over all aspects the operation including digging, security 
and the work of the escape factories.47 He argued that nothing less than his personal 
micro-management, combined with strict authoritarian control, would allow the 
prisoners any chance of realising his vision. Bushell also warned that if his authority 
was questioned, or it broke down, the entire operation risked being exposed to the 
Germans. 
 
To ensure that he had the control that he demanded, Bushell abolished the escape 
committee’s overview and approval role instituted by Day. The escape committee 
could no longer approve any other schemes proposing escape through a tunnel.48 All 
tunnelling efforts in the compound would be devoted to Tom, Dick and Harry. Bushell 
accepted that other types of escape attempts would still be allowed, but only if they 
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46 R. Bushell cited in Vance, A Gallant Company, p.95.  
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were approved by his new hand selected escape committee and then Bushell himself.49 
Bushell reasoned that other escape attempts would provide a distraction from his own 
plan and if escape attempts from prisoners in North Compound stopped altogether the 
Germans might suspect the prisoners were busy planning a new scheme.50 Once they 
were in North Compound, to ensure the Germans were not overly suspicious about 
Bushell’s escape scheme, some of the most senior officers participated in other escape 
schemes.51  
 
As noted earlier, Bushell changed the composition of the escape committee. He 
explained that, for his operation to work, the escape committee structure that Day had 
introduced during his time at Stalag Luft I and Stalag Luft III East Compound would 
have to be significantly expanded.52 Intelligence officers, diggers, security and 
workers for a variety of escape factories would be essential. This would mean a 
significant increase in the number of prisoners working on escape activities would be 
needed. Bushell was confident that the officers in the compound would volunteer their 
time for such an important operation.  
 
Bushell then gave himself a new title. Instead of being known as the executive, or 
president, of the escape committee, he declared that he would simply be known as 
‘Big X’.53 Bushell explained that the purpose of this title was to protect his identity 
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and his anonymity amongst the general population of prisoners. However, despite his 
intention, prisoner writings and recollections reveal that the majority of POWs in 
North Compound were well aware that Bushell was Big X.54 Prisoners such as 
Kenneth Noel Holland and W. Griffith, for example, explained in their repatriation 
reports that they worked ‘for’ Bushell.55 Even Australian POW Horace Fordyce, who 
had transferred to Stalag Luft III North Compound from Italy, knew that ‘Roger 
Bushell planned and organised everything.’56 
 
According to the published recollections of Paul Brickhill and Conrad Norton, within 
a month of the prisoners moving in North Compound, Bushell’s plan was being 
implemented.57 With Flight Lieutenant C. Floody, who Bushell appointed as chief 
tunnel expert, the locations of Tom, Dick and Harry were selected. 58 Then Bushell 
appointed the prisoners to be in charge of each tunnel: Flight Lieutenants John 
Marshall, Robert Kerr-Ramsay and Leslie George ‘Johnny’ Bull. With Floody, each of 
these men drew up plans for their respective tunnels and had trapdoors made that were 
not easily detectable to Germans. Then the prisoners who had volunteered to dig began 
clearing dirt from each of the three sites.   
 
Each tunnel was to be dug to a depth of 30 feet with a length of over 200 feet.59 Tom, 
Dick and Harry each had 30 diggers assigned to them. The men worked in three 
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different shifts of about two and half hours, but it could stretch to four hours.60 Shifts 
were carefully timed to ensure all prisoners could make it to the German appell or roll 
call. For the same reason, no digging took place at night. It was simply too difficult for 
barrack leaders to account for prisoners who were not in the barracks without arousing 
the suspicion of the guards during an inspection.  
 
As the tunnels progressed, prisoner-designed air pumps provided essential 
ventilation.61 John Travis and Bob Nelson, the prisoners in charge of the metal works, 
constructed three air pumps from the prisoners’ supply of powder tins.62 Under 
Bushell’s orders, each tunnel’s trapdoor and shaft was shored with wood.63 The tunnel 
itself was also sourced with electric light,64 ‘gen men’ being in charge of the electrical 
work.65 They used the odds bits of wire that had been left behind from the Germans’ 
construction in the compound and tapped into the barrack wiring system. Then using 
cables located under the floor, they ran these down into the shafts of the three tunnels. 
By using lamps stolen from the barrack blocks, the prisoners had electric lighting in 
the tunnels. Old tins filled with margarine functioned as the backup lighting system. 
Prisoners from the carpentry factory advised the diggers on how to install wooden 
support beams in the tunnels to stop them from caving in.66 Prisoners found a ready 
supply of wood from their bed boards and the corner legs from their bunk beds.67 
Historian Jonathan Vance explains that squadron leader ‘Willy’ Williams,’ who was ‘a 
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big, curly headed aussie [sic],’68 was responsible for collecting the wood supply, a task 
which he performed ‘with all the zest his countrymen were known for.’69 The 
collected wood was also used to make trolleys that moved on rails and operated inside 
each tunnel.70 This invention, constructed by the prisoners’ engineers, not only carried 
diggers to and from parts of the tunnel, but was also used to transport the dirt and sand 
to the trapdoor.  
 
One major problem that Bushell faced was what to do with the dirt removed from the 
tunnels, which was mostly sand based, unlike the surface soil in the camp.71 If the 
Germans saw any trace of sand, they would know that an escape attempt was being 
planned.   
 
Bushell placed Lieutenant Commander Peter Fanshaw in charge of the dispersal of the 
diggings from the three tunnels.72 This involved collecting and transporting the 
material from the digging sites and dispersing it throughout the compound in such a 
way as to not alert the guards that the prisoners were digging in the compound.73 
Fanshaw’s original solution was for his men to collect the sand in pairs using a cloth 
material, that when filled, formed a cylinder secured with pins and string at each end. 
The prisoners then placed the filled cylinder bag underneath their coats and moved 
through the compound to find a suitable place to dispose of the sand. Once they found 
their dispersal location, they loosed the string on the cylinder cloth bag, and slowly 
dispersed the sand through their coat sleeves or coat pockets. Some prisoners, who 
found this method too slow, took off their coats to disperse the sand. Bushell quickly 
realised this scheme was impracticable, and he said so.  
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Very shortly we’re going to run into a problem with dispersal. The 
method we’re using now is just not satisfactory. The bags are too 
difficult to fill, and it is far too risky with the dispersal having to 
take off their coats to unload the sand. Beside, in the warm weather, 
chaps wandering about in great coats are going to look rather 
suspicious.74 
 
Fanshawe came up with a new solution. The tailoring factory designed long johns that 
included the cloth cylinder in them.75 This allowed the dispersal men to collect the 
sand and then walk to different parts of the compound, loosen the tie or pin and then 
disperse the sand as they walked. To offer increased protection against the Germans 
detecting the sand, dispersal locations were chosen by men working the security detail 
who selected sites that could conceal the sand.76 Once they were in the suitable spot, 
the dispersal men usually gathered as a group, pretended to talk while they loosened 
the string on their built-in cloth cylinder bag, and let the sand fall out.77 The dispersal 
men would then start moving and stomp the sand into the ground.78 The sand dispersal 
men became known as the ‘penguins.’79  
 
When it became difficult for the security men to find a safe place for the penguins to 
disperse their sand, Flight Lieutenant Vivian Phillips organised diversions such as 
boxing matches and volleyball games.80 Then when Commandant Von Lindeiner 
allowed the prisoners to have a camp garden, penguins dispersed sand in this area, 
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while the prisoners working in the garden raked the sand into the garden beds.81 
However as the tunnels progressed, even these schemes could not safely handle the 
disposal of the diggings. At this point Bushell ordered sand to be dispersed secretly 
under huts, in hut roofs, under the floor of the compound theatre, and then in the spare 
Red Cross parcel boxes.82 Despite these new solutions, according to Paul Brickhill and 
Conrad Norton, ‘Bushell, Floody and their fellow-brains were never completely 
comfortable about the dispersal problem.’83  
 
To assist the dispersal teams and to protect the men working on other aspects of the 
escape plan, Bushell expanded Day’s duty-pilot system under the direction of 
Squadron Leader Kirby Green and Flight Lieutenant G. Marsh into North 
Compound.84 This system monitored the movements of Germans inside the compound 
to warn prisoners engaged in escape activities whenever a German approached. 
‘Stooges’85 (prisoners working with the security detail) were rostered to sit near the 
gate to the compound and record the name of each German guard who entered.86 A 
guard who was not considered to be a serious threat was shadowed by a prisoner. If 
the guard came too close to escape activities the men were signalled and work ceased. 
If the guard was considered a significant threat, all activity immediately ceased. This 
guard was carefully watched by several prisoners and only after he had left the 
compound did escape activities resume. The duty-pilot scheme was also adopted to 
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assist the penguins when they operated at night.87 These men were tasked with secretly 
dispersing sand from the tunnels underneath the prisoners’ theatre by accessing the 
trap door built underneath one of the theatre seats. The work was carried out before 
‘lock-up at 2100 hours’,88 which meant that barrack leaders did not have to worry 
about prisoners being absent during a lock-up inspection check. According to Harsh, 
colour flash lamps were used to pass on information about where Germans guards 
were located in the camp.89  
 
By the time of the penguins’ night operations, and to Bushell’s dismay, the German 
guards had become increasingly suspicious of the amount of sand in the compound.90 
The underground microphones installed by the Germans to track any vibrations in the 
earth caused by digging were also recording more sounds than usual. The Germans 
suspected that another tunnel being built. They just did not know where. As a result of 
this suspicion, ‘there were always guards within the camp and at night.’91 In this high 
risk environment Bushell reminded the stooges that if they did not do their job 
properly, the entire operation risked being exposed.92  
 
To impose an extra layer of security to protect the penguins’ night duty-pilot system, 
the intelligence department, led by Australian POW Geoff Cornish, was mobilised.93 
Prisoners in Cornish’s department spoke German fluently and were mostly prisoners 
that Day had previously used as intelligence officers in Stalag Luft I and Stalag Luft 
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III East Compound.94 At night these men were strategically placed around the camp, in 
areas that were well away from any escape work. The prisoners were instructed to 
engage their assigned guard in conversation for as long as they could. This diversion 
seems to have worked. According to Harsh’s repatriation report, these prisoners talked 
with their assigned German ‘for hours [often] argu[ing about] National Socialism or 
the merits of German womanhood.’95 
  
Bushell also instructed these men to continue the duties that Day had introduced for 
intelligence officers, duties that he himself had undertaken under Day.96 These 
prisoners were encouraged to cultivate their assigned guard to gain any relevant 
information and escape aids. This usually occurred once the prisoners had convinced 
their contact to come into their barracks. Once inside, the prisoners steered the 
conversation towards the propaganda which made it seem inevitable that the Allies 
would win the war and, as a consequence, it would be better for the guards to help the 
prisoners.97 If they did, the prisoners would be able to vouch for their character when 
the Allied armies liberated the camp. Some guards believed them and provided 
essential escape aids and intelligence that would help the prisoners once they were 
outside the wire.98 Flight Lieutenant Kenneth Noel Holland’s repatriation 
questionnaire explains that the intelligence officers were instructed to ‘obtain electric 
light bulbs and any information of local civilians e.g refugees, population, morale after 
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bombing, attitude towards Ps/w [sic], etc.’99 This information was then to be passed 
onto Bushell.100  
 
Cornish’s interview with the Imperial War Memorial reveals that some contacts were 
not so easy to manipulate.101 In these circumstances, Cornish explained that he turned 
to blackmail. This system worked by firstly befriending the guard and earning his 
trust. Then Cornish would ask him to bring him in little items, such as soap and 
chocolate. Eventually these items included basic escape aids. Cornish explained that 
once the guard began to refuse his requests, he would tell the guard that he would 
report all of the items and information he had already provided. Knowing he was 
trapped, the guard had no choice but to continue to assist the prisoner. Using this 
method, Cornish obtained a compass and German money from his contact.  
The only time the duty pilot or contact system did not work was when the Germans 
undertook a search of the entire compound.102 At this time, the prisoners hid all of 
their escape equipment and anxiously waited. After the search was completed, 
prisoners who worked the security detail were rostered on to search the entire 
compound before activities resumed. Bushell considered this precaution essential 
because it was too risky for escape activities to resume when it was possible that 
guards might still be in the compound.  
 
As noted earlier, the guards were considered either low-risk or high-risk when it came 
to monitoring their movements. The high-risk German guards were from the Abwehr 
department.103 Popularly known to the prisoners as ‘ferrets,’104 these guards were 
responsible for detecting signs of escape activity. In Stalag Luft III North Compound 
the Abwehr guards were led by Unteroffizier Glemnitz who answered directly to the 
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Commandant.105 Glemnitz, who the prisoners called ‘rubberneck,’106 had been with 
most of the prisoners since Stalag Luft I in 1940/1941.107 He was known as a fair, 
smart officer who was ‘incorruptible’ and therefore, a keen opponent.108 In their 
efforts to try and find any evidence of escape activities, Glemnitz and his men went 
under, in and out of barrack huts and common buildings with torches, metal spikes, 
screwdrivers and pliers.109 They patrolled the camp day and night, often 
eavesdropping on prisoner conversations or bursting into barracks unannounced. They 
had the authority to shoot prisoners who were found outside their barracks at night.110  
 
The Abwehr were supported by armed guards in sentry boxes above the compound 
who were equipped with searchlights.111 These guards had orders to shoot prisoners 
who attempted to cross the perimeter warning wire located inside of the compound 
boundary.112 The official report of the escape committee, the ‘X’ Report, explained 
that within these conditions, the security operations of the prisoners’ escape scheme 
implemented by Bushell were vital to it’s success.   
 
Security might well be called the keystone of the arch leading to 
successful escapes. Without good security and by good is meant as 
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near one hundred percent [sic] efficient as it is humanely possible 
to attain, the attempt of any escaping activity, the duration of which 
is to be more than a few days might just as well never be tried, as it 
is bound to fail.113 
 
The escape factories114 were another extension of Day’s original escape organisation. 
In Day’s model, a few prisoners worked on preparing the necessary papers, outfits and 
food supplies that escapers needed once they had breached the wire.115 Bushell 
significantly expanded this idea to create separate groups of factories that were 
responsible for creating specific items as part of a prisoner’s escape kit. The factories 
produced maps, forged documents, compasses, clothing and food supplies, producing 
the most sophisticated prisoner escape kits that any air force officer had seen.116 They 
matched a prisoner’s escape identity and plan with the relevant maps, railway 
timetables, identity papers and clothes that were necessary to convince a German 
soldier, civilian or Gestapo officer that they were genuine. However, as Brickhill and 
Norton explained, not all prisoners received the same level of attention.   
 
Everyone was to have at least one official paper of some kind, 
most had two and the men with elaborate identities, like Roger 
Bushell and some of the German speakers had as many as half a 
dozen, including letters of credit and incidental forged personal 
letters, just for effect.117 
 
The most prominent Australian contributors in Bushell’s escape factories were Flight 
Lieutenant Alan Hake, who was in charge of the compass factory, John Williams who 
                                                          
113 Various Members of Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report “X”, p.36. 
114 Interview with Cassie, reel 18; Interview with J. Bertram by C. Wood for the IWM on 23 June 1981, 
reel 5, IWM 4987; Brickhill and Norton, Escape to Danger, pp.236-237. 
115 For an examination of prisoners working in Day’s escape organisation on escape aids see H. Day, 
Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x1304, pp.1-4, 
TNA:PRO:WO208/5439; Smith, Wings Day, pp.56, 66, 114, 117-118.  
116 Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III 
North (Officers) Compound, pp.13-19, 25-27; Statement by S/Ldr R. Abraham Officer I/C Clothing 
Stalag Luft III (Sagan), pp.1-6 cited in Various Members of Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report 
“X”, TNA:PRO:AIR40/285; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report “X”, 
pp.11-14, 21-22; Interview with Cassie, reels 18-19; Interview with Dowse, reel 5; Interview with 
Fordyce, tape 6; Interview with James, reel 5; Brickhill and Norton, Escape to Danger, pp.236-237, 
267-272, 282-284. 
117 Brickhill and Norton, Escape to Danger, p.284. 
134 
 
was in charge of carpentry and Geoff Cornish who was in charge of intelligence 
gathering.118 Other Australians played a smaller role in a variety of activities such as 
metal work, supply requisition, tunnelling, photography, map making and 
intelligence.119 In addition to these men, several Australian repatriated prisoner 
questionaries note involvement in the escape committee without listing a specific 
task.120  It is presumed that these men participated in the largest operations, security or 
sand dispersal.121  
 
Bushell’s leadership style 
There is little doubt that Bushell applied an authoritarian leadership style.122 It is 
evident in the way he dealt with the men who volunteered to make his escape scheme 
possible, the decisions that he made regarding the scheme’s progress and his final 
decision to order the escape.  
 
Throughout all of the phases of the escape scheme, Bushell ensured that he retained 
absolute control.123 While members of the escape committee could, and did make 
suggestions, Bushell alone made the decisions. His decisions then assumed the 
authority of orders. They were not subject to further input, compromise or 
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interpretation. As British POW Nathaniel Flekser explained, ‘Roger’s decision was 
final.’124  
 
The language used by POWs to describe their part in the Great Escape also reveals the 
extent to which he exercised an authoritarian leadership style. For example, British 
POW John Wilson recalled that he and some other POWs became involved in the 
escape scheme early in the piece simply because ‘Roger sent for us.’125 Wilson then 
explained why he did not question Bushell: it ‘seemed to be something [that] you had 
to do.’126 Flekser’s writings recall how Roger ‘summon[ed]’127 him and some other 
POWS. Bushell then told them that ‘You, you and you will be stooges on internal 
security. The rest of you will be “penguins” and disperse sand.’128 Alan Bryett’s 
memory of how he was assigned tasks in the escape scheme, however, is different.  He 
remembered that ‘[t]he X organisation would come round the night before [tell you] 
what duties you were on [and] where to report to.’129 As the scheme progressed, 
therefore, Bushell’s presence was not overt. Instead of personally assigning men to 
their task, Bushell let his appointed men issue his orders. This may well have reflected 
Bushell’s attempt to attain a level of anonymity as Big X, but, as noted earlier, the 
identity of Big X was well known. It is more likely that Bushell was confident enough 
of his own control of the scheme to know that any decisions he made would be 
implemented. 
 
In his interview with the Imperial War Museum British POW Sydney Dowse 
explained that Bushell’s authoritarian style was a natural extension of his personality. 
‘He just had leadership qualities... he was always at the forefront because he was the 
sort of chap that would take over and say we ought to be doing this and doing 
that...’130 In his interview Alex Cassie explained that Bushell was able to issue orders 
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to the prisoners because of his ‘forceful personality.’131 Richard Churchill believed 
that Bushell had a ‘natural authority’132  
 
Interestingly, Australian Geoff Cornish’s recollections reveal that his willingness to 
cooperate with Bushell in his escape scheme was founded on the regimental structures 
that Bushell introduced through his authoritarian leadership style. ‘Oh, you accepted it, 
it was an order and it was given to you very clearly and with good reason.’133 British 
POW B. James agreed. His writings explain that Bushell simply ‘decreed’134 what the 
prisoners had to do.   
 
The extent of Bushell’s authoritative power over his enterprise is also shown in the 
way that orders that changed his overall plan for escape were not debated. For 
example, when Bushell found out that a new compound was being built for the 
American air force officers, where Tom was meant to break out, he made an instant 
decision.135 According to Flekser, Bushell announced that they would ‘shut down Dick 
and Harry [for a] concentrated blitz on Tom.’136 This broke his own rule regarding 
tunnel construction. It had devastating consequences. With about 30 feet to go until 
Tom reached beyond the wire, a ‘ferret’ discovered Tom’s trapdoor.137  
 
Having suffered this setback, Bushell then announced to his escape committee that 
instead of keeping Dick and Harry operational, they were going to focus all their 
efforts on Harry.138 Dick was now to be used to store sand taken from Harry.139 The 
writings and recollections are confused as to whether Bushell had a choice in making 
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this decision. Smith and Crawley stated that the point where Dick was meant to 
breakout was being cleared by the Germans for another American Compound.140 If 
this is the case, Bushell had no other option. However, if there was some possibility 
that Dick still could have been used, Bushell’s decision to sacrifice Dick meant that he 
now only had one functioning tunnel. The Germans suspected that Tom was not the 
only tunnel in the compound.141 Bushell’s decision effectively meant that if something 
went wrong with Harry, or the ‘ferrets’ found it, his entire operation was over.   
Bushell’s decision that Harry was ready to ‘go’ was also controversial. Harry’s exit 
was short of the adjoining wood and within fifteen feet of a guard watchtower.142 This 
meant that it was possible for the German sentries in this watchtower to see prisoners 
exiting the tunnel. If this happened to the first prisoner to leave Harry, the German 
guards would swarm the compound and its perimeter before even one prisoner had 
made it to the trees and the entire escape enterprise would have been for nothing. 
Despite this significant threat to the integrity of his plans, Bushell was willing to take 
the risk.   
 
Therefore, just after 10pm on 24 March 1944, dressed in a civilian suit, overcoat and 
hat, for the last time, Bushell escaped from German captivity.143 Bushell was one of 
the 80 POWs from North Compound that made it out of Harry.144 According to SBO, 
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Group Captain Herbert Massey, five more prisoners were caught in the tunnel.145 
Three prisoners successfully made ‘home-runs’.146  
 
The majority of escapers were captured within 50 miles of Sagan.147 According to 
Flight Lieutenant R. Wallace-Tarry, Bushell was caught on the Danish frontier.148 The 
interim report of the investigation made by the military department of the Judge 
Advocate General Office in London found that most of the recaptured prisoners were 
assembled in different locations: 35 prisoners were held at Gorlitz, eight at Hirschberg, 
three at Prague, five in Berlin and one in Munich.149 Of these men, 50 were driven to 
unknown locations and shot. Four Australians were amongst the dead.150 On 29 March 
1944, somewhere between Saarbrucken and Kaiserslautern, Bushell was executed.151  
 
Bushell’s execution was not unexpected. Upon his release from Gestapo custody, an 
explicit threat had been made against his life. British Squadron Leader Bertram James 
recalled; ‘[H]e was released with a warning that he would be shot if he attempted to 
escape again.’152 Flekser’s writings reveal that Hauptman Pieber, one of the prisoners’ 
best German contacts, warned them that the Gestapo were being given an increasing 
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amount of control over escaped POWs.153 As SBO of North Compound, Massey, 
alongside the other SBOs of Stalag Luft III, had been warned on two separate 
occasions that escaped POWs, especially those in civilian clothes or German uniform, 
could be liable for the death penalty.154 These warnings concerned the SBOs of North, 
East and South Compound to such an extent, that they lodged two complaints with the 
Protecting Power.155  
 
The writings of liberated POWs also reveal that in the days immediately prior to the 
escape, Bushell was lectured by his SBO, Massey, and one of his closest friends, 
Sydney Downey, regarding his personal safety. Massey left Bushell in no doubt as to 
the possibility that if caught, he would be shot.  
 
The Luftwaffe are meticulous in abiding by the rules of the Geneva 
Convention. The Gestapo are not and their power is growing every 
day. They know that when the war ends they will have committed 
enough bloody crimes to put them away for years to come. So one 
more murder or execution will make no difference. Yours, for 
example, Rodger [sic]156 
 
Dowse also warned Bushell that his death was a likely outcome.157 He begged Bushell 
to see reason. Bushell’s blunt response to these concerns reveals that his all-
consuming desire for escape had warped his sense of reality. To Dowse’s concerns, 
Bushell replied, ‘Nothing doing, Sydney. I’ve lived for this and I’m going.’158 In his 
interview with the Imperial War Museum, Dowse recalled that in response to these 
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warnings, Bushell’s authoritarian style and blind ownership of his escape scheme 
meant that he was unable to apply any sort of common sense to the likely outcome of 
his escape. ‘[Bushell was] quite arrogant in the sense that I’m not going to be captured 
this time. I’m going to make it...he was very, very confident.’159  
 
When he made the decision that Harry was ready to ‘go’, Bushell was well aware of 
the dangers facing the escapers. They were in civilian clothes, they carried no identity 
disks and he knew that escapers would be turned over to the Gestapo. 160 Bushell’s 
refusal to listen to these warnings reveals a man who refused to accept waiting out the 
war behind the wire. It was a vision shared by many others.  
 
Leadership legitimacy  
Bushell was undoubtedly a leader of prisoners in Stalag Luft III North Compound. His 
grand vision, passionate belief in his cause and past escape experience meant that the 
men listened to his idea and participated in his scheme. The ‘X’ Report states that 
Bushell’s control of escape was ‘practically 100 percent.’161 Prisoner estimates of the 
number of them involved in the escape attempt and scheme vary widely. British POW 
Richard Churchill, placed the figure at ‘80 percent,’162 which according to R. Mulligan 
was approximately 750 men, including the majority of the 44 Australians held in 
Stalag Luft III North Compound.163 Australians Paul Brickhill, Horace Fordyce and 
British POW B. James, however, place the figure as low as 500.164 Irrespective of the 
exact number of prisoners involved, it is clear that Bushell motivated the men to 
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become part of his escape ‘lifestyle.’165 Most prisoners in North Compound, then, 
endowed Bushell with leadership legitimacy.  
  
Australian POW Geoff Cornish, who held a high ranking position in Bushell’s escape 
organisation, was one of his greatest admirers. In an interview with the Imperial War 
Museum, Cornish explained that he believed Bushell ‘was brave and cunning. He was 
the ideal type.’166 Other prisoners called him their ‘leading light,’167 ‘tower of 
strength,’168 ‘legendary mastermind of escape’169 and labelled him as a ‘genius.’170 
British POW, Alan Burgess, echoed Cornish’s praise: ‘Bushell was a man of 
prodigious and uncommon talent, [he had] extraordinary leadership in captivity and 
enduring courage.’171 
 
The recollections of Jack Rae, Patrick Welch, L. Hall, B. James and Sydney Dowse 
infer that, from their point of view, Bushell’s authoritarian persona was essential for 
his escape scheme to have any hope of working.172 Although Bushell was not the 
positional leader in North Compound, these men believed in his escape scheme and 
Bushell’s need to have absolute control over all escape activities in a rigorously 
disciplined operation for it to have any chance of working. The fact that these 
prisoners accepted Bushell’s authoritarian leadership style means they not only 
legitimised his leadership style, they also gave him their followership.  
 
Other prisoners’ views of Bushell were less fulsome. According to Flekser ‘Rodger’s 
[sic] autocratic manner attracted a lot of flak’173 from prisoners who had little or no 
knowledge about his escape plan. British POW Maurice Driver knew the details of 
Bushell’s scheme, but he believed that the number of prisoners that Bushell wanted to 
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escape was ‘ludicrous’, and as a result he ‘was not too interested’.174 Driver also 
believed that Bushell’s authoritarian leadership style was not only unrealistic but was 
also an unwelcome presence. ‘He must have got things done but I didn’t have anything 
to do with him. He didn’t inspire me with anything except to distaste [sic].’175 Bryett 
was also critical of Bushell’s leadership style, saying in his interview,   
 
He was a very testosterone man who said very little [and] who 
always looked rather grumpy and irritable. He didn’t communicate 
with anyone at all unless he was directly talking to them and then 
he was just asking them questions to which he was wanted the 
answer and that was the end of it.176  
 
New Zealand Prisoner Jack Rae carefully chose his words when he described Bushell. 
‘He left the impression of being relatively, I would not use the impression of arrogant, 
I am not putting him down. He was just a super confident man with a strong 
personality.’177 Clearly, there were some men in the compound who either did not like 
Bushell as an individual, or saw his escape plan as grandiose. But these were a 
minority. Bushell’s followership was strong and extensive, but as an emergent leader, 
it was still restricted because of his rank.   
 
Bushell approached Day about what he saw as a potential security threat posed by one 
of the prisoners, Byrne. According to Day’s biographer, Sydney Smith, Bushell was 
blunt in his suggestion as to how the matter should be handled: ‘This man Byrne must 
be eliminated, bumped off if necessary. He is too friendly with Von Massow. He will 
sell the tunnel for a repatriation. It’s a completely unacceptable risk. He has to be got 
rid of!’178 Not surprisingly, Day refused Bushell’s solution. As a positional leader, 
Day had to maintain a careful balance between his intelligence and escape activities 
and his duty as SBO to protect the welfare of his formal group. As an emergent leader, 
Bushell had no such responsibilities to consider. He had a single leadership goal – 
escape.  
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Despite the fact that he motivated many men to share his vision of a mass escape, the 
driving motivation for Bushell was always a personal one: a hatred of the Germans 
and his own escape. Cornish recalled that Bushell ‘loathed the Germans. Absolutely 
and utterly.’179 Flekser agreed, describing Bushell as a ‘cold, aloof man …wholly 
dedicated to escape, and consumed by his hatred of the Germans.’180 The importance 
of his own escape is clearly reflected in the final preparations made for the Great 
Escape.  
 
Just as he had at Dulag Luft, in organising the Great Escape Bushell ensured that he 
gave himself every advantage that he possibly could to increase his chances of making 
a successful escape. He had a range of forged documents and a sophisticated escape 
kit. He was also to be one of the first men to escape.    
The escapers were selected by a somewhat complicated process. Bushell personally 
selected escapers numbered 1 to 30.181 These were men who he considered were the 
most likely to make a successful escape, and presumably men who would not impact 
adversely on his chances of successfully escaping. These prisoners became the first 
tiered escapers. Amongst the prisoners, they were called the ‘VIPs.’182 The next 40 
escapers, however, were decided by ballot.183 To be eligible, a prisoner had to be 
considered by the escape committee to be one of the ‘forty most prominent 
workers.’184 Then the names of the remaining prisoners who worked on the escape 
scheme were put into ballot for the fourth group and so on until a planned number of 
200 had been reached. The second and subsequent groups of escapers were considered 
less likely to succeed and as a result, were allocated the more risky escape plans. For 
example Australian Horace Fordyce, who won the ballot to become escaper number 
86, was told he had to be a ‘hard-arser’.185 This meant his escape plan was to walk, 
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mainly at night. He had little German and was only equipped with the most basic 
equipment and papers.   
 
The use of a ballot system, after Bushell had chosen the first 30, suggests that Bushell 
realised that he risked losing leadership legitimacy if he denied the opportunity to 
escape to the men who had worked on his scheme. The evidence suggests that he fully 
cooperated with a process that contradicted his leadership style. Yet, it is also probable 
that Bushell cooperated with the democratic election process of the other escapers 
because he knew that it would not adversely impact upon his own ability to escape. 
Bushell had ensured that he had done everything possible to give himself the best 
chance to escape. It was now up to him alone to succeed in his task. His leadership 




Bushell’s image post World War Two 
In his study of Stalag Luft III, historian Arthur Durand suggests that Bushell’s 
leadership inspired the men of North Compound to realise a collective vision: ‘No 
other camp activity so exhibited the prisoners’ ingenuity, dedication and sense of 
community spirit and purpose.’186 This thesis argues that instead this was in fact a by-
product of Bushell’s personal goals: his own escape, which in turn was his form of 
revenge on the Gestapo.   
 
Durand agrees that Bushell’s motivation for his escape scheme was revenge for the 
treatment he received at the hands of the Gestapo after he was arrested in 
Czechoslovakia.187 As noted earlier, both Cornish and Flesker commented on his 
hatred of the enemy. Alan Burgess described Bushell as a ‘hard man, resolute, tough, 
coldly determined [and] driven relentlessly by his own emotional imperatives.’188  
Only one prisoner thought of the consequences of Bushell’s Great Escape. Thomas 
Nelson thought that Bushell’s leadership contributed to his own death and the deaths 
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of his fellow escapers.189 Yet even then, Nelson tempered his criticism of Bushell by 
arguing that greater consideration should have been given by all prisoners to the 
potential consequences of a mass escape.190 In all the other sources examined, 
however, Bushell is not blamed for the executions that followed his mass escape. 
Instead he is lauded as hero. Hall proclaimed that Bushel’s ‘name had become a 
legend as the chief planner and leader of the great escape [sic].’191 Flesker believed 
that ‘Stalag Luft III became synonymous with Roger Bushell [who was] the genius 
architect of the great escape.’192 Burgess judged Bushell as ‘a man of prodigious and 
uncommon talent, extraordinary leadership in captivity and enduring courage.’193 The 
execution of Bushell and other members of the Great Escape has led to the 
unquestioning reverence of many for Bushell.  
 
The popular memory of the Great Escape is also based on Bushell’s ability to 
transform passive prisoners into men who participated in his complex multi-layered 
escape organisation. Yet, this is not really Bushell’s achievement: it was Wing 
Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day’s. Bushell, in fact, only extended Day’s 
model to suit his particular vision with none of the responsibilities for the wider 
security and safety of the prisoners borne by leaders such as Day. Yet in the aftermath 
of the executions, Day’s contribution has largely been forgotten. Instead, in death, 
Bushell has been transformed from an authoritarian leader who was obsessed with his 
personal escape to the point where he willing put other prisoners’ safety at risk into a 
prisoner who selflessly planned and led the largest number prisoners to escape 
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Stalag Luft I Barth 1941. 
On Christmas Day 1941, British and Commonwealth Air Force officers gathered 
outside Wing Commander Melville Arbuthnot Day’s barracks.1 The men were in good 
spirits, having consumed their fill of homemade beer. The men cheered as Day greeted 
them. Then, with his cap on backwards, and with the men’s help, he climbed on the 
back of the compound’s wooden handcart that was used to transport Red Cross 
Parcels. The men then took it turns to tow Day around the perimeter compound, 
stopping at each German sentry box. Once in position, with his men crowded around 
him, Day led his men in serenading the German guards with a medley of ‘A life on the 
Ocean Wave’, ‘When I die’, ‘Tipperary’ and ‘the Red Flag.’2 This incident reveals the 
unique ability of Day to inspire his men to forget, even for a short time that they were 
captives of the enemy, on a day which should have been spent surrounded by loved 
ones. Day’s ability to do this is indicative of the unique level of followership he 
acquired as their positional leader.   
 
In 1978, James Burns coined the term transformational leadership to explain the 
ability of some leaders to influence their followers to such an extent that they willingly 
accepted the leader’s directive to change the group’s purpose.3 For such a fundamental 
change to occur, Burns argued that each group member had to be motivated to change 
their personal perceptions of their role in the group.   
 
Burns’ concept was built on the work of other leadership scholars who were trying to 
identify the precise qualities a leader needed to have such a significant impact on his 
or her followers. Some leadership scholars had turned to psychologists, such as 
Lawrence Kolherg, to understand why some leaders were able to influence the moral 
and ethical views of their group members to such an extent that they were willing to 
change the group’s purpose.4 Leadership scholars who pursued this line of enquiry 
came up with concept of leadership courage.5 Richard Daft, in an overview of this 
field of scholarship, argued that the core of leadership courage was moral leadership. 
These leaders guided their groups by using a personal sense of what they thought was 
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right, regardless of the personal consequences to their reputation or position. They did 
so in the hope that they could ‘achieve something about which [they] care[d] deeply.’6 
Moral leaders, therefore, acted with a sense of higher purpose for the betterment of 
their group members.  
 
Other leadership scholars believed that leaders possessing charismatic qualities 
enabled them to change the views and roles of their group members. Scholars such as 
Katherine Klein, Robert House and Jane Howell advocated that leaders endowed with 
this remarkable, but largely undefinable, quality were able to convince their followers 
that the group had to establish a new purpose and goal based on the leader’s vision.7 
As Richard Daft argues, ‘Charismatic leaders create an atmosphere of change and 
articulate an idealised vision of a future that is significantly better than what now 
exists.’8 Charismatic leaders, like leaders defined as having moral leadership, also took 
risks to demonstrate the worthiness of their leadership vision. This risk taking 
behaviour, combined with their influential and infectious personality, allowed them to 
gain the trust and respect of their group members who accepted their leader’s change 
in the direction of the group’s purpose and goal.    
 
Burns’ transformational leadership theory combined these. He argued, ‘Transforming 
leadership ultimately becomes moral in that it raises the level of human conduct and 
ethical inspirations of both leaders and led, this has a transforming effect on both.’9 
According to this theory, the moral concerns of the leader elevate the concerns of the 
group members beyond their own personal needs to that of a larger purpose.   
American and British military leadership scholars have been particularly interested in 
Burns’ theory. Using the trait approach described in Chapter 1, they have tried to 
determine if it is possible to teach transformational leadership, or establish if it is a 
leadership style that can only be applied by leaders who have particular innate 
qualities, and who find themselves in the right contextual setting to allow their group 
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members to accept a change in the group’s purpose.10 No conclusive answer has been 
found.  
 
British Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day matches Burns’ model of the 
transformational leader. Day, captured by the Germans when he bailed out over the 
Ruhr Valley, endured all but the first weeks of the war as a prisoner of the Germans.11 
Throughout his six years in captivity Day struggled to cope with his status as a POW. 
Feelings of helplessness and enforced idleness were compounded by the genuine fear 
that he had left his wife and children, who lived on the south English coast, vulnerable 
to being attacked by the enemy.12 Yet, he was also driven by the belief that, even as a 
POW, he could still assist the British war effort.  
 
Day’s transfer into Luftwaffe custody on 18 December 1939 signalled the start of his 
active approach to his role in captivity.13 From Dulag Luft, the interrogation camp in 
which all newly captured air force personnel started their captive experience, Day’s 
gregarious personality allowed him to advocate to his men that they could still 
contribute to the war effort. Under the direction of careful leadership, from behind the 
wire, Day organised his men into groups who planned and participated in coordinated 
escapes, while also gathering intelligence that could be communicated back to 
Intelligence School 9 (IS9), a branch of British Intelligence.14 Day established this 
escape and intelligence organisation in Stalag Luft’s I (Barth), III (Sagan) and Oflag 
XXIB (Schubin).15 Some of Day’s formal group members were transferred by the 
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Germans to other POW camps. These men took Day’s ideas with them. In this way, 
Day’s leadership vision spread beyond his own camps and effectively transformed air 
force POWs and some army POWs into active participants of the war effort, despite 
their POW status.    
 
Day escaped himself four times, but after his escape from Stalag Luft III on 24 March 
1944, he was captured by the Luftwaffe and sent to Berlin for interrogation.16 After a 
preliminary investigation Day was transferred to Sachsehausen concentration camp. 
Despite the extremity of his new location, Day retained his leadership style and goal.17 
Here Day found four RAF men and some Russian military POWs.18 Together with his 
men he started planning, then digging, a tunnel for an escape. After successfully 
breaking out of the camp, Day was quickly recaptured by the Gestapo. This time he 
was sent to the death block at Sachsehausen concentration camp. According to his 
biographer, fellow POW Sydney Smith, Day explained to his interrogators the reason 
for his zealous commitment to escape:   
 
I am a professional solider. My father became a distinguished 
administrator. My grandfathers and their father were soldiers and sailors. 
One of them was decorated by Queen Victoria with the Victoria Cross, the 
equivalent to your ‘pour le merite’ a long time before any of your fathers 
were born. I have served in two world wars. In this war I requested and 
obtained transfer from the staff in order to lead a squadron in the air. At 
the very beginning …I was shot down and became a prisoner. Death 
would have been preferable. Since then I have been vegetating without 
hope, except that of escape to help my country. My proper place is in their 
ranks. I am a Royal Air Force Officer. Do you not understand what that 
means? I am not a spy, nor a partisan, nor a saboteur. My professional 
honour as well as my pride, my ambition too, if you like, has always 
forced me to return to the fight.19  
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Day coped with six years in captivity because he believed that his leadership goal 
meant that he was still, in some way, contributing to the war effort. His fellow 
prisoners, wanting to feel something other than being redundant, believed in his 
vision. They adapted their daily routines to achieve Day’s vision, but not before Day’s 
personal behaviour in Dulag Luft, which included a close relationship with the 
Commandant, had been questioned by his fellow POWs.20 Day overcame those 
suspicions and, in time, gave his men a sense of purpose, gaining their respect and 








                                                          
20 Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1; Smith, 
Wings Day, p.60.  
151 
 
CHAPTER 5: WING COMMANDER HARRY MELVILLE ARBUTHNOT 
DAY       
 
On Friday 13 September 1939, with the war less than two weeks old, British Wing 
Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot Day voluntarily led the 57th RAF squadron’s 
first mission over Germany.1 He was an officer of 23 years standing, and the recipient 
of the Albert Medal in the First World War.2 Despite protests from senior officers, and 
while personally considering the mission nothing less than suicidal, Day felt 
compelled to lead by example. According to his biographer Sydney Smith, Day’s 
reasons were clear-cut: ‘Yes Sir, I think it is most necessary that I should go on this 
trip. I think my pilots want a bit of a boost and if I palm this one off on some junior 
officer, well, it’s not a very good lead.’3 Day did not return from the mission. German 
air defences forced him to bail out over the Ruhr Valley.4 The prospect of spending the 
duration in captivity almost broke him.5 However, Day found a purpose in captivity in 
the way he interpreted his role as a positional leader. Along with other POW leaders, 
the physical and psychological wellbeing of his men, based on the goal of collective 
survivorship and endurance, was important to him. However, the relatively stable 
conditions in Stalag Luft officer compounds allowed Day to construct a very different 
positional leadership goal: Day wanted his men to remain active participants in the 
war effort in two ways, by providing intelligence to IS9 in London and by planning 
and executing escape activities.6    
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Day’s leadership history and legitimacy  
From November 1939 to March 1943, by virtue of his rank, Day served as SBO in five 
camps. These camps were: Oflag IXA Spangenberg (1 November 1939-18 December 
1939), Dulag Luft Oberursel (18 December 1939-5 May 1941), Stalag Luft I Barth (5 
May 1941-April 1942), Stalag Luft III East and North Compounds Sagan (April 1942- 
October 1942, March 1943-March 1944), and Oflag XXIB Schubin (October 1942- 
March 1943).7 In these camps Day forged a relationship with his formal group based 
on his leadership goals of intelligence gathering and escape. However, this only 
occurred after Day made an almost catastrophic mistake at Dulag Luft.   
 
After capture, Day was transferred on 1 October 1939 to Oflag IXA, a castle at 
Spangenburg.8 It housed mixed British and French army and air force prisoners. Here 
Day became SBO for the first time. Smith’s biography of Day reveals that at this early 
stage of his captive experience, Day was unsure as to what the position entailed and 
how to interact with the captor. Initially, Day declined any privileges as SBO, 
believing that by doing so he might forge a connection with the growing number of 
mixed military personnel from Britain and the Commonwealth who had been taken 
prisoner.9 In his interactions with the Germans, Day mostly presented a united front 
with his French counterpart.10 Together they presented their complaints to the 
Commandant: the lack of mail, Red Cross parcels and reading material. They also 
criticised the restrictions the German guards placed on the prisoners, as they were not 
allowed to move freely about the castle. These discussions did not yield any 
significant results. Day’s relations with the Commandant may have been strained 
because he did not even learn the Commandant’s name.11 Basically, his positional 
leadership was passive.   
 
This changed when, on 18 December 1939, Day was transferred to Dulag Luft at 
Oberursel, an interrogation camp for new prisoners before they were sent to other 
                                                          
7 Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Smith, Wings Day, 
pp.30, 47, 73, 75-76, 96-97, 109.  
8 This camp was later named Oflag XIA. For reference to Day’s tenure at these camps see Day, 
Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Smith, Wings Day, pp.27-34.  
9 Smith, Wings Day, p.34. 
10 ibid., pp.30-31. 
11 ibid., p.30. 
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camps.12 Day spent 15 months in this Luftwaffe camp.13 The Germans planned Day’s 
long tenure. Commandant Rumpel had selected him to be the permanent SBO. In 
contrast to Oflag IXA, Day was comfortable in this camp. Along with his staff, he 
lived in permanent quarters and received privileges beyond those given to the 
prisoners who moved through the camp en route to other camps.14 These privileges 
were significant. They included an endless supply of Red Cross parcels, regular dinner 
parties hosted by Commandant Rumpel in his quarters and, under guard, Day and his 
staff enjoyed parole walks and were allowed to attend Church. In the winter months, 
Day and his staff even went skiing with the German officers. Clearly, Day had formed 
a close relationship with the German staff at Dulag Luft.   
 
In his post-war questionnaire, Day explained the thinking behind this relationship. His 
objective of apparently cooperating with the captor was to ‘lull the Detaining Power 
into a sense of security [through] friendliness and cooperation within limits [that] can 
be adopted.’15 What he was actually doing was leading the planning for an escape. 
Therefore Day readily accepted the concessions given to him and his staff by Rumpel 
because they facilitated his planning. Rumpel also had his own agenda. He hoped that 
the comforts he provided Day and his men would entice them to talk.16 In this way he 
hoped to gain strategic information about the RAF.  
 
Over a period of about nine months, Day and his staff dug a tunnel that would lead 
them out of their permanent quarters, under the camp fence and into the adjoining 
forest.17 During the construction of the tunnel, Day and his men continued to 
ostensibly cooperate with the German staff, and this allowed them to secure 
contraband items from the guards that were needed to complete the escape attempt.18 
These included maps of the district and railway timetables. Day also used his parole 
walks to draw a map of the area and scout the best possible route for the escapers once 
                                                          
12 Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Mason, Prisoners of 
War, p.3.  
13 Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1. 
14 For an overview of the conditions experienced by the permanent POW staff at Dulag Luft see 
Crawley, Escape from Germany, p.100; Smith, Wings Day, pp.34-72. 
15 Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1. 
16 Crawley, Escape from Germany, p.100; Smith, Wings Day, pp.45, 58. 
17 Durand, Stalag Luft III, p.78; Smith, Wings Day, pp.56- 65; Vance, A Gallant Company, p.13.  
18 Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1; Vance, 
A Gallant Company, p.11. 
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they had left the tunnel.19 There was, however, one significant flaw in Day’s plan. For 
the sake of secrecy and keeping up appearances with the Dulag Luft staff, only his 
permanent staff knew the reason why they were seemingly cooperating with the 
Germans.20 This meant the overwhelming majority of prisoners who passed through 
Dulag Luft only saw Day and his staff on friendly terms with the Germans. The 
consequences would be significant. 
 
As the SBO in Dulag Luft, Day was responsible for POWs during their most 
vulnerable period, that is, when they were coming to terms with their captive status 
and were being interrogated by the Luftwaffe staff. The interrogation methods used by 
the Luftwaffe were mostly psychological. Prisoners were held in isolation cells and 
then, when they were led into the interrogation rooms, they were asked to fill in a fake 
Red Cross form, designed to trick the prisoners into providing information about their 
mission and training.21 The Luftwaffe interrogators also used a variety of techniques to 
start, and then keep, the prisoners talking. For example, they would engage the 
prisoner in discussions about their homes, families and interests and then, once the 
prisoner was comfortable talking to them, the interrogators would slip in questions 
about their squadron, weapons and mission.22 In his examination of these techniques 
on American Air Force prisoners, David Foy found that some POWs fell for these 
ploys.23  
 
For the prisoners who proved to be more resistant, there were two other strategies the 
Luftwaffe interrogators used. These men were told that their crewmembers had 
already told the Luftwaffe interrogators all they needed to know, which meant that the 
prisoners felt little guilt in answering the questions.24 If this did not work, a Luftwaffe 
officer, posing as a POW, could be placed in their cell. The officer then persuaded the 
POW, whose defences were down, to share his story.25  
                                                          
19 Smith, Wings Day, p.45. 
20 Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1. 
21 Herrington, Air Power over Europe 1944-1945, p.474; Mason, Prisoners of War, p.250. 
22 Foy, For You the War is Over, pp.55-56; Mason, Prisoners of War, pp.250-251. 
23 Foy, For You the War is Over, p.55-56. 
24 Rolf, Prisoners of the Reich, p.23. 




After interrogation, the prisoners were moved into the transit area of the camp.26 Here 
they observed Day and his staff interact with the Germans. These men had just 
endured interrogation, were trying to overcome their sense of failure at becoming a 
prisoner and knew nothing of Day’s motivations. What they saw was an SBO and his 
staff, comfortably quartered and the recipients of privileges, on friendly terms with the 
enemy. They saw this as nothing less than a betrayal of the British war effort.27    
 
What made matters worse was that as the SBO of Dulag Luft, Day was responsible for 
distributing Red Cross parcels.28 In 1940/1941, when the delivery of these essential 
food parcels broke down, some of the prisoners accused Day of hoarding their food 
supply.29 This claim, combined with his behaviour at Dulag Luft, led to the prisoners 
accusing Day of being a collaborator. The prisoners lodged their complaint with the 
British Air Ministry in London, and the Ministry ordered an official inquiry into his 
behaviour.30 The accusation tormented Day.31 In his repatriated questionnaire, Day 
reflected on how he managed to get himself into that position.   
 
[If there is] too much friendliness and cooperation [with the captor] the 
morale of the camp [is low] and [it] results in a lack of discipline with 
many of the ps/w [sic] who do not know what is going on and they lose 
confidence in their leaders.32 
 
Once he knew of the allegations, Day realised that the only way to prove that his 
cooperation with the Germans was subterfuge was executing the planned escape.33 On 
                                                          
26 H. Clarke, C. Burgess and R. Braddon, Prisoners of War, (Sydney: Time-Life Books in association 
with John Ferguson, 1988), p.24; Clutton-Brock, Footprints on the Sands of Time, pp.16-17; Smith, 
Wings Day, p.43.  
27 D. Luddock, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, no.52738, pp.1, 3, 
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Interview with Driver, reel 7.    
28 Smith, Wings Day, p.60. 
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30 Smith, Wings Day, pp.60, 74-75.  
31 ibid., pp.60-61. In Stalag Luft I, after he had cleared his name Day suffered a mental breakdown, 
which manifested itself in paralysis of the face. See Smith, Wings Day, p.88. 
32 Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.3.  
33 Smith, Wings Day, p.61. 
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the first weekend in June 1941, Day, along with 17 of his permanent staff, escaped 
from Dulag Luft.34 It was the first mass escape from any POW camp in Germany.35 
Day remained on the run for only one night. 36 He was captured the next day only 
about an hour and half away from the camp. Despite his failure, Day believed that his 
escape attempt validated his behaviour at Dulag Luft. 
 
Following his recapture, Day was transferred to Stalag Luft I at Barth.37 As the highest 
ranked officer in this camp, Day continued in his role as SBO. He brought with him an 
understanding of his mistake at Dulag Luft. In captivity, rank alone no longer mattered 
when it came to leadership legitimacy and authority.38 Instead, prisoners made 
judgements about the legitimacy of their rank leaders based purely on their observed 
behaviour. In this way, prisoners determined who they would or would not follow. 
Rank, therefore, was not enough to retain leadership legitimacy. Day also observed a 
related issue raised in earlier chapters in this thesis: that the men, once they became 
POWs, felt that they ‘were not subject to military discipline and, therefore, each man 
began to act as he thought fit’.39  
 
In essence, Day realised that effective leadership in captivity depended on earning and 
retaining the trust of his formal group, which, in turn, encouraged discipline. As a 
result, in Stalag Luft I, Stalag Luft III East and North Compounds and at Oflag XXIB, 
Day did his utmost to ensure that his men were looked after by their officers and were 
protected against the Germans and the frustration generated by their status as 
prisoners. For example, at Stalag Luft III North Compound, Day intervened to stop the 
growing power of two enterprising POWs who had established a compound trading 
                                                          
34 One Australian prisoner was involved in the preparation phase of this escape but he did not 
participate in the actual escape. See Crawley, Escape from Germany, p.103; Durand, Stalag Luft III, 
pp.78-79; Vance, A Gallant Company, pp.34-35. 
35 The Germans defined a mass escape as an escape involving five to seven men. See Day, Special 
Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.5.  
36 Smith, Wings Day, pp.70-71. 
37 Day, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1. For reference to the 
escape attempt see Durand, Stalag Luft III, pp.78-79; Crawley, Escape from Germany, p.103; Vance, A 
Gallant Company, pp.34-35. 
38 Day’s repatriation questionnaire has this date as 5 May 1941. This however, is impossible. He did not 
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See Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.8. 
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racket, popularly known as ‘foodacco.’40 Day announced a referendum in the camp. 
The question to be decided: should foodacco be ‘nationalised’. According to British 
POW Kingsley Brown what followed was ‘a spirited campaign on both sides.’41 The 
vote was a resounding no. Irrespective of his referendum loss, as SBO and for the 
good of the compound, Day ordered that foodacco be nationalised. Day reasoned with 
the men that in this way, there would be no monopoly on supplementary food items, 
which were becoming more important as the German ration decreased and the weekly 
issue of parcels were now shared amongst prisoners.42 While his decision was not 
popular amongst those prisoners who were making a substantial profit in cigarettes 
(the replacement currency for money) other men realised that Day’s intervention was 
necessary to ensure that all men experienced the same standard of living in the 
compound.43  
 
Day extended his SBO duties beyond his formal group. As explained in the 
Introduction, air force NCOs were forbidden to work by the Germans, but they also 
received less pay from the captor than air force officers.44 Knowing this, Day tried his 
utmost to also ensure that the British/Commonwealth Air Force NCOs were as 
comfortable as possible in the camps in which he was held. At Stalag Luft I, Day 
established a special fund for them.45 The money was deducted from the officers’ pay 
and managed by Flight Lieutenants Bob Stark and John Gilles who were also 
chartered accountants.46 The money collected was then given to the MOC of NCO Air 
Force compounds. Initially these funds were used to fund leisure activities, such as 
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44 Durand, Stalag Luft III, pp.206-207; Mason, Prisoners of War, p.260. 
45 Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East 
(Officers) Compound,p.13; G. Naville, Protecting Power Inspection Report Stalag Luft I, 22 February 
1943, pp.8-9, TNA:PRO:AIR2/6366. 
46 Durand, Stalag Luft III, p.84.  
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paying for musical instruments and sports equipment.47 Smith, Day’s biographer, 
explains that later in the war this money was also used for the ‘bribery [of German 
guards], obtaining German currency, wireless components, films and other articles for 
escape activities.’48 This fund continued to operate within Stalag Luft I and was 
introduced to Stalag Luft III upon Day’s transfer to that camp.49 In his interviews with 
Protecting Power representatives and Commandant Von Lindeiner in Stalag Luft III, 
Day constantly petitioned for better conditions for air force NCOs, particularly those 
who were being held in the Air Force Compound at Stalag VIIIB.50  
 
Day also worked to ensure that amicable relations were maintained between British 
and American air force officers. For example, in Stalag Luft III, the British and 
American prisoners received different pay rates, with the British worse off.51 Day 
brokered a deal with the American Air Force Colonels Delmar Spivey and Charles 
Goodrich where the Americans agreed to use their extra funds to pay for purchases for 
the British canteen.52 Prisoners in both compounds therefore received the same amount 
of foodstuffs and personal pay. Day also negotiated for the British and American 
officers to share a communal Red Cross clothing pool, which meant that all of the air 
force officers in Stalag Luft III, regardless of their nationality, received essential items 
of clothing from the clothing pool.53  
 
Initially, Day capitalised on the good will that he had earned by escaping from Dulag 
Luft to build followership.54 He and his men explained to the formal group at Stalag 
Luft I how they had managed to pull off the mass escape of 18 prisoners. Then, after 
his prisoners understood the instrumental role he played in planning this escape, 
including the reason for his behaviour with the Germans in Dulag Luft, Day 
introduced his men to his leadership goals: intelligence and escape.      
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Day’s leadership style 
As an SBO Day launched an active campaign against his captors centred on 
intelligence and escape.55 Day laid the foundation for his leadership goals and style at 
Dulag Luft and Stalag Luft I. Then over time, at Stalag Luft III and Oflag XXIB, as a 
result of his men’s faith in his genuine intentions, and Day’s refusal to remain a 
passive prisoner, organising intelligence and escape activities grew to become the 
defining response of air force officers to their captive state.56   
 
Intelligence  
When Day was taken prisoner, he quickly realised that he had to establish a way to 
communicate with the British military or intelligence departments. He wanted to do 
this for two very different reasons. Firstly, Day wanted to remain a part of the war 
effort as a means of coping with his imprisonment.57 The second reason reflected his 
sense of duty clearly evident in his explanation for leading the operation that led to his 
capture. As an air force officer, Day had listened to the lectures on his responsibilities 
if he became a POW.58 These included writing coded letters back home to the British 
intelligence department, which might in some small way assist in military operations. 
However, he faced one significant problem: he had not learned how to write in code.59 
So in Dulag Luft, as prisoners passed through the transit compound, Day asked them if 
anyone had learned how to write in code. Day found one, a British Sergeant Pilot, who 
had learnt this skill.60  
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It was not until Day himself arrived at Stalag Luft I that an existing ad hoc approach to 
intelligence evolved into a systematic operation.61 Day’s decision to transform 
intelligence into a fully functioning operation was not a decision that he made alone. 
In Stalag Luft I, from late 1941, Day received special parcels from IS9, a branch of the 
British Directorate of Military Intelligence (MI9).62 These parcels contained coded 
intelligence messages and escape aids. After he realised that these parcels were going 
to be a continual part of their captive experience, Day created an intelligence team 
amongst his formal group, which was based on a cell structure.63 Each cell in his 
intelligence network was responsible for one particular intelligence activity and trusted 
prisoners were recruited to carry out each cell’s activity.  
 
The first layer of Day’s intelligence cell network was responsible for ensuring that 
Day received IS9 parcels unopened.64 For this task Day recruited prisoners to work in 
the parcels centre at the camp. These men were responsible for identifying and 
collecting IS9 parcels before the Germans guards took custody of them and either x-
rayed them or physically searched them. In his special questionnaire on escape, Day 
explained that because so few German guards worked in the parcel centre and because 
they were often slack, the prisoners managed to slip most of these parcels past the 
Germans.65 On some occasions, however, they failed. These parcels were then either 
confiscated, or the prisoners encouraged and sometimes manipulated friendly guards 
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to turn a blind eye and allow them to take these parcels away from the parcel centre 
without them being searched.66  
 
To gather strategic information that might be useful to IS9, Day recruited prisoners to 
act as interrogation officers.67 These men, led by Day himself, gathered information 
from two different sources. The first was the prisoners themselves. Interrogation 
officers interviewed all newly arrived POWs who entered the camp and any prisoners 
who were forced to return to the prison camp after a failed escape attempt. From 1942 
until June 1943, these officers questioned not only British/Commonwealth Air Force 
officers, but with the consent of Senior American Officer Spivey, American Air Force 
officers.68 All of the prisoners who were interviewed were asked questions to ascertain 
any relevant tactical observations that they had made on any aspect of the German war 
effort during their journey to the POW camp or during their time on the run.69 In his 
special escape questionnaire, Day explained that the most useful intelligence that he 
and his officers gathered was from prisoners who had escaped on foot.70 From these 
men, Day built up a working knowledge of the local area, procedures at railway 
stations and any other information they gained from conversing with civilians and 
even soldiers.  
 
The second source of information was more problematic to collect. Day ordered a 
different group of German-speaking prisoners to establish a relationship with selected 
German guards and interpreters with the aim of cultivating them as sources of 
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information.71 These officers reported daily to the interrogation officer in charge of 
German sources who briefed them on what information they should focus on obtaining 
from their contact. For the most part, these officers were asked to find out about 
internal matters such as the movements of Commandant Von Lindeiner, the possibility 
of searches being conducted in the prisoners’ quarters of the camp, any new security 
measures which the Germans had introduced to assist them in stopping prisoners from 
escaping and any other information that they thought was relevant.  
 
In Stalag Luft III East Compound, these same prisoners were ordered by Day to 
deliver propaganda messages to their contacts.72 Wing Commander R. Collard, who 
also wrote a weekly newssheet for all prisoners called the ‘Plug’, created these 
messages.73 They were based on current news items, heard on the ‘public’ radio that 
was hidden by the prisoners.74 Their purpose was to undermine the morale of the 
German guards with the hope that they would see the futility of the German war effort 
and, therefore, provide assistance to the POWs, particularly in their escape activities, 
which would stand them in good stead in the event of an Allied victory.   
 
The continuity of German staff from Stalag Luft I to Stalag Luft III East and then 
North Compound helped the prisoners selected for this job establish friendly 
relationships with their allocated German guard or interpreter.75 Over time some of 
these men were successful in exploiting these relationships. For example, Captain 
Hans Pieber, who was with the prisoners in Stalag Luft I and Stalag Luft III East and 
North Compounds, had been an aircraft designer in civilian life.76 Over a cup of tea 
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with Day, Pieber provided intelligence on German aircraft, and according to 
intelligence reports from Stalag Luft III, ‘valuable information of secret weapons.’77 
By the time of the Great Escape from Stalag Luft III North Compound in March 1944, 
Pieber had also given Day essential escape aids, such as maps, a camera and vital radio 
parts.78 Other officers exploited their Germans contacts to find out other intelligence 
information, such as the location of factories, airfields, German troop movements, 
weapons and even air tactics.79 Over time the same contacts were also used to help the 
prisoners in their escape attempts.80 As Day had done with Pieber, the other 
intelligence officers convinced their German contacts to give them maps, information 
on the surrounding region, gate passes, money, cameras, civilian clothing, radio parts, 
uniform insignia and railway timetables.81   
 
A fourth group of prisoners were charged by Day with another intelligence task. These 
men were responsible for watching aircraft that passed over the camp to try to 
ascertain which flights were for training purposes and which ones were genuine 
military missions.82 Using this information, these men were then responsible for daily, 
weekly and monthly statistical analysis of their data. At the end of each month, these 
statistics were presented to the SBO in graph form. This information was then 
analysed to measure German aircraft traffic on a yearly basis. This information formed 
part of the intelligence that Day ordered to be passed on to IS9. 
 
Once intelligence had been gathered by his officers, Day himself accumulated and 
evaluated the information and passed on what he believed was relevant information to 
a fifth group of prisoners. These men were code and letter writers.83 Their task was to 
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apply a secret code to what looked like normal letters home to their families. 
Depending on the time delay between the prisoners sending their coded letters and 
British authorities receiving them, the information Day compiled was of some tactical 
use.84 The fact that Day received coded letters in reply to the information sent from his 
camps, usually in the special parcels, confirms that his intelligence operations were 
taken seriously in London.85 
 
Day’s code writers also wrote coded messages that were sent between the prisoner 
compounds in Stalag Luft III and then between different POW camps.86 These 
messages were usually placed inside personal cigarette parcels or were contained in 
letters addressed to brothers in another compound or camp. MO’s letters and reports 
addressed to other MOs in other POW compounds or camps were also used to pass on 
these messages. At Stalag Luft III coded messages were also secretly passed between 
SBOs and MOCs when they attended meetings with the Commandant, or 
representatives from the Protecting Power or the Red Cross.87 The purpose of these 
messages was twofold: to communicate progress in escape plans, particularly 
important for messages that were passed between compounds of the same camp, and 
more generally, to gain information regarding the welfare and movement of prisoners.  
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The special parcels that Day’s men collected and passed on to him increased their 
efficiency in communicating with IS9. In these parcels, the prisoner received 
typewriters, radio receivers and radio parts.88 The contents of these parcels enabled 
Stalag Luft III North Compound to receive messages from IS9 on their radio from 
August 1943.89 This radio was reserved for the use of intelligence officers only. The 
‘public radio’ referred to earlier in East and then North Compound at Stalag Luft III 
was used for listening to the BBC news service.90 The private radio also allowed 
Day’s radio operators to collect intelligence from another source, coded messages 
from IS9 contacts living in Germany. This information, combined with information 
Day’s intelligence network accumulated from other sources, was then passed on to IS9 
through coded radio contact.   
 
In his various camps, Day recruited at least five Australians to his intelligence 
network. In Stalag Luft I East Compound, Flight Lieutenants P. Roberts, A. Slater and 
A. McSweyn worked as code letter writers.91 In Stalag Luft III North Compound, 
Wing Commander R. Norman secured supplies through his German contact and Flight 
Lieutenant J. Gordon became a member of the radio maintenance team.92 It is probable 
that other Australians were also involved in other parts of Day’s intelligence network, 
in particular the security operations, whose members provided warnings of 
approaching Germans to the intelligence officers when they were speaking to their 
assigned contact.    
 
Day’s relationship with his captors is one of the reasons that his intelligence officers 
were so successful in exploiting their assigned German contacts. In each of the Stalag 
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Luft camps where Day was a captive, the Germans viewed him as a respectful officer 
who controlled and disciplined his men with purpose, and they tended to trust him.93 
This provided the structure, motivation and skills for his men to exploit the trust that 
he instilled in the Germans. The trust that he had now earned from his formal group 
because they knew what he was doing allowed his intelligence cells to work 
effectively. In his repatriation questionnaire, Day reasoned that the size of his formal 
group and the level of personal control that he now had over his formal group were the 
keys to his intelligence success.94   
 
Escape  
Whilst intelligence activities were important for Day in transforming his men from 
prisoners feeling that their war had ended into men believing that they could still be 
active members of the war effort, the centrepiece of his leadership goal remained 
escape. To his permanent staff in Dulag Luft and then to his formal groups in Stalag 
Luft I, III and Oflag XXIB, Day consistently reminded his men it was their duty to try 
to escape.95 He argued that escape gave them the opportunity to contribute to the 
Allied war effort, despite being prisoners of the enemy. Prisoners’ repatriated 
questionaries and their personal writings reveal that Day’s passionate enthusiasm for 
escape resonated deeply with his men, even if in different ways.96 British POW G. 
Atkinson, for example, recollected,  
 
[It was a] corporate policy and intent that it was part of our duty to play a 
part in escape arrangements, it was one of the devices in which we kept the 
Germans on their toes and shall we say pinned some down. By and large 
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as loyal members of the Royal Air Force most of us accepted this principle 
whether we felt particularly enthusiastic about it or not.97 
 
Atkinson’s recollections show that Day’s formal group understood his agenda, 
although the prisoners had different reasons for participating in his escape activities. 
Influenced by Day, some prisoners believed that escape was one way they could 
actively contribute to the war effort and, therefore, were duty bound to participate. 
Others had more pragmatic reasons. Some wanted to escape themselves. Others were 
bored with the monotony of life as a prisoner and escape activities provided one way 
to relieve that boredom.98  
 
There is no doubt that Day led by example. In his six POW camps, Day escaped four 
times.99 Smith, Day’s biographer, explained why: it was the ‘duty of the leader was to 
lead.’100 Or, as British POW Alex Cassie put it, ‘He wouldn’t ask anybody to do 
anything he wouldn’t do himself.’101 A survey of repatriated questionaries reveals that 
Day succeeded in creating the image of a defiant prisoner through his escape activities  
as prisoners inextricably tied Day’s legacy to his escape attempts.102 In this way, from 
the perspective of his men, Day’s refusal to accept his passive status as a prisoner and 
to instead continue to fight against the Germans became his trademark as a leader.  
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By watching Day prepare for, and take part in his escape attempts, there is no doubt 
that he fuelled the desire and passion for this activity amongst his men. In contrast to 
his intelligence operations, which were based on a needs to know basis, Day organised 
escape on a collective principle. He believed that even if a prisoner did not want to 
attempt an escape himself, he would be willing to help others that did,103 a goal he 
achieved as Atkinson’s statement quoted earlier shows. Based on this rationale, at 
Stalag Luft I, Day introduced the prisoners to the concept of the escape committee.104 
At this camp, the escape committee comprised of a president and two staff.105 As the 
SBO, Day appointed the president. He entrusted this position to a prisoner who had 
helped him organise the mass escape from Dulag Luft, Lieutenant Commander Jim 
Buckley. Buckley then appointed his staff, selecting Squadron Leader Roger Bushell 
and an unnamed British Air Force officer. Day then created a second tier for the 
committee. Each barrack hut, by popular vote, appointed three officers who functioned 
as their barrack escape committee. Any prisoner who wished to make an escape 
attempt was required to present his plan to his barrack escape committee. These men, 
after working with the potential escapee to refine his plan, were responsible for 
presenting the final plan to Buckley and his staff.  
 
In Stalag Luft I, Buckley and his staff, therefore, functioned as panel of review and 
approval for any escape attempts to be made from the camp. In this way they 
sanctioned, coordinated and scheduled all camp escape activity. This was a significant 
improvement to the ad hoc escape attempts that had occurred prior to Day’s arrival in 
the camp. Some of these attempts had ended in one prisoner’s scheme cancelling out 
another prisoner’s attempt because their planning, materials or dates overlapped. A 
collective escape effort, led by Day, allowed every potential escaper to have the 
benefit of the information that Day’s intelligence operators had gathered on German 
military movements, local landmarks and transport. A centralised escape organisation 
also meant that escapers had the benefit of any supplies the POWs had managed to 
obtain from secret parcels and their contacts. Security was also organised collectively. 
Prisoners working on escape aids were protected by prisoners placed strategically 
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around the compound to warn them when a German guard or guards were 
approaching.106 In this way, for the first time, prisoners were working in a coordinated 
way to increase the security surrounding their escape attempts. In effect, Day’s 
introduction of a centralised approach to escape fostered and promoted collectivism 
amongst the prisoners.   
  
When Day and his men were transferred to Stalag Luft III East Compound at Sagan in 
April 1942, they found a new method was being trialled by the Germans to stop 
prisoners digging tunnels in an attempt to escape.107 In this camp, the POWs lived in 
huts built on stilts. This change proved to be no deterrent. In fact, in order to cope with 
the increasing number of escape applications, Day had to change the structure of his 
escape committee model.108 The central committee now comprised of at least five 
officers, reflecting the growth in the number of prisoners’ escape plans.109 Buckley 
was still the president but now he appointed officers who were in charge of escape 
security, intelligence, supply and planning. Buckley’s planning staff consisted of four 
other officers who were responsible for reviewing and coordinating the four different 
types of escape; tunnelling, climbing over or cutting the wire, walking out of the camp 
gates in disguise and hiding in transport that came in and out of the compound.110  
 
To aid Buckley in his role of preparing escapes on a larger scale, Day introduced a 
multi-level surveillance operation known as the duty pilot system.111 One prisoner was 
located near the camp/compound entrance. His job was to observe and record the 
names of any Germans who entered the compound. Strategically placed prisoners then 
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monitored the movements of each German who entered the compound. Through a 
signalling system, prisoners warned anyone engaged in intelligence or escape 
activities that a German was approaching. In this way the integrity of an escape 
attempt could be maintained. While he was SBO at Stalag Luft III East Compound, 
and up until the time of Great Escape from North Compound in March 1944, most 
prisoners participated in this system at one time or another.  
 
In Stalag Luft III Day’s formal group were confident that his escape system reflected 
his genuine motive to transform his men into active war participants. His personal 
example, along with the success of his intelligence operation and the professional way 
in which escapes were now being managed in his camps, meant that his formal group 
were confident that he was a genuine POW leader. Previous doubts regarding his 
intentions had vanished. Instead of questioning his loyalty, his men now 
enthusiastically embraced his collective and disciplined model of escape. In this way 
his men demonstrated their support of Day’s vision of his men as active participants in 
the war effort. The escape organisation transformed the prisoners’ way of life in air 
force camps, particularly in Stalag Luft III.  
 
Day’s transformation of his men into active participants in the war effort can clearly 
be seen in the number of prisoners who participated in his escape organisation in 
Stalag Luft III East and then North Compound. For example, the security officer’s 
roster comprised of 100 to 150 prisoners.112 Most of these men participated in the duty 
pilot system.113 The intelligence officer, who worked closely with Day, maintained a 
roster of 50 to 80 prisoners, while the supply officer had about 50 volunteers.114 Then 
there were the men who staffed the seven workshops constructing materials that 
escapees required to successfully breach the wire and then, once they had escaped, 
essential items that would allow them to remain at large until they successfully 
reached safety in England, Switzerland or even Allied lines.115 In Stalag Luft III East 
                                                          
112 Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.1. 
113 Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part III 
North (Officers) Compound, pp.12-13, 38; Harsh, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-
Prisoners of War, Attached Report, pp.1-2;  D. Myles, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-
Prisoners of War MI9/S/PG/1/2, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/3341; Various Members of the Stalag Luft III 
Escape Committee, “Report X.” p.10.  
114 Day, Special Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, Attached Report, p.2. 
115 For example of work produced by these factories see Camp History of Stalag Luft III (Sagan) Air 
Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part 1 East (Officers) Compound, p.33; Camp History of 
171 
 
and then North Compounds, Australians were heavily involved in the construction of 
escape materials within these workshops. The most prominent prisoner was Flight 
Lieutenant Alan Hake, who ran the compass factory.116 
 
When the Germans transferred Day and about 100 members of his formal group to 
Oflag XXIB, those left behind at Stalag Luft III East Compound continued to operate 
the escape committee.117 With Day’s absence, the structure of the escape committee 
expanded to suit the growing agenda of its new president, Roger Bushell.118 Then, 
when these officers were transferred to the newly opened North Compound, Bushell’s 
plan evolved into the Great Escape, discussed in the previous chapter.119  
 
Irrespective of any changes made to the escape committee’s structure, including those 
made by Bushell, Day’s overarching authority remained constant.120 During his tenure 
as SBO, Day appointed the committee president and retained the right to review all of 
its decisions.121 Then when Group Captain Herbert Massey and Group Captain D. 
Wilson arrived in Stalag Luft III East and North Compounds and, because of their 
higher rank, assumed the role of SBO, they acted as SBO in name only.122 Although 
Day described his status at this time as ‘advisor’123 to the SBO, his advisory role was 
in fact the continuation of his self-defined leadership role. Smith explains why Massey 
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allowed Day to continue in his leadership role. Massey knew Day well as they had 
both served together in Egypt during the Great War. From this experience, and 
Massey’s reflections on Day’s experience as SBO in captivity and the way in which he 
had transformed his formal group into defiant men, Massey believed that it was best to 
leave the leadership of the men as it was. As far as Massey was concerned, ‘[b]y now 
Wings had well mastered his responsibilities.’124 Massey then defined his SBO role as 
helping Day negotiate with the Germans.125 In this way, Smith explains that Massey 
‘lightened Day’s [leadership] burden.’126 When Massey was repatriated back to 
England due to ill health, Australian Group Captain Wilson assumed the role of 
SBO.127 Smith suggests that Wilson continued to practice his SBO responsibilities as 
Massey had defined them.128  
 
In Stalag Luft I and Oflag XXIB, Day supplemented his intelligence and escape 
network by instructing his men to be ‘as disobedient and uncooperative ... as possible’ 
in their dealings with their captor in what was known as his ‘open warfare’ order.129 It 
is probable that in Stalag Luft I, when Day struggled to convince his formal group that 
his intentions were genuine, this order may have reflected his desire to prove, beyond 
doubt, his loyalty to the British cause and, in doing so, develop a community spirit 
amongst his formal group. However, Day’s ‘open warfare’ order led to such an 
oppressive German presence that it effectively curtailed escape and intelligence 
activities for a month.130 Day was astute enough to rescind the order, which allowed 
escape planning and activities to resume. During his tenure as SBO at Stalag Luft I, 
Day’s escape organisation oversaw 49 escapes, including an escape by one air force 
officer, who successfully made it back home to England, and two others who reached 
Sweden.131   
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In Oflag XXIB at Schubin, Day had a very different motive for ordering ‘open 
warfare’ against the Germans. In this camp the order stemmed from the personality of 
Wehrmacht Commandant Hauptman.132 In October 1942, Day and about 100 men 
were transferred from Stalag Luft III East Compound to Oflag XXIB.133 Their transfer 
came at a most inconvenient time for Day, as he was busily engaged in a new plot to 
escape from Stalag Luft III East Compound. Crawley’s published memoir and Day’s 
biography suggest that the timing of their transfer was not a coincidence as the 
German staff had suspicions that the prisoners were planning an escape.134 In Oflag 
XXIB, camp conditions were not up the usual comfortable standards that air force 
officers had come to expect. 135 What made matters worse was Commandant 
Hauptmann’s attitude towards Day.  
 
Day was used to having the respect of his Commandants.136 In this camp, however, he 
regularly participated in shouting matches with Commandant Hauptman, which 
continued until the German Commandant worked out that the only way to deal with 
Day was with courtesy.137 This understanding, however, did not help Day to negotiate 
concessions for his men, as no matter what the request, the Commandant’s answer 
always seemed to be no. Commandant Hauptmann believed that prisoners should be 
seen and not heard, and that the basic rights of prisoners, such as those decreed by the 
Geneva Convention, were a luxury.138 Day refused to allow his duty to his escape and 
intelligence operations to be curtailed by a repressive Commandant whom he judged 
to be both vindictive and bitter. 
 
In this oppressive atmosphere, the motivation of the air force officers to escape was 
high.139 Despite their enthusiasm, however, planning for escape took time. It was not 
until 3 March 1943, that 40 prisoners, led by Day himself, breached the wire from a 
                                                          
132 For reference to order see Day, Special Questionnaire for American/British Ex-Prisoners of War, 
Attached Report, p.2. For reference to the meaning of the order see Crawley, Escape from Germany, 
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135 For an overview of conditions in this camp see Brickhill and Norton, Escape to Danger, p.154;  
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139 Smith, Wings Day, pp.114-115; Crawley, Escape from Germany, pp.203-204. 
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150-foot tunnel that originated from a latrine.140 Of all the prisoners who escaped, only 
one managed to elude recapture, Jim Buckley, who is believed to have drowned while 
attempting to cross into Sweden.141 This was Day’s most successful mass escape and 
its consequences must have given him immense satisfaction: the court marital of 
Commandant Hauptmann and his staff by the OKW.142  
 
Day and his men were then transferred back to Stalag Luft III and placed in the North 
Compound. Day arrived in time to oversee the preparations that Bushell was making 
for his mass escape. As explained in the previous chapter, by this time Bushell was 
obsessed with escape. Day was the only prisoner who could reason with him. Day cast 
a careful eye over Bushell’s plan and helped him to achieve the greatest mass escape 
by prisoners in Germany in World War Two.143 Day himself participated in this 
escape. He was buddied with Polish POW Peter Tobolski.144 Their cover story was 
that Tobolski was acting as Day’s personal Luftwaffe escort and was taking him on the 
train to Berlin. From there Day hoped to contact a Dane he knew who, in turn, might 
be able to contact an escape organisation to get him out of Germany. Day never made 
it to Berlin. Instead, on their fourth day outside the wire, both he and Tobolski were 
arrested by the Gestapo. Day was then taken to Berlin for questioning and for some 
unknown reason, transferred to Sachasenhausen concentration camp.145 Ironically, this 
transfer probably saved Day’s life because he was not one of the 50 POW escapers 
who were executed by the Germans.146  
 
Day’s followership 
Simon Mackenzie’s analysis of prisoner behaviour in German camps suggests that a 
positional leader’s ability to control the impulse to escape embodied ‘[leadership] 
                                                          
140 This proved to be the most successful escape during Day’s tenure as SBO. See Camp History of 
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North (Officers) Compound, p.57; Smith, Wings Day, pp.148-160. 
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of War, p.1; Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, p.1. 
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175 
 
legitimacy and authority.’147 Day achieved this feat, despite his shaky start. Report 
‘X’, written by various members of the escape committee in Stalag Luft III, along with 
other sources, confirm that Day’s leadership goal, combined with his ‘likeable and 
powerful’148 personality won over the men in his formal group and in the process 
transformed them from downtrodden men, who had been captured by the enemy, into 
an active participants of the war effort irrespective of their status as prisoners.149   
In order to operate his intelligence and escape network, Day needed the absolute 
loyalty of his formal group. There is little doubt that he had that, as the writings of 
POW R. Churchill indicate:  
 
I think if Day had said well I’m afraid [we are] going to have heavy 
casualties, from this idea but I’m asking for volunteers to storm the wire in 
order to get a few people out ...he would probably have had a lot of 
volunteers.150  
 
The majority of the prisoners in his formal group were prepared accept the risks 
associated in performing these tasks inside a POW camp.  
 
Even outsider observers who visited Stalag Luft III North Compound noticed the 
respect the men had for Day. The Swedish lawyer, Henry Soderberg, who came to 
the camp on behalf of the YMCA, observed that he ‘never knew what Wings was 
doing but knew that he was doing something important’.151 
 
Perhaps the greatest evidence of the breadth and depth of Day’s followership is the 
decision of Massey and then Wilson to defer their authority as the highest-ranking 
officers in Stalag Luft III North Compound to Day. Massey and Wilson understood the 
remarkable achievements Day had made in captivity and were aware of the respect the 
men had for Day.  
 
                                                          
147 Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth, p.327. 
148 Various Members of the Stalag Luft III Escape Organisation, Report “X”, p.34. 
149 Smith, Wings Day, p.106. 
150  R. Churchill cited in Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth, p.327. 
151 H. Soderberg cited in Durand, Stalag Luft III, p.318.  
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Despite the fact that after his first escape the Germans must have surely seen him as a 
man to watch, Day was still able to establish good relations with the captor and in that 
sense fulfil his role as SBO to protect the men under his command. In part, this 
reflected his personality, which was also an integral element in his leadership style. 
Prisoners’ writings and recollections recall that Day had a unique, infectious desire to 
continue active service behind the wire that motivated them.152 Day combined his 
mission with immeasurable charm and courage along with a defiant spirit with an 
irrepressible larrikin streak.153 Yet, his nickname ‘Pricky’ reveals that when angered 
Day could be ‘formidable.’154 For British POW E. Hall, Day was a ‘hell of a 
character.’155 His complex persona and his dedication to his leadership goal allowed 
him to harness the instinctive desire of his men for freedom.  
 
After the war, Massey recommended Day for an award for exceptional services.156 In 
part it read:    
  
Amongst prisoners of war generally, one could sense a feeling that, 
although seemingly out of the war, something still could be done by 
concentrating on escape and the work which, if only indirectly, would help 
in the general war effort. I mention all this as it was quite obvious to me 
that this state of affairs existed almost entirely as a result of Day’s 
leadership and his organising ability…[H]e was quite literally loved and 
respected by all. His great indomitable spirit, his complete selflessness, his 
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coolness in emergency, and his determination to continue the war effort 
whatever might befall, were an inspiration to us all.157 
 
Adrian Gilbert, Arthur Durand and Simon Mackenzie agree that as a positional leader 
in Germany, Day’s leadership goal inspired escape to become a way in which 
British/Commonwealth Air Force officers coped with their captive state.158 Day, 
through his vision and modelling behaviour, gave them the method and belief that they 
could still contribute to the war effort. Day did not realise this goal alone. Men such as 
Jimmy Buckley and Roger Bushell helped him and did so willingly because they came 
to share Day’s vision. Yet, most British/Commonwealth Air Force officers realised 
that any escape attempt that they made embodied Day’s spirit.  
                                                          
157 Massey, Recommendation of Wing Commander H.M.A Day, pp.1-2. 




Lower Saxony, Germany, April 1945. 
On the orders of their guards, the prisoners from Stalag 357 are moving. 1 On the 
banks of the Elbe River, their leader, Sergeant James “Dixie” Deans, organises a 
distribution of Red Cross food parcels. While starving men consume their fill, British 
Typhoons open fire. Sixty are killed.2 Appalled at the senseless loss of life, Deans takes 
matters into his own hands. On an aged bicycle, accompanied by a German guard, he 
sets out to cross the British lines.3 He hoped to inform the British Commander of his 
men’s position to spare them from further attack. Against the odds, he succeeds. Then, 
when offered freedom, Deans chooses to return to his men. To the perplexed British 
General, Deans explained that his men still needed him and ‘courtesy’ compelled him 
to keep his word to his Commandant.4    
 
Democratic leadership is a very different style from those examined to date and, at 
first glance, appears to be the antithesis of military structures.5 Leadership legitimacy 
is not defined by positional power but by the followers’ mutual consent based on 
respect.6 Although technically a positional leader because his position as leader is 
officially recognised, this type of leader is always accountable to his formal group, and 
often depends upon a consultative leadership style to implement feedback and ideas 
from the formal group into the decision making process.7 Moreover, it can be 
multilayered, with delegation of responsibilities through a committee structure. The 
works of Richard Daft, David Fleet and Gary Yukl, Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin 
Zander have identified three basic models that have informed the analysis in this 
chapter.8  
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The first model is hierarchical in its structure. A leader is chosen by popular election, 
or the implied consent of group members, and the leader alone determines the group’s 
course of action.9 The second involves a delegation of leadership authority where the 
leader can choose to delegate some of his responsibilities to group members, or even 
the group as a whole. In this case, the leader becomes a facilitator or guide, and 
decisions are made collectively. This style allows for flexibility in the group structure. 
If the group is faced with a crisis, such as the leader’s absence, or changes within the 
group’s membership, it will not fold but instead seek ways to adapt to the new 
variables.10 Studies conducted on the behaviour of inmates in concentration camps 
reveal that the democratic leadership model was used by informal groups whose 
members survived this extreme setting.11 The third democratic leadership style is an 
extension of the second model. In this structure group decisions are made on the basis 
of majority consent. Every group member is an equal stakeholder assuming shared 
responsibility for the group’s actions.12 Irrespective of the form it takes, democratic 
leadership is essentially an expression of human dynamics where belonging to, and 
participating in, a group instils a sense of collective identity, ownership and 
accountability for the achievement of group goals.13 The group can replace leaders 
judged to be incompetent, or who make questionable decisions, or who are simply 
disliked. A leader’s personality, character and vision, therefore, are critical for this 
leadership style. In a sense, they reflect the argument put by military scholars William 
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Rosenbach and Robert Taylor that the most effective ‘leaders come from the ranks of 
followers.’14   
 
Admittedly, democratic leadership is rare in the history of captivity during the Second 
World War. Yet, in response to particular conditions and the social composition of the 
group, it did emerge in the stable captive conditions in Europe and in the volatile and 
extreme captive settings in the Pacific Theatre. In the European Theatre, it was evident 
in the election of leaders of formal groups. In the Pacific Theatre, it was evident in 
informal groups in volatile and extreme settings. In both cases, a combination of the 
three different types of models described above was used. This combination of models 
was a response to the physical and psychological needs of their men, the skills of their 
formal or informal group members and the demands placed on the group by the captor.  
 
The first of the case studies in the following chapter examines the air force NCOs in 
Germany. Housed separately from their officers in relatively stable conditions in their 
own compounds, and all being of a roughly similar rank, official positional leadership 
only came into play when men from the officers’ compound, such as Day, visited the 
NCO’s compound. The second case study examines democratic structures within 
informal groups, where it was more common. Amongst informal groups the roles of 
leader and follower were shared amongst group members with leaders emerging based 
on the needs, desires and skills of group members. In informal groups democratic 
leadership styles were, therefore, applied in their most pure sense.   
 
For the air force NCOs held as prisoners in the European Theatre, the defining feature 
of their military command was the absence of a hierarchical rank structure, as most of 
them were sergeants.15 Historian Adrian Gilbert argues that because of the absence of 
a hierarchy of rank, air force NCO’s earned respect ‘not from years of dutiful service 
but from technical ability.’16 These men were, therefore, used to judging each other on 
merit. This method of assessing each other’s abilities meant that, in captivity, they 
                                                          
14 R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds.), ‘Introduction to Part 2: Followers and Leaders’, in Military 
Leadership, Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p.79.  
15 Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth, p.127. 
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chose positional leaders because of their skills in organising and protecting the formal 
group from the captor, and if necessary, from themselves.   
 
They selected their leaders by casting votes in democratic elections.17 These men were 
proud of their unique method of appointing their leaders, boasting that their election 
process made them different from, if not more intelligent than, the rest of the 
British/Commonwealth prisoners because they were not blinded by allegiance to 
rank.18 However, democratic power could pose problems for the leaders themselves. 
They could not issue orders that their formal group had to follow or, as stipulated in 
military regulations, be held accountable for their disobedience.19 Men chose to follow 
their leader’s directions because they believed they were in the best interests of the 
formal group. If the formal group disagreed with a direction, they could choose to 
ignore it and, if this happened frequently, the formal group could choose to remove the 
elected positional leader and then hold a new election to replace him.20 This process 
would continue until the formal group were satisfied that their elected leader was 
working in the best interests of the group. As elected leaders, air force NCO positional 
leaders were thus democratically accountable for their decisions.  
 
Air force NCO leaders, therefore, implemented the democratic leadership model for 
very pragmatic reasons. The most successful leaders were able to effectively use the 
consultative leadership style discussed earlier, implementing feedback and ideas from 
the formal group into their decision making process. They also used a multiple 
leadership structure to gauge the reactions of their groups, taking into account the 
reactions of their groups to their decisions, and if necessary, amending them to suit 
their group’s needs. The multiple leadership structure ranged from camp elected 
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from the Cage, pp.25, 147.  
19 For reference to the unique nature of the air force NCOs leaders power see Camp History of Stalag 
Luft III (Sagan) Air Force Personnel, April 1942-January 1945, Part II Centre (NCO) Compound, p.17, 
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committees to nominated and elected barrack leaders and national representatives. The 
escape committee in the NCO camps, however, usually worked as an independent 
committee and it was essential for the elected positional leader to have a working 
relationship with the escape committee, or he risked being labelled irrelevant or 
inefficient by members of his formal group.  
 
To retain their position, these leaders had to be very good at their job. They had to 
have the ability to clearly identify their leadership goals, explain to their formal group 
how they were going to achieve these goals, then actually achieve them. In essence, 
these men had to prove to their formal group that they could protect them against the 
captor and build and maintain group cohesion to protect the physical and 
psychological needs of each POW. If an air force NCO positional leader achieved this, 
and he continued to uphold the goals that he had promised on his election, he not only 
gained leadership legitimacy but also, because of the unique level of accountability 
within his formal group, acquired followership.21  
 
The writings and recollections of Australian POWs reveal that the two elected 
positional leaders examined in this chapter, Scottish Air Force Sergeant James ‘Dixie’ 
Deans and Australian Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie, both acquired 
leadership legitimacy through their ability to implement their leadership goals and, as 
result of their success, gained loyal followership. In the chapter that follows, more 
time is given to Deans simply because there are more primary sources for Deans than 
for Currie. Deans was elected leader in six different camps, which had large transit 
populations. As a result, more prisoners came into contact with Deans and reflected on 
his role as leader in their diaries, letters, repatriation surveys and post-war interviews. 
In contrast, Currie was an air force leader for a shorter time within a mixed compound 
of air force NCOs and army other ranks in an army other rank camp run by the 
Wehrmacht. Yet, despite these differences, both men implemented the same leadership 
style. For their ability to translate their leadership goals into effective leadership of 
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men in captivity, both men were made a Member of the British Empire (MBE) after 
their repatriation.22   
 
Democratic leadership in informal groups reflected the captive settings of the 
prisoners. In more stable settings, where the threat to survivorship was, for the most 
part low, roles were interchangeable, meaning men could be both leaders and 
followers. In volatile and extreme settings, however, democratic leadership in informal 
groups was vital for survival, as was belonging to a group. Group members rotated 
leadership responsibilities according to conditions and the needs of the group. The 
final section of the following chapter examines the role of democratic leadership 
among the groups working on the Burma-Thailand Railway and during the forced 
marches in Europe.  
 
                                                          
22 For reference to Deans MBE see Interview with E. Hall, reel 4; Interview with R. Morton for the 
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CHAPTER 6: POSITIONAL AND INFORMAL DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP 
 
Air Force Sergeant James ‘Dixie’ Deans and Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor 
Currie were two air force NCO elected positional leaders. The chapter begins with a 
brief history of both men in captivity, then examines how Deans and Currie balanced 
the needs of their formal groups with the unique nature of their leadership authority in 
order to create and apply a democratic leadership style in captivity. With an ability to 
adapt their leadership style in response to their men’s physical and psychological 
needs, both men became respected POW leaders who gained loyal followership.  
 
Sergeant James ‘Dixie’ Deans  
Sergeant James ‘Dixie’ Deans bailed out over Berlin on 10 September 1940.1 
Captured by the Germans, Deans was transferred into the custody of the Luftwaffe and 
interrogated at Dulag Luft before being transferred to his first camp, Stalag Luft I.2 
Over the course of the war, Deans would be held in six camps run by the Luftwaffe for 
air force POWs3 and, mixed service personnel camps at Stalag 357 at Thorn, then at 
Fallingbostel, which were run by German Wehrmacht.4 Then, in April 1945, with the 
Allied forces approaching Fallingbostel, Deans and his men were forced to evacuate 
the camp via train and then on foot.5   
 
For the most part, the conditions in the Luftwaffe camps were relatively stable.6 
Permanent barracks had been built for housing the prisoners, there were regular 
arrivals of Red Cross parcels to supplement the German ration and to pass the time the 
POWs were allowed to participate in a variety of leisure and educational activities. 
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MI9/INT/SP/MIS-x, p.1, TNA:PRO:WO208/5439.  
4 Deans, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Deans, Special 
Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1. 
5 Deans, Repatriation Questionnaire for British/American Ex-Prisoners of War, p.1; Interview with 
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Relations with the Luftwaffe Commandants and guards were, for the most part, 
relatively amicable.7 The one significant exception to this was Stalag Luft IV in 
Heydkrug.8 Stalag Luft IV already held 3000 NCOs when Deans and some of his 
formal group arrived.9 This number grew to 6000, following large transfers of 
American POWs. From this time onwards, Deans’ men experienced overcrowded 
conditions in temporary accommodation and Red Cross parcels became fewer and 
smaller.10 In the aftermath of the Great Escape, the amicable relations with the 
Commandants established in previous camps ended.11 Some prisoners were shot 
during escape attempts and the German guards were openly violent towards the 
prisoners.12  
 
In Stalag 357 at Thorn and then at Fallingbostel, Deans’ men felt the real impact of 
Germany’s failing war effort. Deans’ formal group arrived at Thorn after a particularly 
trying train journey of four days in overcrowded truck cars.13 When they arrived at the 
camp, 7000 army NCOs were already there.14 This figure soon reached 9000 POWs 
and kept climbing.15 Shortages of German rations and Red Cross parcels continued.16 
At Fallingbostel, they found themselves in a reception centre for POWs who would 
soon be forced to leave the camp and march away from the approaching Allied 
                                                          
7 Interview with Cornish, reel 4; Interview with Fordyce, reel 5.  
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forces.17 Here Deans’ formal group mostly lived in makeshift tents on the parade 
ground, with no heating or lighting, and existed on rations that fell below subsistence 
levels.18  
 
On the open road in April 1945 Deans controlled an expanded formal group of about 
12 000 men, spilt into sections of about 1000 each.19 During the day Deans, rode 
between the groups on an old bicycle to ensure that the men had sufficient rations, 
were given rest breaks and were treated fairly by their guards. 20 At night, Deans 
cycled between the barns that he had arranged as a billet. Deans also had another 
challenge to deal with, British air strafing of his column. This final phase of captivity 
ended on 2 May when Deans’ column was liberated by the American army.21  
 
When Deans arrived in Stalag Luft I, his first camp, he found a formal group who 
believed that their elected leader was making life very comfortable for himself but not 
for his men.22 An election soon followed, with Deans winning the vote. From this 
point on, Deans retained the position of MOC for the duration of his captive 
experience in six camps.23 He did so because he won the right to act as the positional 
leader of his respective air force NCO formal groups through elections. At both Stalag 
Luft III Centre Compound and Stalag 357 Fallingbostel, for example, Deans was 
elected MOC as the previous MOCs were forced to resign by their respective formal 
groups.24 At Stalag 357 at Thorn, where the formal group consisted of mixed air force 
NCOs and army other ranks, the acting SBO, Captain Bonham-Carter, aware of 
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Dean’s reputation, stepped down to allow an election of a new leader.25 Deans won the 
majority of votes against his main opponent, the previous MOC of the army 
contingent of the camp, Regimental Sergeant Major Turner.26  
 
It is important to note that different men formed Deans’ formal groups. The Luftwaffe 
transferred POWs, either as individuals or in small numbers, from camp and camp, or 
from compound to compound within a camp. This ad hoc transfer policy meant that in 
his six different camps, some of the same men remained with Deans, while others did 
not. This changing composition of formal groups and, in the case of Stalag 357 at 
Thorn and then at Fallingbostel where the formal group consisted of mixed service 
personnel, makes Deans’ ability to retain his position as MOC even more remarkable.   
 
Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie 
Warrant Officer Alistair McGregor Currie was an Australian member of the 12th RAF 
Squadron.27 A sheep station worker in civilian life, Currie’s war ended on 15 March 
1942 when his plane was shot down at St. Nazaire in western France. He was 
interrogated at Dulag Luft and then transferred to Stalag VIIIB/344 in Lamsdorf, 
Poland, on 15 March 1942. Currie spent two years and eight months in this camp. This 
was a mixed camp and was one of the worst British army other rank POW camps run 
by the German Wehrmacht.28 Nor were the air force NCOs housed in their own 
compound. In a letter penned in October 1942 to his wife Bel, Currie described the Air 
Force NCO Compound in Stalag VIIIB as a mixed compound with 1000 air force 
NCOs, of which 74 were Australian, and 500 other ranks from the army.29 This mixed 
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population, however, did not last long as the Commandant created a compound for air 
force NCOs.30 Currie was elected MOC of this compound in March 1943.  
 
Although historians have described Stalag VIIIB as one of the most notorious POW 
camps in Germany,31 there were variations in terms of conditions between compounds. 
The worst conditions were found in the other rank army compounds. In comparison, 
conditions in the Air Force NCO Compound were better.32 There were fewer German 
guards, originally more space within the barracks and compound and more food was 
provided for the air force NCO prisoners. As ‘special prisoners’, they were barred 
from working for the Germans.33 This meant that they were largely left to their own 
devices.  
 
Until the arrival of Commandant Rudolf Gylek just prior to the reprisals explained 
below, the Air Force Compound remained locked, isolating the air force NCOs from 
the rest of the POW population in Stalag VIIIB.34 Gylek, however, ordered the Air 
Force Compound gates remain open until 9.00pm daily.35 This order was intended to 
stop persistent attempts by the air force NCOs to find ways out of their compound. 
What it did, though, was facilitate one of the more popular escape schemes – swapping 
identities with an army other rank prisoner in an attempt to be transferred out of the 
camp to a satellite Arbeitskommando (working camp) where the men thought the 
chances of escape were better. 
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Although conditions were better in the Air Force NCO Compound, there were still 
difficulties. The location of the camp in Poland, combined with the lack of basic 
winter supplies, made for poor living conditions. Sickness, including typhus, was a 
constant presence in this camp.36 Although fewer German guards were assigned to the 
compound, there was one guard who caused significant problems. Unteroffizier 
‘Ukrainian Joe’ Kussel, popularly known by the air force POWs as ‘The Bastard,’37 
was responsible for numerous violent assaults against the POWs.38 Then, on 9 October 
1942, the air force POWs in Stalag VIIIB became part of a POW reprisal program 
organised by the OKW.  
 
This program was the OKW’s reaction to the Dieppe incident. Germans, who had been 
taken captive by the Allies during the Dieppe Raid, were discovered dead with their 
hands tied behind their backs.39 In retaliation, the OKW ordered that prisoners’ hands 
be tied with string from the Red Cross parcels, from 7 in the morning until 8 o’clock at 
night.40 After numerous complaints to the Commandant and the Protecting Power that 
the string was cutting off the blood supply in men’s wrists, the guards used shackles 
and handcuffs instead of string. To further punish these men, the contents of Red 
Cross parcels were withheld from October 1942. Over time, however, these 
restrictions were relaxed, particularly after some of the POWs became experts in 
picking the locks and gaining their freedom during the supposed hours of 
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confinement.41 By the end of the reprisal period on 22 November 1943, historian 
Oliver Clutton-Brock described the reprisals as more a ‘nuisance than a punishment.’42 
 
Towards the latter stages of the war, the camp population in Stalag VIIIB exploded, 
particularly after the capitulation of Italy in September 1943. As a result of the influx 
of prisoners into the camp, the OKW divided the work camps originally attached to 
Stalag VIIIB and then renamed the camp Stalag 344.43 Overcrowding, however, 
remained a significant problem.44 The Germans did not provide any significant 
increase in essential provisions for the new influx of prisoners, including those in the 
Air Force NCO Compound. Combined with the onset of a Polish winter, camp 
conditions went from liveable to intolerable. Shortages of basic supplies for the POWs 
became even more pronounced as the tide turned against the Germans in the war.45 
The Germans also began planting ‘stool pigeons’, or Germans posing as POWs, in the 
Army and Air Force Compounds to detect prisoners’ escape plots.46 They enjoyed 
particular success during the winter of 1943 to 1944. Deteriorating conditions and the 
work of the German spies led to the significant downturn in prisoner morale. In this 
atmosphere, members of the formal group found it difficult to trust anyone, including 
their MOC.    
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From late 1944, the situation worsened as the Red Army began its advance westwards. 
Stalag 344 became a staffing target.47 Red Cross parcels, vital supplements to the now 
very poor German ration, became extremely rare.48 Then, on the 22 January 1945, in 
the face of advancing Soviet forces, the OKW ordered the evacuation of Stalag 344.49 
As they left the camp, each man was given one Red Cross parcel.50 These men 
endured the worst of the forced marches discussed in the Introduction.51 They 
evacuated on foot during the height of the Polish winter. Their first objective was to 
reach Stalag VIIIA at Gorlitz. They arrived on 3 February, having walked, according 
to Currie, 270 kilometres, with about 350 men being forced to leave the column, 
usually due to a combination of hypothermia, sickness and exhaustion.52 Those who 
could still walk were ushered out of the camp on 10 February to keep walking. The 
weaker POWs were left behind. Then, on 29 March 1945, these men were forced to 
turn to the east.53 This time they were trying to outmarch the approaching British and 
American armies. Advancing Americans liberated Currie’s marching column on 4 
April 1945.   
 
The trying conditions inside Stalag VIIIB/344 meant that the job of the MOC was 
particularly difficult. The dismissal of at least five British/Commonwealth MOCs prior 
to Currie’s election in March 1943 is evidence of just how difficult it was to be seen as 
acting in the best interests of the formal group and win over its members’ trust.54 
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54 Currie, Statement by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps in Germany and Italy, 
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Currie’s official and personal writings testify that he himself found being MOC 
extremely difficult.55 Yet, he remained the elected MOC of this compound, making 
him the longest lasting MOC during the existence of the Air Force NCO Compound at 
Stalag VIIIB/344. Currie only relinquished his leadership role when the camp was 
forced to evacuate. Then like Deans, Currie became the positional leader of a 
marching column.56 When they were ordered out of Gorlitz, he was in charge of 
between 200 and 300 air force POWS who continued to march until, as noted earlier, 
they were liberated.57  
 
Deans and Currie’s democratic leadership structure 
Despite their different camp locations and captive conditions, Deans and Currie shared 
the same leadership power and the same leadership vision, that is, the collective 
endurance of their formal group in captivity.58 Deans and Currie believed that 
endurance encompassed both physical and psychological matters. To achieve this goal, 
both men became the advocates and protectors of their respective groups, a goal they 
could only achieve if their formal groups understood their intentions.  
 
To achieve their leadership vision and to ensure their men understood it, Deans and 
Currie implemented a consultative democratic leadership model within their camps. 
As noted in the preface to this chapter, the model consisted of three layers of 
consultative leadership structures that effectively allowed group members to play a 
role in decisions made by Deans and Currie, communicate those decisions and reasons 
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for them to all POWS, and so effectively maintain control of their formal groups.59 It 
was a transparent leadership model, a concession to the unique leadership role they 
filled and a recognition of the potential fragility of their power amongst equally ranked 
air force NCOs. Although both men used the same approach to leadership, the specific 
ways in which they implemented that approach, however, differed, a reflection of the 
differences in the camps in which the men were held.  
 
The leadership committee formed the first layer of this consultative leadership 
model.60 The task of this committee was to assist the MOC in the practical application 
of his leadership duties. This included organising the men for daily camp parades, 
advocating the needs of their formal group to the Germans by attending conferences 
with the German Commandant and liaising with the Protecting Power and Red 
Cross.61 
 
Following his election as MOC, Deans was allowed to appoint his own staff.62 Deans 
chose to have a small staff of two: an assistant and officer manager.63 In his six camps, 
British Air Force Sergeant Ron Mogg acted as Deans’ office manager.64 From the 
surviving records, it cannot be ascertained who acted as Deans’ assistant. Then, 
alongside Deans’ personal staff, an election was held to appoint men to the leadership 
committee. In his interview with the Imperial War Museum, Deans remembered that 
there ‘was probably about 10’65 on the committee. The existence of a larger elected 
leadership committee suggests that in Deans’ camps these men were held accountable 
for the running of the camp/compound and, in the performance of these duties, worked 
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closely with Deans and his personal staff, to shape and implement his leadership 
decisions.  
Currie’s personal staff in Stalag VIIIB/344 consisted of three men: British Warrant 
Officer W. Ford as the compound interpreter, Canadian Warrant Officer S. Bailey as 
secretary, and British Air Force Sergeant Wilkinson as compound quartermaster.66 It is 
unclear from the sources if a general election was held in Currie’s compound for 
nominations to the leadership committee, and then he selected men for positions on the 
committee, or if Currie personally appointed these men.  
 
Below the level of the leadership committee were the barrack leaders. In Deans’ 
camps, barrack leaders were elected.67 It is not known how barrack leaders were 
appointed in Currie’s camp.68 Irrespective of their method of appointment, what is 
certain is that these men were not on the leadership committee. Barrack leaders, 
however, were probably the most important of the leadership position within Deans 
and Currie’s organisations.   
 
Barrack leaders were responsible for three tasks.69 They relayed the decisions that had 
been made by the MOC and his leadership committee to men in their barracks. They 
monitored and, if necessary, intervened in the day-to-day interactions between the 
POWs. Lastly, barrack leaders reported to the MOC the mood, opinions and any 
incidents that had occurred between prisoners in their barracks. In this way, barrack 
leaders gave Deans and Currie a way of monitoring the behaviour, reactions and 
opinions of their formal groups to their leadership decisions, and, if necessary, 
allowing them to modify or change their decisions if they proved to be too polarising 
for their formal group. Barrack leaders, in essence, provided the MOC with the 
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knowledge he needed to gain, and then maintain, his leadership legitimacy and the 
followership of his men.     
It is interesting to note that past MOCs in Currie’s compound in Stalag VIIIB/344 
became barrack leaders.70 These were the men who had been forced to step down from 
the positional leadership position because they had lost the trust and respect of their 
formal group. Two possible explanations can be offered for this. Currie wanted these 
men working with him, instead of working against him, possibly causing tension 
within the formal group about the validity of his decisions. Or, as MOC in a difficult 
captive setting, Currie may have found their experience and insights invaluable. By 
keeping them close, Currie could learn from their experiences and mistakes. Currie 
admitted that he found his position as MOC a very difficult one. In particular he found 
his task of liaising with the Germans a ‘continuous struggle.’71 For Currie, the input of 
past MOCs would have offered him some form of support in this difficult task.    
 
National representatives formed the third layer of leadership in the consultative model 
used by Deans and Currie.72 This role complimented that performed by the barrack 
leaders by giving the MOC a complimentary means of monitoring the reactions of the 
formal group to their decisions. The national representative was also in a unique 
position to detect any possible perception by the POWs of any decision made by 
Deans or Currie that reflected national bias. If tensions, based on a sense of 
disadvantage by a national group, emerged, it was essential that the MOC be aware of 
them and act swiftly to nullify them before his leadership legitimacy could be affected 
or even broken. 
 
Deans and Currie, however, used their national representatives differently. Under 
Deans, national representatives were responsible for monitoring the psychological 
wellbeing of fellow nationals within the camp as well as ensuring that their physical 
needs were being met. For example, Warrant Officer F. Seamer, who acted as the 
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Australian national representative in Deans’ camps in Stalag Luft III (Centre 
Compound) and then in Stalag Luft VI, described his role as meeting all newly arrived 
Australian POWs, introducing these men to the Australians already in camp and 
monitoring supplies to ensure that the Australians had access to their basic needs.73  
 
In Currie’s camps, the national representatives took a more active role in ensuring the 
physical needs of their national compatriots were being met. For example, the 
Australian representative, Warrant Officer R. Sherman, monitored the welfare of 
Australians and also performed the administrative tasks needed to ensure that these 
men were receiving their food and goods parcels by communicating with overseas 
headquarters, the Australian Red Cross and the Australian Comforts Fund.74 National 
representatives in Currie’s camps, therefore, not only provided the MOC with a means 
of monitoring the mood of the men but also checked with outside agencies the status 
of the parcels their men were entitled to. This additional role suggests that an extra 
level of accountability was needed in Currie’s compound to prevent any potentially 
polarising of the prisoners that the distribution of goods parcels might have caused. By 
designating this task to national representatives, Currie distanced himself from the 
distribution of parcels at barrack level and could not be held personally responsible for 
any delayed or missing Red Cross parcels. The introduction of this system also 
suggests that equitable distribution of Red Cross parcels had been a problem in the Air 
Force NCO Compound in the past.   
 
Deans initially took a different approach to the distribution of Red Cross parcels. In 
Stalag Luft I and Stalag Luft III Centre Compound, he set up a group of prisoners, 
separate from the leadership team, to distribute the parcels.75 In other camps, such as 
Stalag Luft VI and Stalag 357, however, it appears that this system ceased to exist. 
According to Australian Flight Lieutenant Eric Maher, Deans and his leadership team 
supervised the distribution of food parcels,76 a claim Deans corroborated.77 The fact 
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that Deans’ leadership team controlled the distribution of goods parcels, and not the 
national representatives who could be personally blamed if something went wrong, is 
evidence that Deans had a stronger followership than Currie because his men trusted 
his leadership team to distribute these vital parcels equitably.  
 
If the distribution of parcels reflected a level of trust on the part of the groups, why 
was there an apparent lack of trust in Currie’s leadership? In part, the answer lies in 
camp conditions. The conditions in Stalag VIIIB/344 were more difficult.78 The 
Wehrmacht German Commandant and his guards were also more hostile to the POWs. 
And constant food shortages eroded the trust of the prisoners in their MOC. Currie’s 
own reflections on his role as MOC linked his men’s morale to the level of Red Cross 
parcels being received and distributed amongst the POWS: ‘When we had a full parcel 
issue the morale was a quite high standard. When food was short the men became 
restless, found dissatisfaction with trivial matters, and discipline would unconsciously 
relax.’79 He saw discipline as essential in performing his role as MOC, saying, 
‘Without the maintenance of discipline I could not adopt the firm stand at the 
conference with the Commandant. As I had no power to punish offenders, I found that 
I had to trade on personality and tact to keep things on top line.’80 Separating the task 
of distributing Red Cross parcels from his role as positional leader allowed Currie to 
protect himself from accusations of bribery or corruption, retain the trust of his group 
and therefore his fulfil his role as MOC.  
 
In his post-war interview for the Imperial War Museum, Deans likened his system of 
leadership to a ‘town council’81 whereby the ‘community… always had opportunity of 
raising any points of difficulty that they wanted sorting out’.82 Maher agreed: ‘If one 
were to search the world over, one would never find a display, a true display, of 
democracy in government as successful as that which existed in this particular POW 
camp.’83 According to Deans, the most important advantage of his consultative 
leadership style was the knowledge it gave him of his men’s reactions to the decisions 
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he made. This knowledge allowed him to be proactive if any prisoner, or group of 
prisoners, questioned his ability to lead. ‘I had my finger on the pulse of the camp and 
I knew if anything was going wrong what it was that was causing the upset, if there 
was an upset, and I could do something to put it right,’ he said.84 
 
Accommodating the escape committees 
An elected captive leader, whose legitimacy was founded on democratic structures, 
had to tread carefully. This sometimes meant that the leader had to delegate or transfer 
some of his authority to ensure the continued support of his formal group. For Deans 
and Currie, examples of this have already been shown above. One of the best 
examples of transference of power that both men implemented, however, is evident in 
their relationship with their respective escape committees.   
 
As special POWS who were forbidden to work, air force NCOS were unable to leave 
the confines of their camp.85 Trapped behind the wire, they became obsessed with 
escape. Australian Air Force Sergeant Douglas Butterworth, held captive in Currie’s 
compound in Stalag VIIIB/344, summed it up this way: ‘[You felt that you must] get 
your freedom at any cost... It was there, so burning and you feel so useless. Just 
sitting, sitting there and vegetating. You felt you had to do something.’86 Therefore, 
the escape committee trumped even the leadership committee put in place by Deans 
and Currie for men planning to escape.  
 
Deans and Currie both knew and understood the psychological importance that 
planning for, and participating in, escape activities had for their men. Currie, in 
particular, understood Butterworth’s passionate desire to escape as he had also 
attempted to escape prior to his election as MOC.87 Currie used the switch technique 
discussed earlier.88 He ‘swapped’ places with an army prisoner who took Currie’s 
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place in the Air Force NCO Compound. Posing as the army prisoner, Currie left Stalag 
VIIIB, under German escort, and was transferred to a satellite Arbeitskommando. 
From there he made his escape. He remained at large for five days before he was 
recaptured and taken back to Stalag VIIIB. As he explained in a letter to his wife Bel, 
he wanted to once again be himself.89 Currie believed that if he could only escape, his 
frustrations with captivity would disappear. After being recaptured, Currie accepted 
that his attempts would not bring him freedom and found a purpose to life in his role 
as MOC. To Bel he wrote, ‘[S]ince I got the job a couple of months ago, I have given 
up all ideas of escape….I have felt much better since I acquired my job [I am] much 
more alert mentally and quite energetic.’90 Currie’s acceptance of his captivity, 
however, was buttressed by a false hope. In October 1943 he wrote that ‘in any case it 
[the war] can’t go much longer now.’91 Currie was therefore more than willing to 
transfer any power that was necessary to the escape committee in order to give his 
men the chance to escape and to succeed where he had failed, even at the risk of 
German reprisals.  
 
Deans, however, never had an opportunity to personally experience escape because, 
soon after arriving at his first permanent camp at Stalag Luft I, he was elected MOC.92 
Despite this, Deans was well aware of the desire for freedom evident amongst most of 
his men.93 Like Currie, Deans therefore transferred a certain level of his authority to 
the escape committee. Considering the camps in which he found himself, he may have 
had little choice in the matter. In Dulag Luft and Stalag Luft I, Deans’ formal group 
had originally been intermixed with air force officers. Here, under Day’s leadership, 
escape became an operational mission of the POWs.94 Then when Deans was MOC of 
the Air Force NCO Compound at Stalag Luft III, the officers were planning the Great 
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Escape.95 In his own compounds, Deans’ POW formal group included Sergeant 
George John William Grimson who, in his own right, became a legendary escape 
figure and was the first chief of Deans’ escape committee.96 Combined, this meant that 
if Deans had challenged his men’s plans for escape, his leadership legitimacy would 
most likely have fractured beyond repair.  
 
Deans’ escape committee ran on the same lines as that developed by the 
British/Commonwealth Air Force officers.97 He had learnt from Day who, as the SBO 
of East and then North Compound at Stalag Luft III, under the pretence of checking on 
the welfare of the NCOs, visited Deans.98 During these visits Day informed Deans 
about the officers’ escape committee structure and the intelligence activities that were 
taking place in his compound.99 Day also arranged for the North Compound escape 
committee to secretly tutor the NCOs in the Centre Compound on their escape 
organisation and the work of the escape factories.100 As a result of these visits, the 
previously unsuccessful NCO escape committee, renamed Tally Ho, was restructured 
to undertake both escape and intelligence work according to Day’s operational 
model.101 The men in Currie’s escape committee probably also had this information. 
Most air force NCOs went through Dulag Luft and some air force NCOs were also 
transferred from the Air Force NCO Compound at Stalag Luft IIII to Stalag 
VIIIB/344.  
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One significant difference, however, existed between the officers’ and NCO’s escape 
committees. In the officers’ committees, by virtue of their positional rank power, the 
SBOs retained the authority over the escape committee in regards to the final decisions 
as to if, and when, an escape was to take place.102 In theory, Deans and Currie were 
meant to have the same authority.103 But over time, with a history of successful 
breaches from the wire, Deans’ and Currie’s authority on escape became subservient 
to their escape committees in these matters. Unlike SBOs such as Day and Massey, 
Deans and Currie did not have the power to overrule their respective successful and 
therefore popular escape committees, even when their decisions threatened their 
leadership goal of collective endurance.  
 
In order to comprehend the risks that the transfer of authority to the escape committees 
posed for Deans and Currie’s leadership goal of collective endurance, closer 
examination of the work of their respective escape committees is required. In Deans’ 
camps, George Grimson became the escape committee executive officer.104 Through 
adopting Day’s operational structure, Grimson transformed unorganised, ad hoc and 
often ill-disciplined escape attempts into a highly organised and successful escape 
committee.105 For example, in Stalag Luft III Grimson’s escape committee 
orchestrated the first successful undetected escape by a member of Deans’ formal 
group.106 Then, in Stalag Luft VI, Grimson organised the escape of five men with one 
of these men successfully reaching England.107 Through these and other successes, 
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Grimson instilled in Deans’ formal group a genuine belief that escape was not a fool’s 
hope, but a real possibility. It was at this point, that Grimson’s leadership may have 
threatened to eclipse Deans’. However, before this threat could be realised, Grimson 
himself escaped.108 Instead of attempting to reach home, Grimson decided to stay in 
Germany to arrange a safe escape line for other prisoners.109 This decision, and his 
ability to continue to communicate it to the men still behind the wire, transformed him 
into a legend.110   
 
Deans acknowledged that Grimson’s vision was a powerful one for the men and, 
although it presented a challenge to Deans’ belief in collective endurance, he 
accommodated it to ensure that he still had control over his men. His repatriation 
questionnaire and interview reveals that throughout all of the escape activities in his 
camps he remained a quiet yet constant presence.111   
 
Deans’ interaction with Day instilled in him two vital understandings. Firstly, illicit 
activities conducted by the positional leader could further cement the loyalty of his 
formal group and, more importantly, the positional leader could take control of the 
intelligence network within his camp.112 Through listening to Day and watching the 
work of Grimson, Deans came to understand that by introducing and becoming the 
leader of his camp’s intelligence network, he could, to a certain extent, counter 
Grimson’s power by offering an alternative to escape. Deans, therefore, set up his own 
intelligence network and maintained absolute control over its activities.113  
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In this role Deans personally interviewed all newly arrived POWs in the hope that he 
could glean from their experiences some intelligence worthy of transmission back to 
London. For this task, Warrant Officer J. Bristow built a camp radio.114 The radio was 
also used to code and decode messages coming in and out of the camp. Although 
Deans’ intelligence operation in no way challenged that operated by Day, it did 
exactly what he had hoped it would: it gave Deans another way to interact with his 
men and the illicit nature of his activities confirmed in the eyes of his men that Deans 
was the legitimate leader of their formal group.   
 
Deans also used his intelligence network to strengthen his leadership legitimacy in 
more pragmatic ways. He knew that his men were desperate for information about the 
progress of the war. Deans, therefore, allowed selected prisoners to use the camp radio 
to listen to BBC news broadcasts.115 These prisoners would then pass the information 
on to the other POWS, usually through the barrack leaders or designated 
newsreaders.116 Although this threatened the security of his intelligence operations 
because of the danger of leaks, it met his formal group’s psychological needs.117 His 
permission for a camp news service would have gone a long way to ensuring that the 
men understood the power Deans had come to hold in his position. The fact that Deans 
hid the camp radio in his gramophone also let the men know that Deans was willing to 
personally take risks to ensure that their need for news was met.118 His strategy of 
conceding some authority to the escape committee and countering its attraction with 
other activities revealed a shrewd leader. His actions confirmed for his men that he 
deserved their trust, respect and ultimately their followership.  
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Currie’s personal history of escape and his notion that escape gave prisoners the 
opportunity to feel like themselves again meant that he was more accepting of 
transferring some his leadership authority to the escape committee. As Stalag 
VIIIB/344 was a mixed camp, the favourite escape attempt was the one Currie had 
used, the ‘switch’.119 In order for this scheme to work, the air force prisoners 
cooperated with, and essentially gave the dominant role in organising escapes, to the 
Army Compound’s escape committee. Currie’s transfer of authority, then, was to not 
only the air force escape committee, but also to the army escape committee led by 
their MOC, Regimental Sergeant Major Sidney Sherriff.120 Sherriff had tight control 
of his escape committee. He retained the power to approve or veto all escape attempts 
and, if the prisoner making the escape was a POW who was wanted by the Germans 
for questioning or punishment, or the prisoner was a transit naval officer, Sheriff 
organised the escape himself.121 Sherriff’s power over his escape committee was 
complete. In a multiple-national other rank POW compound in a camp known for its 
difficult conditions and violent incidents, both between guards and prisoners and even 
between prisoners themselves, Sherriff understood the importance of retaining 
absolute control.122 Currie clearly trusted Sherriff’s ability to control his escape 
committee and exercise proper precautions for the safety of his men. In fact, he had a 
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deep respect for Sherriff and described their relationship as amicable and one that gave 
him ‘very little trouble.’123  
 
Yet even with his background of escape, deferring power to a British Army RSM had 
the danger of undermining his own leadership legitimacy. In the circumstances of 
Stalag VIIIB/344, however, the transfer of Currie’s authority to the army escape 
committee was necessary for any air force NCO to have a genuine chance of 
successfully escaping. Currie, therefore, had to be flexible in his leadership approach 
and his transference of power. He had to transfer personal control to two escape 
committees and to another MOC to accommodate the men’s desire to escape. Clearly, 
the decision was a good one because the transfer of power helped give him leadership 
legitimacy and followership. The proof of that lies in the fact that Currie was the 
longest serving air force MCO in Stalag VIIIB/344.   
 
Relations with the captor 
A key component of a leader’s ability to acquire the trust of his formal group was 
successful negotiations on the group’s behalf with the captors. For democratically 
elected leaders, this was even more important. In examining both men’s interactions 
with their captor and their formal group’s perceptions of their abilities, it quickly 
becomes apparent that Deans’ was more confident and successful in dealing with the 
Germans than Currie. Deans, however, did have it easier. He was often dealing with 
the more flexible Luftwaffe Commandants and lived in camps that usually had good 
conditions for his men. He also spoke German fluently.124 Yet, despite these 
advantages, there was something about Deans’ nature that allowed him to gain 
significant concessions from the German Luftwaffe Commandants. 
 
His formal group, for example, believed that Deans’ success could be attributed to 
more than his language skills: they believed that Deans understood the German 
psyche.125 British Air Force NCO Edgar Louis Graham Hall described Deans’ ability 
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to negotiate with their captors as ‘extraordinary.’126 Deans knew just how far to push 
his Commandants without instigating reprisals or punishment and, for the most part, 
he came away from a Commandant’s office having got what he wanted. Deans 
described his technique in dealing with the Germans as reverse psychology. ‘[I] 
usually tried to convince them that it was in their interests as well as ours that they 
should meet our requests and usually it worked,’ he said.127 He added, ‘I had fair 
degree of confidence in what I could ask them and what was reasonable to ask them 
and what I could insist on and that made a big difference’.128  
 
The trust Deans’ group had in him largely stemmed from his tenacity in dealing with 
the captor. Mogg, his assistant, described Deans’ method of dealing with the Germans: 
‘[h]e could argue his principles with skill and hang on with the tenacity of a 
bulldog.’129 Most prisoners agreed that Deans’ success lay in the respect he gave his 
Commandants and the respect he demanded in return. If that respect was breached, 
Deans would not give in until the Germans had conceded the point and order, 
according to Deans’ perception, had been restored.130 He also brought one other 
element to his negotiations, a lack of animus. As he explained, ‘I was never a hater. 
There are some people who can’t avoid hating and it so happened that the Germans 
were the enemy and they were all bitter and full of hatred towards the Germans. Well, 
I wasn’t…It was against my nature to hate just for the sake of hating.’131 
 
Deans was not above pandering to the captor. For example, when a visiting Luftwaffe 
General came to visit Stalag Luft III, Deans, acting on his Commandant’s suggestion, 
organised his men to perform a German military parade. Then, at Stalag Luft VI, 
Deans and the Commandant both attended the prisoner organised ‘races’, which the 
Commandant may have interpreted as the POWs finally accepting their status as 
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prisoners.132 Deans stored up the credit he accrued from activities like these to 
negotiate concessions for his men.133 For example, Deans convinced the Commandant 
in Stalag Luft I, that the normal captor practice of pooling the contents of the Red 
Cross tins into one heap was a health hazard.134 Deans’ prisoners then received the 
contents of their Red Cross packages in their original condition. This was a small 
concession, however, in comparison to those Deans was able to negotiate during the 
forced marches during the final stages of captivity. 
 
As his men were led out of their camp at Fallingbostel to the local train station, Deans 
bluntly told his Commandant that he was not allowed to squeeze 25 prisoners into 
each train car. Instead, ‘It was 12 or 13 or nothing.’135 The Commandant acquiesced. 
Then, when his men were matching, Deans talked his Commandant into giving him 
permission to leave the marching column to find Red Cross food parcels as his men 
had little left to eat.136 Deans, found a Red Cross Representative and negotiated the 
delivery of 6000 food parcels for his men. Once these parcels had been used, Deans 
then commandeered a truck, with one of his fellow prisoners and a German guard who 
acted as his escort, to find more Red Cross parcels. The three unlikely companions 
spent one night in a German services club, before finding a Red Cross depot and put 
200 food parcels in their truck. The biggest concession Deans negotiated with his 
Commandant came on 19 April 1945.137 Just as his men had stopped marching to have 
their lunch break, British Typhoons opened fire on them. Sixty of Deans’ men were 
killed. As explained in the preface to this chapter, Deans realised that these killings 
were not going to be a one-off incident. The Typhoons would be back. Deans gained 
permission from his Commandant to cross British lines to tell the British sector 
commander that the group of men they had targeted were not Germans but 
British/Commonwealth POWs. In the chaos of the last days of the European war, 
despite the overwhelming odds, Deans succeeded in accomplishing his task. Having 
passed on his urgent message, the British commander wanted to fly Deans back to 
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England. To his amazement, Deans refused this offer of freedom. In his post-war 
interview Deans explained the reasons behind his decision.  
 
I said no. I felt I came there with this purpose in mind to contact the 
British and warn them about the POW presence there and having done that 
I felt that I had to go back to the POWs that I was still leading.138  
 
This act is evidence of the extent to which Deans’ dedication to his leadership 
outweighed considerations of his own self-interest. For this action, historian Simon 
Mackenzie labelled Deans a ‘true man of confidence.’139  
 
The behaviour of Deans’ formal group, however did not always make his job easy. In 
his successive camps, baiting the guards, popularly known as goon baiting, became an 
art form. Prisoners stole and sabotaged their guards’ rifles, bleated like sheep during 
compulsory head counts, destroyed their identity cards and when they were being re-
made, stuck a stamp of King George VI over the camera lens.140 The prisoners also 
became highly skilled at deliberately delaying count parades to mask a fellow 
prisoner’s escape attempt. On one such occasion, they held a bonfire, a sing-a-long 
and then constructed a human pyramid.141 Deans only intervened when the prisoners 
placed themselves in danger from the guards.142 Up until that point, he allowed the 
prisoners to have free reign to cause as much inconvenience to their captors as 
possible. 
 
There was one incident, however, where Deans, no matter how hard he tried, had no 
influence over his Commandant. Following a successful escape attempt from Stalag 
Luft VI on 19 April 1944, the Germans found, arrested and took into custody Leading 
Aircraftman (later Warrant Officer) R.B.H Townsend-Coles, Warrant Officer Nat 
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Leaman and six other unnamed air force NCOs.143 These men had been recaptured 
wearing civilian clothes, which in light of the aftermath of the Great Escape horrified 
Deans. Despite his best efforts, the Commandant refused to allow Deans to see his 
men. Then on 6 May, without any warning, the Germans transferred Townsend-Coles 
out of the camp to Tilsit civil prison. Through enquires made to the Protecting Power, 
Deans discovered that Townsend-Coles had been court martialled on charges of 
espionage and collaboration with the Polish underground. Townsend-Coles was 
sentenced to death and executed.  
 
Deans did, however, manage to help Nat Leaman. Somehow he managed to send 
Leaman a uniform and his identity tags.144 Then accompanied by Sergeant Peter John 
Mitchell Thomas, a trained barrister, Deans presented a formidable defence at 
Leaman’s court marital. Despite their efforts, Leaman was found guilty and sentenced 
to three months hard labour.145 Luckily, Leaman never served his sentence. His court 
marital had been delayed until 15 January 1945 and by this time Germany was facing 
bigger problems than punishing a failed POW escaper.  
 
These incidents, and especially the execution of Townsend-Coles, were a sharp 
reminder to Deans of the limits of his capacity to protect his formal group. Despite his 
close relationship with the Germans and his ability to gain important, and at times life 
saving concessions Deans’ influence over his captor was limited. It was a stark 
reminder to Deans and his formal group that their safety depended on the whims of 
their captors, that Deans could only deliver them safely home if their captor wanted 
them to live. Yet, despite his failures, Deans’ followership did not break. He retained 
his men’s trust to the very end.   
 
No substantial writings by Currie or his formal group exist on his interactions with the 
captor. Reasons for this lack of evidence have previously been explained. Currie only 
briefly described his interactions with the Commandants in his camp. In his official 
statement explaining the conditions for the Air Force Compound within Stalag 
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VIIIB/344, Currie stated that ‘complaints of all types were frequently addressed both 
to the Commandant and to the delegate to the protecting power [sic], and from time to 
time some slight improvement in conditions was noticeable.’146 These small 
concessions, according to Currie, only occurred after ‘quite a deal of verbal struggling 
with the German Commandant.’147 Mogg, who also served with Currie as well as 
Deans, had a more positive assessment of Currie’s leadership. In his written 
recommendation of Currie’s leadership he stated, ‘This warrant officer at all times 
handles [sic] the Germans well and obtained the maximum of concessions from them 
at the same time maintaining a high standard of discipline and morale amongst the 
RAF prisoners.’148  
 
Deans’ followership 
Due to the lack of prisoner writings and recollections on Currie’s leadership, the 
narrative below only examines Deans’ followership.  
 
Deans’ followership was exceptional. In the six camps where he was elected MOC, 
the loyalty of his formal group was unquestionable. The POWs themselves best 
describe the extent of their loyalty. They described him as ‘outstanding,’149 
‘wonderful,’150 ‘excellent’151 ‘Mr. Steadfast,’152 and ‘King Dixie.’153 Despite his 
failures, these men credited Deans with the collective survivorship of his formal 
groups.154 For them, Deans was nothing less than their ‘guiding inspiring light.’155  
Deans’ ability to inspire such strong followership when he faced the restrictions of 
democratic accountability is testimony of his ability to make his men feel that they 
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were participants in his decision-making and were protected by his leadership. His 
ability to continually manage his unique form of power is nothing short of remarkable. 
His formal group also understood this. The Official History of Stalag Luft III Centre 
Compound states that: ‘He [Deans] maintained his position by virtue of his popularity 
[as he] could not give orders.’156 The officers’ history of North Compound also 
commended Deans’ on his ability to control his men because, in comparison to the 
SBO who exercised leadership authority based on rank, Deans’ authority was not. 
Instead they described his leadership context as being more similar to the ‘laws of the 
jungle [than] military laws.’157  
 
In return for his selfless service, the men gave Deans their devoted loyalty, a loyalty 
that, even many years after the war, motivated his men to press the British military for 
further official acknowledgment of his services. Many of his men did not consider the 
MBE was adequate recognition of Deans’ role as a POW leader. Hall, for example, 
believed that Deans ‘wasn’t treated particularly well or honoured as he should have 
been…he was a most remarkable leader.’158 Upon his return to civilian life, Deans was 
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.159 During his years as MOC Deans would have 
been suffering from the early stages of this crippling degenerative disease. This makes 
his achievements even more remarkable. Deans became the embodiment of hope for 
his men. He was their protector, guide and friend, a leader who inspired his men to 
endure the boredom and frustration of captivity with dignity. Through his calm 
presence, words and actions, Deans reminded his men that, despite their POW status, 
the war would end, and when it did, they would have the opportunity to live their lives 
to the full. Australian POW, Warrant Officer Calton Younger, aptly summed up the 
importance of Deans to the men, ‘[H]e was the man the hour brought forth…[h]e was 
predestined to lead.’160   
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Democratic leadership amongst informal groups 
Democratic leadership structures are more often found within informal groups where 
the traditional roles of leader and follower are shared amongst group members, and 
leaders emerge based on the needs and desire of group members.161 In informal groups 
democratic leadership styles are, therefore, applied in their purest sense.   
 
Amongst informal Australian groups in captivity in the Second World War, the extent 
to which group members changed roles depended on their captive conditions. In 
relatively stable captive settings it was possible for all group members to 
interchangeably lead and follow. The dynamic status of group roles in this captive 
environment reflected the fact that the captor provided for most of the prisoners’ basic 
needs. Therefore, there was little threat to the survivorship of group members. In these 
circumstances, a prisoner’s social skills, empathy, patience and ability to distract their 
fellow informal group members from their boredom enabled them to emerge as a 
leaders of their groups. At other times the needs, mood and activities of group 
members meant that these men were followers. Australian prisoners across both 
theatres spent some time in relatively stable captive settings and groups were therefore 
also relatively static.162  
 
In volatile captive settings, however, informal group membership became much more 
fluid, allowing prisoners to continue to part of an informal group when their original 
group had either been disbanded or had collapsed.163 As Gavin Daws, Hank Nelson 
                                                          
161 Sociological and socio-psychological studies confirm that democratic structures are used in groups. 
See Bell, ‘Notes on Authoritarian and Democratic Leadership,’ pp.403-404; Cartwright and Zander 
(eds.), ‘An Introduction: Leadership and Group Performance,’ p.492; Cranach, ‘Leadership as a 
Function of Group Action,’ pp.120-133; Homans, The Human Group, pp.109-129,132-155; Wilson, 
Informal Groups, pp.142-158; Whyte, ‘Informal Leadership and Group Structure,’ pp.105-112.  
162 For example see H. Marshall, unpublished and untitled writings, p.787, AWM PR03508 Wallet 4; J. 
Morshel, unpublished writings titled ‘A Wartime Log,’ pp.39-42, AWM PR00506; N. Pritchard, 
unpublished and untitled writings, pp.6-8, AWM PR86/003; McLaggan, The Will to Survive, pp.41, 68-
75; Wilson, You’ll Never Get Off the Island, pp.62-63; Younger, No Flight from the Cage, pp.44, 61.  
163 For example see T. Hamelin, Statements by Royal Air Force Personnel from Prisoner of War Camps 
in Germany and Italy, no.A436224, 9 April 1945, p.1, AWM54 779/3/129 Part 30; J. Akdersley, 
unpublished memoirs titled ‘Memories of World War Two,’ pp.12-13, IWM 07/14/1; M. Edwards, 
unpublished and untitled writings, p.16, AWM PR88/66; Miggins, Diary 10 May 1943, 8 June 1943; 
Interview with D. Dunn on 18 November 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive no.0074, tape 2, 
<http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1562.aspx>, maintained by the 
Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 12 February 2014; Interview with J. Ling on 2 
May 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive No. 0015, tape 2, 
<http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/24.aspx>, maintained by the 
Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 1 May 2014. 
213 
 
and Cameron Forbes have argued, prisoners understood that belonging to a group 
increased their chances of survival.164  
 
Democratic leadership structures were a critical contributing factor to survival for 
prisoners in volatile captive settings. In these settings, group members rotated 
leadership responsibilities based on those who, at any given moment, were more 
capable of helping weaker or sicker group members, or could gain concessions and 
supplies for group members. When a prisoner became apathetic or was dying, 
responsibility for this man were assumed by prisoners in the group who had a special 
connection with him. Usually these men were particularly close mates or shared a 
special trust or even a shared experience. They could use this connection to snap a 
man out of apathy or provide comfort to a dying prisoner.  
 
This section examines democratic leadership structures that existed amongst informal 
groups in two volatile captive environments, the Burma-Thailand Railway and the 
forced marches during in Europe in the winter of 1945.165 The examination of informal 
groups using democratic leadership structures in these settings is focused on two 
themes: how prisoners collected and then distributed food in both theatres, and how 
group members on the Burma-Thailand Railway behaved when one of their own was 
sick or dying.  
 
Burma-Thailand Railway 
On the Burma-Thailand Railway, the options for informal groups to supplement the 
captor ration and any extra food supplied by their positional leader for their base camp 
were limited. The largely uninhabited jungle setting meant that bartering was restricted 
to the occasional Thai traders who operated on river barges. Other options for securing 
additional food were capturing wild animals or stealing from the Japanese or other 
prisoners.166    
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In the initial stage of their transfer to Thailand, most men within informal groups were 
physically capable of engaging in some hunting activities and taking it in turns to walk 
the distance to and from the creek to collect and boil drinking water. For example, in 
February 1942 at their base camp at Konyu, members from informal groups in Dunlop 
Force caught fish, collected clams and captured wild animals.167 Group members 
either performed these acts as a collective group or divided into pairs focusing on 
different activities in an effort to increase their chances of success. This division of 
tasks demonstrates that men understood that by pooling their knowledge, resources 
and skills, their group stood a better chance of supplementing their food supplies.  
 
However, the ability of all group members to contribute equally to gathering food and 
water supplies did not last long. When the prisoners moved to the main construction 
phase of the railway, the intensity and volume of the work demanded by the captor, 
combined with the violence of the guards and engineers, meant that most men soon 
became physically incapable of performing any additional tasks. The onset of the 
monsoon season brought with it significant disruptions to the Japanese supply lines to 
prisoner base camps up river, so the ability and willingness of group members to find 
extra food became essential.168 This task now fell to the healthiest and strongest group 
members. Lance Corporal Alan Michael Middleton provides an example. 
 
Because of his large physical stature, Middleton coped better than most of his informal 
group members with the physical demands of working on the railway.169 He became 
the procurer of extra food. After finishing his shift, Middleton usually walked three 
miles uphill to Konyu River to barter with passing Thai traders. He made sure that his 
informal group members received their fair share of any extra food he had obtained. 
Middleton continued to make this trek even after he became sick. In an interview with 
Patsy Adam-Smith, Bill Haskill explained that Middleton believed that he was 
responsible for gathering whatever food he could because he considered himself as 
better off than the rest of his mates. Haskill painted a vivid picture of Middleton:  
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At the end of a day’s toil, if there happened to be a barge down the river 
(which was about 3 miles away), you’d find Middy going down to do 
business with the Thais, and I should imagine on many occasions to his 
advantage because he wasn’t afraid to use a little bit of force if he had 
mates who were suffering. He’d get an egg or some salt or a bit of 
tobacco or something, but [he] always would do that extra three, 
sometimes six miles to pick up stores so that he’d be able to pass them on 
to his mates.170 
 
Prisoners also used theft and cooperation with other informal groups to secure extra 
food for their mates. Private Elliott McMaster recalled members of U Battalion D 
Force watching British POWs acting as cattle herders for the Japanese.171 Australians 
from different formal groups worked together to capture a straggling cow. Once they 
had successfully stolen and killed the animal, they then sought out their own informal 
group members to share the meat with. McMaster’s memoirs recall that his mate 
Private Syd Creek, who was one of the prisoners involved in the theft, had been a 
butcher in civilian life. Creek made sure that the carcase was properly dressed and 
cooked and that his informal group received the best cuts of meat. As McMaster 
recalled: ‘We ate well that night. I can still taste that meat.’172  
 
Petty Officer Raymond Edward Parkin recalled a similar privileging of members of an 
informal group when it came to food distribution.   
 
Tonight two air force chaps who caught [a king cobra] were cooking him 
over their private fire. By the time they began to eat, they were already 
surrounded by the curious and hopeful. But only a couple of the most 
intimate friends were privileged to taste.173 
   
These examples of democratic food distribution amongst informal groups are not 
exceptional. The practice of healthier informal group members searching for food and 
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then dividing it equally amongst mates became common practice amongst Australians 
in this volatile captive setting. As Signaller Charles J. Parkes, remarked, ‘If you got 
something extra you’d take it back to share it with your mates.’174  
 
Hank Nelson and Gavan Daws argue that the regular distribution of extra food 
amongst mates in an informal group was common, describing it as a unique 
democratic quality of Australians aimed at achieving the collective survival of the 
group’s members.175 Daws drew a sharp distinction between Australian practices and 
those of the Americans who ‘tended to look after themselves as individuals.176 
 
The sharing of food continued if a group member became sick. Food was designated 
specifically for the sick POW and their mates often forced them to eat. Ray Parkin and 
Gunner Russell Braddon recalled that group members used various tactics to get these 
men to eat. For the most part they baited and bullied the sick men into eating. To take 
one example from Parkin’s writings: one of the camp doctors told Parkin’s informal 
group that one of its members, Robert Bertram Blackie, had diarrhoea and had to 
eat.177 Two of his best mates within the group, ‘Ken and Fatty’, took it upon 
themselves to get the job done. When simply relaying the doctor’s instructions to 
Blackie failed to work, they teased and bullied him and gave him ‘pep talks’. It 
worked.178 Similarly, Braddon’s closest mate, Hugh, forced him to drink water and eat 
rice when Braddon was sick with malaria.179 However, soon after, captor’s orders 
separated Braddon from his informal group.180 Braddon quickly found another 
informal group who accepted him and these men protected Braddon from the captor 
when he contracted beriberi and relapsed with malaria. His new informal group 
assumed Hugh’s responsibilities for ensuring that Braddon continued to eat and 
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drink.181 Lance Sergeant Cyril Reginald Gilbert captured this ethic when he said in an 
interview,  
 
When you were sick and you didn’t feel like eating, if you had a mate, 
he’d force you to eat, he’d feed you like, you know, make you eat it all, 
because if you didn’t eat, you died.182  
 
The persistence of exhausted, hungry men to force their sick mates to eat is evidence 
of the importance they placed in the collective survival of their informal groups. 
Instead of taking advantage of their mate’s illness and eating his share for themselves, 
these men persisted in trying to rouse life back into their group member, knowing that 
not if, but when, roles were reversed, their mate would do the same for them.    
 
Apathy was handled with similar tactics. Private Raymond John Ridley, attached to U 
Battalion D Force, recalled how his mate Private Jack C. Scott snapped him out of his 
apathy at Tarso Camp: ‘I dropped my bundle well and truly. One day Jack Scott 
(Scotty was a bloke with a virtually unquenchable spirit) came home from working on 
“hellfire pass” dragged me off my bed, made me bathe and tore a strip off me. From 
then on I improved.’183  
 
The bonds forged between informal group members also meant that group members 
did not face death alone.184 Ken Gray explained that ‘It was here [in Thailand] that we 
all quickly learned the great lessons of brotherly love and mutual dependence. No man 
died alone, but surrounded with love and compassion.’185 Gilbert recalled how this 
difficult task was done. ‘You’d talk to him, you’d do everything you could for him, 
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even though you knew you couldn’t do anymore for him. Talk and try and comfort 
him... tell them lies, “we’re gonna do this, we gonna do this when we get home.”’186 
 
Parkin’s writings reveal that the death of a group member could bring with it 
forgiveness. At Hintok Road Camp, the youngest member of Parkin’s informal group, 
Izzy, who had only just turned 20, was banished from the group for stealing food from 
his fellow group members in May or June 1942.187 However, in August, when Izzy 
was struck down with amoebic dysentery, Parkin and his mates, despite his past 
behaviour, did not let Izzy die alone.188 One morning Parkin found him slumped on 
the ground attempting to reach the banjo. Parkin lifted him, carried him to the banjo, 
held him upright, wiped him down and then carried him back to his tent. Then Parkin 
attempted to rouse a response from the cheeky youngster he once knew. He said: 
‘You’ll be alright, you’ll get over it. Just try and stick it out.’189 Izzy’s response 
revealed that he knew Parkin was lying. 
 
He gave me a weak, grey smile and faintly shook his head, as if he had 
entered a realm of understanding I should never know… ‘I don’t think so 
chief. Yesterday 51 times. Today 39 so far.’ Not twelve hours of the day 
had gone.190  
 
Izzy soon succumbed to his illness. His courage in facing death restored his standing 
amongst his informal group. Parkin wrote, ‘From somewhere, in his last weeks, he 
produced an endurance and courage I greatly admired. He died better than many.’191 
 
When an informal group lost a member they were forced to face their own mortality 
and the fact that their goal of collective survivorship in volatile conditions may have 
been unrealistic. Nevertheless, the loss was deeply felt as Dunlop recorded. At 
Hintock Mountain Camp, at the height of the speedo, Dunlop watched one group 
farewell their mate. ‘Pte RJ Watson of 2\3 MG bn died at 1430 hours…Lt Col 
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McEachern conducted the service with Maj Greiner chief mourner. Aged 24 years, he 
was borne to the graveside by his special chums, one of whom could not control his 
grief.’192  
 
The forced marches in occupied Europe 
Most prisoners subjected to the forced marches realised that their informal group 
would provide their best chance to provide their basic needs and, therefore, their 
survival. The air force prisoners who evacuated from Stalag Luft officer and NCO 
camps received some form of advanced notice of their forced movement out of the 
camp, something denied the army prisoners, particularly those held in Polish 
Arbeitskommandos.193 This allowed the air force informal groups to plan who would 
be responsible for collecting as much food and clothing as possible while also making 
decisions on how to carry these important items.194 Prisoner writings and recollections 
reveal that most informal groups divided their goods between two or four men. Some 
air force officer groups, such as Australians from Stalag Luft IV, used their bed boards 
to construct makeshift sledges to carry their possessions.195 Some informal groups 
made makeshift swags to carry on their backs.196 Then as they were leaving their 
camps, the groups re-arranged their gear to include the final issue of Red Cross food 
parcels and any useful items from the last personal parcels delivered to their camp.197  
 
Most prisoners’ food supplies soon ran out during the march. The delayed decision of 
the OKW to move prisoners away from the advancing Soviets in Poland and Lithuania 
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meant very few transport trucks were available to transport the previously arranged 
Red Cross parcels and German rations to the prisoners while they were marching.198 
Most of these foodstuffs did not arrive at the prisoners’ makeshift camps. When the 
transport was available and found the marching columns, the rations were meagre.  
 
Australian Air Force POW J.H.T (Bert) Bullock, from Stalag 344, recalled that during 
the initial 13-day march from Lamsdorf to Gorlitz, a distance of 262 kilometres, his 
column received a total ration of 3450 grams of bread and 271 grams of margarine.199 
In the second phase of the march, when men walked over 536 kilometres from Gorlitz 
to Hunderdorf, the prisoners received an average daily ration of 330.8 grams of bread, 
76.7 grams of meat and 21.5 grams of cheese.200 However, as the columns spread out 
more widely, some men received no rations at all. Four of these men were Australians 
who received no official ration for seven days. 201 Food shortages were not the 
prisoners’ only problem. The Germans had not organised access to drinking water.202 
To survive these conditions informal groups formed what Scottish POW A. 
MacDougall described as a ‘food sharing pact.’203 Informal groups shared amongst 
themselves their personal stocks of food and when they ran out, they relied on each 
other efforts to scrounge, pilfer and barter for food from the civilian population.204  
 
To perform these tasks, leaders emerged from within the groups based on their skills. 
For example, Australian Air Force prisoner Warrant Officer Jack William Liley was 
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nominated as the main food provider for his group because he could speak French. 205 
This skill allowed him to barter with French foreign workers passing his marching 
column to secure bread for his group. Groups without language skills nominated a 
prisoner or a pair of prisoners who used sign language to communicate their needs to 
German and Czech citizens, foreign workers and refugees.206 Records left by 
Australian prisoners show that this worked and informal groups bartered for food, 
including chocolate, along with soap and cigarettes. Through trial and error, the 
prisoners soon identified those members with bartering skills.207 These men became 
permanently responsible for gaining the best deals for their groups. 
 
Prisoners exchanged personal items, such as watches or rings, for food. Australian Air 
Force NCO Warrant Officer David August Radke’s wrote,     
 
Like so many others, I sold my good Rolls watch for one loaf of bread 
during a rest day – it was divided three ways with my then two matelots 
muckers and lasted probably ten minutes – but oh! The taste, even in its 
dry state, was like the best of any cake.208  
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Not all bartering exchanges were conducted in good faith. Australian Warrant Officers 
R. Cantillion, Gordon Castle and John Kean’s recollections include a description how 
they duped a child to obtain bread.  
 
Jack and I managed to keep our watches so far but decide today that they 
will have to go. Jack’s has no hands or glass and will not go but its solid 
gold and of great sentimental value to him. I managed to get 3 kilos of 
bread for his watch from a school boy who was so anxious to grab it and 
get away before the guards caught him he did not have time to open the 
case to see it if was going. You should have seen his face when he 
discovered no glass and no hands.209  
 
Informal group members who stumbled across an opportunity to steal foodstuffs also 
became the provider for their group. This happened to Australian RAAF Warrant 
Officer Russell Walter Mann. When his column stopped for the night he took the 
opportunity to sneak away and steal a chicken from a nearby farm. Liley’s writings 
explained what happened.  
 
Mac and I were cooking. Russ came up ‘Quick, help me hide this.’ At that 
moment a squawk came from beneath his greatcoat. Mac, the country boy, 
guessing it was chook reached out and wrang its neck.210  
 
Stolen farm produce was a common source of food for informal groups on the march, 
particularly swedes, potatoes and sugar beets.211 Despite most of the produce being 
frozen, men quickly gathered what they could for their group, sometimes cooking the 
produce or if they did not have time or the necessary makeshift equipment, eating it 
raw. The desperation of prisoners for food was such that some informal groups stole 
and ate food meant for animal consumption.212  
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The Australians earned a certain notoriety for their ability to steal food. British Air 
Force NCO Sergeant Ron Mogg described the behaviour of a group of Australians 
who unexpectedly found themselves amongst a flock of sheep. ‘There wasn’t even a 
bleat as the sheep were snatched up, quickly despatched, skinned and jointed while 
still on the march.’213 Mogg even boasted about it, claiming ‘Of all our people, the 
Aussies seemed best able to look after themselves and live off the land.’214  
 
Prisoners stealing food, however, took a significant risk. If they were discovered 
leaving or returning to the column, it was probable that would be physically punished 
or even shot.215 Yet, as Cantillion, Castle and Kean wrote, ‘The risks we are taking to 
get extra food are becoming greater but I am afraid these risks are necessary to keep 
going.’216  
 
Theft was not the only example of Australian adaptability noted by British POWs. 
Edward Chapman was astounded by the quick reaction of Australian prisoners in his 
column when they were billeted in a factory for the night.  
 
The Aussies I couldn’t believe it, these farmer chaps, educated chaps too 
they were Air Force officers ...they were quite skilled in every damn 
things. With the prospect of a thaw, they even made little carts with wheels 
and hubs and shod them with tyres. They found a blacksmith shop and 
carpenter’s shop in this glass works and they worked all night. They made 
three or four little carts. Quite incredible.217  
 
It is unclear from these examples if the Australians were acting within their informal 
groups or as impromptu groups. Irrespective, they do demonstrate the ability of 
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informal groups to find essential food or transport items to help the group cope with 
conditions on the march.  
 
That the spoils gathered by group members, even impromptu groups, were distributed 
equally amongst all group members is not surprising. Even before the marches, 
sharing food was an ingrained practice for prisoners of the Germans. In their camps, 
prisoners were given their Red Cross parcels and captor ration within a food group or 
combine.218 For prisoners democratic methods of sharing food were, therefore, 
normalised behaviour. Yet, if Mogg is to be believed, along with the recollections of 
the prisoners themselves and those of British POWs, this practice was more marked 
amongst the Australians. For these men their identity remained tied to collective 
survivorship of their informal group.  
 
For Australian prisoners in volatile captive settings, the democratic leadership evident 
amongst informal groups reflected the way these men linked personal survivorship 
with the collective survival of their informal group and, on the Burma-Thailand 
Railway, that the informal group sustained a collective spirit even when men were 
starving, sick and dying. In his post-war interview Australian Gunner Fredrick Dunn, a 
prisoner in D Force, summed up the fluid democratic responsibilities that characterised 
informal groups in a single noun.  
 
I think the whole time there was mateship. The Australian mateship was 
something that you could not imagine how strong it is under those 
conditions because you did whatever you could for each other...we mostly 
look upon each other as stronger than a brother. With your brother at 
home, he didn’t go through what we went through. You form that bond 
between you, it is unbreakable.219  
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SELF-SACRIFICIAL LEADERSHIP   
Hintok Mountain Camp, Burma-Thailand Railway, June 1943.  
Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Edward Dunlop stands to the side silently watching the 
scene unfold.1The desperately ill, who had been placed on a log, have been instructed 
on their part. The Japanese approach. The bark of ‘kura’ echoes through the jungle.2 
Dunlop tenses, willing his men not to move, not to react, to remain still. The prisoners 
play their part. Dunlop strides forward. Reaching the first defeated soldier, he bends 
and lifts the fragile frame. Like a baby, Dunlop carries the broken prisoner towards 
the Japanese commander. He offers the ill prisoner’s services as a human sacrifice. 
‘This man, Nippon?’3 Dunlop knows full well the Japanese could not accept such a 
sick man for work. But it is still a risk.  
 
Self-sacrificial leadership is a selfless form of leadership that places the physical and 
psychological needs of group members above the personal ambitions and needs of the 
leader. The reasons why some leaders adopt this selfless leadership style have been 
examined by a variety of disciplines including sociologists, psychologists, political 
scientists, biologists and economists.4 Although it was initially developed within a 
business context, its application can be extended to other situations, as is clear in its 
application in this thesis.   
 
Self-sacrificial leadership as a specific leadership style came from research conducted 
into transformational and charismatic leadership.5 This has meant that self-sacrificial 
leadership has been examined from two perspectives; the leader and the follower.  
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and Situational Factors,’ The Leadership Quarterly, 2004, vol. 15, pp.264-265; B. van Knippenberg and 
D. van Knippenberg, ‘Leader Self-Sacrifice and Leadership Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of 
Leader Prototypicality,’ Journal of Applied Psychology, 2005, vol. 90, no.1, p.25; Matteson and Irving, 




The first model exploring self-sacrificial leadership was published in 1998 by Yeon 
Choi and Renate Mai-Dalton. They defined self-sacrificial leadership as a style which 
‘den[ied] self-interests or personal comfort and safety, limiting personal privileges, or 
sharing pains and hardships with the followers.’6 Choi and Mai-Dalton divided this 
self-sacrifice into three categories: the division of labour, distribution of rewards and 
the exercise of power.  
 
According to Choi and Mai-Dalton, a leader could apply a self-sacrificial style for a 
short period of time in response to an immediate crisis, or a leader could apply the 
style over a considerable length of time, continually responding to the enduring crisis 
and the needs of group members.7 Leaders adopting this style in the short term were 
usually responding to an immediate crisis. If, however, the situation was ongoing, 
Choi and Mai-Dalton argued that a leader’s self-sacrificial style could become his or 
her normal behaviour, resulting in their followers expecting nothing less than a 
continuation of selfless behaviour from their leader which, in turn, could lead to other 
leaders in the organisation adopting the same style and normalising it as the expected 
standard of behaviour by leaders within the organisation.8 If this change of culture 
occurred, the followers’ behaviour, values, attitudes, goals and perceptions of the 
leader-follower relationships would also change. Examples of both short and ongoing 
situations are examined in this section of the thesis. 
   
In a crisis situation, therefore, Choi and Mai-Dalton concluded that a self-sacrificial 
leader was capable of modelling the expected behaviour that was needed by their 
group members to cope with, and overcome, the crisis.9 In this way, they argued, a 
leader who was respected by his or her group not only earned leadership legitimacy 
but could expect a level of reciprocal behaviour by his or her followers.10 Sociologists 
J. Adams, Alvin Gouldner, George Homans and Martin Greenberg also found that 
                                                          
6 Choi and Mai-Dalton, ‘On the Leadership Functions of Self-Sacrifice’, p.476. 
7 ibid., pp.477-481. 
8 ibid., pp.482-483. 
9 ibid., p.486. 
10 Choi and Mai-Dalton, ‘The Model of Followers Responses to Self-Sacrificial Leadership’, pp.401-
404; Choi and Mai-Dalton, ‘On the Leadership Functions of Self-Sacrifice,’ pp.484-493.  
227 
 
reciprocal behavioural responses by group members occurred when a leader adopted a 
self-sacrificial leadership style.11 
 
Choi and Mai-Dalton argued that the nature and extent of reciprocal behaviour by 
followers depended on a number of variables, such as leader competence and 
charisma.12 Stefanie Halverson, Courtney Holladay, Stephanie Kazama and Miguel 
Quinones and Barbara van Knippenberg and Daan van Knippenberg extended this 
work.13 They concluded that a self-sacrificial leader who had charisma was more 
likely to be effective in a crisis.14 These leaders could motivate their followers to 
reciprocate their behaviour for the benefit of all group members by using what David 
De Cremer, David Mayer, Marius van Dijke, Barbara Schouten and Mary Bardes 
called prosocial behaviours.15 Jeffrey Matteson and Justin Irving defined prosocial 
reciprocal behaviours of a self-sacrificial leader as ‘altruism, taking initiative, 
empathy, role modelling, provid[ing] justice, developing people, building community, 
providing leadership, shared vision, empowering followers, serving followers [while] 
yielding status, privileges [and] power.’16  
 
Choi and Mai-Dalton concluded that reciprocal self-sacrificial behaviour would only 
occur if two essential prerequisites were met. Firstly, the leader had genuine 
motivations for his or her self-sacrificial behaviour that were linked to the group’s 
goals and not their own personal ambition.17 Secondly, there had to be the possibility 
that self-sacrificial behaviour by leaders and followers gave some hope of surviving 
                                                          
11 J. Adams, ‘Towards an Understanding of Inequity,’ Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
1963, vol.67, pp.422-436; A. Gouldner, ‘The Norms of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement,’ 
American Sociological Review, 1960, vol.25, pp.161-178; M. Greenberg, ‘A theory of indebtedness’ in 
K. Gergen et al, (eds.), Social Exchange: Advances in Theory and Research, (New York: Plenum Press, 
1980), pp.1-26; G. Homans, Social -Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 1961).  
12 Choi and Mai-Dalton, ‘The Model of Followers Responses to Self-Sacrificial Leadership’, pp.402-
413.  
13 Halverson et al, ‘Self-Sacrificial Behaviour in Crisis Situations’, pp.263-275; van Knippenberg and 
van Knippenberg, ‘Leader Self-Sacrifice and Leadership Effectiveness,’ pp.25-27.  
14 Halverson et al, ‘Self-Sacrificial Behaviour in Crisis Situations’, pp.264-272; van Knippenberg and 
van Knippenberg, ‘Leader Self-Sacrifice and Leadership Effectiveness,’ pp.25-27, 34. 
15 D. De Cremer et al, ‘When does Self-Sacrificial Leadership Motivate Prosocial Behaviour? It 
Depends on Followers’ Prevention Focus,’ Journal of Applied Psychology, 2009, vol.94, no.4, pp.888-
889, 895-896.  
16 Matteson and Irving, ‘Servant versus Self-Sacrificial Leadership,’ p.42. 
17 Halverson et al, ‘Self-Sacrificial Behaviour in Crisis Situations’, p.270. 
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the crisis.18 Choi and Mai-Dalton concluded that if all hope of survivorship was lost, 
followers would not see any point in copying the self-sacrificial behavioural style of 
the leader and place their own interests above those of the group. John Leach and Glin 
Bennett in their studies of civilians in extreme environments, including survivorship 
patterns in concentration camps, have observed this, along with feelings of absolute 
hopelessness that come with it.19 Both observed that when internees believed that they 
had nothing left to fight for, they turned away from being a member a group and 
instead adopted one of two behaviours: aggressive individual survival or passive 
acceptance of death.20   
 
Choi and Mai-Dalton also considered what would happen to leader and follower 
behaviour if the organisation itself operated within a crisis sector, such as charity 
organisations and the military.21 They concluded that in an employment sector where 
crises were expected, self-sacrificial behaviour became the normalised response of 
leaders. In formulating this conclusion Choi and Mai-Dalton drew heavily on the work 
of Emile Durkheim’s Le Suicide: étude de sociologie, published in 1897. Durkheim 
compared the behaviour of military and non-military personnel in crisis situations. He 
concluded that military personnel were more likely to apply a self-sacrificial 
leadership style, which he titled altruistic suicide, than non-military personal. 
Durkheim concluded that this difference in leadership style was based on the training 
of military personnel that resulted in an ingrained sense of collective responsibility for 
a group. Military leaders therefore, were trained to resist behavioural patterns that 
focused on individual survival.22 This thesis argues that training alone could not 
explain the adoption of a self-sacrificial leadership style by men in captivity.    
   
In the volatile and extreme captive settings across the Pacific Theatre of the Second 
World War, a leader’s legitimacy often depended on his willingness to place his 
group’s physical and psychological needs before his own. A positional, professional or 
                                                          
18 Choi and Mai-Dalton, ‘The Model of Followers Responses to Self-Sacrificial Leadership’, pp.402-
413.  
19 Bennet, Beyond Endurance, pp.69-72, 196-211; Leach, Survival Psychology, pp.44-46, 52, 91-96, 
160, 166. 
20 Bennet, Beyond Endurance, pp.69-72, 196-211; Leach, Survival Psychology, pp.44-46, 52, 91-96, 
160, 166. 
21 Choi and Mai-Dalton, ‘On the Leadership Functions of Self-Sacrifice’, pp.488-490. 
22 E. Durkheim, Le Suicide: étude de sociologie, cited in Choi and Mai-Dalton, ‘On the Leadership 
Functions of Self-Sacrifice’, pp.489-490.  
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emergent leader who made this choice understood that the decision to protect his men 
in whatever way he could against the aggression of the captor meant that he risked his 
own survival. This section of the thesis examines a variety of different leaders who, 
knowing the potential consequences of their actions, believed that they had a duty to 
try and protect the men who trusted them to do what was right for the most vulnerable 
members of their group.   
 
The first chapter in this section focuses on the iconic self-sacrificial POW leaders of 
the Second World War, the MOs on the Burma-Thailand Railway. This is not a new 
area of research. It has been referred to by a number of historians, biographers and 
liberated prisoners in broad narratives of the POW experience in the Pacific.23 As 
discussed in Chapter 1, Rosalind Hearder has also produced a doctoral study, now 
published, on MOs who cared for Australian POWs at numerous camps in the Pacific, 
including Changi and different camps on the Burma-Thailand Railway.24 This chapter, 
however, differs from these previous explorations of MOs on the Burma-Thailand 
Railway by approaching their experiences through an examination of their leadership 
style, legitimacy and followership. The experiences of three MOs are explored; 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop, who on captors’ orders, acted as both 
professional leader and MO of Dunlop Force, Major Kevin James Fagan, a surgeon 
attached to H Force, and Major Bruce Atlee Hunt, an MO attached to F Force. This 
chapter explores the reasons why each of these men chose to evolve from being an 
MO who provided a professional service to the sick and injured into a professional 
leader who adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style to not only treat the sick and 
injured as best they could, but to also protect men from being assigned to working 
parties or being beaten by Japanese guards. The chapter explores the personal 
consequences of this choice and the leadership legitimacy and followership Dunlop, 
                                                          
23 For example see P. Brune, Descent into Hell: The Fall of Singapore- Pudu and Changi - The Thai 
Burma Railway, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2014); H. Clarke, A Life for Every Sleeper: A Pictorial 
Record of the Burma-Thailand Railway, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986); H. Clarke et al, Prisoners of 
War, (Sydney: Life-Time Books in Association with John Ferguson, 1988); S. Ebury, Weary: King of 
the River, (Carlton: Miegunyah Press, 2010); S. Ebury, Weary: The Life of Sir Edward Dunlop, 
(Ringwood: Viking, 1994); C. Forbes, Hellfire: The Story of Australia, Japan and the Prisoners of War, 
Pan Edition (Sydney: Pan McMillian, 2007); D. Wall, Heroes of F Force, (Mona Vale: Self-published, 
1993). 
24 R. Hearder, ‘Careers in Captivity: Australian Prisoner-of-War Medical Officers in Japanese Captivity 
During World War II,’ (PhD dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2003). For reference to Hearder’s 
publication of this thesis see R. Hearder, Keep the Men Alive: Australian POW Doctors in Japanese 
Captivity, (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2009). 
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Fagan and Hunt acquired from their respective formal groups as a result of their 
leadership style.  
 
The second chapter in this section of the thesis explores a variety of different 
positional, professional and emergent leaders who also adopted a self-sacrificial style. 
On the Burma-Thailand Railway, a number of men, by virtue of their rank, became 
positional leaders of small working parties sent to the Railway. Some of these men, 
despite the significant risk to their own survival, chose to do whatever they could to 
alleviate the work load forced on their men by the Japanese guards and engineers and 
endured the beatings that followed when men could not reach their work quotas. For 
different reasons, some chaplains assigned to Work Forces also choose to place 
themselves at risk for the sake of providing spiritual comfort and guidance to POWs 
who were willing to listen. In Borneo, the survivors of the death march revealed that 
one group leader, Warrant Officer John William Kinder, maintained a self-sacrificial 
leadership style, even when he understood that the Japanese were executing any 
prisoners who fell behind on the trek through the jungle from Sandakan POW Camp to 
Ranau. In turn, this chapter examines each of these leaders’ self-sacrificial style, the 
consequences of this choice and the followership they attained from their respective 
group because of their courage and self-sacrifice in protecting vulnerable men. 
 
This chapter concludes with the examination of a very different type of self-sacrificial 
leader. Through his own behaviour, Australian Corporal Rodney Breavington showed 
a mixed group of Australian and British POWs who were facing their executors at 





CHAPTER 7: THE SELF-SACRIFICAL LEADERSHIP STYLE OF MEDICAL 
OFFICERS ON THE BURMA-THAILAND RAILWAY 
 
The writings of prisoners who toiled on the Burma-Thailand Railway reveal the 
fundamental role MOs played in their survival.1 In a volatile captive environment 
characterised by slave labour, violence, starvation and disease, illness and injury 
became a way of life. Nearly all of the prisoners suffered from one or more of the 
following diseases: dysentery, septic sores, skin infections, pellagra, beriberi, 
diphtheria, malaria, cholera and a condition similar to trench foot.2 MOs attempted to 
treat the sick and dying without basic medical supplies and in appalling conditions.3  
 
When positional leaders failed to protect their formal groups, some MOs assumed 
their leadership role.4 This transition was based on a conscience choice to adopt a self-
sacrificial leadership style. This leadership style involved accepting the personal 
consequences that followed attempts to protect the men in their formal group from the 
demands of the captor. These men were regularly assaulted when they placed 
themselves between their patients, or men from their formal group, and the Japanese. 
This protective stance, alongside their willingness to continue questioning Japanese 
orders for the sake of their formal group’s wellbeing, became the central feature of the 
MO’s self-sacrificial leadership style on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Hearder argues 
that although MOs held positions of responsibility over their formal group, they 
essentially had ‘responsibility without authority’.5 This thesis disagrees with this 
analysis. MOs who assumed a self-sacrificial leadership style, and were seen by their 
formal group as the legitimate leader, did gain leadership authority and followership.  
 
                                                          
1 For example see Miggins, Diary 15 May 1943; Thomas, ‘Forty Years on as I Remember’, p.33; 
Interview with D. Whalley on 2 December 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.1261, tape 
7, <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1265aspx> maintained by the 
Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 17 May 2014; L. Cody, Ghosts in Khaki: The 
History of the 2/4 Machine Gun Battalion, Eighth Australian Division A.I.F., (Carlislie: Hesperian 
Press, 1997), p.243; Uren, Straight Left, p.36.  
2 E. Dunlop, ‘Medical Experiences in Japanese Captivity,’ British Medical Journal, October 5 1946, 
vol. II, pp.279-286; Walker, Middle East and Far East, pp.580, 583, 588-589, 596-597, 599, 603-604.  
3 For an overview of conditions see Hearder, ‘Careers in Captivity,’ pp.108-149; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of 
the Japanese’, pp.541-586; Walker, Middle East and Far East, pp.580-641. 
4 This analysis concurs with Header’s view that in situations of life and death, the role of the MOs 
became vital. See Hearder, ‘Careers in Captivity’, p.228. 
5 Header, ‘Careers in Captivity,’ p.229.  
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Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop, Major Kevin James Fagan and Major 
Bruce Atlee Hunt were three Australian MOs who adopted a self-sacrificial leadership 
style in this captive setting. Originally, the leadership responsibilities of these three 
men were different.   
 
Dunlop was unusual in that he held positional leadership from the beginning. Because 
of his rank as a Lieutenant Colonel, the Japanese appointed Dunlop as a Work Force 
positional leader in Java.6 He was officially responsible for 878 Australian army, navy 
and air force prisoners captured in Java.7 When Dunlop Force arrived at Konyu in 
Thailand, Lieutenant Usuki Kishio (Okada) added two more POW battalions to 
Dunlop Force, although Dunlop had little interaction with these men.8 From 25 April 
1943, Dunlop Force was further supplemented with about 200 Australians from D 
Force, S Battalion.9 On 9 May Dunlop handed over his positional leadership 
responsibilities to the Australian commander of S Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel 
Cranston Albury McEachern.10 Therefore, for about three months in Thailand, Dunlop 
worked both as the SMO and the positional leader of his formal group. During this 
time, Dunlop not only responded to his men’s health needs, but also their discipline, 
hygiene, sanitation and the division of rations. The stance taken by Dunlop with the 
Japanese shaped how his fellow officers in his force interacted with the captor.     
 
Kevin Fagan (a surgeon) and Bruce Hunt (a physician), were attached to Australian 
Work Force battalions of H and F Force respectively.11 In contrast to Dunlop, neither 
                                                          
6 Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, 
p.1. 
7 Ibid. An unknown number of American survivors of the USS Houston were also attached to this 
Force. See Parkin, Into the Smother, p.1; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ pp.562, 564.   
8 Under Okada’s orders Dunlop assumed positional command of R Battalion (623 Dutch prisoners) and 
Q Battalion (377 Australians). Each of these battalions had their own senior officer who retained day to 
day control of these men. From 11 March 1943 Dunlop had very little contact with either battalion. See 
Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of POW Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, 
pp.1-2; Cody, Ghosts in Khaki, p.238; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese’, p.562. 
9 Dunlop, Interim Report upon Experiences of P.O.W. Working Camps and Hospitals in THAILAND, 
p.1; Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.246; Walker, Middle East and Far East, p.610. 
10 Lieutenant Colonel E. Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 30 October 1945, p.1, AWM54 
1010/4/46; Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.257. 
11 Hunt left Changi in group six of the Australian contingent of F Force which comprised of 20 officers, 
538 other ranks, and 22 medical staff. Fagan accompanied a group of 600 AIF prisoners in H Force and 
was assisted by one other MO, Major H Morrison SSVF. Captain M. Winchester, a dentist, was also 
originally attached to Fagan’s group when they left Changi. For reference to Hunts group composition 
see Roll of AAMC Officers and Chaplains Proceeding with Medical Detachment F Force, 15 April 43, 
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man held any official positional responsibilities as the military officers attached to 
their battalions outranked them.12 Fagan and Hunt’s duties were limited to the task of 
serving the POWs in their capacity as medical professionals. Like many of their 
colleagues on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Fagan and Hunt soon discovered that the 
volatile conditions required MOs not only to treat their patients, but also to protect 
them. Both Fagan and Hunt’s positional leaders also struggled to cope with the 
responsibilities and challenges of positional leadership in this captive setting.13 Having 
watched their respective positional officers falter in their duties to protect their formal 
groups, Fagan and Hunt both made the choice to not only operate as MOs but to 
accept leadership responsibilities for their formal groups. As a consequence of this 
choice, like Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt became responsible for the survivorship of their 
formal groups.14 
 
This chapter’s examination of Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt’s self-sacrificial leadership 
style is divided into two sections. The first section explores the reasons why Dunlop, 
Fagan and Hunt were willing to move from being MOs providing a professional 
service into becoming leaders of their formal groups who adopted a self-sacrificial 
leadership style. The second section explores how each of these men undertook their 
leadership responsibilities and the physical consequences of their leadership style that 
                                                          
p.1, AWM54 481/8/25; P. Head, F Force, 13 April 43, p.1, AWM54 481/8/25. For reference to Fagan’s 
group composition see Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, pp.1, 8.  
12 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Henry Kappe was the OC of Australian POWs attached to F Force. 
Lieutenant Colonel Rowland Frank Oakes was the positional officer of the Australian POWs attached to 
H Force. For reference to F force positional leaders see Head, F Force, 13 April 43, p.1. For reference to 
H force positional leaders see K. Fagan, War Crimes Trials Statement, 8 April 1946, p.1, AWM52 
1010/4/50 Part 1. 
13 The inability of Oakes to cope with positional responsibilities in the volatile captive setting of 
Thailand is examined in Chapter 9. For reference to Kappe’s inability to cope see Stanley, “The men 
who did the fighting are now all busy writing,” pp.300-308. 
14 For reference to Fagan’s leadership responsibilities of his base camp see Barlow, manuscript, p.50; 
Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, ff.177-181, 185-187, 189, 191; B. O’Sullivan cited in Adam-Smith, 
Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea, p.410; Braddon, The Naked Island, pp.178-199, 184-185, 
187. For reference to Hunt’s unofficial positional leadership role see Interview with R. Cahill on 11 
April 2002 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.0662, tape 6, 
<http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1765aspx> maintained by the 
Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 27 April 2014; Interview with C. Gilbert on 2 
October 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.0821, tape 7, 
http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/search.aspx maintained by the Australian 
Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 2 February 2014;  Interview with M. Venables on the 12 
May 2004 for the Australians at War Film Archive, no.2044, tape 6, 
<http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1504aspx> maintained by the 
Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 1 May 2014.  
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led to leadership legitimacy and strong followership from their respective formal 
groups.  
 
Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt 
The primary reason why MOs adopted a self-sacrificial leadership style lay in their 
sense of professional duty to use their medical skills to treat the sick and injured.15 
Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt’s interpretation of their professional duty would not allow 
them to passively stand by when sick and injured prisoners were forced to labour and 
were assaulted by the captor. In these circumstances, these three doctors gave the sick 
and vulnerable their protection, even when this meant risking their own personal 
safety. When Fagan, for example, was asked after the war why he was willing to risk 
his own survival for the men, especially one prisoner who was accused of stealing 
food from the other men. Fagan simply replied, ‘He was a patient.’16  
 
Dunlop echoed Fagan’s sense of professional responsibility. As the commander of 
Number One Allied General Hospital at Bandoeng, Dunlop placed himself between 
critically ill patients and Japanese guards who threatened them with fixed bayonets.17 
As he explained to Hank Nelson, ‘Oh hell, I had to intervene and say you can’t do this. 
You’ll have to kill me first.’18 Yet, Dunlop’s reasons for adopting a self-sacrificial 
leadership style were more complex than simply his sense of professional duty. 
Dunlop used his willingness to stand between his men and the Japanese as a way to 
unite his mixed formal group of service personnel. He believed that it was also ‘the 
beginning of good discipline’19  
                                                          
15 This professional duty has existed for medical practitioners since the fifth century when the Greek 
physician Hippocrates outlined the obligations of a doctor to their patient. It was not until after the 
completion of the Second World War, that the ethical duties of a medical practitioner to treat the sick 
and wounded became international law. See The Declaration of Geneva, World Medical Association 
International Code of Medical Ethics, adopted by the Third General Assembly of the World Medical 
Association, 1949 cited at <www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c8/index.html> maintained by 
the World Medical Association.  This code has subsequently been amended in 1968, 1983 and 2006.  
16 Interview with W. Nankervis on 27 May 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive No.0236, tape 
6 <http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/1758aspx> maintained by the 
Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 12 May 2014.  
17 Interview with E. Dunlop by H. Nelson on 22 June 1982, reel 2, AWM S00358. Dunlop’s courageous 
defiance against Japanese aggression towards his patients was rewarded with one night’s reprieve to 
organise the transfer of 806 Australian and British patients. Of these men 477 had to walk 10 miles to 
the goal at Tjimah and 329 critically ill patients were moved to ‘some sort of hospital’ at Tjimah. See 
Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.7-8.   
18 Interview with Dunlop, reel 2.   




Dunlop’s belief that a self-sacrificial leadership style would not only protect his men 
but also help consolidate his formal group is demonstrated in an incident that took 
place at Makasura POW camp in Java. When the Japanese Commandant asked Dutch 
officers about conditions in the camp their reply, when translated into English, was 
‘nothing to report.’20 When Dunlop discovered this, he was livid and the next day 
when the Commandant asked about conditions in the camp, Dunlop spoke up: ‘You do 
not feed us. You do not treat us like good sailors (or) soldiers. [You are] abusing all 
the rules of the game and the rules of war.’21 Dunlop continued in similar vein until 
the guards, armed with rifles and bayonets, began ‘pricking my tummy.’22 Dunlop’s 
response to this danger typifies his uncompromising defiance. ‘Looking down I said, 
“I see your point, but there will be more tomorrow.”’23 Dunlop’s willingness to 
challenge the captor gave his formal group confidence in his ability to stand up to the 
captor for their basic needs, irrespective of the personal consequences.   
 
The three men studied for this chapter combined their sense of professional 
responsibility with personal codes of morality in their leadership style. For Dunlop this 
moment came when he understood how the Japanese treated their prisoners, especially 
the sick. Dunlop, as a surgeon, could not perform his professional duties to the best of 
his abilities and there is no doubt that he harboured feelings of animosity towards the 
Japanese.24 This animosity spiralled into an all-consuming hatred for his captors in 
Thailand. In his diary Dunlop wrote:  
 
These days, in which I see men being progressively broken into emaciated, 
pitiful wrecks, bloated with beriberi, terribly reduced with pellagra, 
dysentery and malaria, and covered with disgusting sores, a searing hate 
arises in me whenever I see a Nip. Disgusting, deplorable, hateful troop of 
men – apes. It is a bitter lesson to all of us not to surrender to these beasts 
                                                          
20 ibid., reel 2. Lieutenant Colonel E. Lyneham was the positional leader in this camp. See E. Dunlop, 
Report on 2/2 Casualty Clearing Station, AAMC June 1942-August 1945, p.1, AWM54 554/5/7. 
21 Interview with Dunlop, reel 2. 
22 ibid.  
23 ibid.  
24 For example see Interview with Dunlop, reels 1-3; Dunlop, The Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.37-38, 
40.   
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while there is still life in one’s body. It is squalor [sic] and degradation of 
body and mind.25 
 
Prisoners’ writings and recollections suggest that it was Bruce Hunt’s personality that 
reinforced his allegiance to his professional responsibilities and enabled him to adopt 
and maintain a self-sacrificial leadership style.26 Hunt was a regular army MO. He 
believed that his experiences in the First World War and subsequent service as an 
officer in the inter-war years, combined with his medical knowledge, meant that the 
men in his formal group should respect and listen to him.27 As a consequence, Hunt 
forcefully imposed his views on others, be they friend, foe, subordinate or superior. 
When Hunt understood how the Japanese treated the prisoners, particularly the sick on 
the Burma-Thailand Railway, Hunt channelled his self-righteous attitude into a defiant 
stance against the Japanese in an attempt to protect his patients and the men of his 
formal group. In an interview with the West Australian newspaper after his 
repatriation, Hunt explained that his aggressive leadership style was his attempt to try 
and even out of the odds of his men’s chances of surviving. The Japanese, he said, 
‘understands force majeure and so the only way to meet him is to have the force 
majeure yourself’.28  
 
For Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt, the survival of their patients was paramount. As MOs, 
by virtue of their skills and training, they could have saved many of the sick and 
injured if they had been given the opportunity and equipment to do so. Unlike other 
leaders examined in this thesis, the survival of the sick for these officers was not an 
abstract concept but a professional obligation. And because they remained with their 
Work Force battalions on the Burma-Thailand Railway, their familiarity with their 
                                                          
25 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.264-265. For further reference to Dunlop’s hatred of 
his captors which influenced his ability to act as a self-sacrificial leader see Interview with Dunlop, reel 
3.  
26 For example see Letter to the Chairman of the National Health and Medical Research Council from 
A. Derham, 18 March 1946, AWM3DRL/3517, Folder 3; Interview with Cahill, tape 6; Interview with 
W. Holding on the 11 December 2003 for the Australians at War Film Archive no.1317, tape 6, 
<http://www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au/aawfa/interviews/435aspx> maintained by the 
Australian Department of Veteran Affairs, accessed on 10 April 2014.  
27 For reference to Hunt’s service during the First World War see B. Hunt, Statement of Service, p.4, 
NAA: B883:WX11177; B. Hunt, Officers Record of Service, p.2, NAA:B883:WX11177. 
28 B. Hunt in author unknown, ‘Under the Heel: The Siam-Burma Railway. How the Australian PW 
Suffered,’ The West Australian, November 1945, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 3.  
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patients heightened their sense of duty to protect them. The sick and dying were not 
anonymous figures but men with names, stories and mates.    
 
In order to fully comprehend the enormity of the self-sacrificial acts these three MOs 
performed on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt’s leadership 
experience will be examined in turn.  
 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop 
In his attempts to protect sick, weak and injured prisoners from labouring with the 
working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Dunlop matched the Japanese 
scream for scream, particularly with Corporal Usuki Kishio or Okada, the Japanese 
MO in Dunlop’s camps (who Dunlop renamed ‘Doctor Death’),29 his assistant Warrant 
Officer Tadano, the camp Commandant, Lieutenant Osuki and the Japanese 
Commandant in charge of the sector where Dunlop Force worked, Lieutenant Colonel 
Ishi30, HQ clerk Kamamoto31, a Korean, Private Hiramura or ‘the Lizard’’32 who 
collected the working parties from Dunlop’s base camp for shifts set by Lieutenant 
Hiroda, the chief engineer of the Hintok-Kanyu sector.  
 
At Konyu and initially at Hintok Mountain camps, Dunlop, as the positional leader, 
was responsible for arranging working parties33 with the support of Major A. Moon 
and Major E. Corelette as MOs, and his battalion officers. Two problems quickly 
arose: the inability of the battalions to produce enough healthy men for work; and if a 
man assigned to a working party became ill, Dunlop was not able to excuse him from 
the working party.     
                                                          
29 Lieutenant Colonel E. Dunlop, War Crimes Trial Statements, 27 June 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/46. 
The Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry used different Japanese names to identify the same people. 
The names used in this chapter reflect the names Dunlop used in his writings. For reference to the other 
titles given to these men during the Australian War Crimes Trials see G. McCormack, ‘Apportioning 
the Blame: Australian Trials for Railway Crimes,’ in G. McCormack and H. Nelson (eds.), The Burma-
Thailand Railway: Memory and History, (Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993), p.91. 
30 Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 27 June 1946, p.1; Lieutenant Colonel E. Dunlop, War Crimes 
Trials Statement, 6 September 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/46. 
31 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.243. 
32 Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 6 September 1946, p.1. 
33 Following a meeting on the 25 January 1943, between Dunlop and his second in command Major 
Wearne with their Japanese Commandant, Dunlop delegated the duty for selecting POW work parties to 
Major H. Greiner and Major A. Woods, the POWs he had placed in charge of O and P Battalions 
Dunlop Force. Greiner and Woods agreed to select POWs for working parties based on medical advice. 
As conditions deteriorated and the number of sick and injured prisoners grew, Dunlop assumed this 
responsibility. See Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.175-177, 182-183, 218-219. 
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Dunlop, with the help of Corelette and Moon as fellow MOs, tried to get around the 
first problem by assigning men who were not well enough for a shift on the railway to 
light duties in the camp.34 However, as Dunlop recorded in his diary, the Japanese 
stopped this practice. ‘Ns [Japanese] fixed for all light duty men to go out to work and 
terrific beat up of all available labour, with none left for sanitation and anti-malaria 
work.’35 Dunlop confronted his captors in an attempt to protect the sick:   
 
I ruled no light duty or no duty men to go and we fell them out (46 in all). 
Then began a terrific row; I attacked Kanamoto furiously, saying that the 
men were sick and must not go. [The] Engineer said march them over. I 
went too... I was furious... [I] told Hiroda that I objected strongly to his 
sending sick men to work, adding a few comments on the rations, camp 
sanitation, bad medical arrangements and the general bloodiness of N. I 
invited him to make good his threat to shoot me (rifles were trained on 
me). ‘You can shoot me, but then my 2 I/C is as tough a man as me, and 
after him you will have to shoot them all.’36 
 
On this occasion, as in many others, Dunlop’s efforts failed to protect his men. Hiroda 
forced the light duty men onto a working party and made them leave base camp 
without having had any food or water.37 In response to his failure, Dunlop lashed out 
at Osaka:  
 
I [told] him exactly what I thought of the arrangements... I told him after 
making us administrative officers they did not accept our decisions on the 
men’s health etc. And therefore they could go to hell and run the camp 
themselves. They were a lot of murderers and (indicating a cross on the 
ground) that was the fate for us. I finally swung the bomb at him that if 
sick men driven to work all would ‘down the shovels.’ This threw him 
                                                          
34 ibid., p.183. 
35 ibid., p.222. 
36 ibid., pp.222-223.  
37 Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 6 September 1946, p.1. 
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into a severe rage and he raved at the men as if working himself in to a 
passion to hit me (but I bet he never could if I was looking at him).38 
 
In time Dunlop learned that his confrontational approach, while occasionally easing 
demands for workers, would often do more harm than good. Irrespective of the 
amount of noise and threats he made, Okada, Kanamoto and Hiroda not only assigned 
Dunlop’s light duty men to work, but also went on indiscriminate sweeps of the 
hospital, forcing patients out of their makeshift beds to fill their working quotas.39 The 
Japanese found plenty of men in the hospital lines. As early as 8 May 1943, 122 men 
from O Battalion, 115 men from P Battalion and 27 men from S Battalion were in the 
hospital lines.40 The number of sick prisoners would escalate when cholera struck 
Dunlop’s camp on 19 June 1943.41 
 
Despite the growing numbers of sick men and Hiroda’s orders that no men would be 
allowed to stay in camp to work on sanitation, water or anti-malaria schemes, Dunlop 
still tried to assign men to light or no duties in the camp42 and failed. It became a 
regular practice for Okada, Kanamoto and Hiroda to sweep the hospital lines for 
workers. In his War Crimes Trial Statement, given on 27 June 1946, Dunlop explained 
the consequences of this practice:    
 
In May-June and July 1943, it was a daily spectacle to see scores of 
emaciated sick men forced out to gruelling labour tottering along with the 
aid of sticks. Others too sick to even walk were by his [Hiroda] orders 
carried to the engineer’s lines to labour in the lying or seated position.43 
 
                                                          
38 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.223. This incident is confirmed in the writings of 
Lance Corporal Kenneth Norman Heyes. See K. Heyes, Diary 22 March 1943, AWM PR86/232. For 
other examples of Dunlop adopting this aggressive tactic in an effort to protect his men see Dunlop, The 
War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.218-219, 238, 338; Thompson, Diary 14 April 1943.  
39 For further examples of Dunlop’s aggressive tactics leading the captors to force men from the hospital 
lines onto working parties see Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.229, 259, 276, 258, 281, 
287-289; Parkin, Into the Smother, pp.148-149. 
40 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.256. 
41 ibid., p.283. 
42 For example see Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.232, 235, 238, 257.  
43 Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 27 June 1946, p.1.This incident is confirmed by the War 
Crimes Testimony of Major Wearne. See Major W. Wearne, War Crimes Trials Statement, 18 March 
1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/145.  
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Dunlop quickly realised that he had to come up with another tactic and one proved 
useful. On 5 April 1943, Dunlop ordered the 133 patients in the hospital lines to ‘look 
as sick as possible.’44 Then when Kanamoto came looking for more workers in the 
hospital lines, he failed to find a single ‘fit’ prisoner.   
 
This victory was short lived. Dunlop’s aggressive tone, combined with his growing 
hatred of the Japanese, and his despair at his failure to protect his men, meant that he 
struggled to find a balance between strongly advocating for his patients and pushing 
his captors too far. When Dunlop got the fragile balance wrong it had devastating 
consequences for the men in the hospital lines who were carried out to the railway to 
work.45  
 
Dunlop only really succeeded in protecting his patients when McEachern replaced him 
as the positional leader at Hintok Road Camp on 9 May 1943.46 Dunlop’s writings 
reveal his relief when McEachern assumed positional leadership responsibilities for 
the camp, allowing him to focus all of his attention on his patients.47 McEachern’s 
even temperament helped Dunlop find more balance in his negotiations with the 
Japanese, ensuring that he backed down from screaming matches when they 
threatened to sweep the hospital lines for more workers.48 
 
With McEachern’s support, Dunlop was able to apply his self-sacrificial leadership 
style using more calculated techniques. One example is the wailing log, described in 
the vignette in the preface to this chapter.49 Lifting and carrying the sick to the 
Japanese guard, forcing the guard to make the decision, seemed to work. Petty Officer 
Raymond Edward Parkin, who observed the tactic, explained that ‘[e]ven the most 
                                                          
44 Thompson, Diary 5 April 1943.  
45 For other examples when this occurred see Staff Sergeant J. Ross, War Crimes Trials Statement, 20 
May 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/124; Parkin, Into the Smother, pp.148-149.  
46 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.257. 
47 For reference to Dunlop’s relief that McEachern arrived in his base camp and then when McEachern 
assumed the role of positional leader see Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.249-250, 257, 
283. Ray Parkin’s writings also explain that McEachern’s presence in the camp eased some of Dunlop’s 
burden and helped him cope a little better with their situation. See Parkin, Into the Smother, pp.128-129. 
48 For reference to McEachern’s calming effect on Dunlop see Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary 
Dunlop, pp.257, 337.  
49 For example of the use of the wailing log as a negotiation tactic see Dunlop, The War Diaries of 




hardened Japanese found it difficult to accept a man proffered in Dunlop’s arms as fit 
to labour on the railway.’50 However, this tactic was not fool proof. On the occasions 
when it did fail, Dunlop instructed the men to collapse. This usually convinced the 
guards that they were too sick to work and had to stay in the camp. Some of the 
prisoners’ performances were very authentic. On 14 June 1943, Dunlop wrote in his 
diary, ‘[s]taged three collapses of men who had gone sick during the night. Poor 
wretches, they were convincing enough - so much so that Okada suspected one of 
being cholera, yet advanced to feel his pulse. Gallant fellow!’51 The combination of 
Dunlop’s aggression and McEachern’s calm approach set the tone for the way officers 
in Dunlop’s camps created a ‘firm front’52 to protect sick men from working parties.     
 
Day in and day out, Dunlop also risked his personal safety in his attempts to protect 
the sick and vulnerable men in his formal group. Interestingly, during the main 
construction phase of the railway, Dunlop’s diary only refers once to the physical 
consequences of his leadership style.53 This is in stark contrast to the writings and 
recollections of officers and men of Dunlop Force who remarked that Dunlop’s 
bravery regularly ended in a bashing.54 
 
There are two possible reasons for Dunlop including the one reference to being 
assaulted at Hintok River Camp in his published writings. First, it was the only time 
when Dunlop overpowered his attacker. Second, the consequences of this incident 
resulted in his transfer from Hintok River Camp to Tarso Base Hospital, where he 
stayed until 16 January 1944.55 On 3 October 1943, Dunlop was assaulted by the same 
guard twice in one day. During the second altercation, Dunlop had had enough. He 
                                                          
50 Parkin cited in Nelson, P.O.W., p.50. 
51 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.280. 
52 ibid., p.266. 
53 ibid., pp.332-333.  
54 For reference to men in O and P Battalions Dunlop Force who witnessed Dunlop being assaulted see 
McMaster, ‘My War Experiences, Friendships and 3 ½ Years as a Prisoner of War’, p.24; Letter to Mr. 
Prime Minister from J. Graham, 7 October 1955, AWM PR00926, Subseries 5, File 39; Cody, Ghosts in 
Khaki, pp.126-127; Parkin, Into the Smother, pp.50-51.  
55 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.333, 367. Dunlop became Second in Command at 
Tarso Base Hospital from late October 1943 until 16 January 1944. From here Dunlop went to 
Chungkai Base Hospital where he acted as SMO. On 22 May 1944 Dunlop was transferred to Nakom 
Patom Hospital. He remained at this location serving both as a surgeon and in an administrative support 
role to Lieutenant Colonel Albert Ernest Coates until his liberation. For reference to Dunlop’s positions 
in these locations see Thompson, Diary 21-31 October 1943; Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary 
Dunlop, pp.369, 411-412.  
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overpowered the guard and took away his rifle. Then, after Dunlop had been escorted 
to the guardroom, the same guard thrashed him with a bamboo stick. Dunlop 
overpowered the guard again taking away the bamboo stick. Finally, the guard used a 
piece of wood to hit Dunlop. It was only when the camp clerk came running into the 
guardhouse after hearing screams that Dunlop, who was now hitting the guard with the 
wood, stopped. Both men were sent to Okada and then Hatorisan. Dunlop’s diaries 
explain what happened next:  
 
I saw Okada, showing him my abrasions to hand and forearm and 
bruises, cuts and abrasions to the leg. I told him of the subsequent 
developments and asked him if he would take me to the commander. This 
he did and introduced me, apparently referring to the incident. I then 
further explained in English, making a strong protest. Hatorisan pondered 
this for a long time and finally said ‘you must avoid such incidents with 
Nipponese soldiers!’56 
 
As explained above, this violent incident also led to Okada arranging Dunlop’s 
transfer out of the Hintok River Camp to Tarsau Base Hospital. Dunlop explains this 
turn of events by suggesting that Okada genuinely feared for his safety,57 and in his 
interview with Hank Nelson, Dunlop himself admitted that Okada ‘saved my life on 
one or two occasions.’58 Clearly, Okada provided him with some level of protection 
against the other guards and engineers. Dunlop, however, dismissed this. Instead he 
focused on how Okada allowed so many of his men to suffer and die when some 
simple supplies and protection from working parties might have saved many men 
during the seven month period his men worked on the railway.59   
 
Historian Cameron Forbes argues that Dunlop’s relationship with Okada was 
complex.60 Okada did attempt to help Dunlop on some occasions. For example, he 
donated a forequarter of beef to the sick mess, only for it to be taken back when the 
                                                          
56 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.332-333. 
57 ibid., p.337. Dunlop added a note to his diary after the war, confirming that his transfer out of Hintok 
River Camp occurred because Okada genuinely feared for his safety. See ibid., p.333.  
58 Interview with Dunlop, reel 3. 
59 For an explanation of the basic supplies that Dunlop believed MOs on the Burma-Thailand Railway 
needed to save their patients see Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.175, 193-194. 
60 Forbes, Hellfire, pp.323-326. 
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Japanese guards found out.61 Okada also gave Dunlop occasional pep talks 
encouraging him to heal the sick faster.62 None of these interventions eased his hatred 
of the Japanese. He told Nelson, ‘Total hate was there. You see so many people die in 
such misery. The hate is intensive.’63  
 
Dunlop’s followership 
Dunlop’s self-sacrificial behaviour gave rise to a collective spirit amongst his formal 
group. For example, Acting Bombardier Tom Uren explained that Dunlop’s personal 
example and his introduction of compulsory deductions from the pay of all men and 
officers to purchase essential food and medical supplies allowed the men to retain their 
identity as a formal group.64  
 
We lived by the principle of the fit looking after the sick, the young 
looking after the old and the rich looking after the poor... It is the 
collectivism that Weary bred in us... Not all Australian camps were like 
ours. Our survival rate was due, basically, to Weary’s leadership.65 
 
Yet, Dunlop’s own writings and those of his men reveal that there was a significant 
difference between the leadership legitimacy Dunlop acquired as their doctor and as 
their positional leader. During his tenure as positional leader, he struggled to maintain 
control over the discipline of the formal group. For example, his diary recorded fights 
between the men at Konyu Camp on 28 January 1943.66 On 31 January, a warrant 
officer, who had been appointed as the quartermaster, was relieved of his duty because 
he had been stealing food.67 On 6 February, Dunlop warned his warrant officers and 
                                                          
61 ibid., p.324. 
62 For example see Dunlop, War Crimes Trials Statement, 27 June 1946, p.1; Dunlop, The War Diaries of 
Weary Dunlop, pp.181, 251, 276, 277, 337; Forbes, Hellfire, pp.323-326. 
63 Interview with Dunlop, reel 3. For other references to Dunlop’s intense anger see Dunlop, The War 
Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.264-266, 269, 274, 297.  
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Interview with Dunlop, reel 3; Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, pp.161, 174, 185-186, 198-
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65 T. Uren, ‘Journey’s in Captivity,’ in G. McCormack and H. Nelson (eds.), The Burma-Thailand 
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sergeants that if they did not maintain better control over their men they risked 
insubordination from the other ranks.68 That, he said, would place the survival of the 
entire formal group at risk. Yet, isolated pockets of theft continued into April.69 One of 
Dunlop’s men, Private Alf Denton, stole a can of sardines from the Japanese as late as 
August 1943.70 Dunlop witnessed Denton’s punishment by the Japanese and did 
nothing to stop it. He also had problems with some of his officers when he informed 
them that they had to join working parties to allow the sick men to remain in camp.71 
Some officers immediately volunteered, some had to be persuaded, others refused 
outright. 
 
Poor discipline posed a potential threat to collective survival, but Dunlop considered 
the black market run by the prisoners in his camps as a greater threat. The prisoners 
who were involved in these rackets stopped river barges loaded with foodstuffs, or 
secretly went down to Konyu to purchase supplies.72 To Dunlop’s disgust, most of 
these men sold the food they had purchased to their fellow prisoners, including 
hospital patients, for a profit. However, although Dunlop disapproved of the practice, 
he understood why men resorted to this kind of behaviour, stating in his interview with 
Nelson, ‘If you thieve off me, you were going to survive and I wasn’t… It was just 
surviving.’73  
 
Dunlop clearly struggled with his duties as positional officer and he often put his 
medical duties first when he was the positional leader. As noted earlier, he welcomed 
the arrival of McEachern to take over the positional leadership duties in his camps. 
What earned Dunlop leadership legitimacy and followership amongst the men was, 
therefore, his role as their doctor. As Parkin noted at Konyu Camp on 3 February: ‘He 
[Dunlop] is our camp CO but primarily our doctor.’74  
                                                          
68 ibid., p.190.  
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70 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.315.  
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The importance Dunlop attached to his role as doctor, the fierce protectiveness that 
characterised his attitude towards his patients, and the self-sacrificial nature of his 
leadership style sometimes brought with it feelings of guilt and inadequacy. Despite 
his own health problems, included bouts of malaria, a light case of cholera, and what 
Dunlop himself admitted was ‘fairly bad’ tropical ulcers, he felt guilty about receiving 
medical treatment for himself.75 Receiving a mouthful of food above the ordinary 
ration made him uncomfortable, seeing anything extra he received as tantamount to 
stealing life from the helpless. Eggs provide one example of the complicated interplay 
between Dunlop’s sense of responsibility and protectiveness for the sick, and his 
discomfort about receiving ‘extras’.  
 
A rare supply of eggs arrived in the camp one day. After a long day working in the 
hospital, Dunlop arrived back in the officers’ lines and his mess man gave him his 
meal: ‘a plate of dry rice with two fried eggs on top.’76 Just as he was about to take his 
first bite, Dunlop saw two British prisoners being forced to carry a heavy log. 
Suddenly, one of them faltered, which led to both men collapsing. Dunlop ‘got up and 
said a few things to the Jap.’77 Parkin, who observed the incident, reasoned that 
‘[s]omething in the big man’s subtle presence must have affected the Jap, for he left 
the tommies in Weary’s care.’ 78 After treating them, Dunlop suddenly became very 
conscience that both men were eyeing his meal. His mess man, who had watched the 
scene, intervened. He said, ‘Now look here. We don’t get eggs every day, you know. 
Mostly it is rice and seaweed soup, same as you. These are the first we have had for a 
long while. The colonel would have eaten his by now, only he’s working hard in the 
hospital lines all day. He needs them more than you do. You eat them colonel. Go 
on.’79 Unable to eat, Dunlop retreated to his tent and ‘scrapped together a few biscuits 
and palm sugar’80 for the men, who quickly demolished them. After they had gone, 
Dunlop ate his eggs, but did not enjoy them. He explained to Parkin that ‘he felt a 
                                                          
75 For reference to Dunlop’s guilt see Interview with Dunlop, reel 3; Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary 
Dunlop, pp.271, 272, 277-278. For reference to some of Dunlop’s illness see Interview with Dunlop, 
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76 Parkin, Into the Smother, p.147. 
77 ibid.  
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keen disappointment in himself.’81 This is not the only time when Dunlop’s own 
behaviour disappointed him. His diary chronicles other times when he describes his 
reaction to the suffering around him as selfish, which caused him to be ‘full of self-
loathing.’82    
 
Dunlop’s writings also reflect a sense of inadequacy, even despair, over what he saw 
as personal failures to protect his men from both the brutality of the Japanese and the 
illnesses that cost his men their lives in Thailand. Too many men who trusted his skill 
and courage died. Dunlop’s last entry before he was transferred to Tarsau Base 
Hospital epitomised these thoughts. ‘I find now that my policies of keeping our group 
of Java party together was in the end a failure… I just didn’t reckon on the inhumanity 
of the last three months or the cholera.’83 
 
Dunlop’s sense of failure is the antithesis of his men’s writings and recollections about 
his leadership.84 That Dunlop often failed in his quest to protect sick and vulnerable 
men did not matter. What did matter was that he never gave up. For his men, Dunlop’s 
leadership style meant that he had acquired leadership legitimacy and a followership 
that could be fiercely protective as two incidents reveal.  
 
The first took place in Java at Makasura Camp. One of Dunlop’s men kicked a soccer 
ball at the Japanese Commandant.85 The Japanese reacted by fixing their bayonets and 
filling their guns with ammunition. After this display, the Japanese gave Dunlop 
permission to dismiss his troops, but as he was giving them a salute, he received ‘an 
upper cut in the teeth.’86 Not expecting the blow, Dunlop fell to the ground. When he 
got back on his feet, as he recalled, ‘[a] samurai sword came out and he [the Japanese 
Commandant] ran at my neck. This was the one thing I blessed boxing for, I got out of 
                                                          
81 ibid., p.147. 
82 Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary Dunlop, p.269. Also see Dunlop, The War Diaries of Weary 
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85 Interview with Dunlop, reel 2. 
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the road but he got my larynx with a sickening crash.’87 As Dunlop lay on the ground, 
he looked up and saw his men breaking ranks. Fearing a massacre, Dunlop desperately 
motioned for his men to back off. To Dunlop’s relief, the men obeyed him but did not 
leave their lines until he was safe. The second occurred at Hintok River Camp, when 
Dunlop was being assaulted. As Private Maxwell Lawrence McGee recalled,   
 
There was one parade where all the men were on show and the bashing 
started. A certain amount was always accepted but when Weary got more 
than his fair share, there was a sudden concerted growl from the men. 
That was the only time I remember the Japs backing down. We would 
have got them all even though a lot of us would have been shot.88  
 
Dunlop’s physical presence became a symbol of hope to men enduring the heartache 
and hell of captivity in Thailand. Parkin, for example, wrote:  
 
Weary has been down from the road a couple of times. He seems in good 
health and high spirits. This, in itself, is a tonic to the men. It went around 
the camp when the workers came in, ‘Weary has been down and he looks 
well.’ He is a symbol and a rock to us.89 
 
He added, ‘This selflessness, this smile, commands more from the men that an army of 
officers waving a manual of military law.’90  
 
The men were not blind to Dunlop’s heartache at the loss of so many patients or his 
health problems. On 21 July 1943, at the height of the speedo, Lance Corporal 
Kenneth Hayes, a prisoner who worked as an orderly in Hintok Mountain Camp, 
wrote in his diary ‘Weary is working day and night and hasn’t a hope with no 
equipment. I’m afraid the strain on him is beginning to show.’91 Other men’s writings 
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include a chronicle of Dunlop’s health problems alongside their own, along with the 
sense of protectiveness described earlier.92 Parkin, for example, wrote:   
Weary’s legs are bad, ulcers and beri beri [sic] swelling. But he keeps 
going all day at the hospital. This affects the fellows in the camp. They 
feel for him and worry about him. Many of them try to think of some ruse 
to keep him off his feet, none had been found.93 
 
The men on Dunlop Force, of course, realised that Dunlop did not perform his medical 
duties alone. They consistently wrote and recalled that he was assisted by Moon and 
Corlette.94 They also acknowledged the bravery and skill of the medical orderlies who 
assisted the doctors. Yet it is clear, that out of all these men, it was Dunlop who 
acquired a strong followership. He stood above the others through his selfless 
leadership style. Gerald Bourke, a chaplain on the Burma-Thailand Railway, explained 
to Dunlop’s biographer, Sue Ebury, that Dunlop had ‘Christ like virtues.’95 Brigadier 
Arthur Blackburn, the officer who was in Changi at the time when Lieutenant Colonel 
Frederick Gallagher Galleghan questioned Dunlop’s authority to lead a formal group, 
praised Dunlop’s work in Java and Thailand with these words:  
 
[N]o mere award can ever begin to express and appreciate the thanks of 
the many thousands of men who are alive today solely because of your 
self-sacrificing work.96 
 
Hearder’s study of MOs on the Burma-Thailand Railway explains that Dunlop was a 
man who was respected for his work in Thailand,97 but notes that Dunlop was not the 
only MO who became a legitimate leader for the prisoners within his formal group.98 
Fagan and Hunt were two others. 
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Major Kevin James Fagan  
Major Kevin James Fagan was attached to Group Three of H Force as its surgical 
specialist.99 Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes led this group of 600 
Australians.100 From its initiation in Changi, this force was different. Due to the 
unavailability of other ranks from Changi as a result of illness, and the significant 
number of prisoners who had already left on other Work Forces, H Force was a mixed 
group, half having been captured in Java, half in Singapore.101 Even before they left 
Changi, the health of the Australians on this Work Force was, at best, mediocre. Oakes 
claimed that ‘[s]omething like 25 percent of the personnel of H [F]orce were medically 
unfit’.102 According to the 2/30th battalion history, many of these men had been unable 
to work for months, and others had only recently been discharged from the Australian 
General Hospital at Changi.103 Oakes was hesitant about taking sick men with the 
Work Force, but Galleghan allowed it because the Japanese had assured him that the 
sick and unfit prisoners would be well looked after.104 The mixed composition of H 
Force was also a problem: this formal group lacked cohesion. When the reality of 
conditions in Thailand became apparent, this lack of unity had devastating 
consequences for the prisoners, especially when their officers became hesitant and 
when some stopped advocating on their behalf to their captors.105  Fagan, however, 
established his willingness to protect sick, vulnerable and exhausted men from the 
beginning. 
 
When they arrived at Bampong, like other Work Forces before them, the men were 
forced to march to their base camp. However, as H Force was one of the last Work 
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Forces to arrive in Thailand, their base camp was the furthest up the line on the 
Thailand side of the construction project.106 These Australians, therefore, marched 
about 90 miles from Bampong to Malaya Hamlet. At the beginning of their march, the 
officers refused to let go of the non-essential items that they had been allowed to bring 
with them from Changi. Fagan explained to Nelson that: ‘[w]e were told we were 
going to a holiday camp, good food, bring the old piano and musical instruments.’107 
As the prisoners marched on, some of the officers sold their possessions to the natives, 
while others were determined to struggle on with their surplus gear.108 As these 
officers were concerned only with their own welfare on the march, Fagan filled the 
void.   
 
Most of the other ranks, particularly the ones who were already classified as unfit, 
struggled on the march. Even the Japanese threat to assault prisoners who fell behind 
was not always enough to get sick men back on their feet. At this early point, Fagan’s 
actions evolved from providing a professional medical service into professional 
leadership. The writings and recollections of Gunner Russell Braddon, Private Patrick 
George Pringle, Lieutenant Robert Molesworth Goodwin and even Oakes himself 
reveal that the skills of Fagan and his medical orderlies were essential in getting the 
prisoners to Malaya Hamlet. Braddon recalled:  
 
Not only did he treat any man needing treatment to the best of his ability, 
he also carried men who fell; he carried the kit of men in danger of falling, 
and he marched up and down the whole length of the column through its 
entire progress. If we marched 100 miles through the jungle, Kevin Fagan 
marched 200. And when, at the end of our night’s trip, we collapsed and 
slept, he was there to clean blisters, set broken bones and render first 
aid.109  
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Through these selfless acts, Fagan laid a foundation of trust amongst the mixed formal 
group.  
The Australians finally reached their base camp on 21 May 1943, six days after they 
left Bampong.110 Like the other Work Forces on the Burma-Thailand Railway, the 
men on H Force found a somewhat cleared space, which they were forced to convert 
into a camp site, while at the same time providing working parties to start construction 
on their section of the railway.111 Initially the Japanese engineers in this sector ordered 
the officers to supply 200 workers for the day shift and another 200 workers for the 
night shift.112 Once the officers and the men understood the nature of their work, and 
the unreasonable demands by the Japanese for sick men to labour, the officers, led by 
positional leader Oakes, largely stopped their efforts to protect their men because they 
did not want to risk their personal survival. Fagan, however, remained their defender 
and in doing so, became their legitimate leader.113 
 
Little is known of the techniques Fagan used to protect the sick from working parties. 
However, from Braddon, Captain Bernard Matthew O’Sullivan and Private Alexander 
Hatton Drummond’s writings, it can be presumed that Fagan used all of his cunning, 
courage and professional skill in his attempts to protect the sick, injured and weak 
from being assigned to working parties. For example, in Patsy Adam-Smith’s study of 
Australian POWs, O’Sullivan, an officer in the Australian Battalion of H Force, 
reflected on Fagan’s efforts to protect the sick from working parties:   
 
Dr. Fagan was with us, he was absolutely marvellous, every man of us 
owes much to him. He was a quiet man, a surgeon, gentle with us and 
strong with the Japs. He defended our men as best he could. Fagan fought 
like a demon to keep sick men off work parties. If a man could show [he] 
was bandaged it was okay with the Japs, but sick men had to go to work 
because the Japs thought Fagan was sheltering bludgers; what Fagan was 
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doing was trying to help the men stay alive. As I said, all of us on H force 
[sic] owe our lives to this man.114 
The official report on the activities of H Force describe the MO’s protection of their 
patients as ‘unremitting and self-sacrificing.’115 Oakes’ report explains that Fagan, 
along with Major H Morrison of the SSVF, ‘did everything that was humanely 
possible’116 for the sick, including defending them ‘bravely’117 against Japanese 
aggression. The H Force report concluded that his behaviour saved many lives.118 
Drummond (writing as ‘Alexander Hatton’) believed that Fagan’s protective stance 
was vital for the Australians as the senior officers of the camp were mostly unwilling 
to put their bodies on the line to protect the men.119 Drummond’s writings even 
suggest that the leadership legitimacy and followership Fagan acquired from these 
self-sacrificing acts were resented by the other officers because it contrasted with their 
decision to protect themselves.120 
 
In contrast to prisoner writings and recollections on Dunlop and F Force, there are no 
specific references to Fagan being assaulted during his attempts to protect the sick 
from being forced onto working parties. However, within the context of the Burma-
Thailand Railway, and the official reports and private writings and recollections noting 
Fagan’s bravery, it is highly likely that Fagan was assaulted during his attempts to 
protect the sick.121 
 
Despite his self-sacrificial leadership style, like Dunlop, Fagan had mixed success 
protecting sick men in his camp from the Japanese demands for labour. The official 
report on H Force states that ‘doctor’s opinions as to the fitness of individuals were 
frequently ignored and men were often dragged from their beds in order to make up 
deficits in numbers.’122 Oakes confirmed that despite Fagan’s best efforts, the sick 
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were forced to work. Oakes also recalled Fagan’s reaction when Oakes told him he 
had to pick the 50 least sick men in his camp for work. Fagan replied: ‘It’s no good 
asking me for the least sick. They’re all sick.’123 
As a leader who applied a self-sacrificial style, Fagan’s response to Oakes’ question 
was not surprising. He had an enormous number of men to protect. According to the 
Official Australian Medical History, when the Australian Battalion of H Force arrived 
at Malaya Hamlet, about one-third of the men were sick.124 Then, on 16 June, cholera 
struck.125 By the end of the month more than 200 men had contracted the disease.126 
Braddon wrote that with few medical supplies, ‘their only sustenance was the tireless 
strength and devotion of Major Fagan.’127 Drummond’s writings also stress that Fagan 
was their only hope.128  
 
Fearing that they too would catch the deadly disease, and in the face of Fagan’s 
demands for medical supplies, food and rest for the men, the Japanese engineers 
agreed to reduce the numbers of men required in the working parties.129 To make up 
the shortfall, the Japanese brought in reinforcements, a British Battalion of H force, 
comprised of 266 men.130 These men also fell ill. In his official history, A. J. Sweeting 
explains that by 4 July, out of a total camp population of 750 men, 91 had died.131 
Another 110 had cholera and 118 men were suspected of having the disease.132 By the 
end of July, 217 men were dead, 111 Australians and 106 British prisoners.133 Despite 
this, the Japanese still expected the prisoners to work on the railway in eight-hour 
shifts. At the end of five weeks, by the time H Force had finished construction, one out 
of every six men in this camp had died. In total 165 other ranks and 4 Australian 
officers died.134   
                                                          
123 Oakes, ‘Singapore Story,’ p.323. 
124 Walker, Middle East and Far East, p.616. 
125 C. Mansfield, Diary June 16 1943, AWM PR00111; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.584; 
Various Members of the 2/19 Unit Association, The History of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F., p.657.  
126 Walker, Middle East and Far East, p.616. 
127 Braddon, The Naked Island, p.187. Also see Clarke, A Life for Every Sleeper, p.46. 
128 Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, ff.186, 198. 
129 Walker, Middle East and Far East, p.616. 
130 Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.584. 
131 ibid., pp.584-585. 
132 ibid. 
133 Walker, Middle East and Far East, p.616. 
134 Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p.27; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the 
Japanese,’ p.585. In total 880 men from the combined Australian, British and Dutch Battalions of H 
Force died. This figure accounting for 29.6% of the men assigned to H Force. See Humphries, Report of 




In an interview with Nelson, Fagan described his worst experience in Thailand. It 
occurred after construction had been completed in their sector. Just when he thought 
their hell was over and his patients might have a chance to recover, the Japanese 
ordered him to select 100 men to go further up-country to Konoita, to help another 
battalion that had fallen behind schedule. Fagan believed that what the Japanese had 
really asked him to do was choose 100 men to die.  
 
There were about 300 of us left out of 600. From that group, none of 
whom were well, all of whom had malaria, were malnourished, and some 
of them were shivering on parade, dressed in laplap or a pair of shorts, 
rarely any boots. I had to select 100 men to march another 100 miles into 
the unknown, certainly to worse and not to better. I never saw any of those 
men again. I felt that I had come to the end at that stage because these 
were the fellows whom I had nursed through difficult times and there was 
a bond of affection between us. I would have understood if they’d cursed 
me, turned on their heels and walked away. Instead they came and shook 
hands with me and wished me good luck. And I found it necessary to walk 
into the jungle and weep…135 
 
Although the Japanese had forced Fagan to make this choice, it haunted him, even 
after the war. He could not cope with the fact that no matter what he did, he could not 
save these men.  
 
Fagan’s followership 
Fagan’s attempts to protect the sick against the demands of the Japanese, even when 
he failed, created a loyal followership. Oakes himself admitted that Fagan emerged as 
the natural leader of the Australians and British prisoners at Malaya Hamlet.136 The 
men in Fagan’s formal group understood that his every word and action sought to aid 
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their survival.137 They were confident in the belief that Fagan, despite the cost to 
himself, would not falter in his efforts to protect them.   
 
The most powerful evidence of the level of followership Fagan had acquired was the 
reactions of his formal group when Fagan himself became critically ill after the 
survivors arrived back in Singapore. Instead of going back to Changi, they stayed at 
Sime Road Camp.138 Here Fagan collapsed.139 News of his dire condition spread like 
wildfire amongst his men. The mood of the camp was sombre. Distraught men tried 
to find some way to help the man who had been willing to risk his life to help them 
through hell. In return for his sacrifice, the men gave Fagan what scant belongings 
they had. Braddon wrote:  
 
To the fibro-cement room where he lay, from all over the camp, came an 
endless pilgrimage of soldiers bearing tinned food, money, oil, soap, 
clothes, all their most cherished possessions. ‘Brought this for the Major’ 
they would say, ‘thought it might help’ then wandered off. No other man 
in the entire Malayan force could have won so spontaneous a tribute of 
treasures.140 
 
In time Fagan made a full recovery. While the relief was palpable in the camp, 
Braddon’s writings also reveal how grateful the prisoners were to have had the 
opportunity to show Fagan the depth of their gratitude for the selfless and courageous 
leadership he had given them in the midst of the jungle.141 
 
Major Bruce Atlee Hunt 
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Bruce Atlee Hunt’s self-sacrificial leadership style was similar to Dunlop’s selfless 
and passionate defence of sick and vulnerable prisoners. However, Hunt’s decision to 
apply a self-sacrificial leadership style, whilst similarly based on protecting the sick 
and vulnerable men in his F Force Battalion, was also based on personal and 
professional pride. He refused to allow the Japanese to treat him as a subservient, 
passive prisoner. In the context of F Force’s experiences on the Burma-Thailand 
Railway, Hunt’s defiance of the captor enabled him to become the legitimate leader of 
his formal group. 
F Force consisted of 7000 prisoners, including 3662 Australians, of whom 125 were 
classified as unfit before they left Changi.142 Australian Lieutenant Colonel Charles 
Henry Kappe was the ranking officer of the Australian contingent of F Force. Most of 
the Australians assigned to F Force came from the 27th Brigade, but there were also 
some prisoners from other units.143 The Australian contingent of F Force arrived at 
Bampong between 28 and 30 April.144 By the end of May 1944, 1060 or 44 percent of 
these Australians were dead.145 Most of the dead came from the other ranks.146 
 
F Force received an even more hostile reception than H Force had. After arriving at 
Bampong, they were forced to march 180 miles to their base camps, with some 
Australians even crossing the border into Burma.147 The Australian contingent was 
divided between four base camps.148 The largest group of Australians (1800) were at 
Lower Songkurari Number 1 camp. Smaller groups of Australians prisoners were 
located at Upper Songkurai (393) and Konkoita (700). Another 200 Australians were 
sent to F Force headquarters, originally at Lower Nieke then at Nieke. During the 
construction phase of the Burma-Thailand Railway, Hunt was firstly based at 
Konkonita camp and then at Lower Songkurari camp.149  
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Peter Stanley has argued that some positional leaders in F Force, realising the personal 
consequences that followed trying to protect the men from the Japanese, chose not to 
risk their own survival for the sake of their men.150 The positional officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles Henry Kappe, led this reversion from their duties. The men in 
Kappe’s formal group rechristened him ‘kappe-san’151 or ‘kappeama’152 because of his 
refusal to help his men against the demands of the Japanese, which, according to the 
men of the Australian Battalion of F Force at Lower Songkurari, made Kappe ‘jap-
happy.’153 When Kappe returned to Changi POW camp in Singapore, he explained the 
reason for his behaviour to his superior officers: ‘I had to look after myself to tell the 
story.’154 In a similar way to Fagan, Hunt moved from being a MO performing a 
professional service into a positional leadership role. Fellow Australian MO Captain 
Richard Lloyd Cahill explained that Kappe accepted this de facto transfer of his 
official leadership responsibilities to Hunt. In his interview with the Australians at 
War Film Archive project, Cahill recalled that,   
 
You had to have the best you could [leading the camp]… Fortunately the 
CO of the camp really had handed over to Bruce Hunt, the doctor, so that 
he ran the camp.155  
 
Hunt’s major antagonist at Lower Songkurari camp was Lieutenant Fukuda, who 
quickly ‘christened’ Hunt ‘Hunt Tai, Hunt Tai’156 because of his aggressive manner in 
dealing with the Japanese demands on his men. Fukuda learnt that, in his attempts to 
protect the sick from being assigned to working parties, Hunt never cowered or backed 
down from strenuously arguing his point that the men were too sick and weak to work. 
Cahill recalled that Hunt was ‘fearless’157 in his attempts to protect his patients. 
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According to Cahill, Hunt ‘didn’t care’ about the personal consequences: ‘He just 
talked them down.’158  
 
Hunt’s often defiant style of negotiating did not protect him from being physically 
assaulted. Australian prisoner Private Maxwell Venables’ interview for the 
Australians at War Film Archive project described the consequences of Hunt’s 
determination to protect the sick:  
Major Hunt took more of a hiding than anybody up there. He had to find 
these troops [for the work parties] and he’d say no I haven’t got them and 
they’d come up and bash him. And he’d say, ‘I haven’t got them.’ 
Sometimes he’d fall down, they’d kick him and Major Hunt took a lot of 
bashings up there for us. He saved us. 159   
 
Lance Corporal Erwin Heckendorf’s memories of Hunt’s self-sacrificial leadership 
style are similar. He described his memories to Hank Nelson and Gavin McCormack:  
 
He was [a] fantastic man. He took bashings from the Japs and took abuse. 
They’d come along and want to pull men out of the hospital to take them 
to work. He’d try and stop them.160 
 
The 2/10th battalion history remarks that Hunt ‘was always eager to seize on any 
excuse to stop his men working.’161 For example, when cholera struck the Australians 
at Lower Songkurari, like Fagan, Hunt used the Japanese fear of the disease to his 
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advantage.162 He called a meeting with Fukuda who agreed that all construction work 
should stop on the railway until the disease was under control. This concession, 
however, only lasted three days.163 Fukuda then returned to his practice of demanding 
sick men fill the quotas for working parties.164 Despite Hunt’s best efforts, 210 
prisoners contracted cholera. Of these men 101 prisoners died: that constituted 47 
percent of all the prisoners in Hunt’s camp.165  
 
Hunt’s sense of responsibility for the men prompted him to leave the camp, sometimes 
without permission, in an attempt to gain vital supplies for his formal group.166 The 
trek was not easy, as Kappe recorded in his official report on F Force. 
 
On occasion Major Hunt walked to NIEKE and returned with medical 
stores and special diet food. The loads of these stores, which he carried 
through rain and mud, were far beyond the physical capabilities of the 
average man and would have deterred any but the most determined. 167  
 
On one occasion, when he was accompanied by Major N. Johnson, Hunt used his time 
out of base camp to demand an interview with Colonel Banno, who was in charge of 
the POW camps in the sector.168 During this meeting, Banno was handed a written 
complaint regarding the conditions and treatment of the men in the camp, and the lack 
of basic food and medical supplies that the Japanese provided for the prisoners. 
According to the 2/10th battalion history, Hunt demanded that the report be forwarded 
to the Red Cross in Switzerland.169 
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On his way back to his base camp, Hunt would ‘beg, borrow or steal’170 any medical 
supplies that he could. The 2/10th battalion history describes how Hunt usually arrived 
back in camp with ‘three or four… haversacks [of supplies] over his shoulder.’171 
Because Hunt often undertook these journeys without Japanese permission, when he 
returned to camp he was beaten.172 Hunt’s willingness to repeatedly engage in this 
behaviour, knowing full well the personal cost, demonstrated his willingness to accept 
the consequences of risky behaviour if it gave his men the chance to survive.   
 
Like Dunlop, Hunt expected his men to reciprocate his self-sacrificial leadership style 
by looking after each other. When his men broke this agreement, Hunt interpreted this 
behaviour as a personal affront. Captain J. Dillon’s report on the conditions in 
Thailand described one incident at the Lower Songkuari Camp.173 At the height of the 
cholera outbreak, Hunt discovered that some of the ‘fit’ men were engaging in the 
theft and black marketing of food products that were meant for the sick. Hunt was 
livid. He had worked hard to get more basic food supplies into camp for the men, and 
he had personally paid the price by putting his body on the line for their essential 
needs. Hunt gathered all the ‘fit’ prisoners and bluntly explained that there could be no 
greater crime than stealing food from men who would surely die if they did not receive 
it. In contrast to Dunlop who faced a similar problem, Hunt threatened corporal 
punishment to any man who continued to engage in such behaviour. Most of the men 
stopped this behaviour. Private O’Rourke, however, did not. Hunt acted on his threat. 
The entire ‘fit’ prisoner population was ordered to gather on parade. Hunt then 
explained why he had to punish O’Rourke:  
 
I told them I regarded it was my duty to get as many sick home alive to 
Great Britain and Australia as possible and that I would not permit any 
selfish actions as that of O’Rourke to prevent me from doing so.174   
 
                                                          
170 ibid. 
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172 ibid., pp.137-138.    
173 B. Hunt, Notes for F Force Report, pp.1-2, AWM 3DRL/3517, Folder 2.   
174 ibid., p.2.   
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In front of the entire parade, O’Rourke received 20 strokes with a cane on his 
backside. Captains Walker and Roberts, two officers who supported Hunt in his 
administration of the camp, administered the punishment. Hunt’s report explained that 
as a result of this public punishment, discipline in the camp ‘improved considerably’ 
and black marketing ‘practically disappeared.’175 The Japanese officers also respected 
Hunt’s heavy-handed punishment, and rewarded him with more regular food supplies 
for the men. Hunt’s report, however, did not regard the Japanese reaction, or the 
improvements in discipline, as the most important outcome of this event. Rather, it 
was the approval of his tough punishment by the majority of the men. He wrote: ‘I was 
told afterwards by many hundreds of men that they regarded my actions as having 
been very well justified in the interests of the camp.’176  
 
On 26 June 1943, Lieutanant Tanio, the Japanese MO at Lower Songkurari Camp, 
announced that a hospital would be established for F Force prisoners at Tambaya, 
about 50 kilometres from Thanbyzayat in Burma.177 This announcement was not a 
surprise to Hunt. He, in fact, had been suggesting it to Tanio for quite some time. 
Tanio also announced that Hunt would be in charge of the hospital. Therefore on 1 
August 1943, Hunt left Lower Songkurari camp. Hunt knew that it would be a struggle 
for sick prisoners to reach the hospital, so en route to the hospital’s location, he set up 
staging camps for the sick. However, the Japanese guards escorting them beat any man 
who fell behind. This behaviour, combined with the appalling conditions and sickness 
of the men, meant that when the first party reached the hospital, they were less the 46 
men who had died on the journey.  
 
The conditions at Tamabaya Hospital were not much better than at Hunt’s original 
camp. There were dire shortages of food and medical supplies, and no light or 
water.178 Only non-infectious cases were allowed in the hospital, which meant most 
prisoners were suffering from diseases associated with malnutrition, such as 
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and Memories, p.138. 
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beriberi.179 At first, the death rate was extremely high. Between 1 August and 24 
November 1943, nearly 700 patients died. Of these men 45 percent were British and 
21 percent were Australian. The survival rate increased when Hunt managed to 
negotiate with A Force’s Hospital, which was close by, to buy food supplies on a daily 
basis.180  
 
Throughout his time at Tamabaya Hospital, Hunt became not only a leader of 
Australians but also of British patients, medical orderlies and doctors. His 
determination in the face of Japanese cruelty, his negotiation techniques and above all 
his kindness to his patients, earned him universal acknowledgement as a leader who 
brought hope to the helpless.181  
 
Hunt’s followership 
The writings and recollections of men from F Force who were located either at Hunt’s 
camps or hospital describe him in glowing terms. Signaller James Ling referred to him 
as a ‘wonderful’ and ‘magnificent’ man.182 Cahill called him ‘extraordinary’183 even if 
he was ‘arrogant’.184 Private Donald Wall remarked ‘he was hard to match’,185 while 
Captain W. Nankervis proclaimed him a ‘saint.’186 
 
The prisoners praised Hunt’s unflinching, stubborn stance with the Japanese and his 
courage in enduring continuous assaults on their behalf.187 Drummond believed that 
Hunt’s willingness to stand up to the Japanese was the reason for the few precious 
concessions made by the captor. For example at Tamabaya Hospital,  
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He [Hunt] soon got into his stride annoying the japs [sic] for more food, 
better dressings, drugs, you name it. Hunt asked for it. They dished out 
physical punishment, Hunt took their bashings and then repeated his 
request. After the easy targets they’d been [hitting]… men like Hunt was 
[sic] a complete enigma to them. They gave in because they couldn’t 
win.188 
 
Drummond was not alone in thinking that Hunt’s success with the Japanese was the 
result of his refusal to give in to their demands, irrespective of the personal costs. 
Gilbert and Cahill’s recollections also attribute Hunt’s success to his courage.189 
Private Walter Holding believed that Hunt’s physical stature, combined with his 
courage, helped him achieve some concessions from the Japanese. In his interview 
with the Australians at War Film Archive project Holding explained that Hunt  
 
… was a big bloke. He was about 6 feet 2 but big physically in every way 
and he’d bark at those bloody Nips. Go crook and half of them were 
frightened of him, I’m bloody sure of it. He used to have some 
arguments.190 
 
Although Dunlop used similar tactics, he failed to achieve any real concessions for his 
men. Hunt, on the other hand, did. For example Lieutenant Norman Clayton, who was 
an orderly or ward master under Hunt at Lower Songkurari, recalled one occasion 
when Hunt’s courage allowed him to bargain with Lieutenant Fukuda to gain extra 
medical supplies for the men.  
 
Major Hunt endeavoured to discuss the issue but Fukuda had worked 
himself into a terrible rage, and his reply was to knock the Major down 
into the mud. Undeterred, Bruce Hunt rose on one knee and told Fukuda 
he would have more men for work if he would supply quinine for the 
treatment of malaria. Fukuda, taken aback by the sudden directness of 
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reply from Major Hunt, agreed to allow an officer with a guard to go that 
day and bring back a haversack full of quinine tablets.191  
 
Quinine was a vital drug for all doctors on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Hunt also 
managed to reduce the number of prisoners required for construction work from 1300 
to 1220 over two shifts at the height of the cholera outbreak in May 1943.192 With 88 
men in hospital, 327 unfit for duty, 70 assigned to light duties and 250 men and 
officers on camp duties, including those establishing vital hygiene and sanitation 
requirements to stop cholera from spreading, any concessions in Japanese demands for 
workers could save lives.193 
 
Like Dunlop, Hunt also refused to allow his men to intervene on his behalf when he 
was being punished. For example, during the initial march from Bampong, Hunt found 
himself in charge of 60 Australians.194 During a transit stop at U Battalion’s camp at 
Tarsau, Hunt arranged with the Japanese medical orderly for 27 of his sickest men to 
remain behind. When the party was paraded, however, the Japanese corporal refused 
to allow these men to stay. In full view of Captain Reginald William James Newton 
and Dunlop, Hunt placed himself between these sick prisoners and their guards. With 
horror, Newton and Dunlop watched as the Australian interpreter, Captain C. Wild, 
and then Hunt were brutally bashed.195 Dunlop’s diaries note that this bashing was 
particularly savage and it seemed to Dunlop, noting Hunt’s past injuries, that this had 
become a common occurrence.196 Lying on the ground, and still being kicked, Hunt 
saw some of his men break ranks. He screamed out to them. ‘Keep out of this you 
bastards! This is a private fight.’197  
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The writings and recollections of the prisoners emphasise the way Hunt treated his 
patients with kindness and dignity. For example, the 2/10th battalion history recorded:   
 
A memory of Bruce Hunt stands out in the minds of many, himself 
exhausted and recently beaten, but visiting the sick, pausing to place a 
hand gently on a feverish forehead and murmuring in his beautiful voice, 
‘poor old boy, God rest his soul.’198 
Hunt could be direct with his patients when he thought they were not trying to live, 
giving them one of his ‘pep talks’.199 In these talks, Hunt used the loyalty that he had 
attained from his followership to try and influence despondent and sick men not to 
give into the darkness, but to fight for the future that awaited them back at home. What 
Hunt was really doing was bullying these men into surviving. This bullying approach 
was evident when he first arrived at Lower Songkurari. He found a disorganised camp, 
one overwhelmed doctor, Cahill, and no hygiene measures put in place to control the 
spread of the infection. After surveying the scene, Hunt gathered the prisoners and 
gave them a pep talk:  
 
Now you’ve just got to pull together and get together if you want to live. 
Your only chance of getting back to Australia is if you do what I tell you... 
The first thing that you’ll do is get all this earth off the ground here and 
we’ll get this camp going. Who can do this? 200  
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According to Cahill, the reaction of the men was extraordinary. They understood that 
this man offered them a chance to get home and they did as he asked. Captain Norman 
Couch’s letter addressed to Hunt, written on 16 December 1945 after he arrived home, 
reveals just how much influence Hunt had had on his survival and the nature of Hunt’s 
pep talks. He wrote,   
 
Your actions throughout that trying period defy comparison with those of 
your senior officers…I shan’t forget who obtained more than sufficient 
volunteers to work in a cholera compound…nor shall I quickly forget the 
Major Hunt, who was in the darkness of a rainy Thailand evening, when 
death faced hundreds of men cold, hungry and without a place to sleep 
much less a keep dry [and who] cheered him loudly after he had abused 
them foully and called them bastards. Words could not convey what joy 
you gave, what life you gave to hundreds of starving, desperate, dying and 
semi-frantic men.201 
 
Hunt’s followership did not break when he left the men at Lower Songkuari to go to 
Tamabaya Hospital. This loyalty reveals the intensity of the bond forged between 
Hunt and his men.202 Instead of feeling abandoned or betrayed by him, the prisoners 
accepted Hunt’s reason for leaving: patients needed him.203 Kappe, who had been 
unofficially replaced by Hunt as positional leader at Lower Songkuari, attempted to 
resume the duties that he had chosen to push aside for the sake of his own survival.204 
This change in leadership only served to confirm for the men the true value of Hunt’s 
leadership. The men from his formal group at Lower Songkuari Camp and at 
Tamabaya Hospital were adamant that Hunt’s leadership allowed them to survive the 
horrors of the Burma-Thailand Railway.205  
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After the war, only Dunlop and Hunt were officially acknowledged for their services, 
with both men receiving OBEs.206 In his later life, Dunlop became the iconic doctor of 
the Burma-Thailand Railway. His public persona became the story of all doctors who 
treated patients in inhumane conditions and who were willing to practice a self-
sacrificial style of leadership for the sake of their formal group. Yet, of the three 
professional leaders on the Burma-Thailand Railway examined in this chapter, Dunlop 
was, initially, the least successful in achieving his leadership goal of protecting his 
patients against the captor. Dunlop struggled to protect his patients when he was both 
both their positional leader and their doctor. His uncompromising negotiation 
technique aggravated the captor and on several occasions Dunlop’s angry responses to 
Japanese demands led to a sweep of the hospital lines for patients to work with the 
construction working parties. Dunlop openly acknowledged in his writings that once 
McEachern took over positional responsibilities in his camp he had more success in 
protecting his patients from the Japanese in his leadership capacity as a doctor. 
McEachern had a calming influence on both Dunlop and the Japanese Commandant, 
and the officers in the camp worked with Dunlop to protect the sick prisoners. Hunt 
and Fagan, however, functioned as both the MO and the default positional leader. 
Hunt, acting in both roles, had more success in manipulating his Commandant into 
vital concessions that protected some of his patients – once he had endured the 
physical beatings. Although the sources on Fagan are more limited, they suggest that 
he was as successful as Hunt.  
 
Irrespective of the degree of success each of these professional leaders had, their 
example inspired and shaped the behavioural responses of some of the officers and 
other ranks in this volatile captive setting. Their behaviour offered a model for these 
men to follow, albeit on a smaller scale. How they did so is examined in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8: GROUP, POSITIONAL AND EMERGENT SELF-SACRIFICIAL 
LEADERSHIP IN VOLATILE AND EXTREME CAPTIVE SETTINGS 
 
This chapter continues the examination of self-sacrificial leadership in the Pacific 
Theatre by extending the analysis beyond the MOs to other positional, professional 
and emergent leaders in the volatile conditions on the Burma-Thailand Railway and 
the extreme captive setting of Borneo. It concludes with the case of Australian 
Corporal Rodney Breavington, whose act of self-sacrificial leadership did not occur in 
either Thailand or Borneo, but at Changi.   
 
Positional leaders of working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway  
The survival of men working on the construction of the railway depended on their 
working party’s positional leader’s style. Normally, warrant officers, NCOs or 
prisoners appointed as acting in these ranks were placed in charge of Australian 
working parties.1 Small in number, most officers attached to the Work Forces studied 
in this thesis (D, H, F and Dunlop Forces) were allocated to camp duties. Some 
officers, however, chose to accompany their men on working parties.2 Hank Nelson 
concluded that this choice reflected their sense of duty to the men.3 
 
Depending on whether the officer had come from Changi, Java or Borneo, the officers 
who volunteered to accompany men on the working parties had very different 
perceptions of what they would have to do to protect their men. Most of the officers 
from the Australian Battalions of D and F Work Forces had come from the relatively 
stable captive setting of Changi. They assumed that their rank authority would protect 
them and their men on the construction site and they joined working parties thinking 
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that they would act as a ‘protective foreman.’4 In contrast, the Australian prisoners 
who had been captured in Borneo and Java had experienced the realities of Japanese 
captivity.5   
 
The Changi officers who had volunteered to lead the working parties, quickly 
discovered that rank offered no protection for themselves. They were treated like any 
other prisoner and were forced to work on the railway construction.6 In these 
circumstances, it became clear that to have any chance of protecting their men against 
the captor, officers had to have the courage and stamina to endure violence. Some 
officers made the choice to put the safety of the men above their own. For example 
Private Alexander Hatton Drummond recalled how his working party leader, Flight 
Lieutenant Don Dewey, seemed almost at ease with the responsibility of protecting the 
men. Dewey even sought out the most sick and vulnerable men for his working party. 
Drummond wrote:    
 
Dewey was the type of man you meet all too seldom in life. A handsome 
young man he remained, even in the mud of Thailand, always immaculate. 
He was kind, brave, considerate and completely overawed the Japs. The 
way he bluffed the Japs was an object lesson. He actually sought sick men 
for his WP and usually had 6 to 7 men to boil the billy, he stood up to the 
Jap bashing and appeared completely unconcerned by them.7  
 
Dewey’s selection of sick men for the working party was an attempt to protect them 
from hard labour. He assigned these men light duties, such as boiling the billy, despite 
knowing that he would receive a beating from the captor. Dewey, who had seen Hunt 
in action in base camp, most likely modelled his leadership style on Hunt’s example.  
Other working party leaders did not have Dewey’s élan, yet shared his sense of 
responsibility for their men. F Force survivor Sergeant Donald Moore remembered 
one such man.   
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There was one officer I knew who was dedicated to duty. He knew that 
was expected of him; he was an officer. He did have moral fibre. But he 
visibly shook when nervous, and he still did his job. Sometimes he was 
ineffectual, sometimes he made it. I remember him physically putting 
himself between the Japanese and some of the boys, realising that he could 
probably have stayed aloof, but he got into that situation which meant he 
copped it. He would be visibly shaking, but he did it.8 
 
Private Clifford Morris, a member of D Force Q, Battalion, explained to Nelson the 
psychological importance of having an officer who stuck by the men on their working 
party. ‘It made an awful difference if you had officers that would have a go.’9 
However, as Nelson has argued, if leaders of a working party refused to adapt their 
leadership style to suit the conditions in which they found themselves, the guards and 
engineers paid closer attention to their group.10 Any prisoner identified as being at risk 
of falling behind his work quota generally led to beatings for both the prisoners and 
also the working party leader. This extra attention could also lead to collective 
punishment for all prisoners in the working party, including an increase in each man’s 
quota and the suspension of any rest or meal breaks.   
 
The majority of working party leaders, however, were not officers. Yet, they faced the 
same dilemma. For a prisoner in charge of a working party to be accepted as a 
legitimate leader, he had to find the right balance between what was considered 
acceptable intervention on his part to protect his group members and the level of 
intervention which would lead the captor to punish them, the weaker workers and 
impose collective punishments on the entire group.11 It became a matter of trial and 
error.  
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Petty Officer Raymond Edward Parkin led a working party that originally consisted of 
30 men that was then increased to 50.12 These prisoners came from O, P and S 
Battalions of Dunlop Force at Hintok Mountain Camp. He tried different tactics to 
ease the physical demands the Japanese guards and engineers placed on his men. 
Through trial and error, Parkin discovered that the tone of his voice when he addressed 
his men allowed him to manipulate his guards. He wrote:  
 
As number 1 I am expected to drive the men for the Japanese. So I yell at 
the men in rough overbearing manner and the nips [sic] think I am 
‘yuroskui’ (good) number one. But the Japs don’t know that what I am 
yelling at the men is a string of awful insults about our bosses and their 
ways, what we think of them and what we would like to do with them, but 
it has practical results, for when I ask for a man to be allowed to yasume 
[rest] sometimes they allow it.13 
 
When his men were most in need of his protection, however, Parkin discovered that 
this tactic did not always work. On one shift, when two of his men collapsed with 
malaria and another prisoner was suspected of having cholera, Parkin launched into a 
verbal tirade against his guards in an attempt to allow these sick men to go back to 
camp.14 Like his positional leader, Dunlop, Parkin was persistent, despite a violent 
response:   
 
I haggled with the nip [sic] corporal all afternoon to be allowed to send 
them back. He roared and swung at me with whatever he had in his hand at 
the time – shovel, bamboo or hammer- but I moved discreetly and none of 
the blows fell solidly.15 
 
It was not until some hours later that the guards finally relented. However, they would 
not let ‘healthy’ workers help the sick prisoners back to camp.16 Parkin watched the 
two prisoners with malaria provide stumbling support for the man suspected of having 
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cholera, until the burden became too much and all men collapsed to the ground. The 
two men with malaria crawled towards shelter. It was not until hours later that the 
suspected cholera case was carried back to camp on a stretcher carried by medical 
orderlies. 
 
In a trial and error system it was inevitable that not all of the tactics used by men in 
charge of working parties were successful. When they failed it was inevitable that 
physical punishment would follow. For example, Private Roy Mudiman’s writings 
describe what happened to his NCO who pushed the guards too far in his attempt to 
gain more rest breaks for his men.  
 
Sgt French received a devilish beating for insisting on a smoko. He was 
belted and kicked in the privates until he collapsed. They then laid the boot 
in, jumping on him every now and then.17 
 
The choice of men in charge of working parties to continually attempt to negotiate for 
their men, knowing that if they got the balance between making demands and 
conceding to the captor’s authority wrong they risked a severe beating, allowed them 
to become legitimate leaders of their small formal groups. Single acts of courage, 
whilst acknowledged and deeply appreciated by the men, were not the actions of a 
leader. Instead leadership could only be attained through a continual pattern of self-
sacrificial behaviour for the purpose of negotiating better conditions for the prisoners 
at work.   
 
Parkin’s leadership extended beyond the construction site to the base camp where he 
encouraged the development of close bonds between the men by encouraging them to 
tell the group their life stories, bonds that Parkin described as a ‘little spirit de corps of 
a tattered sort’.18 When more officers and NCOs were transferred to Hintok River 
camp, Parkin was removed from his position as a working party leader.19 Parkin was 
relieved at no longer having this difficult responsibility. His men, however, were 
                                                          
17 Mudiman, Diary 28 May 1943.  
18 Parkin, Into the Smother, p.167. 
19 ibid., pp.160-172.  
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openly disappointed by the news: ‘My chaps cut up rough about it.’20 The men’s 
reactions demonstrate the followership that he had acquired, a followership based on a 
consistent pattern of behaviour and his men’s belief that his leadership choices were 
based on his group’s best interests rather than his own survivorship. 
 
Parkin, of course, was not unique. After the war, for example, General Army 
Headquarters received a letter from men of the 2/19th Battalion who were attached to 
D Force U Battalion praising the leadership of Acting Warrant Officer Desmond 
Malcahy.  
 
He [Malcahy] imparted to all under his command the example of 
determination set to himself and this will to win is all that carried many 
our troops safely through the misery and suffering of prisoner of war life. 
For a warrant officer to have retained such a high standard of discipline 
among his own troops, whilst at the same time commanding the respect of 
the severe and often inconsiderate Nippon authorities… [embodied] 
leadership, courage, honesty and devoted attention to the comfort of his 
troops.21 
 
It is an apt summary of the men, who, irrespective of rank, became legitimate leaders 
of their working parties. 
 
Emergent leadership within working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway 
Not all appointed leaders were capable of making the sacrifices evident in the case 
studies discussed above. When they failed, emergent leaders from within the smaller 
formal group came to the forefront. 
 
In 1989, Donald Wall, a survivor of F Force, interviewed Gunner Owen Colin 
Campbell and Bombardier Richard ‘Dick’ Braithwaite, two survivors of the Sandakan 
marches to Ranau. Braithwaite explained that in his extreme captive environment, 
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when a positional leader chose not to protect his men, or his attempts to do so did not 
work, some men within the same formal group chose to help each other. These men 
became emergent leaders. ‘They would have come up like mushrooms. [It] only stands 
to reason that when the situation arises they were up.’22 Donald Wall agreed with 
Braithwaite’s observations. He explained that the same experience occurred in 
working parties on the Burma-Thailand Railway when the positional leader reverted 
from his responsibilities in order to protect himself. He said:  
 
The experience sorts the men from the boys. There were pathetic NCOs 
and officers [and] other ranks that came to the top as far as leadership was 
concerned. It was a just a natural thing to happen. Various blokes emerged 
as leaders.23 
 
The memoirs and statements of other POWs corroborate Wall’s claim. Some men put 
the needs of others, particularly the weaker, sick and more vulnerable prisoners, in 
front of their own, making this their intuitive behavioural pattern. These men, deeply 
respected for their self-sacrificial leadership style, acquired followership from their 
group who trusted that they would do all that he could to protect them from further 
harm.   
 
For Private Stanley Francis Denning, a prisoner attached to H Force, it was Private 
George Edward Cubby. On the march from Bampong to Malaya Hamlet, Cubby 
looked for prisoners who were struggling to carry their packs.24 These men would then 
hear ‘Cubby will help.’25 The phrase became one of hope for men who were close to 
collapsing.   
 
Lance Corporal Alan Michael Middleton’s decision to protect not only the weaker 
prisoners but also all members of his working party enabled him to become a 
legitimate emergent leader. Privates James William Bernard Haskell recalled:  
 
                                                          
22 Interview with R. Braithwaite and O. Campbell conducted by D. Wall, 24 May 1989, tape 1, AWM 
S04102. 
23 Interview with K. Botterill conducted by D. Wall, no date, tape 10, AWM S04080.  
24 Denning, ‘Memoirs of Private S.F Denning,’ pp.54-55. 
25 ibid.  
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Middy was always on the hammer and tap. He would select the weakest 
of the party to hang on to the bit while he did the hammering. When we 
kicked off it was a meter a day that had to be sunk in the type of stone up 
there on the cutting. It gradually increased until it was three metres a day, 
which was way above the capacity of a lot of men. This was where 
Middy really came into his own. He’d be clobbering holes and giving his 
tally over to other people and he’d just rouse around like a chook 
mothering her hens and work to make sure that the weakest were getting 
their quota and this protected them from being bashed.26 
 
Sometimes the selfless behaviour of one member of a working party to protect weak 
prisoners transformed the collective behaviour of the entire working party. For this to 
occur, the selfless behaviour of one POW had to be accepted as the legitimate acts of a 
leader by the formal group. Then, the followership that this leader earned through his 
actions enabled his behaviour to become the new code of conduct amongst the group. 
Bombardier Tom Uren achieved this. Attached to Dunlop Force, Uren modelled a 
selfless behaviour pattern of looking after sick and weak prisoners.27 As one of the 
larger men on the work site, he considered that this was his responsibility. In time, 
Uren’s behaviour became the normal response of the more physically able prisoners in 
his working party, even if, at first, he had to constantly remind his men that this was 
the expected practice within his working party.   
 
I also made sure that the other big blokes did their share. I just said 
‘Listen, come on, we’ve got to help so and so, he’s a bit crook’. I would 
try to protect the bloke who was bit smaller or who wasn’t quite so well. 
We always knew who was genuinely crook and would try to help as best 
we could.28 
 
Gunner Russell Braddon’s writings also demonstrate that self-sacrificial group 
behaviour evident in the example above occurred within smaller group structures in 
                                                          
26 B. Haskell cited in Adam-Smith, Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea, p.421. 
27 Uren, Straight Left, pp.27, 34.  
28 ibid., p.27. 
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working parties. In Thailand, when Braddon was separated from his mates,29 he 
retreated into himself, convinced that he could survive on his own. However, the 
physical demands of the forced labour on the working parties, combined with a lack of 
food, soon meant that he was suffering from beriberi. Unable to reach his work quota 
on his own, Braddon latched onto a group of Australians within his assigned working 
party, who without asking any questions, allowed him to work with them. Braddon’s 
writings explain how important their decision to let him into their group became. 
 
In truth, things would have gone very badly for me had it not been for the 
generous help of the men. At all times they covered up for me so that the 
guards did not realise how slowly I worked. And when they had finished 
their own quota of work then they would do mine too.30 
 
Braddon’s new informal group gave him a chance to survive. One man in particular, 
who Braddon refers to as ‘Snowy Bernard’,31 helped him the most to cope with his 
work tasks. Bernard was always partnered with Braddon on the worksite.32 When 
both men were carrying wood or bamboo back to camp, Braddon often collapsed 
under the weight of his load. When this happened Bernard kept going onto camp and 
then came back to carry Braddon’s load and help him to walk back to camp.  
 
Braddon’s new group continued to protect him, even after his behaviour compromised 
their relationship. Braddon, waking up shaking with fever, was told by his group to 
stay resting in the tent and that they would work his quota for him. Braddon soon ran 
out of boiled water. A mate, Jimmy, had left a full bottle in camp. Braddon’s writings 
recall what happened next:  
 
Five minutes later I had furtively uncorked that bottle. I knew what I was 
doing. I was stealing water, more precious than gold, from a man who at 
that moment was doing my work. Breaking the one hard and fast rule – 
                                                          
29 Braddon, The Naked Island, pp.184, 189, 191, 193. 
30 ibid., p.193. 
31 ibid.  
32 ibid., pp.193-194, 201-202. 
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that every man is responsible for providing his own water. I drank a 
mouthful.33 
 
When Jimmy returned that night, Braddon confessed. To his amazement, Jimmy 
understood: ‘For a moment Jimmy was silent – “that’s the trouble with the bug makes 
you mighty thirsty”’.34 Jimmy then offered Braddon the rest of his water, collected the 
cans the prisoners used to collect and then boil water, and walked half a mile to the 
waterhole to replenish not only his own drink bottle, but Braddon’s as well.35  
 
With trial and error, and time, the men in charge of working parties came to 
understand that what they needed was astute judgement to interpret the particular 
circumstances in which they found themselves, as well as adaptability, negotiating 
skills, perseverance and a significant amount of luck, combined with courage and 
resilience in order to find the right balance referred to earlier. These characteristics 
were essential qualities for men to become legitimate leaders of the working parties. 
Nelson described the process as an exercise in ‘fine judgement.’36  
 
Nelson argued that it was the ‘exceptional officer’ who evolved into a leader in the 
volatile captive setting of the Burma-Thailand Railway.37 To survive, this officer had 
to have ‘the presence, the command of language, and the tolerance of pain to keep 
pressing the men’s cases against the Japanese.’38 However, it is clear from the case 
studies that this characterisation applied to all leaders of the working parties who 
attempted to strike this balance, irrespective of rank. And, as the examples of Uren and 
Braddon demonstrate, self-sacrificial leadership could inspire a collective sense of 
self-sacrifice within the group itself.  
 
Chaplains on the Burma-Thailand Railway  
In times of training and war, the responsibilities of military chaplains can broadly be 
described as spiritual and moral. They perform religious ministries and provide advice 
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to men who seek their help. Some men who regularly attend services, and who may 
ask for, and listen to, their advice, try to integrate the chaplain’s teachings into their 
everyday lives. When this occurs, for this individual the chaplain becomes a legitimate 
leader. The ability of a chaplain to become a leader is, therefore, based on the faith of 
the individual and the importance the individual places on the chaplain’s role in 
influencing his ideals and behaviour.     
 
The same distinction between men who saw chaplains as leaders and those who only 
viewed them as men providing a professional service existed in captivity.39  In 
relatively stable camps in the Pacific and Europe, such as Changi and Stalag Luft III, 
chaplains largely assumed a passive role. In Changi chaplains were mostly separated 
from the ranks, but provided religious services and were available to offer advice for 
those who wanted it.40 Simon Mackenzie explained that in Stalag Luft camps, 
chaplains gave advice and prayer services to those prisoners who wanted them.41 In 
the volatile captive setting of the Burma-Thailand Railway, however, chaplains had 
the potential to play a vital psychological role for men trying to cope with fear, 
exhaustion, sickness and violence. For the men who sought comfort in religious rituals 
and teachings of hope, compassion and mercy, chaplains, through their words and 
actions, could provide spiritual comfort and in some cases, a living example of how to 
withstand the hardships of this volatile captive environment with dignity. For some 
prisoners, that proved to be the case and the chaplains, for them, moved from a 
professional role to a leadership role.   
 
The willingness of chaplains to continually perform their professional duty within the 
volatile conditions of captivity on the Burma-Thailand Railway was a different form 
of self-sacrificial leadership. These men did not offer their bodies, for example, as 
protection for sick prisoners. Instead they offered moral strength to men seeking to 
                                                          
39 For examples of this perception of chaplains see Anonymous, untitled and unpublished papers, pp.88-
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cope with their inhumane circumstances for the duration of their time in Thailand. 
These men, therefore, sacrificed their own psychological wellbeing to try and help 
exhausted men find the strength to keep going, tried to comfort sick men and 
attempted to bring some form of peace to prisoners who were dying.  
 
In the writings and recollections of prisoners who worked in D, F and H Force, two 
Australian men who worked as chaplains fulfil the criteria of self-sacrificial 
leadership. Only one, however, was officially a chaplain.   
 
Australian Chaplain Major Lionel Thomas Marsden was attached to H Force.42 From 
his arrival at Bampong, Marsden realised that his contribution was needed to help the 
men endure the ninety mile march to Malaya Hamlet.43 Like MO Kevin James Fagan, 
Marsden offered not only encouraging words but also practical help to the men. 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes, Marsen ‘was up and down the 
line, cheering the men, carrying their burdens, helping in the medical treatment, acting 
as a true padre, unsparing in his selflessness.’44 Marsden explained that he felt 
compelled to do this because his status as a chaplain at Changi had protected him from 
physical labour.45 Marsden, like the other chaplains in Changi, was also permitted to 
draw extra rations. Marsden knew the men were not as lucky. Many of them were 
already weak, sick and vulnerable to exhaustion. In his report, Marsden explained that 
his actions on the march were one practical way he could fulfil his duties.46 To men 
struggling to put one foot in front of the other, kind words of encouragement and his 
practical help were not only appreciated but were also acknowledged as the actions of 
a leader.47    
 
Originally Marsden was attached to Konyu Number 2 Camp. During the day, when the 
men were out at work, Marsden assisted the medical staff in their duties and offered 
comfort to the sick.48 At night, when the men returned, he usually offered a prayer 
                                                          
42 Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.3. 
43 ibid., p.2. 
44 Oakes, ‘Singapore Story,’ p.319.   
45 Marsden, Report of the Work of Chaplain with H Force, p.1.  
46 ibid.  
47 For example see Clarke, A Life for Every Sleeper, p.45; Goodwin, Mates and Memories, pp.140-141; 
Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.582. 
48 Marsden, Report of the work of a Chaplain with H Force, p.1.  
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service for them. In the middle of June, the Japanese Commandant in charge of H 
Force gave Marsden permission to visit the nine other H Force camps.49 This 
coincided with the outbreak of cholera. 50 His report explained that most of his days 
were spent ‘giving religious services, visiting the sick and, where necessary, giving the 
last rites to the dying.’51 This daily routine continued until 21 August when H Force 
had finished its construction work.52 Despite his regular interaction with the sick, 
Marsden’s own health remained ‘good.’53 He credited this to the positional leaders in 
all the camps he visited making sure that he received the necessary rations to sustain 
him in his work. By providing spiritual guidance and comfort for the sick and dying, 
Marsden was recognised as a leader for men who had faith or recognised the 
symbolism of his office.54   
 
Marsden was humble in describing the personal cost of his work. His final comment in 
his report stated: ‘I had the most satisfying duty that any man could wish for and to be 
able to do it was a full compensation for any demands that were made of me.’55 
Despite his self-effacing tone, his duty must have placed great emotional and physical 
strain on him. Unlike the doctors who had skills to use to heal the sick, Marsden’s 
work demanded a more personal and arguably emotional cost. For three months of his 
time in Thailand, his days consisted of trying to bring humanity and compassion to 
desperate exhausted men, hoping that his words would in some way ease their burden. 
This was the easier part of his job. Marsden also administered the ritual of the last rites 
to the dying, trying to find some way to give peace to these men in their final hours 
knowing that soon he would be consecrating their graves. To perform these duties 
across all of H Force’s camps, which had one the highest mortality rates of all 
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Australian Work Forces, would have pushed Marsden to his limits.56 Writing for the 
Catholic Weekly after liberation, he gave some insight into what that meant.  
In no time cholera was raging. It was quite a common thing for the 
commanding officer, a few others and myself to go to the cemetery at 9 
a.m. and dig a grave for one man. By 10 o'clock a messenger would come 
to say that another cholera patient had been taken to hospital. Leaving my 
pick and shovel I would return to the camp give the Last Sacraments, if 
the lad was a Catholic, and if not, say with him acts of Faith, Hope and 
Charity, Contrition and an act of love of God. Then back to the cemetery 
to help increase the size of the grave.57 
 
Denning described Marsden as ‘a tower of strength to each and everyone.’58 The 
number of attendees at Marsden’s final service reflected the level of his followership. 
Denning wrote, ‘Anyone who could walk, crawl or be carried [attended].’59 At this 
service Marsden tried to offer words of comfort and compassion to his congregation.  
 
He prayed for us all, he prayed for the sick, he prayed for the dying and 
offered prayers for those on cholera hill, most of whom would be dead 
within a few hours. The good padre then offered prayers for our inhuman 
captors... He finished the prayers like this ‘Oh God, oh God, forgive them 
for they know not what they do.60  
 
The next day Marsden left the camp. According to Denning, Marsden’s absence 
caused despondency to creep back into the men.61  
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Australian Private Harry Thorpe’s story is different. He was not an official chaplain 
because he had only completed two years of theological studies prior to enlisting.62 
When Captain Reginald William James Newton organised the officers for U Battalion 
on D Force, he sought a chaplain willing to join them.63 Newton thought a chaplain 
would help his men cope with the hardships that Newton believed his men were bound 
to encounter. Newton only received one response from the 33 chaplains at Changi. 
However, he considered the volunteer too old to cope with what the prisoners might 
encounter in Thailand.  Knowing that Newton had not found a suitable chaplain, 
Thorpe, a private from the 29th Battalion volunteered.64 Based on his theological 
training and good health, Newton accepted Thorpe’s offer. As an unofficial chaplain 
Thorpe had to earn his leadership legitimacy without the assistance of the symbolism 
of his position, yet he did so.   
 
At Tarso, Thorpe explained to Australian and British prisoners how each of them 
could apply Christian teachings to their current circumstances. The 2/19th battalion 
history explains: ‘He was persuasive, articulate and he gave the chaps something to 
think about.’65 The willingness of men to listen to Thorpe and reflect on his words 
reveals the respect the men had for him, even in the early stages of his time as acting 
chaplain. 
 
At South Tonchan, U Battalion experienced its one and only outbreak of cholera. 
Thorpe was the only non-MO allowed to visit the cholera lines.66 In spite of the risks 
to his own health, like Marsden, Thorpe willingly accepted that his duties included 
offering comfort to the sick and dying. Thorpe’s presence in the cholera lines also 
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served a secondary purpose. Beyond providing comfort to the patients, their mates 
knew that the sick were not facing their darkest hour alone: ‘Happy Harry’67 was with 
them.68  
Thorpe’s sincerity touched not only men from U Battalion but patients and staff in the 
base hospitals at Tarso and Tamunag.69 According to Dunlop, against Japanese orders 
Thorpe, ‘jump[ed] on a barge’ to help prisoners who were being sent down the river to 
the base hospitals.70 Once he was there, Thorpe continued in his role as a chaplain, 
tending to the sick and dying, while also offering comfort to the staff. The strength of 
Thorpe’s followership at these locations is revealed in the high attendance rates at his 
services. For example, at one of his services over 1000 prisoners attended.71  
 
Thorpe’s leadership did not go unnoticed. After liberation, McEachern, the positional 
leader who took over from Dunlop at Hintok Mountain Camp, attempted to have 
Thorpe retrospectively appointed to an official chaplaincy position.72 Accompanying 
McEachern’s recommendation was a reference supplied by British Lieutenant Colonel 
A. Knight.73 Knight’s words reveal the extent to which Thorpe had become a 
legitimate leader of men in Thailand:  
 
He spared no efforts in his work and his influence on the spiritual welfare 
of the prisoners of war was evidenced by the large attendances at his 
services. His work in visiting and comforting the sick brought happiness 
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to many dangerously ill and bordering on death. Only those who have 
experience of Japanese prisoner of war camps can realise the appalling 
conditions and difficulties under which Thorpe performed his duties in 
most exemplary manner.74 
Marsden and Thorpe’s stories reveal that a chaplain could become a legitimate leader 
of men in a volatile captive setting. Their ability to do so rested on the willingness of 
men to accept their presence as a symbol of hope and comfort. Some prisoners, of 
course, could not reconcile their message of hope with the horror that surrounded 
them.75 But other men found that their presence was essential for them when coping 
with their day-to-day experiences. Despite their calm public personas, however, 
Marsden and Thorpe must have struggled with the disparity between their teachings 
and their lives as a prisoner on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Yet, they did not doubt 
the importance of their work and risked their own health to undertake their duties, 
which earned them followership.    
 
Warrant Officer John William Kinder 
At Sandakan POW camp on Borneo, Australian and British prisoners lived in a 
volatile and then extreme captive setting.76 Sandakan has provided three cases studies 
for this thesis, Captain George Robin Cook and Warrant Officers William Hector 
Sticpewich and John William Kinder. Cook and Sticpewich will be examined in the 
next chapter.  
 
In late January 1945, when the Japanese feared that that the Allies were capable of 
launching an attack to recapture Borneo, they put the Australians and British prisoners 
in Sandakan camp through hell.77 These men, divided in two groups, then subdivided 
into smaller groups, were force marched about 160 miles through the mountains to 
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Ranau.78 There was a day’s interval between the marching parties. According to 
Lynette Silver, the prisoners were told that they were being sent to a different part of 
Borneo where there would be better living conditions and more food.79 As a result, 
most men were eager to be included in the first march. Cook, the Australian positional 
leader at Sandakan, organised the marching groups and assigned the leaders for each 
group. The prisoners assigned to the first march were given a small issue of food, extra 
shorts and a shirt and, and for the prisoners who did not have footwear, rubber latex 
slip on shoes.80  
 
The promises were false. The promised food turned out to be 30 kilos of rice, reserved 
mainly for the Japanese.81 The men were expected to carry it, along with the Japanese 
officers’ gear. For the duration of the march, most prisoners survived on small 
amounts of watered rice. Men supplemented this small ration with anything they 
thought was edible from the jungle. The debilitated condition of the prisoners and 
Lieutenant General Yamawaki Masataka’s orders to move the prisoners as quickly as 
possible (which was interpreted by the Japanese officers on the march as permission to 
execute any man who fell behind) turned this forced movement through the 
mountainous jungle into a death march.82  
 
The writings and recollections of Lance Bombardier William Dick Moxham and 
Private Keith Botterill reveal that one man, who was given the responsibility by Cook 
of leading a marching column during the first march, became a self-sacrificial leader. 
Warrant Officer John William Kinder chose to put his concerns about his own 
survivorship aside in an attempt to protect the men in his group. Originally Kinder was 
responsible for the seventh group, comprising 55 Australians, including Moxham.83 
On the march, Kinder quickly learned that the promises given to them at Sandakan 
                                                          
78 The exact distance between Ranau and Sandakan POW camp is disputed. Sweeting states the 
distance as 160 miles, while Walker notes it as 140 miles. See Sweating, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ 
p.600; Walker, Middle East and Far East, p.648.  
79 Silver, Sandakan, p.188. Also see Cunningham, Hell on Earth, p.111; Ham, Sandakan, p.276. 
80 Silver, Sandakan, pp.188-189. 
81 Forbes, Hellfire, p.433; Ham, Sandakan, pp.289-293. 
82 Ham’s research reveals that the interpretation of Mastaka’s order into a directive to kill the prisoners 
was ‘vague and inconsistent’ with his meaning. See Ham, Sandakan, p.277. It is clear by their 
behaviour, however, that the Japanese soldiers on the march interpreted the order as permission to kill. 
See Cunningham, Hell on Earth, pp.110-114; Ham, Sandakan, pp.276-281. 
83 Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.5; Smith, Borneo Australia’s Proud but Tragic Heritage, 
p.128; Wall, Sandakan under Nippon, p.62. 
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were worthless. His immediate concern was what happened to the men who fell 
behind. The prisoners had been told that these men would be collected and kept in 
‘rest houses’.84 This seemed unlikely to Kinder, who had not seen any built structures 
during the early stages of the march. Kinder and the other prisoners soon realised that 
these men were being executed by their captor.85 Japanese soldiers captured after the 
Allies assumed control of Borneo testified that Captain Shoichi Yamamto, the 
commanding officer of the first march, and Captain Takuo Takakuwa, the 
commanding officer of the second march, organised execution squads to follow the 
last group of prisoners in each march.86 Determined to do all that he could to protect 
his men, Kinder began to negotiate concessions with the Japanese officer leading his 
group, Lieutenant Sugimura Shinichi.    
 
Kinder’s decision to approach Shinichi was a risk. If Shinichi objected to being 
addressed by a prisoner, and asked to give concessions to the prisoners, Kinder risked 
being physically assaulted, if not killed. This risk, however, paid off. Surprisingly, 
Kinder discovered that Shinichi was willing to negotiate with him in order to help 
keep his men alive.87  
 
In the initial stages of the march, Kinder persuaded Shinichi to allow one sick prisoner 
to return to Sandakan.88 Then, when his group had marched too far from Sandakan to 
risk sending any men back to camp because they were not physically capable of 
making the journey, and risked being caught by the execution squad, Kinder 
convinced Shinichi that the sickest men in his group should be given a head start each 
morning before the rest of the group set out on the track.89 Kinder hoped that this 
                                                          
84 Silver, Sandakan, p.188. 
85 For reference to prisoners understanding the fate of the men who fell behind on the march see 
Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.31, AWM226 Box 3(a), Item 8A; Botterill, 
War Crime Trials Statement, p.3; Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.1; Short, War Crime Trials 
Statement, p.2; Sticpewich, ‘Prelude to Sandakan – Ranau March’, ff.3, 6-7. 
86 Lieutenant Abe Kazuo led the killing squad on the first march. Lieutenant Genzo Watanabe was in 
charge of the killing squad on the second march. For reference to the formation and activities 
undertaken by these squads see Interrogations of Officers and NCOS who came over in the First Ranau 
March in February 1945, pp.1-7, AWM54 779/3/5; Record of Military Court Japanese War Criminals 
Capt. Takakawa and Capt. G. Watanabe, 3-5 January 1946, pp.1-56, AWM54 1010/3/94; Record of 
Military Court- Japanese War Criminals, Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, May 1946, pp.1-118, AWM54 
1010/3/98; Report on War Crimes Investigation British Borneo, Appendix A, p.1, AWM54 1010/1/5.  
87 Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.2; Smith, Borneo Australia’s Proud but Tragic Heritage, 
p.128.  
88 Smith, Borneo’s Australia’s Proud but Tragic Heritage, p.128.  
89 Interview with Botterill, tape 7.   
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tactic would lessen the chances of the sick men falling behind the pace of the main 
group during the day. When the men’s deteriorating physical condition meant that 
even with an earlier start men still fell behind, Kinder was sometimes given 
permission by Shinichi to retrace the group’s steps to try and find the missing 
prisoners.90 Men volunteered to accompany Kinder in his searches. The ability of 
Kinder to find volunteers to help him in this task, knowing that these men were most 
likely sick themselves and had had very little food, demonstrates that Kinder had been 
accepted as the legitimate leader of his group. His men were willing to follow his 
example, risking their own survivorship, to help others.  
 
In his post war testimony to the military court, Moxham recalled that while they were 
marching, Kinder heard the cries of a prisoner.91 Shinichi gave him permission to find 
the prisoner. Kinder found Private Roderick Richards, from the sixth marching 
group.92 This group had been ordered to carry Lieutenant Tanaka Shojuir’s boxes and 
trunks.93 These items, which required six prisoners to lift them, had been arranged on 
bamboo poles. The Formosan guards in their group were quick to beat any prisoner 
who failed to keep the pace, especially those carrying Shojuir’s possessions. Richards 
had taken exception to constantly being poked in the back. As a result of his 
insubordination, the guards tied Richards up, savagely beat him and then kicked him 
off the track into a gully.94   
 
Kinder and his volunteers assisted him back to their marching group. With the help of 
the men in Kinder’s group, Richards began walking. However, despite their efforts, 
Richards only lasted one day before, on 11 February 1945, at age 23, Richards, a 
member of the 2/10th Field Ambulance Medical Corps, died as a result of his beating 
                                                          
90 Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, pp.16-
17; Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.4.  
91 Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, pp.16-
17.  
92 There is some confusion between the sources regarding the identity of this prisoner. Silver and Smith 
have accepted that Private Roderick Richards was the prisoner who was assisted by Kinder and his men. 
However, Ham refers to this man as an unknown prisoner. See Ham, Sandakan, p.297; Silver, 
Sandakan, p.203; Smith, Borneo Australia’s Proud but Tragic Heritage, p.129.  
93 Silver, Sandakan, p.203; Smith, Borneo Australia’s Proud but Tragic Heritage, p.129. 
94 Moxham, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at Rabaul, pp.16-
17; Silver, Sandakan, pp.203-204.  
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and illness.95 For possibly the first time on the march, Kinder was faced with the harsh 
reality that he was unable to protect a man for whom he claimed responsibility. This 
feeling of powerlessness soon became Kinder’s constant companion. Moxham’s 
testimony reveals that there were at least six prisoners from his group who dropped 
out. Shinichi, on these occasions, refused to allow Kinder to find them.96     
 
The concessions that Kinder was able to negotiate with Shinichi appear to be unique. 
The men who survived the march and escaped at Ranau were unable to recall any 
other marching group leader being able to negotiate any concessions with their 
Japanese officer. Instead Botterill (group 3 of phase 1 of the first march to Paginatan), 
Private Nelson Alfred Ernest Short (group 4 of phase 2 from Paginatan to Ranau) and 
Campbell (group 5 of phase 2) only recalled the extreme violence of the Japanese 
officers and Korean guards who escorted them on the march.97  
 
In one way, therefore, Kinder was fortunate. He was assigned a Japanese officer who 
was willing to listen to him and grant concessions to help him protect his men. 
However, Kinder’s willingness to initially ask for help, and having been successful, to 
keep badgering Shinichi for more concessions for his men, is evidence of his courage, 
tenacity and dedication to his leadership goal: to keep as many men alive as possible. 
Yet even Kinder could not protect all of his men. Sickness, the arduous nature of the 
march and Shinichi’s refusal of some of Kinder’s requests took their toll. When his 
group reached the rallying point for groups 6 to 9 at Paginatan, 138 miles from 
Sandakan POW camp, only 44 of the 55 original prisoners were still with him.98 In 
                                                          
95 According to the Roll of Honour, Richards died as a result of his illness. However the circumstances 
leading to his death suggest that he may have been executed by the captor. See Photograph Description 
of NX4415 Private Roderick Moncrieff Richards, AWM P02467.026; R.M. Richards, Grave 
Registration Report, <http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-
dead/casualty/173444/RICHARDS,%20RODERICK%20MONCRIEFF>, maintained by the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, accessed on 21 February 2015; R. M. Richards, Roll of 
Honour, <http://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls/R1699969/>, maintained by the AWM, accessed on 21 
February 2015.  
96 Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.4; Lance Bombardier W. Moxham cited in Australian War 
Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.130, AWM226 Box 3(a), Item 8A.  
97 This analysis does not include the experiences of Warrant Officer Hector William Sticpewich. His 
experiences as a leader are examined in the Chapter 9. For reference to Botterill, Short and Campbell’s 
recollections of their group leaders see, Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, pp.2-3; Interrogation of 
Private Campbell who escaped from Sandakan Area British North Borneo, p.9; Short, War Crimes Trial 
Statement, pp.2-3; Interview with Botterill, tapes 1, 3, 7; Interview with K. Botterill and N. Short 
conducted by D. Wall, tape 1, AWM S04095.  
98 Moxham cited in the Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.130.    
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comparison to other groups at Paginatan, Kinder’s men suffered the lowest mortality 
rate. Group 9 had the highest with 36 percent of its members dead before they reached 
Paginatan.99  
 
At Paginatan, the Japanese ordered the prisoners to make their own camp, while also 
providing the Japanese with labour for fatigue duty.100 In total, from groups 6 to 9, 
about 170 Australian and British prisoners made it to this point alive.101 Most, 
however, were critically ill and therefore incapable of the physical labour needed to 
construct their own barracks, let alone the labour demanded by the Japanese.102 Any 
prisoner, however, who did not contribute to the construction of the camp or Japanese 
fatigues was brutally beaten. As a result, an average of four or five prisoners died at 
the beginning of their stay at this camp.103 The death rate quickly grew. After a month, 
only 60 men were still alive.104 
 
The groups were re-organised and new men were attached to Kinder’s group, 
including Botterill. Kinder continued to apply a self-sacrificial leadership style in a 
vain attempt to protect the sick and the dying in his group from further physical 
punishments. He tried to negotiate with the Japanese for more rations and less physical 
work.105 When this failed, Kinder took it upon himself to complete the labour of men 
who were too sick to even attempt it. Moxham remembered the consequences this had 
for Kinder:   
 
There was a lot of beatings there, sick and all. We had to carry and get our 
own wood, clean up the barracks. A Warrant Officer Kinder took charge of 
                                                          
99 Cunningham, Hell on Earth, pp.118-119; Silver, Sandakan, p. 204. 
100 Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.5.  
101 Cunningham, Hell on Earth, pp.118-119; Silver, Sandakan, p.204; Smith, Borneo Australia’s Proud 
but Tragic Heritage, p.130; Wall, Sandakan under Nippon, p.73. Men marching in groups 1 to 5 were 
ordered to march straight through to Ranau. In total 70 out of 265 prisoners died on this march. See 
Cunningham, Hell on Earth, p.118; R. Reid, Sandakan, 1942-1945, (Canberra: Australian Department 
of Veteran Affairs, 2008), p.29. 
102 For an overview of conditions at Paginatan see Moxham cited in the Australian War Crimes Board 
of Inquiry Report, vol.1, pp.129-130; Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, pp.2-5; Interview with NX 
19750 Lance Bombardier W. Moxham conducted by Casualty and Repository Section, 6 December 
1945, p.1, NAA:A705:166/22/357. 
103 Wall, Sandakan under Nippon, p.74.  
104 Silver, Sandakan, p.205.  
105 Moxham, War Crime Trials Statement, p.5. Also see Smith, Borneo Australia’s Proud but Tragic 
Heritage, p.130, Wall, Sandakan under Nippon, p.74. 
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us, eventually taking charge of the whole of the parties at Paginatan. He 
went up to some of the Japs and was able to get some food from some of 
them. Some of the Japs, however, would come down and beat the men and 
Kinder himself was beaten when he took somebody else’s part. He was 
belt [sic] with sticks.106 
Moxham’s testimony and his recollections suggest that Kinder never considered 
applying a different style of leadership, despite the physical consequences that it 
incurred.  
 
Even when Kinder understood that the men were not meant to survive, as he did at 
Paginatan, his commitment to his men’s survival remained unchanged. The personal 
cost of that commitment, and the strength of the followership he commanded, would 
find their quintessential expression during the march from Paginatan to Ranau.   
On this phase of the march, an Australian sergeant stopped walking.107 He taunted the 
Japanese guards, still under the command of Shinichi, to shoot him. When they did not 
listen, the prisoner begged. Botterill, who witnessed this incident, recalled that nothing 
said by Kinder, his fellow prisoners, or even Shinichi, made a difference. He has lost 
the will to live. Finally, Shinichi agreed to shoot the prisoner. However, faced with 
murdering a prisoner in cold blood, Shinichi was incapable of pulling the trigger. 
Kinder finally took the gun and shot and killed the sergeant. According to Botterill, the 
men in Kinder’s group understood why he had killed one of his own men. The 
sergeant, he said, ‘went raving mad’, he was a ‘lunatic’ who ‘went right off his head’. 
Kinder, he said, ‘had to shoot him’.108 Kinder’s group realised that this prisoner 
jeopardised the survival of the entire group. In these extreme circumstances, despite 
the horrific act he had committed, Kinder retained leadership legitimacy and 
followership from his group.    
                                                          
106 Interview with Moxham conducted by Casualty and Repository Section, p.1.  
107 Private K. Botterill cited in Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.127, AWM226 
Box 3(a), item 8A; Botterill, Testimony in the Trial of Japanese War Criminals Court no. R125 held at 
Rabaul, p.13; Botterill, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.3; Interview with Botterill, tape 7; Interview with 
Botterill and Short, tape 1; K. Botterill cited in Wall, Sandakan under Nippon, p.65. There is some 
confusion between Botterill’s recollections in his interviews and statements regarding the identity of the 
warrant officer involved in this incident. Botterill’s written statement has Warrant Officer Clive William 
Warrington as the officer in charge of this group. While in his interviews with Donald Wall, Botterill 
insists that it was Kinder. While it is impossible to discern the absolute truth behind the identity of the 
Australian warrant officer involved in this incident, in light of Kinder’s actions during the march and at 
Pagination and Ranau, it is highly probable that Kinder who was involved in this incident.  




In April 1945, Kinder and the 38 survivors from Paginatan reached Ranau.109 Here 
they found about 60 survivors from the initial marching groups 1 to 5.110 In this new 
location, Kinder still tried to protect his men. The Japanese did not make his job any 
easier, continuing to demand that prisoners perform manual labour that included 
walking back to Paginatan and carrying rice for the Japanese, which weighed about 20 
kilograms a bag, back to Ranau.111 Knowing full well the physical consequences of 
any defiance of Japanese orders, Kinder informed the guards that the prisoners refused 
to carry any more rice.112 The Japanese Commandant, Second Lieutenant Saburo 
Suzuki, refused to even consider the matter. On Anzac Day 1945, when American 
bombs fell on their camp, Kinder rushed from the makeshift prisoner hospital to find 
Suzuki.113 Screaming at him, Kinder was successful in getting Suzuki to let the 
prisoners take shelter in the air raid trenches they had dug for the Japanese. Suzuki 
also agreed to Kinder’s practical suggestion that the prisoners’ camp should be moved 
one mile into the jungle to protect them against further air raids. By this time, 46 only 
men from the first march were still alive. As Botterill recalled, the prisoners at Ranau 
considered Kinder to be their leader or ‘boss.’114   
 
                                                          
109 Between 20 and 30 POWs at Paginatan were too ill to march. Thus in the period of about a month, 
about 140 POWs died at Paginatan. See Smith, Borneo Australia’s Proud but Tragic Heritage, p.130. 
For reference to the number of men capable of marching and Kinder’s leadership see Moxham cited in 
Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry Report, vol.1, p.130; Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, 
p.5. 
110 It is believed that 350 prisoners from groups one to five in the first march made it to Ranau. This 
means that 120 prisoners died during the march. Then, when these men merged with the survivors from 
group’s six to nine from Pagination, only about 60 were alive at the end of April 1945. For reference to 
the number of prisoners that arrived from groups one to five on the first march see Interrogation report 
submitted by Captain T. Mort, OC 3 PW C and I Teams, obtained from the four Aus recovered PW ex 
RANAU, pp.1-2, AWM PR00637 Folder 1.  
 For reference to the number of survivors at Ranau upon Kinder’s arrival and at the end of April 1945 
see Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.6; Darling, Report on Investigations of Australian and 
Allied Prisoners of War of 9th Division Area, p.22; Excerpts from Important War Crime Trials, p.3, 
AWM PR00637 Folder 3.  
111 Statement by Ishii Fujio, Formosan Suga Butai, p.1, AWM PR00637 Folder 3; Interview with 
Botterill, tape 6.  
112 Interview with Botterill, tapes 6, 7, 10. 
113 Moxham, War Crimes Trial Statement, pp.6-7.  
114 Interview with Botterill, tape 10. Also see Silver, Sandakan, p.208.  
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Kinder died on 10 June 1945.115 Moxham, who had nursed Kinder in the last days of 
his life, dug Kinder a grave and marked it with his name.116 It is unlikely that Moxham 
performed this task alone: the prisoners, upon hearing of Kinder’s death, performed 
one last collective task for their leader. Most of the men who died at Ranau were 
buried in mass graves. No other grave, beside Kinder’s, was marked with the name of 
the prisoner who lay there.117 The leadership legitimacy and followership Kinder had 
earned from his men meant that he alone was granted this privilege.   
 
Until his last moments, Kinder retained a self-sacrificial leadership style, knowing that 
there was every likelihood that he would not survive. His leadership style came from 
his belief that, as a leader, he had no choice but to do everything he could to protect 
his men. Yet, this overlooks the fact that it was also a personal choice to take on the 
responsibilities he believed came with leadership. Other leaders did not, a matter that 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
An emergent leader facing execution 
To date, this thesis has examined examples of self-sacrificial leadership carried out over a 
relatively sustained period of time on the Burma-Thailand Railway and in Borneo. Yet, it 
was possible for this leadership style to manifest itself for a far shorter period of time, yet 
still be powerful enough to be remembered by those who witnessed it. This was certainly 
the case with an Australian Corporal, Rodney Edward Breavington.  
 
On 12 May 1942, Breavington and Private Victor Lawrence Gale escaped from their 
prison camp at Bukit Timah.118 They did not remain at large for long and were back in 
captivity in June 1942. On 2 September 1942, at Telok Paku Beach, the Japanese 
                                                          
115 Interview with Moxham conducted by Casualty and Repository Section, p.1; Letter to Mrs H. Hope 
from M.C. Langslow, Casualty Section, 13 December 1945, NAA:A705:166/22/357; J. W. Kinder, Roll 
of Honour, <http://www.awm.gov.au/people/rolls/R1720526/>, maintained by the AWM, accessed on 
22 February 2015. 
116 Interview with Moxham conducted by Casualty and Repository Section, p.1; Interview with 
Botterill, tape 7.   
117 J. W. Kinder, Grave Registration Report, < http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-
dead/casualty/2677559/KINDER,%20JOHN%20WILLIAM>, maintained by the Commonwealth War 
Graves Commission, accessed on 22 February 2015; Ham, Sandakan, p.377; Silver, Sandakan, p.211. 
The marking of Kinder’s grave enabled his body to be recovered. See Interview with Botterill, tape 7.  
118 L. Stewart, Re Cpl R.E Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, ff.1-2, AWM PR01013, Folder 4.  
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executed four POWs who had attempted to escape captivity.119 These men were 
Breavington, Gale and two British Privates Harold Waters and Eric Fletcher, who had 
also briefly escaped from Japanese captivity. For the Japanese, the execution of these 
men served two purposes. Their deaths would provide a powerful a deterrent for other 
prisoners who were contemplating escape. And, at the time of the executions, the 
Japanese Commandant at Changi had presented the British and Australian positional 
leaders with the non-escape clause discussed in Chapter 2: the executions were also 
designed to pressure British Malaya Command GOC Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Holmes 
and Australian GOC Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan into signing 
the clause.120 While the execution of the four prisoners stopped other men from 
planning their own escapes while they were held captive in Singapore, the second 
purpose failed. As discussed in Chapter 2, instead of inducing Holmes and Galleghan 
into submissively signing the non-escape clause, the deaths of their men led Holmes 
and Galleghan to strengthen their resolve, resisting the Japanese demands. The key lay 
in Breavington’s behaviour at this execution.  
 
For a time, it must have seemed to Breavington that the Japanese had forgiven or 
forgotten his escape attempt. Both men were returned to the Australian lines in 
Changi. Breavington was immediately admitted to the Australian General Hospital, 
suffering from malaria.121 However, without warning, on 1 September, while he was 
still recovering in hospital, Breavington was suddenly arrested by the Japanese and 
sent to Curran Camp, a Japanese punishment camp.122 Gale, Waters and Fletcher were 
already there.123 
 
                                                          
119 Lieutenant Colonel F. Galleghan, War Crimes Trials Statement, 23 November 1945, p.2, AWM54 
1010/4/56; N. Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, 8 September 1945, 
pp.1-2, AWM54 554\11\4 Part 9 Appendix 6; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, ff.1-
2. Also see Havers, Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience, pp.68-72; Sweeting, 
‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.522.  
120 Galleghan, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.2; S. Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding 
Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 22 August 1945, p.5, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3; Maculey, 
Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.1.  
121 Stewart, Re Cpl R.E Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1; Sweating, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ 
p.522.  
122 Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.1; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. 
Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1. 
123 The exact date these men arrived at Curran camp is unknown. Their transfer occurred sometime 
between 31 August 1942 and the morning of 2 September 1942. See F. Magee, First Witness Statement 
Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, 22 August 1945, pp.1, 4, AWM 3DRL/2313 
Folder 3.  
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No official files or private recollections record what happened to these men at Curran. 
It is uncertain if they even had contact with each other. If the Japanese deliberately 
kept them isolated, it is possible that these men may not have understood the reason 
why they had been removed from Changi. If the captor did keep them in the same 
area, or allowed them to see each other, they would have known that they were to be 
punished. It is possible that one, or all of them, may have even anticipated their 
execution. If this is the case, it is impossible to know how these men coped with this 
knowledge. If Breavington realised what was to happen, he had the least amount of 
time to prepare for his death.  
 
The importance of the execution for the Japanese was evident in the orders issued by 
Major-General Fukuye. Holmes and Galleghan, accompanied by three British 
compound commanders, Lieutenant Colonels Stanley Wakefield Harris, Edward 
William Francis Jephson and Arthur Edward Tanney, and the Indian Commanding 
Officer Lieutenant Colonel John Griffith Firth, were ordered to witness the 
executions.124 Two British chaplains, John Frederick Watson and John Northridge 
Lewis Bryan, and Galleghan’s personal assistant, Australian Captain N.G Maculey, 
were also present. Eight of the witnesses provided statements for future war crimes 
trials. Not surprisingly, given the nature of the event and the fact that the executions 
took place early in the experiences of these men as prisoners of the Japanese, the 
accounts are inconsistent. The sources have different sequences of events and there is 
some confusion about what actually happened. Despite these inconsistencies, however, 
they agree that Breavington’s behaviour was courageous and provided a model for the 
other three men to follow. 
 
The sources suggest that the Japanese deliberately made it difficult for the four 
condemned men to cope with their impending execution. At least three of the men 
waited for over an hour at Telok Paku Beach for the arrival of the fourth prisoner 
before they faced the firing squad.125 The majority of the witnesses suggest that 
                                                          
124 E. Holmes, Report Command British and Australian Troops Malaya to Comd Relieving Forces 
Singapore, pp.1-5, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 9. 
125 Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; A. 
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Breavington was the fourth man. This would make sense, as he was only removed 
from the Australian General Hospital at Changi the day before and his illness meant 
that he would have been difficult to move to the site. Three witnesses also described 
how Breavington, still dressed in his pyjamas, walked towards them with the aid of a 
crutch.126 However, Maculey and Watson’s statements suggest that Fletcher, who had 
also been forcibly removed from his hospital bed in the British section of Changi, was 
the prisoner the three other men were waiting for.127 Irrespective, when the four 
condemned men were present, they were still forced to wait: the Sikh firing squad had 
yet to arrive. The witnesses’ estimates range from the men being forced to wait from 
between 40 minutes to two hours for the firing squad.128 Tannay believed that the 
delay was a deliberate ploy to add to the distress of the men.129  
 
When the firing squad finally arrived, the Japanese officer in charge, Lieutenant 
Okasaki, addressed the four men. Through an interpreter, Okasaki informed the men 
that they were  ‘guilty of escaping or attempting to escape contrary to Imperial 
Japanese Army orders and that they were to be shot forthwith ’130 Perhaps it was 
instinct, but Breavington immediately questioned the details of the charge, only to be 
cut short by Okasaki who curtly responded that the details ‘didn’t matter.’131 Realising 
that the Japanese were determined to carry out the executions, Breavington then 
pleaded for Gale’s life, explaining that Gale was his rank subordinate and that he had 
ordered Gale to escape with him.132 He argued that Gale should not be executed for 
following orders of a superior officer. He was, he argued ‘responsible for the whole 
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130 Bryan, Seventh Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.7.   
131 Watson, Eighth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.8. 
132 AIF War Diary, Barrack Square Concentration, POW File 749/36/1, pp.1-2, AWM 3DRL/2313, 
Folder 3; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1; J. Wyett, Sequence of Events from 1-
5 September, p.1, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 6.   
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thing... he was the leader.’133 Harris, Tannay, Bryan and Watson’s recollections, 
however, noted that Breavington also extended his plea for clemency to include the 
two British prisoners.134 If so, Breavington was arguing that he alone should be 
executed, that his execution should be enough for his captor. It remains remarkable 
that, despite the fact that he was facing execution, Breavington was not only capable 
of quickly articulating a reasoned argument but was also attempting to save the lives 
of his three companions. It had no effect. Okasaki’s response was brief: the Japanese 
Major General had ordered the execution of the four prisoners and he could do nothing 
to reverse the decision.135 In that exchange, however, Breavington had demonstrated to 
his companions that even when they were facing death, they did not have to be 
submissive prisoners.   
 
Before the execution, Holmes sought permission for the chaplains to address the 
prisoners.136 As all four men were belonged to the Church of England, Padre Bryan 
approached them. His delivered what comfort he could. His evidence also reveals that 
Breavington played an important role in comforting the men and he read a passage 
from the Bible as the firing party prepared its rifles.137  
 
When the men were finally lined up, facing the shooting party, Maculey recalled that 
Breavington instigated a salute to their commanding officers.138 British Lieutenant 
Colonel Stanley Wakefield Harris recollections differ stating that it was the officers 
who instigated the salute and Breavington responded.139 Irrespective of the order of 
events, his fellow condemned followed his lead.140 Through this action, Breavington 
reminded the men of their identity as soldiers who had done their duty by trying to 
                                                          
133 Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.3.   
134 Bryan, Seventh Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.7; Harris, 
Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; Tannay, Fifth 
Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.5; Watson, Eighth Witness 
Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.8. 
135 Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.5; Holmes, 
Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.2; Maculey, Report on 
the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.2. 
136 Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.3.   
137 Bryan, Seventh Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.7; Stewart, 
Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1.  
138 Maculey, Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.2.  
139 Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4. 
140 Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; Maculey, 
Report on the Execution of Soldiers in September 1942, p.2; Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte 
V.E Gale, f.1 
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escape and now they were paying the ultimate price for doing so. Having saluted their 
officers, Breavington then turned to the men and shook their hands.141 The men were 
offered blindfolds which, according to Holmes, all four ‘scornfully refused.’142 It is 
probable, considering his behaviour, that Breavington instigated this last act of 
courage.  
 
All who witnessed the executions agreed that they were botched.143 Breavington, Gale, 
Waters and Fletcher, with their backs to the sea, stood about three yards from the 
firing squad who stood on slightly elevated ground. Perhaps because of the angle of 
fire from the firing squad, it took over fifteen shots before all four men were dead. 
Breavington is reported to have suffered the most. At some stage during the shooting, 
Breavington stood up and screamed at the firing squad: ‘[F]or God’s sake, shoot me 
through the head and kill me. You have only hit me in the arm.’144 Breavington was 
then shot in the leg and stomach. He continued to scream until death finally took him. 
 
It can be argued that Breavington’s emergent leadership was intertwined with a sense 
of duty associated with his higher rank and its responsibilities. Breavington was a 
corporal; the other three men were privates. Yet this thesis has argued that rank alone 
did not in itself induce acceptance of the responsibilities associated with rank or 
followership. The ability of a leader to provide a means of responding to the physical 
or psychological needs of their formal or informal group determined if they were seen 
as a legitimate leader. Breavington did this with his calm courage, defiance and 
stoicism, a model the others followed. Breavington willingly chose to place the 
psychological welfare of his ‘men’ above his own needs.   
                                                          
141 Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1.  
142 Holmes, Third Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.3. Also see 
Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E Gale, f.1; Adam-Smith, From Gallipoli to Korea, p.258; 
Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ p.522.  
143 For example see J. Firth, Sixth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in 
Changi, 22 August 1945, p.6, AWM 3DRL/2313 Folder 3; Galleghan, War Crimes Trials Statement, 
p.3; Harris, Fourth Witness Statement Regarding Execution of Prisoners of War in Changi, p.4; Holmes, 
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of Soldiers in September 1942, pp.1-2. 
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Breavington’s men were not the only ones to recognise his leadership. When 
Galleghan returned to the Australian Compound at Changi, he held a meeting of his 
staff, ordering that his officers inform all Australian troops of Breavington’s 
bravery.145 Galleghan, who was trying to cope with what he had seen, then wrote a 
letter to his wife, requesting that she pass on these words to Breavington’s wife: 
‘[Y]our husband’s calmness and bravery was outstanding. He was to me the bravest 
man I have ever seen.. [y]ou should know how his bravery in the face of death was an 
inspiration to those who saw it and will remain an inspiration to us all. Believe me.’146 
The tone in this letter stands in stark contrast with Galleghan’s usual authoritarian 
tone. These were not the words of a superior officer trying to comfort the next of kin 
of a lost loved one, but an officer honouring the bravery and selflessness of a man who 
had reminded the men that even though they were prisoners, they could still be defiant, 
proud soldiers.   
 
Once the story was told to the men, Breavington’s actions quickly turned into legend. 
As with all legends, soon fact and fiction began to merge. Sergeant James A. 
Roxburgh’s diary records that he heard that ‘one of these men [Breavington] when the 
bullet struck him turned and saluted Black Jack before he fell.’147 Corporeal Leonard 
Albert David Stewart’s writings were closer to the truth: ‘[he] was tortured beyond the 
wildest of imagination.’148 Stewart’s writings also record the rumour that Holmes had 
described Breavington as the bravest man that he had ever seen, and through his 
actions the ghosts of the ANZACS had come alive.149  
 
The poem ‘Greater Love’150 written in Changi in the days after Breavington’s death, 
reveals the extent to which he had acquired followership from Australians POWs:   
 
Doubtless deeds of courage by which Australia’s known 
Shall flourish on forever from a new seed that’s been sown 
                                                          
145 AIF War Diary, 2 September 1930 Hours Conference, AWM54 554/11/4 Part 6 Appendix 3; Barrack 
Square Concentration, 1 September 1942, p.1.  
146 Letter to Mrs R.E. Breavington from F. Galleghan, 3 September 1943; NAA:B3856:144/14/65.  
147 Roxburgh, Diary 5 September 1942. 
148 Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E. Gale, f.1. Also see Orr, Diary 2 September 1942.  
149 Stewart, Re Cpl R.E. Breavington and Pte V.E. Gale, ff.1-2.  
150 Author unknown, ‘Greater Love,’ AWM PR02023.  
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By a soldier of the AIF who face to face with God 
Pleaded for his comrades before a traitor’s firing squad. 
But the pleadings of this noble man beneath the sunlit sky 
Were unavailing, so he stood and showed them how to die. 
The old slouch hat lay battered with its dinted rising sun 
And an Angel softly murmured ‘Duty nobly done.151  
 
One of the core characteristics of self-sacrificial leadership is the capacity to put 
collective or group needs above those of the individual. Although his group was small, 
and his time as leader short, Breavington still provides a powerful example of the self-
sacrificial leadership style.  
 
                                                          
151 ibid.  
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THE COLLAPSE OF LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES 
Ranau Number One Compound, Borneo, April 1945.  
In April 1945 at Ranau number one compound, between 180 and 60 Australian and 
British prisoners congregate.1 Most are dying.2 Realising their fate, an Australian 
MO, Captain Rodney Lionel Jeffrey, plots. His response to the grim situation is very 
different to Dunlop’s. In a desperate attempt to stay alive, Jeffrey enters into a pact 
with the Japanese. In return for some food and medical supplies, he treats them. Most 
of these precious goods that Jeffrey receives for his services, he keeps for himself. A 
group of hostile Australians confront him over his betrayal. In response to their bitter 
protests, he tells them to ‘stuff it, to mind our own business. He [is] doing the best for 
[them] ...’3 
 
Survivorship studies argue that in extreme settings, where people are dying because 
they are not receiving their basic physiological needs, it is common for group 
structures to breakdown.4 In these dire circumstances, some individuals believe they 
are more likely to survive if they cut themselves off from other people and only look 
after themselves.5  
 
The literature in this field, particularly studies conducted on the reflections of 
survivors of concentration camps reveals, however, that in extreme settings it is not 
the loners who survive, but those who remain part of a group structure.6 This is for 
two reasons. Firstly, the survivors realise that it is only in groups that they have a 
chance to pool their skills to try and meet basic physiological needs.7 Secondly, group 
structures also provide a way for members to draw courage, conviction and hope from 
each other, even when all seems lost.8 The nature of the Holocaust meant that for 
groups to achieve these two functions, group structures had to be flexible.9  
                                                          
1 The exact number of prisoners at Ranau Number One Compound during April 1945 is unknown. 
About 180 POWs reached here after the first march from Sandakan. Of these men, 60 were still alive 
when Americans bombed the compound on 25 April 1945. See Botterill, Testimony at Court no R125 
held at Rabaul, p.13; Darling, Report on Investigations of Australian and Allied Prisoners of War of 9 th 
Division Area, p.22; Moxham, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.5.  
2 Botterill, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.4; Interview with Botterill by Wall, tapes 6-7.  
3 Interview with Botterill by Wall, tape 6.  
4 Bennet, Beyond Endurance, pp.70, 172-192; Leach, Survival Psychology, pp.51-52.  
5 Bettelheim, The Informed Heart, pp.151-152; Cohen, Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp, 
pp.158-165; Pres, The Survivor, p.121. 
6 Bennet, Beyond Endurance, pp.195-197; Bloch, ‘The Personality of Inmates of Concentration Camps,’ 
pp.335-341; Cohen, Human Behaviour in the Concentration Camp, pp.182-19; Luchterhand, ‘Prisoner 
Behaviour and Social System in the Nazi Concentration Camps,’, pp.245-262.   
7 Bennet, Beyond Endurance, p.89; Bettelheim, The Informed Heart, p.136; Leach, Survival 
Psychology, pp.137-142; Pres, The Survivor, pp.96, 132-134.  
8 Bennet, Beyond Endurance, pp.69-72; Leach, Survival Psychology, pp.137-142; Pres, The Survivor, 
pp.97-98, 136-140, 199, 203.  




POWs in some volatile and extreme captive settings experienced the same tension 
between individual survival and collective identity. This tension resulted in some 
Australian POWs abandoning a collective survivorship mentality and instead thought 
only of their own survival. This self-reversion existed at most of the levels studied for 
this thesis. It was found at the leadership level, whether it was positional or 
professional, and amongst the groups, whether they were formal or informal. It was 
not found, however, at the emergent leadership level, primarily because emergent 
leaders had stepped in to fill a gap left by the failure of positional leaders.  
 
This thesis has examined two volatile settings (the Burma-Thailand Railway, the 
forced marches in Europe in 1944-1945) and one extreme setting (the forced marches 
from Sandakan to Ranau). Using case studies, this chapter examines examples of the 
collapse of leadership and group cohesion and a basic instinct, self-preservation, came 
into play in both settings.  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first is an analysis of the reversion of 
three positional leaders from their responsibility to protect their men: Lieutenant 
Colonel Roland Frank Oakes, the positional leader of the 600 Australians attached to 
H Force sent from Changi to work on the Burma-Thailand Railway; and Captain 
George Robin Cook and Warrant Officer Hector Sticpewich during the marches from 
Sandakan to Ranau. The second section examines a professional leader, MO Captain 
Roderick Lionel Jeffrey at Ranau. The third section examines the behaviour of 







CHAPTER 9: THE COLLAPSE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL      
LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES 
 
An examination of men who, in volatile and in extreme conditions, choose to protect 
themselves instead of their men or group is difficult to write. In a similar vein to Joan 
Beaumont’s approach in her study of Gull Force, the purpose of this chapter is not to 
judge the decisions these men made.1 Instead it is an attempt to understand their 
choices and the impact those choices had on formal and informal groups. And although 
most men were able to adapt to the volatile or even extreme conditions in which they 
found themselves, particularly when led by men such as Captain Reginald William 
James Newton or Warrant Officer John William Kinder, others could not. To ignore 
this is to ignore an integral aspect of the POW leadership experience. 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes 
In May 1943, Galleghan appointed Lieutenant Colonel Roland Frank Oakes as the 
positional leader of 600 Australians attached to H Force,2 the second last Work Force 
to leave Changi. According to Oakes, about ‘25 percent’ of the men were sick or 
unfit.3 
 
Apart from a period of about seven months when he had accompanied a Singapore 
based working party, Oakes had spent most of his time within the confines of Changi.4  
Oakes’ exposure to the captor before bing placed in command of H Force, according to 
his unpublished memoir and official report, was minimal. He rather naively expected 
that the Japanese would respect his rank authority.5 The forced march from Bampong 
to Konyu for the Australians in H Force, and the first week at Hell-Fire Pass, made 
him realise his mistake.6 Oakes also discovered that the captor’s promise of plentiful 
food and medical supplies was a lie. At the end of the first week at Malaya Hamlet, 
                                                          
1 Beaumont, Gull Force, p.11.  
2 AIF HQ Malaya, War Diary 7 May 1943, p.2, AWM52 1/5/19/12 Part 2; Letter to R. Oakes from F. 
Galleghan, Warrant for the Convening and Confirming of District Courts Martial, Appendix A2, 
AWM52 1/5/19/14; Sweeting, ‘Prisoners of the Japanese,’ pp.581-582; Walker, The Middle East and 
Far East, p.614.  
3 Oakes, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1. Also see Penfold, Bayliss and Crispin, Galleghan’s 
Greyhounds, p.387. 
4 Oakes, War Crimes Trial Statement, p.1; Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy,’ pp.295-310.  
5 ibid., pp.310, 312.  
6 ibid., pp.312-323. 
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Oakes’ base camp at Konyu, over 100 of his men were in the hospital lines.7 Oakes 
realised that, if his men were to survive, he had to do something.  
 
At morning roll call, as Private Kurakuni collected the working parties for the day, 
Oakes spoke up as the positional officer of H Force. He told Kurakuni that he  
 
… would not take the responsibility of sending the men out [to work], 
because I would be held responsible when I got back to Australia, and that 
I considered that if they were sent out a large number would die.8 
 
Kurakuni laughed.9 He then informed Oakes that if he did not provide the number of 
prisoners needed to work, he would go into the hospital and force prisoners out of their 
makeshifts beds to make up the numbers. Oakes backed down without any further 
remark. This confrontation, initiated by Oakes, tested his leadership legitimacy. His 
concession to Kurakuni’s authority laid the foundation for his reversion from his 
positional leadership responsibilities at Konyu. The men who watched this 
confrontation must have realised that Oakes was not only powerless as a POW 
positional leader but, when challenged, gave in to the demands and threats of the 
Japanese. His formal group, therefore, could not look to their positional leader for 
protection.   
 
Captain Richard Vanderbyl Pockley’s War Crimes Trial Statement reveals that if 
Oakes’ initial failure in his dealings with Kurakuni sowed doubts in the minds of his 
men, these were confirmed by a second incident. On this occasion, Oakes attempted to 
stop Kurakuni from forcing 11 prisoners, who he considered to be too sick to work, 
from leaving the camp.10 Kurakuni did not even bother talking to Oakes. Instead he 
lined up the 11 prisoners that Oakes had identified and, in turn, asked them what was 
wrong with them. Regardless of the answer, Kurakuni bashed each man. In his 
statement, Pockley explained that he found the event so traumatic that he turned away. 
The dismay Oakes must have felt because he had identified these men for the captor 
                                                          
7 Oakes, War Crimes Trials Statement, p.6.   
8 ibid.   
9 ibid.   
10 Captain R. Pockley, War Crimes Trials Statement, 27 March 1946, p.1, AWM54 1010/4/116.  
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broke the courage that he had left to defend his men. For the men watching this second 
showdown, Oakes’ second failure to protect his men must have confirmed for most 
that Oakes did not have any leadership legitimacy in Thailand.11 This is clearly evident 
in the writings and recollections of the men examined who were in H Force. Unlike the 
writings and recollections of the men led by Dunlop and Newton, where the decisions 
and actions of their positional leaders are central, most of the men of H Force do not 
mention Oakes’ name.  
 
Yet, Oakes’ personal writings reveal that he still felt responsible for his men.12 In his 
memoir Oakes explained his predicament:  
 
I ceased to be an Australian solider on active service in control of other 
fighting soldiers fighting for the defeat of an enemy... and became a 
prisoner of war of this same enemy, responsible in theory for the survival 
of other prisoners of war but without the real authority I had formerly 
enjoyed.13 
 
As Oakes struggled to reconcile his powerlessness with his leadership responsibilities, 
cholera struck his camp.14 As explained in Chapter 7, at this point the prisoners 
realised that the survivorship of the entire group rested on the medical skill, knowledge 
and self-sacrificial leadership style of Major Kevin James Fagan.15 Once Oakes 
understood that Fagan was willing to risk his personal survivorship to help protect his 
patients, Oakes deferred his responsibilities to him and others.     
 
Each morning, when the Japanese guards collected the working parties, he recalled 
‘constant nagging and arguing and pleading and fighting between my administration 
and the guards to adjust the working party numbers.’16 It is interesting to note that 
Oakes refers to ‘my administration’: he does not describe himself as personally 
                                                          
11 For example see Hatton, ‘The Naked Island’, ff.177, 183, 186-188. 
12 Oakes, War Crimes Trial Statement, pp.4-7; Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy,’ pp.285, 315-316, 321, 
323-325. 
13 Oakes, ‘Work and Be Happy,’ p.285. 
14 Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, pp.3-5; Oakes, War Crimes Trial Statement, pp.6-7.   
15 Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, ff.187,189, 191; Braddon, The Naked Island, pp.182, 187, 209; B. 
O’Sullivan cited in Adam-Smith, Prisoners of War from Gallipoli to Korea, p.410. 
16 Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy’, p.323. 
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participating in these negotiations. Instead, his staff performed this task, acting on 
Fagan’s advice as to which men were physically able to work and which men needed 
their protection.17 Oakes had stopped trying to negotiate with his captors. In fact, 
unlike Newton and Dunlop, Oakes did not even know the name of his Japanese 
Commandant.18 Oakes was protecting himself from a becoming a target. 
 
Yet, despite his attempts to isolate himself from the captor, there were occasions when 
the Japanese forced Oakes into situations where he had to respond. For example, a 
Japanese guard at the camp caught an Australian prisoner trading with a native,19 a 
practice banned by the Japanese at Malaya Hamlet. As a consequence, the Japanese 
guard demanded that Oakes punish the Australian prisoner for breaching the ban by 
beating him in front of the entire camp. Oakes’ memoir reveals his response to the 
demand:   
 
This was a tricky one. ‘We can’t do it’ admonished Dicky [Lieutenant 
Richard Wigram Austin, Oakes’ interpreter]. ‘I haven’t the slightest 
intention of doing so’ I assured him, at the same time wondering how I 
could get out of a beating myself.20 
 
Through Austin, Oakes managed to convince the guard that docking the prisoner’s pay 
was the gravest punishment he could give. He argued that if he hit the prisoner, Oakes 
himself would get into ‘serious trouble’21 with his own superiors after the war. The 
guard accepted this. Oakes’ success in deescalating this situation suggests that he was 
capable of negotiating with the guards to protect his men. Yet, his memoir suggests 
that his major motivation was not the protection of the prisoner, but rather a desire to 
avoid a potential beating by refusing the guard’s demands.  
 
This incident appears to have been the exception. The records left by Oakes show that 
on most of occasions when the Japanese confronted him, it became his policy, and that 
                                                          
17 Oakes, War Crime Trials Statement, p.7.    
18 Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy,’ pp.326-327.   
19 ibid. 
20 Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy’, pp.326-327. For reference to Austin’s position as interpreter see Oakes, 
Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.3.  
21 Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy’, p.327.  
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of his officers, to pretend that they did not understand what the Japanese were telling 
them.22 This, he believed, would avoid any suggestion that their orders were being 
questioned, thereby sparing them the likelihood of physical assault.  
 
Between April and August 1943, the Japanese increased the working hours and work 
quotas on the railway in what became known as the ‘speedo’. At its height in July 
1943, a Japanese sergeant approached Oakes with a proposal.23 In return for the 
prisoners butchering one of the cows that the Japanese were herding past the camp, the 
prisoners could keep half the meat. This scheme would have given his malnourished 
men some much-needed protein. Oakes, however, refused the offer because he 
believed the potential risk of collective punishment outweighed the short-term benefits 
of one meal for his men if the deal was discovered. It was a cautious decision and, 
perhaps, warranted. Yet Oakes also knew that his men were on a smaller ration than 
the men in the Thailand based Work Forces. On the captor’s orders, H Force retained 
its status as a Malaya based battalion, which meant it was supplied from Malaya rather 
than from Thailand.24 H Force, however, was based in the most northern part of the 
Thailand cutting with some battalions, including Australians, crossing over into the 
Burma side of the project. The logistics of supply meant that supplies could be delayed 
and consequently the men were on a smaller ration. Irrespective, Oakes’ decision 
stands in stark contrast to the schemes Dunlop and Newton initiated to provide for the 
needs of their men.  
 
As noted earlier, Oakes had difficulty adjusting from being an officer in command of 
fighting men to being an officer in charge of POWs. That may account for the curious 
fact that at Malaya Hamlet he maintained the custom of officer privilege. It was 
familiar and probably reflected the fact that Galleghan had maintained it as part of his 
administration in Changi. Officers were excused from the working parties, even during 
the speedo when men worked 15-hour shifts.25 The officers lived in better tents and 
were spared the task of collecting the daily ration from the Japanese food depot, an 
                                                          
22 ibid., p.312. 
23 ibid., p.321.  
24 Humphries, Report of H Force Ex Changi POW- Thailand, p. 5; Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy’, p.319; 
Various Members of the Unit Association, The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F., p.654. 
25 Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, pp.2-6; Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, f.186; Braddon, The 
Naked Island, p.187; Cody, Ghosts in Khaki, pp.253-255; Goodwin, Mates and Memories, pp.140-142. 
307 
 
eight-mile return journey.26 That task fell to the men who, after their shift, were 
rostered to collect bags of rice. The weight of the bags, the debilitated physical state of 
the men and the distance, meant that four prisoners were needed to carry one bag.27 
Most of this rice fed the Japanese.  
 
Oakes admitted that allocating his men to collect the food ration caused problems.28 At 
the height of the speedo, men returning from the construction site were not physically 
capable of performing this task. Oakes then ordered the convalescent hospital patients, 
who had been protected from construction work by the officers, to perform this task.29 
At no point did Oakes consider ordering his officers to walk the eight miles to collect 
the bags of rice.   
 
When Oakes and his men returned to Singapore, they were transferred to Sime Road 
POW Camp. There, his men openly complained that the officers had lived better than 
the men in Thailand.30 Oakes vehemently denied these allegations, blaming them on 
men wanting to make ‘trouble.’31 However, to some extent, his official report to 
Galleghan contradicted this.  
 
In his report Oakes claimed that his leadership was based on ‘co-operation with 
Nippon as regard[s to] transport, extra water, food and clothing’,32 which, he claimed, 
alleviated the stress of the volatile conditions on his men and provided for their basic 
needs. In this way, he suggested, he ‘maintain[ed] strict discipline, appearance and 
morale’33 amongst his formal group. However, his ‘co-operation with Nippon’ did not 
lead to extra food, water and clothing for his men. Private Alexander Hatton 
Drummond (one of the few to mention Oakes) provides an insight into both how 
Oakes was regarded by the men and whether Oakes’ policy of cooperation benefited 
                                                          
26 Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.5; Barlow, untitled manuscript, pp.52-53; Hatton, ‘The 
Naked Truth,’ ff.186-191; Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy’, pp.320, 322-323; Braddon, The Naked Island, 
p.187.  
27 Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, f.186.  
28 Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy’, pp.321-322. 
29 For example see Denning, ‘Memoirs of Private SF Denning’, p.34; Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth,’ ff.190, 
191-192; Braddon, The Naked Island, p.196. 
30 Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy’, p.306. 
31 ibid. 
32 Oakes, Report of AIF Section of H Force, p.4.  
33 ibid.  
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his men. He wrote that at Malaya Hamlet ‘Oakes was not over-endowed with courage 
and from the time he arrived at Kanu [sic], retreated from contact with the Japs… 
isolated from the brutality and misery of the ORs [other ranks].’34 As far as 
Drummond was concerned, Oakes was ‘Jap happy.’35 At no point, however, does he 
suggest that Oakes’ policy of ‘cooperation’ had secured extra food, water or clothing 
for the men.36 The description of starvation, beatings and forced labour by other 
members of H Force at Malaya Hamlet, combined with schemes they attempted to gain 
more food, corroborate Drummond’s account.37   
 
Oakes’ claim that his ‘co-operation’ with the Japanese allowed him to retain discipline 
and control of his formal group is a curious one. It may have reflected the fact that he 
had distanced himself from his positional responsibilities as argued earlier and 
therefore had no knowledge of discipline within his formal group, or he may have been 
protecting his own reputation. The writings and recollections of men, however, do not 
mention Oakes maintaining discipline, as, for example, the men under Newton did. 
Even Oakes’ official report to Galleghan suggest that there were discipline and morale 
problems with the formal group. It acknowledged that tension and division existed 
between the men and the officers:    
 
The men, wore [sic] out, were very difficult to get working, even to the 
point of insubordination. With the guards pushing on one side, and the men 
failing to respond on the other, the officers had a worrying time.38  
 
Oakes’ personal memoir also acknowledges that some of his men slipped beyond his 
control. Some prisoners, he wrote, ‘sank to the lowest depths of miserable selfishness 
and cowardly depravity…help[ing] no one, even robbing the dead of their few poor 
belongings.’39  
                                                          
34 Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, f.177. 
35 ibid., p.183.  
36 For example see Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, ff.163-165, 177-195. 
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With his administration attempting to protect sick men from working parties, Oakes 
turned to other tasks. He helped construct the camp hospital.40 Then, when his men 
began dying, Oakes helped bury the dead or, if a patient died from cholera, cremated 
the body of the deceased.41 This task both consumed and haunted Oakes. He retreated 
from sight, infrequently making contact with the rest of the camp.42 Despairing that so 
many of his men were dying without a sense of peace that could only be achieved by 
being surrounded by family and loved ones,43 he constructed a cross to serve as a 
symbol of salvation to men in their final moments and help alleviate their suffering. 
On 22 August 1943, when the main phase of construction work had been completed 
under the speedo, Oakes unveiled it at the entrance to the camp cemetery. On it he had 
inscribed, ‘To our Australian and British Comrades. Here laid to rest 1943. Amatos 
eorum dues aspicat.’44 Of the prisoners’ writings, recollections and testimony 
examined, only two mention the project. Drummond was the only one to comment on 
it.45 He remarked, perhaps ironically, that ‘[t]his fine gesture allowed the men who 
died after its completion to see their monument before they died.’46 
   
From their position at Malaya Hamlet, the Australians in H Force could observe 
Newton’s camp. They soon realised Newton organised his camp very differently. They 
witnessed officers attached to working parties who worked alongside the men and tried 
to protect them from the guards. They watched Newton’s officers performing camp 
fatigues, including collecting the ration and buying extra food with money pooled from 
the men’s and officers’ pay.47 This may have prompted some of the officers at Malaya 
Hamlet to become more active in their efforts to protect the men.48 For example, 
                                                          
40 Humphries, Report H Force Ex Changi POW camp, p.16; Oakes, ‘Work and be Happy’, pp.325-326. 
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Drummond considered that Major Kenneth Carlyle Moulton, who tried to protect the 
sick from working parties and attempted to negotiate concessions for the men, had 
taken over from Oakes as their positional leader.49 Flying Officer R. Gibbs, however, 
in his statement to the War Crime Trials, thought that Major G. Gaskell became the 
positional leader of the camp.50 Gibbs explained that on at least one occasion, Gaskell 
willingly placed his body between sick men and Japanese guards and, despite his 
failures, never wavered in his duty to protect them, even when threatened with 
violence. Private Samuel Ambrose Barlow wrote that some officers assumed 
responsibility for men on the construction site.51 One unnamed officer, for example, 
accompanied his working party, and, despite repeated beatings, gave permission for his 
men to go to the banjo during their shifts. The confusion in the prisoners’ recollections 
about who their positional leader actually was reveals the extent to which Oakes’ 
reversion from his leadership responsibilities had destroyed his leadership legitimacy, 
leaving a gap that was filled by others. 
 
At the end of the main construction phase of the railway, 217 of Oakes men were 
dead.52 Nowhere in his private or official writings did Oakes admit that his own 
leadership failings contributed to some of these deaths. Instead, he blamed his captors 
and, on occasions, the poor discipline of his men.53   
 
Captain George Robin Cook and Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich  
Captain George Robin Cook and Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich were 
positional leaders at Sandakan and during the forced marches to Ranau. Both men took 
a very different path to that taken by Kinder discussed in the previous chapter. Cook’s 
reversion from his positional responsibilities had begun in the Sandakan camp. 
Sticpewich followed Cook’s example.  
 
                                                          
49 Hatton, ‘The Naked Truth’, f.187 
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On 22 July 1943, the Japanese exposed a complex underground intelligence, supply 
and escape network in the camp.54 This network consisted of different channels of 
communication and mutual assistance between officers at Sandakan Camp, interned 
civilians at Sandakan, civilian medical practitioners at the Sandakan hospital, POWs 
and civilian internees at Berhala Island, and Filipino guerrilla forces on Borneo who 
were in contact with the Australian and American military.55 In response, the Japanese 
transferred all but eight officers and two chaplains from Sandakan POW Camp to 
Kuching POW Camp in October 1943.56 By virtue of his rank, Cook became the 
positional leader of the Australians imprisoned at Sandakan.57 Michele Cunningham 
and Lynette Silver argue that the captor made sure that Cook became the positional 
leader of the Australians by not transferring him from the camp.58 He had ensured that 
the Japanese had the men required for the working parties.59 According to Australian 
MO Major Hugh Rayson, Cook willingly jeopardised the safety of the men in this 
task,60 by questioning Rayson’s medical judgment and his authority over his patients:   
 
Capt [sic] Cook began to show up in a very unfavourable light, being 
apparently definitely in favour with the IJA authorities and to keep this 
position he did not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of the PsOW [sic]. He 
repeatedly challenged my authority over the hospital group 
notwithstanding the written authorisation I held from Lt Col [sic] 
Sheppard.61 
 
On assuming command, Cook organised a leadership committee to assist him.62 The 
committee consisted of the remaining seven officers and senior NCOs, including 
Warrant Officers Sticpewich and Kinder.  As the positional leader of Australian POWs, 
                                                          
54 Cunningham, Hell on Earth, pp.71-77; Ham, Sandakan, pp.190-208.  
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Cook openly aligned himself with the Japanese. He imposed strict orders governing 
the behaviour of the men.63 Any man who breached these orders was punished. Cook 
also incorporated the captor into his punishment regime by asking the Japanese 
Commandant, Captain Susumi Hoshijma, to build an extra punishment cage.64 This 
cage, Cook told Hoshijma, would be used to confine Australians who had committed 
‘short term offences or [for] a softening up period for longer terms...’65 
 
In his War Crimes Statement, Private Keith Botterill reported that Cook handed over 
five Australians to the Japanese for stealing the captor’s rations.66 Botterill also 
claimed that Cook insisted that three of these men be imprisoned in one of the 
confinement cages ‘for the duration.’67 As a result of their confinement in the cages, 
Privates Leonard Jack Annear and Albert Anderson, and Sergeant Errol David 
Bancroft died within three months.68  
 
Between October 1944 and May 1945, as a result of forced labour, sadistic violence 
and starvation at Sandakan, approximately 1100 Australians died in the camp.69 The 
conditions were so extreme that there were times when Cook did make protests to the 
camp Commandant. Yet, he usually made these in writing.70 By using this method of 
communication, Cook appeared to be doing something to protect his men’s interests 
while at the same time avoiding any confrontation with the Commandant. But there 
was one occasion when he did make a protest face to face. When three prisoners were 
viciously assaulted, the leadership committee forced Cook into making a protest to the 
captor in front of the men.71 On parade, the men watched Cook act on their behalf. The 
guards ignored his protests and then proceeded to beat Cook and his leadership team.72   
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Cook left the camp with the seventh group on the second forced march to Ranau.73 
According to Private Nelson Alfred Ernest Short and Japanese Private Takahara, on at 
least one occasion, Cook protested about the treatment of the sick men in his group.74 
His protests were ignored.  
 
Cook made it to Ranau. Here, amongst sick and dying men, he isolated himself.75 
Instead of being assigned to a work party, for some reason, perhaps because he had 
been cooperative at Sandakan POW Camp, the Japanese allowed Cook to spend his 
time maintaining the nominal roll of his formal group. Cook must have hoped that this 
concession by the captor meant that he would survive. He was wrong. Sometime 
between the 15 and 28 August, in one of three separate massacres of the surviving 
prisoners, the Japanese executed Cook.76 A few days before his death, Sticpewich, 
whose story is examined below, approached Cook about his escape plans and once 
Cook made it clear he would not accompany him, Sticpewich asked Cook to hand over 
the nominal roll.77 He refused. Instead, sometime before his execution, Cook entrusted 
the document to Captain Genzo Watanabe, the Japanese officer in charge of the 
prisoners at Ranau.78 Watanabe promptly burnt it. Botterill summed up what must have 
been the prevailing view of the men in Cook’s formal group: they saw him as their 
enemy, not their leader.79  
 
Even before the Japanese removed most of the officers from Sandakan, Warrant 
Officer William Hector Sticpewich’s behaviour, like Cook’s, had caused rumblings of 
discontent amongst the formal group.80 A carpenter by trade, Sticpewich used his skills 
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to persuade the Japanese to set-up a ‘technical party.’81 This party consisted of 
prisoners trained as ‘carpenters, engineers, plumbers, electricians and drivers’.82 This 
group, led by Sticpewich, was initially responsible for the maintenance of the camp. 
Then, when men began dying, they were ordered to make coffins for the dead.83 In 
return for their specialised services, unlike the rest of the men who were forced to 
labour at the aerodrome, the technical party received extra rations in return for their 
services. These men were also spared the regular beatings endured by the aerodrome 
workers. Prior to the forced march, Sticpewich’s men were the healthiest prisoners at 
Sandakan POW Camp.  
 
Sticpewich never explained why he requested to set up his technical party. He may 
well have considered that by making himself known to the Japanese as a valued 
prisoner with special skills, he could protect himself from the aggression of the 
Japanese, which as time went on, became more extreme. However, it is important to 
note that, unlike Cook, Sticpewich shared this protection with his select group of 
tradesmen. It is impossible to know if Sticpewich’s motives for allowing other men to 
join his scheme were a result of his genuine attempts to protect these men from the 
captor or whether their combined skills made his team more attractive to the Japanese.   
 
Men outside Sticpewich group viewed his technical party and its work as a form of 
collaboration with the enemy.84 They saw how he and his men escaped the physical 
and psychological impact of the quickly diminishing ration, forced labour and 
beatings. The willingness of Sticpewich and his men to make coffins for the dead most 
likely confirmed the men’s views that his privileged position came at their expense. 
They also watched a close relationship form between Sticpewich and his party’s guard, 
Private Takahara.85   
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Sticpewich’s behaviour in Sandakan, however, remains something of a conundrum. He 
had worked with the underground intelligence network that operated out the camp. 
Using his specialised work as a cover, Sticpewich had collected food and medical 
supplies for prisoners from civilian contacts and had made part of a radio.86 When the 
Japanese discovered the network, they also discovered his involvement.87 Sticpewich 
was arrested and interrogated by the Japanese. They believed that he had been 
involved in the operation of an illegal radio, yet could not directly link it to him.88 
Sticpewich had, in fact, removed the radio and buried it in the officers’ lines. In his 
testimony during the War Crimes Trial of the camp Commandant, Sticpewich claimed 
that he was sentenced to three weeks in a punishment cage, yet his repatriation 
statement notes that he was released after only four days.89 The absent radio may well 
have convinced the Japanese that Sticpewich had played only a minor role in the 
underground network; or perhaps they viewed both him, and his team, as necessary in 
terms of the camp’s infrastructure, and his punishment was a token gesture. Then, with 
the transfer of officers to Kuching, the Japanese promoted Sticpewich, appointing him 
as ‘area master for the number 1 area (compound).’90 This startling transition from 
punishment to appointed leader, suggests that, the Japanese believed that they could 
manipulate him into making decisions that were in their interests. In a show of good 
faith in his judgement, the Japanese allowed Sticpewich to resume his duties as the 
leader of the technical party.91   
 
Little is known about Sticpewich’s behaviour as compound leader. In his statement for 
the War Crimes Trials, Sticpewich claimed that he volunteered to take the place of sick 
men assigned to aerodrome working parties on two occasions.92 He also claimed that 
he was part of the leadership committee that forced Cook to protest the treatment 
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meted out to the three Australian prisoners discussed earlier in this Chapter.93 None of 
the other five men who survived the forced marches in Borneo could corroborate his 
repatriation statement or testimony.    
 
Until he left the camp on the second forced march, Sticpewich remained the leader of 
the technical party and an Australian compound.94 It can therefore, be presumed that 
Sticpewich’s behaviour did not anger or challenge the captor’s order and control over 
the men. As the Japanese predicted, Sticpewich was not willing to risk his protected 
position in the camp. His self-interest, therefore, compromised his responsibilities to 
his men.  
 
On the forced march from Sandakan, Cook placed Sticpewich in charge of a group of 
50 prisoners, 42 of whom were hospital patients.95 These men quickly fell behind the 
pace set by the Japanese. Sticpewich complained to his guards about the rough 
treatment of the sick men in his group.96 The reply came swift and fast: if he wanted to 
survive, he would not help the sick. On only one other occasion did he attempt to help 
one of the men in his group. At a river crossing, as the prisoners tried to walk along a 
single log above raging waters, one Australian in his group suddenly stopped.97 With 
the Japanese threatening to shoot him, Sticpewich, who had already crossed to the 
other side, crawled back and coaxed him into moving. Then when they reached the 
bank, the Japanese seized the prisoner, stripped him of his gear, bashed him and then 
ordered the group to keep marching. Sticpewich had watched and then, when ordered 
to, walked away. That characterised his behaviour during the march to Ranau. After 
that incident, he watched as the guards graduated from harassing his men to beating 
them before they disappeared, the victims of illness and injury, or the execution squads 
following the columns.98  
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Upon reaching Ranau, realising that Cook had abandoned his leadership 
responsibilities, Sticpewich claimed leadership of the 189 men still alive.99 However, 
his own safety remained his first priority. At this new location, Sticpewich again used 
his trade skills as a means of self-protection. With Japanese permission, Sticpewich 
built a hut for the prisoners, with five helpers.100 On 5 July 1945, when his work party 
numbers were short, Private Masao Fukushima went down to where the sick and dying 
Australians were lying.101 He selected Private Richard Bird, a survivor from the first 
march, to join Sticpewich’s working party. Bird did not come quietly. He argued with 
Fukushima, repeatedly telling him that he was not well enough to work. Even after 
being slapped and knocked down, Bird still refused to relent but was finally beaten 
into submission. Sticpewich, who had been watching the scene, rejected Bird for his 
working party. In his testimony in the War Crimes Trial of Fukushima, Sticpewich 
explained why:  
 
I didn’t want Bird and he couldn’t do the job as it was no use having him 
climbing around the building as he was not fit for work, and for my 
insolence I was smacked over the ear and Bird sent to another party… I 
thought Bird was not fit for my party because he was very sick at the 
time.102 
 
Sticpewich’s rejection of Bird on the grounds of the latter’s ill health is plausible, yet 
needs to be considered within the context of the conditions in the camp and the 
behaviour of the Japanese guards. Sticpewich well knew that the guards would have 
watched Bird very closely and any hint that he was falling behind, or not contributing 
to the workload, would have resulted in a bashing, and perhaps, not just for Bird. By 
rejecting him as part of his working group, Sticpewich was also protecting himself. 
Fukushima accepted Sticpewich’s decision and ordered Bird onto an outside working 
party. 
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Two types of outside working parties existed: prisoners either laboured all day splitting 
wood and bamboo, or were forced to walk a six mile return trip to the Japanese food 
dump to carry bags of rice and vegetables back to Ranau.103 Fukushima assigned Bird 
to split wood and bamboo.104 He never even made it to the worksite. On the way, he 
collapsed and was unable to move.105 For more than ten minutes the prisoners watched 
as the guards kicked Bird in the testicles, head and mouth. The attack continued as the 
guards led the prisoners away. In the afternoon as his working party staggered back to 
camp, they found Bird lying unconscious where they had left him that morning. 
Carried back to camp, an MO, Captain Domenic George Picone, took one look at Bird, 
and, knowing there was nothing he could do, walked away.    
Following the completion of the prisoners’ hut, Sticpewich found another way to 
protect himself by securing a place on the cattle butchering parties.106 In this role he 
had the opportunity to obtain extra food, usually small portions of cattle stomach and 
intestines. He also had an ally in Private Takahara. As noted earlier, the two men had 
formed a close friendship at Sandakan Camp and Takahara secretly supplied 
Sticpewich with food and medical supplies at Ranau.107 It is unclear if Sticpewich kept 
these supplies for himself or shared them. What is clear, however, is that Sticpewich 
was determined to keep himself alive. 
 
Then, on 27 July 1945, Takahara warned Sticpewich that the Japanese were planning 
to execute the surviving prisoners.108 Sticpewich immediately approached Cook and 
three remaining MOs, Picone, Captain John Bernard Oakeshott and Captain Roderick 
Lionel Jeffrey, informing them of the news and offering them the opportunity to 
escape with him. All four men turned down his offer. Sticpewich did not share his 
information with any of the other prisoners. Nor did he offer any other prisoner the 
chance to escape with him. Sticpewich’s reasons were simple enough: he believed that 
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the 32 men still alive were either ‘too sick or incompetent’109 to escape. However, 
Sticpewich did not escape alone. Private Algie Reither accompanied him.110 Silver 
suggests that Sticpewich did not agree to take Reither with him out of a sense of duty, 
but rather because Oakeshott insisted that Reither be given the chance to escape.111 
The fact that five other prisoners escaped Ranau, and lived, shows that there were 
others he could have taken with him. That, and his reluctance to take Reither with him, 
suggests that his primary motivation remained his own survival. For that he was 
prepared to abandon the men at Ranau, knowing that they would be killed. 
 
The other five escapees who survived have questioned the accuracy of Sticpewich’s 
recollections.112 Even before the forced march from Sandakan Camp, according to 
Botterill and Captain Athol Motiff, an army legal officer who investigated the events 
surrounding the death marches, most of the men considered Sticpewich a traitor.113 In 
an interview with Donald Wall, Botterill suggested that had the prisoners been freed 
from Sandakan camp in January 1945, they would have killed Sticpewich.114  
 
It is, therefore possible, that in an attempt to save his reputation, Sticpewich’s evidence 
and recollections were purposely flawed, that he was attempting to construct a 
narrative that would put him in the best possible light post-war. This would explain 
some of the apparent contradictions in his behaviour. He claimed, for example, that at 
Sandakan he willingly collected food and medical supplies for the prisoners from 
civilian contacts, despite the risks involved.115 He did protest against the treatment of 
the sick prisoners on the march to Ranau. Yet, the only evidence we have of this is 
Sticpewich’s testimony, a testimony that others doubted. What is clear, however, is 
that in extreme conditions, despite his leadership position, Sticpewich preferred to 
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remain a passive observer, using his skills to give himself the best chance of making it 
home alive.  
 
The choice made by Oakes, Cook and Sticpewich as positional leaders to protect 
themselves instead of their men meant that they lost their leadership legitimacy. Even 
in volatile and extreme captive settings it seems that Australian other ranks believed 
that their officers remained responsible for their men. As far as the men in their formal 
groups were concerned, their leaders had not simply failed them: they saw their 
reversion from their responsibilities as leaders as a betrayal.116 
 
The reversion of MOs  
As noted in the previous chapter, MOs in volatile captive settings were faced with a 
moral choice when it came to discharging their professional responsibilities. Men, like 
Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt, chose to put their patients first by placing themselves 
between the sick and the captor’s demand for labour, despite the physical 
consequences that such actions could bring. Others did not. The references to these 
men are often fleeting in the sources studied for this thesis. For example, the 2/19th 
battalion history described one unnamed MO in Thailand whose treatment regime 
involved ‘a daily walk or almost run through the hospital saying “how are you, 
better?”117 On the forced marches in the European Theatre discussed in Chapters 1 and 
6, one unnamed British MO in a column from Stalag 344 chose to remain silent rather 
than report that the men in his column were suffering from exhaustion, starvation, 
dysentery and chest complaints.118 A South African MO, also from Stalag 344, went 
one step further by refusing to intervene to protect sick men from German orders to 
continue marching.119 The reasons for this choice are unknown. It is probable that the 
personal consequences of defying German orders influenced his behaviour. These men 
were never named, but in the forced march from Sandakan Camp to Ranau, Keith 
Botterill named an MO who reverted from his professional obligations.  
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On 29 January 1945, Australian MO Captain Roderick Lionel Jeffrey, left Sandakan 
Camp with the first marching party.120 Kevin Smith’s study suggests that during the 
course of the march, Jeffrey tended to the sick.121 It is unclear how Smith knows this. 
No one from this marching group survived. Nor do any of the statements, testimonies 
or recollections of the six survivors from the marching groups give any indication of 
Jeffrey’s behaviour apart from Botterill who was with Jeffrey at Ranau.122 This 
assessment of Jeffery’s behaviour is, therefore, reliant on his memories.   
 
At Ranau, Jeffrey did not immediately revert from his duties. As the only MO on the 
first march, Jeffrey tended to the sick with limited supplies, diligently kept records of 
the dead and passed this information on to the Japanese interpreter.123 Jeffrey, 
however, could do little to stem the tide of death. Approximately 180 prisoners from 
the first march reached Ranau alive.124 Most were critically ill. They suffered from 
malaria, beriberi, tropical ulcers, open sores and/or dysentery and, as noted earlier, the 
Japanese made their precarious condition worse with forced labour, starvation and 
beatings.125 On 25 April 1945, when American bombers destroyed the compound, only 
60 prisoners, including Jeffrey, were still alive.126  
 
Jeffrey spent three months at Ranau. At some point during those three months, Jeffrey 
decided to protect himself by using the only tactic available to him. In return for 
medical supplies and food, he also treated the Japanese.127 As Botterill recalled, this 
did not go down well with the prisoners: ‘[W]e used to go crook at Jeffrey’s. He told 
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us to stuff it, to mind our own business. He was doing the best for us.’128 Jeffrey may 
have convinced himself that his choice to treat the Japanese helped the formal group. 
His alliance with the Japanese provided him with some medical supplies and he 
certainly used these in part to treat the prisoners.129 Yet, this was occasional: most of 
the medical supplies were used to treat the Japanese.         
 
According to Botterill, the Australian prisoners refused to believe Jeffrey’s claim that 
he was doing his best for them.130 They expected Jeffrey to treat and comfort the sick 
prisoners, not the captor. Botterill captured the sense of animus felt by the prisoners by 
quoting Sergeant Cole Smythe: “You’re a mongrel, a bastard Doctor Jefferys [sic].’131 
When tested, Jeffrey’s had failed to lead.132 
 
Jeffrey’s attempt to save himself proved futile. On 6 May 1945, suffering from acute 
beriberi, Jeffrey joined the growing list of the dead.133 When word of his death spread, 
the prisoners descended on his hut.134 They looted his supplies and then attempted to 
treat each other. Using surgical instruments, they split open each other’s carbuncles. 
Some gave the sickest men injections and distributed to all the prisoners Jeffrey’s 
supplies of the anti-malaria drug, quinine. This crude attempt at treatment proved too 
little, too late.  When survivors from the second march reached Ranau, of the 470 
Australian and British prisoners who had left Sandakan on the first march, only six 
were still alive.135    
 
The reasons why Jeffrey chose to abandon his professional and leadership 
responsibilities, of course, can never be known. The extreme captive conditions, the 
hopeless task of treating the sick with few medical supplies and the brutality of the 
captor may have triggered his reversion. If Botterill is any guide, the prisoners had a 
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very different view. They maintained that, as MO, Jeffrey’s behaviour should have 
been uncompromising. Jeffrey was the only one with the skills to treat the sick and 
ease pain at the first Ranau Compound. As far as they were concerned, this should 
have made him the leader of the damned. His reversion, however, denied the 
Australians the chance to die amongst the collective structure of compassion and 
humanity. As a MO, Jeffrey could have offered this dynamic to the group as other 
MOs had, but his reversion from his responsibility demonstrated that he was unwilling 
to accept it. Instead, he chose to save himself, a choice that Botterill could neither 
forgive nor forget.  
 
Self-preservation at the group level 
In the two volatile and one extreme captive setting examined in this thesis, it was the 
informal group dynamic that drove the groups. Friendships, mateship and mutual 
interest networks fed into the group ethic of collective survival and encouraged a sense 
of loyalty to the group. Although the majority of men remained loyal to the group, 
some did not. The references to these men are often fleeting, but where they exist, they 
are stinging because prisoners who put themselves above the collective group risked 
other men’s lives.  
 
Four responses emerged amongst prisoners who chose to put their own survivorship 
above their loyalties to the collective survivorship of their group: feigning or 
exaggerating illness, pretending to have completed a work quota, stealing from other 
prisoners and withdrawal from the group.   
 
Feigning or exaggerating illness was found in groups working on the Burma-Thailand 
Railway and the forced marches in Germany. (The men who tried this tactic on the 
marches from Sandakan to Ranau ran the risk of being shot by the Japanese.)136 For 
example, Major Albert Ernest Saggers’ diary noted that on the march from Bampong 
to Malaya Hamlet, some Australians attached to H Force, overwhelmed with the 
conditions, sat down and refused to move. These men claimed that they were ill and 
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could go no further.137 Sagger’s writings described his failure to resolve the problem 
and the one element that did resolve it.  
 
I would scold, growl, entreat, sympathise, encourage and beg of them to 
rise, but I might have spoken to the Sphnix [sic] – they just lay there like 
dead men, but immediately a Jap grunted at them they were up like a 
shot.138 
 
Russell Braddon experienced a similar dilemma on the march to Malaya Hamlet. On 
the second day of the march, he and his mate, Roy, came across Smokey who refused 
to get up. He explained to Braddon that he could not move his legs. Braddon and his 
mate, who was suffering from dysentery, carried the prisoner between them. Two 
hours later they caught up with the end of their marching column and found MO Kevin 
Fagan. Fagan replaced Roy and then suddenly stopped. The sick prisoner fell to the 
ground. Fagan instructed Braddon to ‘kick him in the seat of the pants. Hard.’139 
Dumbfounded, Braddon refused. Fagan, however, did.  
 
Impatiently Fagan strode over to the prostrate Smokey and applied a 
vigorous boot in his paralysed posterior. With a howl of pain, all symptoms 
of paralysis suddenly vanished. Smokey leapt to his feet and fled. ‘Playing 
possum’, Fagan explained. Roy Death looked rueful. ‘Guess that’s the 
easiest couple of hours march he’d ever had.’140  
 
As far as Saggers was concerned, men like these were ‘the scum of the AIF’141 The 
writings and recollections of prisoners in this captive setting, irrespective of what 
Work Force they were attached to, shared Saggers’ opinion.142 Men who feigned or 
exaggerated illness risked other men’s lives by forcing men, who were often sicker 
than the prisoner attempting to protect himself, to take the malingerer’s place on a 
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working party or expend more energy in an attempt to provide the ‘sick’ with 
protection while on the march.    
 
Fagan’s attitude towards Smokey, of course, was not unique. In camps where MOs 
assumed a self-sacrificial leadership style, the selfishness of men who feigned or 
exaggerated illness was not tolerated. For example, Barlow described the reaction of 
his doctor to a prisoner who ‘fainted’ on the work parade.  
 
There was one chap who was a known bludger. When they were lined up 
to go [to work] he threw a faint. The Dr had a look at him and went and got 
a bucket of cold water and threw it over him. He sat up and the Dr said 
now you will go as I am not sending a sick man to die in your place.143  
 
Feigning illness usually did not have such an impact on the survival chances of their 
group members during the forced marches in Europe. These men were usually left 
behind by their marching column either in a reception camp, another POW camp or in 
the nightly billet, sometimes under guard. Sometimes entire informal groups decided to 
feign illness to stay together.144 Feigned or genuine illness sometimes led to the 
separation of informal groups, with some group’s members finding themselves alone 
and having to join a new group, if other prisoners were willing to let them.145 Warrant 
Officer David Radke, for example, had little trouble finding a new group when his 
mate, Tom, left the marching column.146 He quickly found two fellow Australians 
willing to absorb him into their informal group. Tom Collins, who also found himself 
alone on the march, also used his nationality to merge into a new group of Australian 
POWs.147 Other men were not so lucky, remaining isolated for the rest of the march.148  
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Pretending to have completed a work quota was unique to the Burma-Thailand 
Railway. On the construction site, a working party was allocated a daily quota that was 
then subdivided into a quota for each member of a working group. Some prisoners 
devised ways to avoid their quota. This tactic inevitably meant that the other workers 
in their party had to complete their own quota and make up the shortfall. As noted in 
the previous chapter, the men in the working parties had no hesitation in doing extra 
work for the sick or the weak, but they had little time for the malingers as Parkin’s 
writings show:  
 
Today has been particularly bad, we got mixed with a lazy crowd of low 
morale who cloak their laziness with an affected patriotism that they will 
do as little as possible for the enemy. It doesn’t trouble them that what they 
don’t do will fall on their mates.149 
 
Stealing food and the personal belongings was evident across all captive settings. The 
theft of personal items had an emotional impact on the victim of the theft,150 but in the 
volatile conditions experienced on the Burma-Thailand Railway and, to a lesser extent, 
during the forced marches in Europe, the theft of food threatened group cohesion.   
 
Ray Parkin, Samuel Barlow, Major A. Thompson and Lance Corporal K. Hayes’ 
writings note how their informal groups struggled to remain civil with each other when 
they became desperate for food.151 Mates bickered with each other and closely 
monitored each mouthful of food each group member received to ensure a fair 
distribution. Those who stole food, however, became outcasts and were ostracised by 
the group. Parkin recorded one such example.  
 
Izzy, the 18-year-old seaman who had a plum job in the Japanese kitchens (see Chapter 
6) also stole food from his mates’ tents when they were working.152 At Hintok Road 
Camp, when his health deteriorated, he spent time in the hospital lines.153 He was 
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replaced in the kitchen by one of Parkins’ group, Jim, a man who was sicker than 
Izzy.154 Izzy assumed that once he recovered, he would return to his job. As Parkin 
recorded, it was not to be.     
  
Izzy came out of hospital yesterday and went down to the Nip engineer’s 
kitchen for his job back. Jim flared up at him. He called Izzy everything. 
Izzy whined back, ‘Well, I’m entitled, I don’t want to go out and work in 
the jungle.’ Jim had to be held back from bashing him. ‘You ---- What 
about the others more sick than you have been – they’ve got to go out 
while crawling bastards like you (with a good pair of boots) stay in. Why 
don’t you take your bloody turn.’155 
 
Izzy’s behaviour deteriorated from this point. He begged for cigarettes. Then he traded 
some of the food he had stolen for more cigarettes. Despite threats from his mates to 
‘half-kill him’, Izzy’s behaviour did not change. In the end, the group refused to have 
him in their camp.156 Izzy’s story matches Bettelheim’s and Cohen’s models described 
in Chapter 1: he was rejected by the group because he had betrayed his mates by 
stealing food but could not survive without the group.157 As described in Chapter 6, it 
was only when he was dying that his behaviour improved and he was forgiven by his 
mates.  
 
For some prisoners, however, the theft of food could never be forgiven. On the march 
from Sandakan to Ranau, one of the Australians in Botterill’s party was forced to carry 
an excessive load of stores. When this prisoner began to fall behind, Botterill’s mate, 
Private Richard Murray went to help him.158 Botterill talked Murray out of it. In an 
interview with Donald Wall he explained why. At Sandakan Camp, this prisoner had, 
like Izzy, stolen food. Botterill described him as ‘the greatest bastard in the 
world…[he] used to sit outside the kitchen all night and…knock food off.’159 For 
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Botterill, this act of betrayal, even when the perpetrator faced certain death, could not 
be forgiven. 
 
During the volatile conditions created by the forced marches in the European Theatre, 
particularly those from Poland during the winter of 1944-1945, Australian POW Snow 
Campbell recalled that his marching group had ‘reached a stage of almost the limit of 
human endurance.’160 In these conditions, prisoners stole food from each other. Some 
prisoners, such as Australian Flight Lieutenant R. Bethal, described these acts as 
merely ‘petty theft amongst kreigies.’161 Other men recorded what was stolen without 
making further comment. For example, Australian Flight Lieutenant Alfred Playfair 
noted on February 1 1945, ‘incidents of biscuits stolen.’162 In his interview with the 
Australians at War Film Archive project, Flying Officer Herbert Edward Dawson 
explained his mental state regarding the allocation of food on the forced marches: ‘It 
doesn’t matter about my mate, as long as I got something.’163  
  
Withdrawal from the group took three basic forms: men could isolate themselves from 
the larger group by forming sub-groups with the larger body of men, men could 
withdraw physically from the group as the men who dropped out of the forced marches 
did in Europe, hoping to hide until liberation, and men could escape.  
 
The volatile conditions endured by the men on the forced marches in Europe, led to the 
larger formal groups breaking down into subgroups or pairings based on a sense of 
loyalty to a best mate or mates. Considering the suddenness with which the marches 
were organised, and the ad hoc nature of the formation of the multi-national and multi-
service marching columns, the men believed that these subgroups offered a better 
chance of survival. In effect, they adapted the notion of collective survivorship to a 
smaller group setting. As Bloch, Luchterhand and Des Pres have argued, in some 
circumstances it was better for a few to look after each other, than a larger group trying 
to collectively survive.  
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For example, on the march from Stalag XXA at Thorn, British signalman G. Manners 
explained how he and his mate isolated themselves from the chaos of the march. ‘JH 
and I in good shape, but many tempers getting frayed and many unkind things said, so 
we are keeping as much to ourselves as possible in this struggling mess of 
humanity.’164 Australian RAAF POW Warrant Officer Rex Alan Austin and his mate 
Reg Tyce also formed an exclusive pairing.165 To survive the march, these men 
constantly switched roles of provider, motivator and organiser. Australian Air Force 
Warrant Officers R. Cantillion, Gordon Castle and John Kean’s writings reinforce the 
view that in smaller groups, Australian prisoners on the march in Europe, found a way 
to cope with the volatile conditions: ‘As muckers we three are doing fairly well as 
compared to others and have managed to stick [together] and help each other 
remarkably well.’166 These subgroups lasted for the duration of the march.    
 
For some prisoners marching in columns where their guards either turned a blind eye 
to, or did not severely punish, prisoners who either attempted to, or did, drop out of the 
marching column, this option seemed to promise their best chance of surviving.167 
Corporal Raymond Stewart Middleton was one. In his interview with the Australians at 
War Film Archives project, he stated that when his foot injury meant he could not keep 
up with the rest of the men, he planned to leave the march.168 His mate, however, 
would not join him, and Middleton left him with the column. Middleton’s decision to 
leave the column on his own was rare. Unless prisoners were desperately ill, most men 
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dropped out of the march either in pairs or small groups.169 Very few, such as 
Middleton, felt confident enough to take this risk alone.    
 
As explained in Chapter 6, on the Burma-Thailand Railway, once the prisoners 
understood their new routine of labour, violence and sickness, informal group loyalty 
became essential for physical and psychological survival. Overwhelmingly, prisoners’ 
writings and recollections emphasise that in these small informal groups, mates 
physically helped each other or even bullied into each into survival.170 However, 
despite this overwhelming metanarrative, there are some examples of informal groups 
fracturing to the point where some group members believed that withdrawal from the 
group would ensure their personal survival. Izzy was one. 
 
Others simply chose to die. Signalman James Ling’s mate made this choice. Nothing 
Ling did or said made a difference. Ling remembers this decision not with anger, but 
with awe. ‘Fancy just having the guts to decide you were going to do that.’171 Barlow 
also saw men make the same choice. Most of these men, he believed ‘died as though 
their heart was broken.’172 Cyril Gilbert, however, had another explanation: ‘If you 
didn’t have a mate you died. If you didn’t have somebody to look after you or you look 
after them.’173 For some of these men, it is possible that they had pushed their informal 
group members away, or had been banished by their group for their survivalist 
behaviour, or had been separated from their mates, either by Japanese orders or by 
death. Bombardier Philip Relf, however, thought that the drive for personal survival 
was the dominant response of men to captivity, trumping even mateship:   
 
To a prisoner, self becomes all-important. It is yourself who must survive. 
That philosophy is above even mateship…Very few men would give up his 
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life for a mate if the actual pinch came. The ‘alone-ness’ of a man was 
starkly revealed.174 
  
There is no doubt that some of the men who dropped out of the forced marches in 
Europe did so with the intention of escaping. Generally speaking, their motivations 
mirrored those of the men who were part of the escapes discussed earlier in this thesis, 
a desire for freedom. In the extreme captive setting of the forced marches in Borneo, 
however, the motivation was very different – it was survival. Escape could be an act 
entirely motivated by self-preservation, as Sticpewich’s escape clearly was. He knew 
of the coming massacre. Other escapes by an individual could also be seen in the same 
light. Yet, small groups of men also planned and undertook their escape as the 
conditions endured by the prisoners began to undermine the notion of collective 
survival and the Japanese intentions as to the fate of the prisoners became clear. 
Escape, then, is the most complex of the withdrawal examples studied in this thesis 
because it could range from the clearly selfish to the only choice left for men in an 
extreme captive environment. The following case studies reflect those complexities, 
complexities evident in the literature analysing the behaviour of groups in extreme 
situations discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
The number of men who attempted to escape alone during the forced marches from 
Sandakan to Ranau is unknown. Many may have tried and failed, but Gunner James 
Braithwaite succeded.175 In his interrogation and repatriation statement, Braithwaite 
stated, ‘I took to the jungle and from there I lay all day until afternoon thinking…and I 
decided that I had nothing to lose and would try and make the end of the river for I 
knew the PT boats were near LUBAK [sic].’176  After five days crawling along the 
riverbank and then crossing the river, Braithwaite stumbled across local people who 
nursed him and then, once they thought it was safe, carried him to Allied forces. At no 
point in Braithwaite’s statement or interrogation did he explain why he chose to escape 
alone. In one sense, his escape could be seen as self-centred as Sticpewich’s had been, 
believing that he was more likely to survive by cutting himself off from the group. It is 
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interesting, then, to note that it was Sticpewich, not Braithwaite, who in the aftermath 
of the war, was labelled as the only Sandakan survivor who abandoned the group to 
ensure self-survival. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Braithwaite was not a 
leader, but was one of the other ranks.  
 
The more common escape attempts, however, were made by the subgroups referred to 
earlier, although even then the basic instinct of self-preservation could come into play.    
 
At Ranau Number 1 Jungle Camp, Gunners Walter Crease and Albert Cleary escaped, 
but were recaptured by local villagers and returned to the Japanese.177 The Japanese 
tortured both men as an object lesson. Somehow, Crease escaped a second time, 
leaving Cleary behind.178 The Japanese stripped Cleary naked, tied him up, suspended 
him off the ground, starved, beat and urinated on him daily. This went on for 10 days 
before the Japanese cut him down. According to Botterill, it was not only the physical 
punishment that killed him. Having been abandoned by his mate, he also died of ‘a 
broken heart’.179 Crease was found and executed by the Japanese.  
 
After six days on the march from Sandakan POW Camp, Gunner Owen Colin 
Campbell, Corporal Edward Victor Emmett, Private Sidney Arthur Webber, Private 
Edward Kenneth Skinner and Private Keith Hamilton Costin planned their escape.180 
Their opportunity came when American planes dropped bombs near their marching 
group on 6 June 1945. As their guards and the other prisoners sought cover, these men 
stumbled in a different direction into the jungle. For four days these men attempted to 
trek further into the jungle. By following this route, the group hoped to avoid the 
Japanese. However, because they were so sick, their pace often slowed to a literal 
crawl. On the fourth day, Skinner stopped moving. Even after a few days’ rest, 
Skinner’s health had not improved. At this point the group fractured; Emmett, Webber 
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and Costin kept going, while Campbell, suffering from malaria and beriberi, stayed 
with Skinner. Skinner urged Campbell to leave him and go with the others. Campbell 
refused to listen. Then, on their second day alone, when Campbell went down to the 
river to collect water, Skinner cut his own throat. In his repatriation statement, 
Campbell had no doubts as to what his mate’s suicide meant.   
 
Before this he [Skinner] had tried to persuade me that I should go on and 
that there was no hope for him. There have been other men who have done 
the same thing that my mate did, but there have been none braver... I 
buried him and then pushed on.181 
 
Of the five men in this sub-group, only Campbell survived.182 Costin died from 
malaria. The Japanese shot Emmett and Webber as they hailed a passing native canoe.   
 
The last of the case studies in this section is the subgroup that included men from 
Ranau whose precarious health, in Sticpewich’s opinion, would have compromised his 
own attempt to survive.183 On 7 July 1945, Lance Bombardier William Moxham, 
Privates Keith Botterill and Nelson Short, and Driver Andrew Anderson escaped.184 
According to Botterill, these men agreed to escape before they became too weak to 
make an attempt to flee. They decided not to discuss their plans with Cook because 
‘we were afraid he may report us.’185 They asked ‘a lot of men to come with us,’186 but 
those they asked were ‘either too weak or frightened to come after seeing the treatment 
that had been meted out to Crease and Cleary.’187 In his interview with Donald Wall, 
Nelson Short tells a different story. Initially, Short had doubts about escaping. 
Suffering from beriberi and ulcers on his feet, he was almost convinced by other 
Australian prisoners that his best hope of survival was to wait to be rescued. In the end 
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it was the importance of collectivism which made him decide to go. ‘I think I’ll go 
with mob’, he said.188 Three succeeded because local villagers helped them: the fourth, 
Anderson, died from illness.189   
 
In terms of the captive environments in which POWs found themselves, Sandakan was 
the most extreme. In that sense, then, it throws into sharp relief the way that a primeval 
desire to survive could come into play because these prisoners were not faced with a 
threat to life but with the certainty that their captor intended to take it. Braithwaite 
escaped alone, Sticpewich wanted to, yet the other examples discussed above involved 
men acting together, an indication that although the notion of collective survival had 
long gone within the larger groups, as Botterill found when trying to get other men to 
join him, it was still evident at the subgroup level for some of the prisoners. Yet even 
then, the instinct for self-preservation was strong. Crease abandoned Cleary and 
Emmett, Webber and Costin abandoned Skinner and Campbell.  
 
For the most part, Australian informal groups remained loyal to each other in the 
volatile and extreme captive settings examined in this thesis. It was rare for men to put 
their own survival above that of their mates. It did, however, happen. This chapter 
demonstrates that an individualist response emerged out of four themes; feigning or 
exaggerating illness, pretending to have completed a work quota, stealing from other 
prisoners and withdrawing from the group that included escape. Of these themes all 
but one, escape, reflected an individual’s choice to try and protect themselves from 
harm, even if this meant putting the lives of other prisoners at risk. Escape was more 
complex. It was adopted for both personal survival and group survival. The men in the 
forced marches in Europe believed it offered them the chance to wait until the Allies 
found them, away from the danger of their German guards. In essence their choice 
reflected the desire for freedom. In the jungle of Borneo, only the men who 
successfully escaped survived this extreme setting, whether they escaped alone or as 
part of an informal group. Yet their desire to live meant that they had to leave others 
prisoners behind, including for some men, their mates.      
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Historians’ examination of the Australian captive experience in the Second World War 
has not been conducted as a shared narrative across the European and Pacific Theatres. 
Instead, as explained in the Introduction, historians have examined the experience of 
Australian POWs in this conflict through the structural device of captor and 
location.190 This thesis has, through a series of case studies, united the experience of 
Australian POWs through the structure of leadership which existed in two different 
group structures; formal and informal. In formal groups positional leaders, by virtue of 
their rank, retained legal control over their men, regardless of the captive conditions. 
Informal groups, which largely consisted of mates who trained, fought and then were 
captured together, became the most important leadership structure in the day-to-day 
interaction of POWs. In examining these two leadership structures, this thesis has 
drawn attention to the similarities and differences of positional, professional and 
emergent leaders’ styles, interaction with the captor and ability to manage and assist 
their formal or informal group cope with their captive conditions. From this 
examination and analysis one fundamental difference emerged that affected the 
operation and status of leaders; the captive conditions. The difference between the 
relative stable, volatile and extreme captive settings in Europe and in the Pacific 
Theatre meant that while distinct differences have been observed in this thesis on the 
Australian POW leadership experience, such as the application of specific styles of 
leadership, expectations placed on leaders in their interactions with the captor and 
control of their men in order to advance survivorship, similarities did exist.   
 
Ultimately regardless of the type of captive conditions, Australians expected their 
positional leaders to maintain their leadership responsibilities. This manifested itself in 
two forms; positional leaders had to present their formal groups’ needs to the captor, 
regardless of the personal risk this posed. They also had to retain a cohesive formal 
group to ensure a collective mentality to help their men cope with their POW status 
and conditions and establish the legitimacy of their leadership. According to Australian 
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POWs, therefore, the new setting of captivity had done nothing to lessen rank 
responsibilities. In fact, captivity had sharpened positional leaders’ obligations to serve 
their men’s best interests.  
 
In the setting of captivity, serving the men’s best interest meant that positional leaders 
needed to be adaptable. As acknowledged in the Introduction, it was, for most leaders, 
impossible to retain one single leadership style for the duration of their captive 
experience. This thesis has, therefore, examined the predominant leadership style used 
by leaders in their interactions with their men and captors. It was through their 
application of a leadership style that their formal groups understood how their leaders 
perceived their responsibilities in captivity and managed these tasks. The group’s 
observations of these tasks then allowed them to assess their positional leader’s ability 
to serve the formal group’s needs and accord them leadership legitimacy or declare 
them a failed leader.  
 
Four styles of leadership were evaluated in this thesis; authoritarian, transformational, 
democratic and self-sacrificial. Authoritarian leadership, the traditional regulatory 
military leadership style, was the most common style applied by positional leaders. It 
is based on the traditional military hierarchical model of controlling subordinates 
through orders. This leadership style works in times of peace, training and battle 
because of the operation of a regulatory disciplinary system that supports the orders of 
higher-ranking officers. In captivity, this supporting regulatory system ceases to exist 
because the positional leader is subservient in authority and power to the captor. 
Positional leaders who recognised this limitation, like Captain Reginald William 
James Newton, adapted their leadership structures to ensure that they could still retain 
leadership legitimacy amongst their formal group.  
 
Having endured 60 hours of interrogation by the Japanese upon capture, Newton had 
no illusions about the true nature of his status as a POW or the capabilities of his 
captor. Newton, therefore, understood that, in captivity, positional leaders were first 
and foremost responsible for the collective survivorship of their men. To achieve this 
leadership goal, Newton realised that more than a traditional regulatory military 
leadership style would be required. Newton tested his leadership style at Pudu Jail 
where he learnt that a combination of innovation, resourcefulness and offering himself 
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in lieu of one of his men for physical punishment were the best ways that he could 
achieve collective survival. Having learnt these essential leadership skills, Newton 
came into his own in Thailand. Through his unorthodox techniques with civilian 
contacts and his staunch opposition to his captors, Newton achieved the lowest death 
rate of any battalion leader on the Burma-Thailand Railway. Newton was only able to 
use these techniques because he had absolute control over his men, a control he 
achieved because the men trusted his judgement and because they understood that 
Newton would do everything he could to ensure that as many men as possible 
survived. This leadership goal led not merely to leadership legitimacy, but to loyal 
followership.  
 
Newton accepted that he had to adapt his leadership goals and methods to achieve his 
goal of collective survival to suit the structures of captivity. Newton did have the 
advantage of being in charge of a small static formal group and he was a Captain. His 
junior rank may have meant that he did not have an ingrained sense of duty to 
regulatory procedures. In contrast Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Gallagher Galleghan 
refused to compromise the integrity of military regulations. For him, captivity did not 
diminish or even slightly change military protocol or regulations. Instead, captivity 
was a new military setting, similar to a training camp. Therefore, he saw no need to 
change his traditional authoritarian leadership style and maintained military 
regulations, including officer privileges, discipline and Court Martials, and 
imprisonment for those men who breached his orders. His early victory with Malaya 
Command against the Japanese Commandant during the Serlang Barrack Square 
Incident in Changi affirmed, in Galleghan’s mind, that traditional authoritarian 
leadership was the only response necessary to captivity.  
 
Galleghan’s refusal to adapt his leadership style to the reality of his POW status meant 
that, with the exception of some of the favoured officers and men from his own 2/30th 
Battalion, Galleghan never acquired leadership legitimacy behind the wire. His formal 
group, Changi’s prisoner population, was disturbed at his inability to adapt his 
leadership style, even when conditions in Changi deteriorated. For the duration of his 
time as a POW leader Galleghan faced opposition from his formal group. Men 
subversively then openly questioned his orders. When the men from H and F Working 
Forces returned to Changi barely alive, many men who had previously put up with 
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Galleghan’s authoritarian leadership style, now refused to humour him. Their sole 
concern at this point was not Galleghan’s perception of his leadership authority, but 
their own survival. Irrespective of the acute needs of his men, Galleghan, refused to 
adapt his leadership style. Even when the Japanese forcibly separated Galleghan from 
his formal group, he still tried to control the Australians, something he had not been 
able to achieve when he was in the same compound.  
 
In contrast to Newton, Galleghan did have a more difficult formal group. It was a 
considerably larger and dynamic group, with men who were coming in and out of his 
charge. Yet, Galleghan’s uncompromising traditional authoritarian leadership style 
reveals a leader who failed to acknowledge the reality of his status as a POW and the 
risks confronting his men. Unlike Newton, who adapted his leadership goal to suit the 
challenges of his captive settings, Galleghan refused to acknowledge that anything had 
changed. Followership, therefore, was not a priority for Galleghan. His rank was 
enough, in his eyes, to retain his position as a legitimate leader, regardless of what his 
men thought.   
 
British Squadron Leader Roger Bushell was an emergent leader who also used an 
authoritarian leadership style. In the relatively stable setting of air force officer camps 
in Germany, Bushell based his leadership status on a scheme for a mass escape. This 
leadership goal resonated with the men of Stalag Luft III North Compound who, bored 
with life behind wire, wanted to be part of something that might also allow them a slim 
chance of regaining their freedom. The desire of these men to be part of a scheme 
which would fill their days with a genuine purpose, combined with Bushell’s past 
escape record which had elevated him to the status of hero, allowed him to use an 
authoritarian leadership style. 
 
Bushell’s leadership reveals that in relatively stable captive settings, if a prisoner had a 
special skill and his scheme offered the formal group a distraction, men would not only 
listen to him, but were willing to follow his orders. Bushell’s past success allowed him 
to acquire leadership legitimacy, and the scope of his plan allowed his followership to 
be maintained throughout the two years of preparations. For the men who believed in 
his cause, rank was irrelevant to his status as a legitimate leader and his acquirement of 




Bushell’s authoritarian leadership, however, must be understood in its proper context. 
His authoritarian leadership style, even his leadership goal, would never have been 
accepted without the achievements of Wing Commander Harry Melville Arbuthnot 
Day who introduced intelligence and escape work into British/Commonwealth air 
force camps in Germany and its occupied territories. Bushell used Day’s escape 
network system and the prisoners’ acceptance of Day’s transformational leadership 
(see below) to launch and sustain enthusiasm for his escape scheme. Bushell himself 
recognised the limits to his leadership legitimacy. He realised that as an emergent 
leader, he did not exercise absolute power over his men. Day, along with SBO Group 
Captain Herbert Massey, who were his superior officers, were the only two prisoners 
who could reason with and over-ride Bushell. The inclusion of a ballot in selecting 
second tiered escapers, instead of allowing Bushell to select those who should be given 
the opportunity to escape as he had wanted, provides evidence of Day and Massey’s 
ability to place limitations on Bushell’s authoritarian planning of the Great Escape.   
 
Authoritarian leadership in captivity, therefore, only worked if the formal group 
recognised and accepted that their leader’s goal was genuine. For this to happen, the 
leader had to acknowledge the reality of his captive status and adapt his leadership 
goal to suit the circumstances. If this failed to happen, as it did with Galleghan, the 
leader failed to gain leadership legitimacy and was considered a hindrance, not a help, 
to the formal group’s collective purpose.  
 
Of all the different types of leaders examined in this thesis it is Day that best fulfils the 
requirements of James Burns’ model of a transformational leader.191 Day’s 
organisation of intelligence and escape activities in air force officer camps in Germany 
and its occupied territories, combined with his participation in these schemes, inspired 
not only his men, but prisoners in other camps to reconsider their status as prisoners. 
The relatively stable captive settings of the Stalag Luft camps, combined with Day’s 
gregarious personality and his utmost belief in, and dedication to, his cause allowed 
Day to empower passive prisoners by convincing them that they were still active 
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servicemen, even behind the wire (a belief Galleghan shared but failed to translate into 
an effective policy behind the wire).    
 
Day began this quest for personal reasons. He found life as a POW intolerable and, 
captured two weeks into the war, felt like a failure. In Dulag Luft, Day coped with 
these feelings by secretly laying the foundation for what would become an escape 
organisation. Over a period of almost 12 months, Day became consumed by his task. 
Yet, he kept it secret from most of the men in the camp. Not knowing the reasons for 
his apparent cordial relations with his captors, to most men Day’s actions looked like 
those of a collaborator. In hindsight Day realised his mistake and at Stalag Luft I went 
about rectifying it by transforming his escape organisation into a transparent operation. 
In this way he regained the trust of his formal group and acquired leadership 
legitimacy.  
 
The extent to which Day’s leadership goal became shared by not only his, but also 
other formal groups, provides insight into the extent to which prisoners, inspired by his 
leadership goal, changed their perception of their status as a POW. Day’s personality 
had a lot to do with this. In contrast to Bushell, Day was a charmer, able to put both 
officers and men of any nationality, including the enemy, at ease. The ability of Day to 
win over so many different men to his cause, despite his shaky start, is evidence of his 
integrity, an essential prerequisite for any legitimate leader in captivity.   
 
The relative stable captive conditions in Europe, in comparison to the volatile and 
extreme captive settings in the Pacific, meant that some leadership styles were 
particular to one theatre. The relative stable captive conditions of Air Force NCO 
compounds, combined with the absence of a hierarchical authority amongst these 
captives, meant that democratic leadership, the antithesis of military hierarchal 
authority, became the predominant style of two successful air force NCO leaders. In 
the Pacific, the volatile and extreme settings meant that professional and emergent 
leadership were forced to adopt a self-sacrificial leadership style to achieve their 
leadership goals of collective survive.  
 
Scottish Air Force NCO Sergeant James “Dixie” Deans and Australian Warrant 
Officer Alistair McGregor Currie both adopted a democratic leadership style. It is 
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important to understand that these men did not choose this leadership style on their 
own initiative. Instead both men understood that it accurately reflected their leadership 
status authority. Air force NCOs did not have a hierarchical rank system. The absence 
of a hierarchical culture, combined with the practice of electing their leaders, meant 
that these groups would not consent to their leader adopting an authoritarian style, an 
attitude reinforced by the fact that the NCOs were housed in their own compound.  
 
In their respective POW camps, Deans and Currie managed to find the right balance 
between including their formal group members in their decision making process while 
also acting as a leader. It is no coincidence that in the performance of this task both 
men adopted a similar leadership model based on different layers of collective, barrack 
and national consultation. Through these consultative layers Deans and Currie were 
aware of the different opinions, interests and perspectives of their formal group 
members. This knowledge empowered them to deal swiftly with any complaints or 
suspicions before any rumours threatened their leadership authority and legitimacy.  
 
In and of itself, however, a consultative leadership model alone was not enough to 
secure leadership legitimacy. Deans and Currie also had to transfer some of their 
authority to another important leadership structure in their camps; the escape 
committee. Both leaders carefully used escape and, Deans also used intelligence work, 
in a controlled manner to contain the increasing levels of boredom and frustration 
amongst their formal group members. By allowing this careful transfer of power, 
Deans and Currie gained a significant amount of goodwill from their formal groups. In 
this way, combined with their consultative leadership style, Deans and Currie retained 
leadership legitimacy and gained followership from their respective formal groups. 
This trust was retained on the open road during the forced marches.  
 
As noted above, in the volatile and extreme captive settings of the Pacific examined in 
this thesis, it took a special leader to gain and retain leadership legitimacy and 
followership, the self-sacrificial leader. The nature of these captive settings meant that 
a POW leader had to continuously take personal risks to advocate his formal group’s 
basic needs to the captor. Of the leaders examined in this thesis only two positional 
leaders were able to meet these challenges; Newton and Warrant Officer John William 
Kinder. As a positional leader of U Battalion D Force in Thailand, Newton’s ability to 
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accept personal risks on behalf of his men for the sake of collective survival was 
remarkable. On the Borneo death marches, Kinder accepted this risk, despite 
understanding that he would die.  
 
Kinder engaged in continuous haggling with the Japanese Lieutenant in charge of his 
marching group in an attempt to offer some protection to his sickest men. The acute 
levels of illness, starvation and exhaustion amongst his group, combined with the 
threat of the execution squads waiting to kill any prisoner who fell behind, meant that 
Kinder, despite adopting a self-sacrificial style, was never going to succeed. In time 
Kinder must have realised this. Yet despite this knowledge, he never gave up trying to 
offer some advantage or assistance to his men against the cruelty of the captor. Kinder 
used his words, his body and labour to aid his men. His persistent efforts and refusal to 
compromise his positional duties for the sake of easing his own suffering, even when 
he himself was dying, meant that his original marching group, and then his expanded 
formal group at Paginatan and Ranau, acknowledged him as their legitimate leader. In 
this most extreme captive setting, Kinder’s loyalty, humanity and dignity won the 
admiration and loyalty of exhausted, violated and heartbroken men.  
 
On the Burma-Thailand Railway, professional leaders filled in the void when 
positional leaders were unwilling or unable to protect and lead their formal groups. 
This thesis has defined professional leaders as prisoners who were able to offer 
particular skills to help formal groups physically and/or psychologically within the 
context of their captive setting. To be acknowledged as a leader, a prisoner had to 
regularly offer these skills as part of his leadership goal and the formal group had to 
see their relevance to a leadership goal of collective survivorship. These prerequisites 
meant that, for the most part, professional leaders were MOs. Some practicing/acting 
chaplains also fulfilled these requirements.    
 
The most iconic Australian self-sacrificial POW leaders on the Burma-Thailand 
Railway are the MOs. Although they all shared a sense of professional duty to use their 
medical skills to treat the sick and injured, they also differed in their motives, methods 
and success rate in protecting patients and sick, weak prisoners in their formal groups. 
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Ernest Dunlop’s choice to protect his men was largely 
fuelled by hatred and contempt for his captive’s behaviour towards his patients. Major 
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Kevin James Fagan’s motives were more akin to those of a MO willing to put his body 
between sick men and the demands of the captor because it was the right thing to do. 
Major Bruce Atlee Hunt’s behaviour was more complex. He firmly believed that his 
experience as an army MO in the First World War and inter-war years meant that by 
virtue of his experience, his word demanded respect, not only from his men but also 
from the Japanese.   
 
Despite the different motives for their behaviour, all three MOs adopted a self-
sacrificial style in attempt to gain any concession they could from the captor for their 
patients and sick men assigned to working parties. In performing this task, all three 
were regularly beaten. They each had some success and all experienced failure. Yet 
despite the poor odds and the personal risk, Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt refused to give an 
inch. For their resilience and genuine attempts to protect the most vulnerable men, all 
three MOs were acknowledged by their formal groups as leaders. Men within their 
formal groups trusted Dunlop, Fagan and Hunt unconditionally to do the right thing by 
of all the men. For this their leadership legitimacy evolved into fierce followership.  
 
Unlike the MOs, chaplains could not offer a skill that eased physical pain. Instead, for 
those who chose to listen and respect their words, chaplains offered a message of hope 
and compassion, alongside a chance to participate in religious services that brought 
comfort to some POWs. These actions alone were not enough for chaplains to be 
acknowledged as leaders. Something more beyond symbolism and words were 
necessary. The two chaplains on the Burma-Thailand examined in this thesis, in 
different ways, practiced a self-sacrificial leadership style. Major Lionel Thomas 
Marsden and Private Harry Thorpe acted above and beyond their professional duties 
and became recognised by some men within their formal groups as leaders. By 
assisting their MOs, particularly in the cholera lines, both men chose to put the needs 
of sick and dying men above their own. Here they offered comfort to the dying, last 
rites where appropriate and ensured that the dead were buried with dignity and the 
rituals associated with their beliefs. These acts also provided comfort for those 
struggling to live, particularly those with mates in the cholera lines. These men were 




Marsden and Thorpe often undervalued their contribution to their respective formal 
groups. However, the writings and recollections of survivors of H Force and U 
Battalion D Force show that their presence, teachings and choices were critical in 
enabling some Australian POWs to cope with the heartache, forced labour and 
violence of this captive setting. The classification of these men as leaders reveals that 
self-sacrificial leadership did not have to be practiced against the captor in order to 
gain followership. It was enough that they risked their lives by treating the living and 
the dying gently and with dignity.  
 
The example of self-sacrificial professional leaders inspired some positional working 
party leaders to adopt the same style. These men understood that, on the construction 
site, sick prisoners were at their most vulnerable and, in this setting, working party 
leaders were responsible for stepping between the sick prisoner and the captor. This 
thesis has demonstrated that men of different ranks and men in acting ranks assumed 
this role. Each working party leader who adopted this style had a favourite tactic, 
learning by trial and error what particular schemes best helped protect their sickest 
men and which tactics led to reprisals for not only the prisoner they were attempting to 
save, but also for themselves and the rest of their group. The legitimacy of working 
party leaders was only acquired once the men understood that their ranking officer, 
NCO or the man acting in these ranks, would be persistent in their efforts to try and 
protect them. One sole act of self-sacrifice, while undoubtedly courageous, was not 
enough to be a leader.  
 
When working party leaders failed to protect their men, or chose not to, emergent 
leaders from amongst the group could take their place. These men made a 
conscientious choice to protect the vulnerable members of their working parties, 
knowing that it would mean doing extra work and, most likely, a bashing. The men 
who continually adopted this self-sacrificial behaviour were acknowledged by their 
group as their leader. The more influential emergent leaders shaped the behavioural 
code of their group, emphasising collectivism rather than individual survival.  
 
All of the self-sacrificial leaders mentioned so far had time to understand their captive 
conditions and choose to adopt a self-sacrificial leadership style, fully aware of the 
potential consequences. Corporal Rodney Edward Breavington was different. Without 
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warning, Breavington found himself facing execution with three other POWs for his 
failed escape attempt from Malaya that had taken place four months earlier. 
Breavington’s decision to adopt a self-sacrificial leadership style, more than any other 
leader examined in this thesis, was instinctive. After he failed in his attempts to 
convince the Japanese that he alone should be executed, Breavington showed his 
fellow condemned how to die with courage and dignity, not as POWs, but as soldiers. 
The reasons for his choice can never be known. However, his story is an example of an 
exception to the observation that one sole act of courage was not enough to make a 
leader. In this immediate extreme setting, with little time left to live, Breavington’s 
behaviour demonstrates that some acts of leadership were so selfless, brave and 
powerful that they demanded instant followership.  
 
Of all the leadership styles examined in this thesis, a self-sacrificial leadership style 
was practiced by the three different types of leaders in captivity in the Pacific; 
positional, professional and emergent. This reflects the nature of this leadership style; 
self-sacrificial actions are not innately tied to positional or professional obligations but 
are the result of a moral choice by individuals to put the interests and wellbeing of 
others above their own. Adopting and maintaining this leadership style was a choice 
based on the assumption that collective survival, compassion and dignity were more 
important than personal survivorship.   
 
For Australian POWs in the Second World War, it was rare for positional leadership 
structures to collapse. In the case studies used for this thesis, it only happened in 
volatile and extreme conditions found in the Pacific. Yet even then, the reversion of 
positional leaders from their responsibilities was abhorrent to the men under their 
command. Australians expected their officers to protect them against the excesses of 
the captor, even when it meant they would get hurt or all hope of collective 
survivorship was lost.  
 
The men of Australian Battalion H Force judged Lieutenant Colonel Frank Rowland 
Oakes to be a failed leader. On most occasions Oakes choose to put his own 
survivorship above the collective interests of his formal group in Thailand. On some 
occasions, he did try to help his men but the men considered this to be an exception to 
his normal response in the volatile conditions on the Railway. Men’s writings and 
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recollections largely recall how Oakes backed down from protesting to the captor on 
behalf of his formal group when he was threatened with, or received, a bashing. For 
this choice, Oakes’ formal group were unforgiving. The contrasting self-sacrificial 
behaviour of Fagan in the same camp affirmed in the minds of most the men that 
Oakes was only concerned with his own survival and not that of his formal group.  
Even during the death marches on Borneo, Australian POWs expected their positional 
leaders to fulfil their duties. The work of Kinder demonstrates that this expectation was 
not unrealistic. For their contrasting choices, the men judged Captain George Robin 
Cook and Warrant Officer William Hector Sticpewich as traitors. For the sake of their 
own protection, Cook and Sticpewich turned their backs on their positional 
responsibilities. Sticpewich, in particular, manipulated the situation to ensure 
maximum protection for himself against the harshest work demanded of the sickest 
POWs and the inhumane cruelty experienced by dying men at the hands of the 
Japanese at Ranau. For this, the five survivors never forgave him.   
 
At Ranau Captain Roderick Lionel Jeffrey’s betrayal cut even deeper. As an MO, 
Jeffrey had the ability and skill to make sick and dying POWs as comfortable as 
possible with the limited supplies he had. Jeffrey, therefore, had the ability to give the 
men some dignity before they died. Instead, for the slim hope that he himself would be 
spared, Jeffrey turned his back on his professional and moral duties to his patients and 
treated the Japanese first. The anger the men felt towards this betrayal reveals that the 
Australian POWs firmly believed that Jeffrey’s professional and moral obligations as a 
doctor had not been lessened because of the extreme captive setting. If anything, it 
meant that Jeffrey should have tried his utmost to help them.   
 
Formal groups were the secondary social structure in the prisoners’ daily lives. 
Informal groups, based on friendships and shared experiences, were where the majority 
of the day-to-day interactions occurred within captivity. At the beginning of captivity, 
these groups consisted of the men who had trained and fought together and had then 
been captured together. They knew each other well and felt comfortable in each other’s 
company. In captivity, these men helped each other adapt to their new life as a POW. 
In relative stable captive settings, across both theatres of war, usually the most 
charismatic group members who were able to cope with their captive status assumed 
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the roles of group leaders by modelling coping strategies. These strategies included the 
use of humour, irony and daily routines to induce a sense of normalcy.  
 
In time, as conditions deteriorated and Australians were transferred to volatile captive 
settings, leadership structures within informal groups became more fluid. Informal 
group members shared leadership responsibilities with the more physically able group 
members assisting weaker group members cope with the demands of forced movement 
and labour. They also collected, bartered or stole food for their group members and 
then distributed it fairly amongst their group. This responsibility continued even when 
some group members refused to help themselves. In these circumstances, such as on 
the Burma-Thailand Railway, the more physically able group members did all they 
could to force apathetic, sick and weak men to survive.  
 
Informal group structures on the forced marches in Europe could afford to be more 
flexible than those on the Burma-Thailand Railway. The recollections and writings of 
Australians examined in this thesis reveal that group members relied on the most 
innovative and physically able members to look for extra food and devise new ways of 
easing the burden of carrying their goods, by making sleds or carts. In this volatile 
captive setting, the recollections of Australian POWs and POW from other 
nationalities who observed their behaviour on the march, reveals that even outside of 
the wire, Australians informal groups maintained democratic structures both initially 
and in their revised groups when members dropped out of the marching column 
because of illness or exhaustion.  
 
For Australian POWs, democratic informal group leadership structures, therefore, 
existed across both theatres of captivity. Irrespective of the captive setting, the purpose 
of this leadership style was the collective survivorship of all group members. In 
Borneo, however, this was to be severely tested.   
 
During the death marches to Ranau, the collective spirit of informal groups was tested 
in the most extreme circumstances. Due to the high death rate, new informal groups 
were constantly formed from those who were still alive at Paginatan and then at Ranau. 
The recollections and testimony of the six surviving prisoners revealed that, even in 
these horrific circumstances, the men tried to maintain democratic structures, with the 
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strongest trying to help and protect the weakest, and that the POWs who were still 
alive maintained a collective mentality based on group survivorship. However, when it 
became clear that the Japanese intended that none of the prisoners were meant to 
survive, escape became a survival option for some informal groups.   
 
Pairs of mates or smaller informal groups tried to escape together. It is not known how 
many men attempted to escape, but sources record four informal group attempts at 
escape. None survived in their entirety. Gunners Walter Crease and Albert Cleary, for 
example, were both killed in their attempts to escape. Sticpewich survived but his 
companion, Private Algie Reither, did not. Three survivors did come from one 
informal group; Lance Bombardier William Moxham, Privates Keith Botterill and 
Nelson Short. This group still lost one man, Driver Andrew Anderson, to illness. The 
significance of three of the six survivors from this captive setting coming from one 
informal group is important. These men were able to survive because they motivated 
each other with the will to live and physically helped each other. However, in this 
extreme setting, their informal group was not the most important reason for their 
survival. These men, who were not in the final stages of malaria, by sheer luck, 
managed to avoid Japanese patrols and found friendly natives who helped them. In 
such dire circumstances, these events proved more important than collective group 
structures for their survival.  
 
It is clear from the thesis that similarities existed across the leadership structures of 
Australia POWs in the Pacific and European Theatres of the Second World War. The 
structure of group dynamics in both formal and informal groups, and the leadership 
styles applied by positional leaders were similar, although leadership styles were 
usually applied for different purposes. For example, in the Pacific Galleghan used an 
authoritarian leadership style to control his men by applying traditional military 
regulations, while Newton used authoritarian control to maintain a sense of collective 
identity which allowed his group to cope with, and survive, the volatile conditions in 
Thailand. In Europe Bushell applied this style to recruit POWs to an escape project. 
This example demonstrates the importance of captive conditions in leaders selecting 
and applying their leadership style, while also choosing their leadership goal and the 




The difference between relative stable captive conditions in Europe and volatile and 
extreme captive settings in the Pacific meant that some leadership styles were 
particular to one theatre. For example, positional group leaders only practiced a 
democratic leadership style in Europe, while professional leaders adopted a self-
sacrificial leadership style in the Pacific, usually when their positional group leader 
had proved inept at protecting the men or chose not to place themselves at risk for their 
sake of collective survivorship.  
 
Despite the contextual differences across the European and Pacific Theatres of war, the 
ultimate test of a leader’s style was the group’s response to his behavior and decisions. 
The men’s perception of a leader’s motives, interest in and concern for his men’s 
welfare impacted on their willingness to accept their leader’s status and afford him 
leadership legitimacy and followership. To pass this test, leaders, regardless of their 
type, had to be considered genuine in their motives, understand the reality of their 
weakened power as a POW and be willing to repeatedly defy the power imbalance 
between themselves and the captor, even when this meant personal harm, to secure the 
best possible conditions and concessions for their men. Rank, medical qualifications 
and/or courage, therefore, was not enough to be accorded the status of a leader in 
captivity.  
 
Some leaders, such as Newton, Deans and Day, relished these tasks. Others like 
Kinder, Dunlop, Fagan, Hunt, Marsden, Thorpe and Breavington, persevered despite 
their fear and often anger. Cook, Sticpewich, Jeffreys and Oakes, to different degrees, 
according to their men, failed in these tasks. With the exception of Galleghan, these 
ranking officers and NCO along with one MO, choose to put their own survivorship 
above the needs of their formal group. For this choice, their men refused to 
acknowledge them as leaders in captivity. Galleghan’s leadership choices were 
different to the other failed leaders. His men, while grudgingly accepting his authority, 
even as conditions deteriorated within Changi, refused to adapt his leadership style to 
the realities of the new captive setting. For his rigid application of regulatory military 
discipline, he failed to gain leadership legitimacy and therefore followership. Like the 
other failed leaders, his men did not trust that he would put their interests above his 




The inconsistencies of formal group leadership meant that, across both theatres and 
captive conditions, informal groups not only existed, but also provided an important 
alternative leadership structure when conditions required it. Mates helped each other 
persevere and survive. For some Australians in volatile and in particular, extreme 
captive settings, informal groups became the only leadership structure left. In these 
settings, despite the overwhelming fear and innate survivalist instinct of each man left 
alive, informal groups remained intact and were, therefore, valued by the men.   
 
This thesis has explored one aspect of the captive experience of Australians during the 
Second World War across both theatres of war – leadership. Yet, as noted in the 
Introduction, it is only one aspect of the research linking the captive experience of 
POWs that is needed when it comes to exploring the possibilities raised by Bob Moore, 
Kent Fedorowich, Gerhard Hirschfeld, Peter Romijn, Pieter Lagrou and Hank Nelson 
in their call for further studies that incorporate both theatres of war in their analysis. 
Two areas that this research has raised are whether any Australian national 
characteristics influenced leader or follower behaviour and the captors’ views of 
Australian and Allied leaders.  
 
The belief that nationality impacted on leadership style is a complex phenomenon. The 
nature of the captive setting, the personality of the leader, his group goal and 
perception of duty, all contributed to a leader’s ability to fulfil the quintessential 
qualities of the Australian soldier as explored in works by Jane Ross and John 
Laffin.192 And it is clear from the writings and recollections of Australian POWs in the 
Pacific that the POWs believed that a positional, professional or emergent leader’s 
nationality could make a difference to the way they lead their men. Russell Braddon, 
Raymond Parkin, Tom Uren and Edward Ernest Dunlop, for example, stress in their 
writings the unique characteristics of the resilient Australian who, with an 
understanding of mateship, adopted a leadership style which aimed to protect all group 
members from further harm. In contrast, positional leaders such as Cook and Oates, 
who chose to protect themselves, failed not just as leaders but also as Australians in the 
eyes of their men.  
                                                          
192J. Laffin, Digger: The Legend of the Australian Soldier, Second Edition, (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 





Studies by POW historians in both the Pacific and European theatres have noted the 
importance and pride Australian prisoners took in being different to POWs of other 
nationalities.  
 
In his study of Australian POWs held captive on the Burma-Thailand Railway, Nelson 
argues that a unique national character enabled Australian informal groups to cope 
better with the volatile conditions of imprisonment than other informal groups 
compromised of different nationalities, in particular the British and the Dutch. The 
ability of Australian POWs to risk their survivorship in order to look after each other is 
also noted by Daws, who contrasts the behaviour of American, British and Dutch 
POWs in Thailand to that of Australians. Header’s analysis of MOs’ behaviour in 
Thailand reflects the selfless characteristics assumed by some Australian informal 
groups. These findings are echoed in the examination of the behaviour of Dunlop, 
Hunt and Fagan to their formal groups in this thesis. In contrast to these studies, 
Beaumont’s study of the relationship between rank privilege and survivorship in 
Thailand and Ambon argues that in and of itself, Australian nationality did not 
necessarily equate with a selfless style of leadership for the sake of collective survival. 
This was clearly the case with Cook and Oates.  
 
Mackenzie describes how Australian POWs in Stalag VIIIC at Hohenfels questioned 
the British MOC’s leadership decisions, insisting that blind loyalty to rank was not an 
Australian characteristic, instead the leader had to prove himself worthy of their 
trust.193 At the same camp, Monteath describes a prominent Australian identity 
emerging amongst the large contingent of Australian POWs. This identity was based 
on ‘a combination of mateship and dedicated self-reliance’194 which the Australians 
considered to be unique to their national character. On the forced marches in Germany, 
British POWs Edward Chapman, D. Hustler and Ronald Buckingham also observed 
Australian informal groups displaying ingenuity to look after their group members in 
this volatile setting. 
 
                                                          
193 Mackenzie, The Colditz Myth, p.131. 
194 Monteath, P.O.W., p.180. 
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It is clear from this overview and the findings in this thesis that the exact relationship 
between Australian national characteristics, leadership type, style and followership is, 
as noted earlier, complex. Further analysis of the link between perceived Australian 
national character, the different types of leadership and followership is, therefore, an 
area of POW studies worthy of further study.  
 
The second area for further research offered by this thesis is that of an opposing 
perspective; how the captor viewed POW leaders. In both the European and Pacific 
theatres of war, POW positional leaders had to maintain a relationship with the captor 
for them to retain the leadership legitimacy of their formal group. The different ways 
POW leaders sought to initiate and then maintain their leadership position with their 
captor has been an integral part of this study and it is clear that men like Newton, Day 
and Deans, over time and through trial and error, established a relationship with their 
captor that helped define their leadership style and achieve leadership legitimacy and 
followership amongst their respective formal groups. And although the primary focus 
of this study has been the captives’ side of the story rather than the captors’, it has 
offered glimpses into how the captors saw their prisoners. We know, for example, that 
Commandant Rumpel at Dulag Luft saw his prisoners as fellow officers and ran a 
benign camp, partly in the hope that a relaxed atmosphere would lead to slips on the 
part of the prisoners that would provide intelligence. The commandants at Stalag 
VIIIB, however, ran a far harsher regime in an attempt to control one of the largest 
other rank POW camps in occupied Germany. The Japanese view of their prisoners is 
far easier to characterise – it was universally harsh, Sandakan being an extreme, but 
telling, example. Yet, even within a culture that saw POWs as men without honour, 
respect by a captor for a captive could emerge as was clearly evident in ‘Tiger’ 
Hiramatusu’s relationship with Newton and, to a lesser extent, Kinder’s relationship 
with Shinichi.  
 
Other historians have also offered some insights into the captor’s views on their 
prisoners, notably Nelson, Mackenzie, Cunningham, Hearder, Gilbert and Beaumont. 
Yet, this is an aspect of the POW history across both theatres in the Second World War 
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